On 4 November Vice Admiral (retired) Tim Barrett launched A Maritime Strategy for Australia at the Maritime Strategy Masterclass held during the Indo-Pacific International Maritime Exposition in Sydney. The monograph was written by the Naval Studies Group (NSG) from the University of New South Wales (Canberra) and edited by past ANI President Peter Jones and current ANI councillor Jen Parker.
The other contributing authors were Dr Mark Bailey, Dr Richard Dunley, Dr Jack McCaffrie, John Mortimer, Dr John Reeve and Dr Neil Westphalen. The Masterclass was held with the assistance of the ANI and attracted nearly a hundred attendees.
In his foreword to the monograph, Professor Craig Stockings wrote, “The School of Humanities and Social Sciences at UNSW Canberra is proud to support this work. It reflects our ongoing commitment to rigorous, policy-relevant research that bridges the gap between academic scholarship and strategic practice. In a period of accelerating uncertainty, such collaboration between the university sector, the Australian Defence Force, and government is not only valuable—it is indispensable.”
In providing background to the monograph Peter Jones said at the event, “The NSG was conscious that in recent years very significant national security and defence investment decisions have been made by successive governments. But how would this capability operate in the 2030s? Furthermore, what measures are needed to ensure the robustness of Australia maritime capabilities and posture? Notably, Australia does not have an integrated national maritime strategy. This is arguably the next step. In the Age of the Enlightenment there was a term ‘useful knowledge’. The NSG and others, who I would call Friends of the Naval Studies Group, decided to pool their intellect and their ‘useful knowledge’ to offer a possible Australian maritime strategy. The proposed strategy is based on the fundamentals of existing government policy settings and capability decisions, but with some significant adjustments and inclusions to realise a more robust maritime capability.”
The monograph has three parts:
- Part 1 – The Ends: Strategic circumstance & goals,
- Part 2 – The Ways: The Strategy – Australian Maritime Strategy 2035 (AMS 2035), and
- Part 3 – The Means: Proposals to realise AMS 2035.
The document also includes three ‘Primers’, that provide further intellectual underpinning of AMS 2035. They are:
- NSG Primer No.1 – Maritime Warfare Technological Developments,
- NSG Primer No.2 – Maritime Strategy, and
- NSG Primer No.3 – Australia’s Maritime Defence Security Tasks.
Part 1
Part 1 of the monograph lays the foundation for the strategy. It essentially sets out Australia’s maritime credentials, namely:
- its reliance on merchant shipping and undersea communications cables
- the vast size of our EEZ, and the
- maritime dimension of the Australia’s defence problem.
Importantly, Part 1 also highlights shifts in Australia’s defence policy and force posture. It surveys geopolitical environment, the Indo-Pacific military balance and the economic outlook. In all this the authors were challenged by the discontinuity posed by the Trump administration in some areas and continuity in other (eg AUKUS). At the same time the authors were cognisant of the longer time horizon of AMS 2035. For the economic outlook they surveyed many official and other reputable agencies. In terms of the military balance they decided to separately write NSG Primer 1 which goes into much more technical details, so as not to diffuse our central arguments in the text. Part 1 concludes that Australia faces a volatile and dangerous maritime environment that demands a coherent, durable maritime strategy able to integrate government, defence, and industry to safeguard its lifelines and help shape regional stability.
Part 2
Part 2 sets out AMS 2035 which is designed to align Australia’s strategic goals, defence policy, and force structure to the challenges of an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific. The strategy is built around three enduring objectives: Deterrence, Sea Control, and Presence. Deterrence will be underpinned by the development of a nuclear-powered submarine capability, supported by balanced surface combatant task groups, mine warfare and uncrewed systems, and enhanced replenishment and strategic lift. AMS 2035 warns that for the RAN, any move away from a ‘balanced’ fleet structure could inhibit its ability to deliver upon the maritime and naval tasks that underpin the defence of Australia’s interests. AMS 2035 argues that balanced fleet is essential because of both the RAN’s size and its multifunctional nature – spanning military, diplomatic and, at times, constabulary tasks.
Sea control is identified as essential not only to secure freedom of manoeuvre for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) but also to protect Australia’s lifeline maritime trade and critical undersea infrastructure, including cables and pipelines. Presence underscores the need for regular and sustained deployments to Southeast Asia and the Pacific to reassure partners, shape the regional environment, and demonstrate commitment to the rules-based order.
AMS 2035 is whole of nation in scope, integrating Defence, diplomacy, industry, and civil maritime agencies. It emphasises layered defence, alliance cooperation, and targeted interoperability to offset capability gaps. Recognising that Australia is a medium power with limited resources, the strategy stresses prioritisation of capabilities that deliver both independent national options and credible contributions to coalitions. It also underlines the need for close coordination with regional partners, especially in protecting maritime trade routes vital not only to Australia but also to allies such as Japan and South Korea. By aligning ends, ways, and means, AMS 2035 provides an enduring framework for protecting Australia’s sovereignty, ensuring economic resilience, and projecting power to enhance stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Part 3
- Part 3 focuses on the means required to realise the AMS 2035, setting out proposals to ensure Defence, government, and industry can deliver the capabilities and resilience needed for deterrence, sea control, and presence. It identifies funding as the fundamental constraint, noting that current projections of 2.4% GDP for defence will be insufficient to sustain both the Integrated Investment Plan (IIP) and AUKUS Pillar I. A priority recommendation is an independent, comprehensive costing of the nuclear submarine program to provide a realistic financial baseline. Beyond resourcing, the section highlights the urgent need for platform standardisation, industrial capacity building, and supply chain resilience to mitigate the inefficiencies of the RAN’s heterogeneous fleet. Mine countermeasures, long neglected, are identified as a critical gap that must be regenerated to guarantee maritime access to ports and littoral waters.
- Personnel and structural shortfalls are recognised as the most persistent challenge, particularly with the growth of the submarine force from 800 to 3,000 personnel under AUKUS. Proposals include creating high/medium/low readiness task groups, establishing an Australian Sealift Command to free naval personnel for warfighting roles, and exploring the creation of an Australian Coast Guard to rationalise constabulary functions. The strategy also calls for investment in uncrewed systems, a scoping study on undersea cable protection, and adoption of the 2022 Protecting Australian Maritime Trade Finally, Part 3 stresses the importance of whole of government administration, akin to the wartime Advisory War Council of 1940-45, to ensure coordination across Defence, industry, and civil agencies. Together, these reforms will provide the practical foundation to translate AMS 2035 from a strategic vision into an operational reality.
A Maritime Strategy for Australia and the three NSG Primers can be downloaded at:
