Drones and the Jeune École

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By Luke Boyce and Dr Mark Bailey*

Enthusiasm about drones is not new; nor is this the first time technological innovation and geopolitical revisionism have challenged the role of seapower and of navies. Earlier occasions proved that the theories and strategies of Mahan and Corbett remained valid. The French Jeune École emerged during the 1880s, championed during the ministry of Admiral Théophile Aube. The Jeune École envisaged a new form of naval warfare based on technology which allowed small, cheap, torpedo-armed ships to destroy much larger and more expensive blockading battleships.

The French understood that the British blockades during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars had contributed to the defeat of France. Subsequently the French sought new technology to defeat close blockade. With <em>Gloire</em> they explored ironclads – the British outbuilt them.

The Jeune École integrated traditional coastal defences with torpedo-boat squadrons along the French coast. Huge numbers of littoral combatants were built: 57 destroyers, 19 torpedo gunboats, 54 seagoing torpedo boats and 369 torpedo boats completed by 1905. The Marine Nationale also built the world’s first effective operational submarine force, starting with the <em>Gymnote</em>, an electrically powered submarine armed with torpedoes launched in 1888, and by 1905 it had developed a fleet of 40 submarines.

By the early 1890s the French realised that, whatever the defensive littoral capabilities of the Jeune École, they had no ability to counter-blockade the British, so they constructed advanced, powerful commerce raiders. <em>Guerre de corse</em> was the offensive side of the Jeune École, and its instruments were capital ships, with the French building 25 big, fast, powerful armoured cruisers. They had characteristics opposite to the other Jeune École assets.

The parallels with current excitement regarding small, cheap littoral assets are clear, since the principles of the Jeune École worked within the restricted boundaries of short range, low endurance operations undertaken during good weather. The Jeune École ended the strategy of close blockade, which the British replaced with distant blockade. Yet extending the strategies of the Jeune École beyond coastal waters demanded that France develop very expensive long-ranged fast cruisers for commerce-raiding to have any strategic effect outside the littorals. In the end, it was just a better way of coast defence and the Corbettian seapower aspect of it failed. The Jeune École was no replacement for classical Corbettian seapower. Torpedo boats and submarines did not ‘end the reign of the battleship’. Instead, the Jeune École added a new type of capital ship, the armoured cruiser.

Similarly, uncrewed surface and undersea vessels (USVs and UUVs as distinct from autonomous systems – AUV/AAV/ASV) add variables and complexities and demonstrably work in narrow seas. The Black Sea being the current example and technological forcing-ground. This also needs to be assessed with the differences between uncrewed and autonomous systems in mind, as the Ukrainian USVs, such as the Magura V5 and Sea Baby, are remotely piloted via satellite links: operational effectiveness depends on this link. A large autonomous undersea vehicle (AUV), such as Anduril’s Ghost Shark, cannot be controlled similarly while submerged. Such vehicles rely on onboard autonomy for navigation and, potentially, targeting between external mission updates. Limited underwater communications constrain how operators monitor a mission or change its objectives. At this stage of development these technologies provide a relatively narrow littoral and short-sea capability. Aerial drones (UAVs) are a strategic return to the 1940s National Socialist Germany’s V-1 with better guidance, and a tactical return to the kamikaze. There is nothing new in the air side of the drone equation, and there are few drones (as distinct from missiles) that a destroyer off Okinawa in 1945 could not have handled individually. Their losses resulted from simultaneous kamikaze attacks overwhelming their targeting and engagement capabilities. The same challenge is posed today by a modern destroyer facing a drone-swarm; its capability limits remain the number of targets it can engage simultaneously and magazine depth; worsened by the cost of interceptors vastly exceeding that of drones.

USV and UUV remain short-ranged. The longest-ranged USV attack possible in the Black Sea is the 850km stretch from Odessa to Sochi, a pond by Indo-Pacific standards. The shortest equivalent attack from Darwin to Sanya on Hainan Island is 4500km. Merely deploying a Ghost Shark AUV from Darwin to Sanya cannot take less than about 50 days, assuming it has the range to travel that far, and the command-and-control (C2) problems posed by that ~50 days of autonomous transit are extraordinarily difficult and may be insoluble. The obvious solution is to forward-base into the Calamian islands (northern Visayas/ Mindoro) and use depot ships as forward operating bases – which places the assets well within the Chinese weapons engagement zone and their AAV. And that’s still about 1400km or 16 days sailing for an AUV like the Ghost Shark.

Success in littoral warfare does not establish that USVs and UUVs can deliver comparable effects at oceanic distances while retaining the same advantages in cost and numbers. The endurance, seakeeping, and communications needed to operate at oceanic range can drive up a drone’s size and unit price until it becomes at best an attritable asset rather an expendable one, which removes the low cost and large numbers that were its principal advantages. Welcome back to the lessons of the Jeune École: we have just re-invented the armoured cruiser problem and added unusual C2 requirements and difficult to maintain command-and-control links.

*Luke Boyce leads the strategic initiatives program at NYC Emergency Management, focusing on emerging threats, crisis operations, and urban resilience. His interests include maritime security, irregular warfare, and civil preparedness. He holds an MSE from Johns Hopkins University and is pursuing an MA in Global Security at King’s College London.

Dr Bailey joined the RAN in 1979 and after 2002 was active reservist: 2016-2024 he was full-time strategic planner at RAN HQ Canberra. In 2025 he was the Navy Fellow at ADFA. His academic expertise is the protection of maritime trade and is the coordinator of the International Corbett Network.

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