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Dear Editor,

Tax Deductions and Donors for AE1 Search
The Australian Taxation Act was amended in July 2013 to give AE1 Incorporated a Deductible Gift Recipient (DGR) status. It was announced by the Minister for Defence on 14th September 2011, shortly before the commemoration ceremony and unveiling of a plaque to AE1 at the Garden island Heritage Centre, Sydney, that AE1 Inc. would have DGR status for three years from that date but it has taken until now for the Act to be amended to this effect. As the grant was only for three years unless AE1 Inc. applies next year for an extension of this time then this status will expire on 14th September 2014, which is the Centenary of the anniversary of the loss of AE1 with all hands off Rabaul in PNG.

The DGR status means that the AE1 Inc. Honorary Treasurer, Commodore Michael Dunne AM RAN Ret’d, can give a valid receipt to any donor that a gift for the search of AE1 is a tax deduction. The tax deduction only applies to gifts for the search, or near related activities, for the submarine and not, unfortunately, for the commemoration plaques that have been are being erected in Australia and the UK.

AE1 Inc. is grateful to Ms Glenys Hodges and her firm, Allens Linklaters Lawyers, for pursuing this DGR matter with the Government over the years on a pro bono basis. The Reports into the likely circumstances of the loss and the likely costs of a search, which are on the AE1 Inc. web site at www.ae1.org.au, show that between A$6m and A$8m is needed to charter a suitable ship, equipment and crew to conduct the search for AE1 in the deep water and strong tides off Rabaul.

With Sydney, Centaur and the nation’s other naval wrecks having been found it is appropriate for the nation now to find its first loss and properly honour those lost in her. Donors are sought for the search and they are requested to be in touch with Honorary Treasurer Michael Dunne by email to mbdunne@ bigpond.com.

Michael White President, AE1 Incorporated Brisbane

Dear Editor,

Ursula Hewat has been kind enough to send me free of charge, the September magazine containing the K IX article. As a matter of historic accuracy you should be aware that for as long as the Dutch K IX was in RAN hands she was officially titled “HMAS K9” as shown in the attached appointment.


Regards,

Bryan Cleary

(Ed: Bryan was thoughtful enough to send us his appointment to the submarine as a midshipman.)
Sydney Harbour awash with action. A large flight of RAN helicopters conducting a flypast of the Re-enactment Fleet proceeds past the reviewing ship HMAS Leeuwin, while a Seahawk proudly displays the Australian White Ensign to the spectators of the Ceremonial Fleet Review. By ABIS Cassie McBride, Navy Imagery Unit – East

An escort of NSW Water Police vessels and a flotilla of pleasure craft accompany HMAS Sydney as she leads the ‘Magnificent Seven’ during a recreation of the initial entry of the RAN Fleet into Sydney Harbour. By Leading Seaman Peter Thompson, HMAS Sydney
RAAF Hawk-127 aircraft from 76 Squadron and F/A-18 Hornets from 77 Squadron fly in formation toward Sydney Harbour to conduct a flypast for the International Fleet Review.
By CPL David Gibbs, 28SQN AFID-EDN

RAAF Hawk-127 aircraft from 76 Squadron and F/A-18 Hornets from 77 Squadron conduct a flypast over Sydney Harbour in formation for the International Fleet Review.
By CPL David Gibbs, 28SQN AFID-EDN
The tall ship fleet departs Sydney at the completion of the International Fleet Review 2013. By LSIS Bradley Darvill, Navy Imagery Unit - East

Long queues are formed to look over HMAS Darwin as some expected 22,000 members of the general public visit Sydney’s Garden Island, to view the Australian and International warships on display for the Navy Open Day as part of the International Fleet Review 2013. By LSIS Brenton Freind, Navy Imagery Unit - East
Warships from Africa, China, Europe, New Zealand, South East Asia and Australia docked alongside Garden Island and Fleet Base East for the Warship Open Day as part the International Fleet Review. By ABIS Nicolas Gonzalez
His Royal Highness Prince Harry of Wales walks with Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, AO, CSC, RAN down the wharf at Fleet Base East after inspecting the International Fleet Review in Sydney Harbour, onboard HMAS Leeuwin. By LSIS Jo Dilorenzo

A HMAS Sydney hat, with a wreath at the memorial service at Bradleys Head to commemorate HMAS Sydney (I) and SMS Emden. By LSIS Jo Dilorenzo, Navy Imagery Unit - East
By LSIS James Whittle, Navy Imagery Unit - East

Crowds pack vantage hot spot Bradleys Head to view the Ceremonial Fleet Review 2013. By ABIS Chantell Bianchi, Navy Imagery Unit – East
A formation of RAAF F/A-18 Hornet and Hawk aircraft fly overhead as HMAS Sydney leads the 'Magnificent Seven' Australian Warships through Sydney Harbour for the International Fleet Review, before the reviewing officer, the Governor-General of Australia, Her Excellency the Honourable Quentin Bryce, AC, CVO and her guest of honour, His Royal Higness Prince Harry of Wales. By Leading Seaman Peter Thompson, HMAS Sydney
The Sydney Harbour Bridge is transformed during the International Fleet Review Fireworks Spectacular where thousands of people watched stories unfold with pyrotechnics and lightshows. By ABIS Sarah Ebsworth, Navy Imagery Unit - East

Sydney Harbour comes alive during the Royal Australian Navy Pyrotechnics Display and Lightshow Spectacular in Sydney Harbour. By WOIS Shane Cameron, Navy Imagery Unit - East
Fireworks explode overhead as the Sydney Opera House is illuminated by the lightshow display during the International Fleet Review Spectacular.

By ABIS Jesse Rhynard, Navy Imagery Unit - East

HMAS Yarra plays her part in the Pyrotechnics Display and Lightshow Spectacular as part of the Royal Australian Navy’s International Fleet Review (IFR) 2013 in Sydney Harbour. By ABIS Kayla Hayes, Navy Imagery Unit - East
Thousands of spectators lined the harbour foreshore as the Sydney Harbour Bridge lights up with the Royal Australian Navy emblem during the International Fleet Review Firework Spectacular. By ABIS Sarah Ebsworth, Navy Imagery Unit - East

The Royal Australian Navy Crest is projected onto the Sydney Opera House during the International Fleet Review 2013 Pyrotechnics Display and Lightshow Spectacular. By POIS Paul Berry, Navy Imagery Unit - East
GALLIPOLI 2015 BALLOT OPENING SOON

Australians planning to attend Anzac Day commemorations at Gallipoli in 2015 can apply for the ballot from 1 November. But there’s no need to rush – the ballot is open for 3 months, closing on 31 January 2014.

The Anzac Commemorative Site at Gallipoli can safely, securely and comfortably accommodate 10,500 people. In 2015, this will comprise places for 8,000 Australians, 2,000 New Zealanders and up to 500 official representatives of the countries that served in the Gallipoli campaign.

Some of the places available to Australians will be reserved for special representatives including: direct descendants of Gallipoli veterans, widows of Australian First World War veterans, veterans of other conflicts, Australian secondary school students and their chaperones.

Widows of First World War veterans do not need to apply for the ballot and will be contacted separately by DVA regarding their interest in attending. Places for secondary school students and their chaperones will be allocated outside the ballot by State and Territory Governments. The remaining places (3,000 double passes) will be open for all Australians to apply.

Advice will be provided to individuals on the ballot outcome in March 2014, to ensure those successful have enough time to organise and pay for their trip.

Those who have already booked a tour to Gallipoli in 2015, which includes attending official Anzac Day commemorative services, should speak to their travel agent or tour operator regarding arrangements if they are not successful in the ballot. Tour operators are not in a position where they can guarantee a place at the commemorations.

For information on ballot eligibility or to apply from 1 November 2013, visit the Gallipoli 2015 website www.gallipoli2015.dva.gov.au
The British expedition to Somaliland in 1904: A case study of the use of logistics

BY MIKE FOGARTY

The British expedition to Somaliland in 1904 is a case study in military and naval logistics. This fourth campaign to attack and destroy an enemy redoubt at Illig, in Somaliland, was conducted from 20 to 26 April. Its purpose was to suppress, if not subdue, the threat of the Dervish forces led by the so-called “Mad Mullah”, Muhammad Abdulle Hassan (sic). One author, Jardine, wrote that the Mullah had been soundly beaten in battle and had lost the greater part of his following and stock.1 In contrast, the British logistical effort and its forces prevailed over its enemies. Few were killed.

Aden was a nearby hub. India also serviced logistics. Another author asserts the obvious in a general principle on warfare, which is no less applicable to Somaliland. New demands could only be met by continuous replenishment from base.2 The Royal Navy and the Royal Hampshire Regiment effected an amphibious assault to re-assert Britain’s national interests.

The duties of the Navy were constant and unrelaxing, and involved those functions which always fall to the Service afloat, such as “patrolling the coast”, “embarking and disembarking troops and stores”, and which, though at times unseen, and unadvertised, are yet no less important than the military operations proceeding concurrently.1

The Somaliland hinterland was mostly an unknown region. The topography, climate, hydrographical and sea state factors affected the application of logistics. Intelligence from friendly natives allowed planners to proceed with an appreciation of local resources.

Water
GC Shaw in Supply in Modern War observed that a desert has always proved to be the most formidable frontier against invasion, owing to its lack of water. Forces of heavy manpower and particularly of heavy animal power (camels and horses) consume an immense amount of water and its carriage in bulk presents many difficulties.2 Grain may be suitable for Indian camels but Somali camels graze. Water (and food) are the prime logistical needs to nurture an army. Somalia had little available fresh stocks of the former, outside of the rainy season. It required local knowledge to find streams and potable water sources. Some water had to be shipped in and rationed accordingly. The commanders recognised the need for an assured supply. As the normal supply of water was likely to prove inadequate for the large increase of troops and transport, water supply plants were shipped from England and installed with satisfactory results at the various posts on the line of communication.3 The need for water was no less so on embarkation after the campaign. The Admiralty noted that the task of feeding and watering the garrison had become arduous and even dangerous.4

Food
The expeditionary force had to victual itself with adequate provisions of food. It required a determined endeavour to garner food stocks, land them, and sustain their continuing replenishment. Religious and cultural sensitivities also impacted on food shipments. The meat supply was principally

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1 Douglas Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, Herbert Jenkins, London, 1923, p. 153. The British force neutralised many of his followers. Coupled with that, the enemy lost a considerable part of its logistical back-up, which nullified its ability to successfully prosecute its campaign. The country lacked all civilised transport. Jardine also notes the dietary conditions which complicated supply. Religious and cultural factors meant that food sources were variegated. Water was short in the desert.

2 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 233. The author provides some intellectual ballast, using examples to correlate logistics with strategy. For that he applies a sound theoretical base to any case study. In his introduction (page 1) he defines logistics as the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied. He puts logistics in their correct perspective. At once, their supply is twinned with strategy.
The British expedition to Somaliland in 1904: A case study of the use of logistics

furnished by sheep for British troops and goats for Indians. 3 Volume II of the official history provides a voluminous inventory of stocks. It demonstrated the need for their integration and disbursement. For example, in a joint operation, it required a high level of liaison and co-ordination to furnish the soldiers in the field.

Supply and Transport

In recognition of the need to coordinate the supply functions it was found necessary to appoint a senior officer who could take responsibility for that role. The overall commander, General Egerton, decided to put supply and transport under one head. Supply was to greatly depend on transport. Lieutenant-Colonel WR Yeilding contended that the supply situation would appear to be impossible in Somaliland, unless administered by one officer with the interests of supply and transport equally at heart. 4 Conversely, the local camels were more amenable to the terrain and conditions. Beadon argues in The Royal Army Service Corps that the Somali baggage camel is a small and wiry animal, capable of prolonged exertion on scanty food and water. 5 Post offices, medical services and sanitation units also augmented logistics.

Logistical Arrangements on Landing

The beachhead is a key determinant in landing men and equipment at an opposed site. Why Illig? There were few options available, as Gordon indicated. Illig was little more than a bay partially protected by nearby headlands of which Ras Illig to the south was much the larger, where the beach extended back to a semi-amphitheatre and fishing boats could be hauled up behind the surf. 2 Hauling ships’ boats with men and equipment was fraught with danger. But with ingenuity, the sailors, soldiers and marines took their equipment ashore. Illig proved to be perilous for its small rocky beach strip. Several small boats were either swamped by waves or dashed on rocky outcrops. Some camels drowned or died of exhaustion on beaching.

Another writer provided a concise operational order. The commentator Hamilton gave the results faint praise as the intended capture of the significance of Illig. The British gained valuable experience in amphibious operations at Illig. An army needs to draw from its combat experiences. Logistical support has to be fine-tuned. Illig educated British war-fighting doctrine.

3 General Staff War Office, Official History of the Operations in Somaliland, Volume II, p. 525. Local food acquisition, like water, was parlous and of poor quality which could only supplement those rations shipped in. That said, there were some grazing areas which were dependent on good seasons.
4 C.T. Atkinson, Regimental History, The Royal Hampshire Regiment, Volume I to 1914, Robert Maclehose, The University Press, Glasgow, 1950, pp 413-415. These troops formed a punitive expedition to suppress the “Mad Mullah”, Mullah Mohammed (sic) Abdullah. Ponies were also used for raiding attacks by the local Dervishes. Too few were available for the British forces. Horses were also used in the campaign. Some animal transport could sometimes be hired from local sources. This was often resisted by sheiks and tribes. Stock represented a capital investment they were loath to shed.

5 Andrew Gordon, “Time after time in the Horn of Africa”, Journal of Military History, The Society for Military History, Lexington, Virginia, Volume 74, No. 1, January, 2010, p. 112. This is an authoritative source drawing much from the standard histories. The landing is vividly described. The difficulty of landing animal transport in the breaking surf can only be imagined. Logistical support also demands of commanders and their staff a capacity for innovation and endurance in difficult conditions. The troops carried a few Maxim machine guns. They also carried heavy boxes of its ammunition. Gordon also summarizes the evacuation and departure phase. The surf had worsened and a small ship’s boat was also destroyed on the rocks. The author highlighted the
Mullah was not achieved. He did, though, agree that Somaliland was an unmapped and waterless wilderness. The need for water was paramount. The order stipulated that all boats will carry a plentiful supply of water, as in all probability the force, after the work is done, will be exhausted.\(^7\)

To summarize, the British were reasonably well prepared to campaign against the Dervishes. Callwell has enunciated a general principle. If no supplies can be obtained from the theatre of war, as is often the case in these operations, everything in the way of food for man or beast has to be carried.\(^8\) Callwell also re-stated an imperative for desert warfare. Camel corps are in fact of use only under given conditions.\(^6\) The British often relied on camels to move logistics. They could not have succeeded without them as they needed more and not less. Hiring was tentative.

To conclude, the logistics of supply and transport are decisively enmeshed in all military operations. They are symbiotic dynamics and that was well demonstrated in the Horn of Africa in 1904. The naval logistical contribution at Illig, and elsewhere, resourced the qualified success of the campaign, despite the escape of the Mullah. Lessons learned informed future doctrine. Somaliland is a compelling case of the need for thorough logistical planning in warfare.\(^5\)

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Mike Fogarty is a retired diplomat who has served in Singapore and Hanoi during his DFAT career (1973-2001). A former SLSU officer, he served from 1966-1972. He has a BA (Social Sciences) from the Canberra CAE. He is now a part-time postgraduate student at UNSW undertaking an M.Phil at ADFA.

\(^6\) Callwell, p. 428.

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Admiralty, Intelligence Department, Papers on Naval Subjects, Capture of Illig, Somaliland, 1904, No. 747, published London, February, 1905.


G. C. Shaw, Supply in Modern War, Faber and Faber, London, 1939.


(Endnotes)


4 Admiralty, Intelligence Department, Papers on Naval Subjects, Capture of Illig, Somaliland, 1904, No. 747, published London, February, 1905, p. 10. This report has useful facts on Somaliland.

5 General Staff, War Office, Volume II, as above, p. 489.


The Key Driver’s Behind China’s Naval Modernisation and their Consequences for Regional Security

BY LIEUTENANT JENNIFER PARKER

‘China has been modernising its military forces, with the rapid and continuous increase it its total defence spending. However, with clarity on neither the present condition nor the near future of its military power, there is concern how the military power of China will influence the regional state of affairs and the security of Japan.’

Since the late 1990s China has undertaken a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which has focused on the production of technologically advanced platforms and weaponry. Supported by a defence budget that has more than doubled in size over the past five years, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is undergoing an unprecedented era of naval modernisation.

First, I will focus on the three key aspects that are driving China’s naval modernisation. China’s rapid naval modernisation is creating a degree of tension within Asian region, a tension which is clearly evident in the unprecedented acquisition of naval platforms, particularly submarines and anti-ship cruise missiles by China’s neighbours. The tension within the Asian region has manifested itself in a number of escalating minor naval skirmishes between China and its neighbours. The second section of this article will discuss the developing tension within the Asian region and its effects on long term regional security.

There are three key drivers behind China’s naval modernisation program: firstly, the desire to provide protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). Secondly, a growing trend of naval nationalism and thirdly, increasing financial and technological capacity to build platforms.

Protection of Sea Lines of Communication

China’s desire to possess a navy capable of protecting its major SLOCs is evident in its changing maritime strategy. Historically focused on access denial, China’s naval acquisitions centred on a submarine force with a number of old surface units, many of which lacked basic capabilities such as combat systems. Although China’s force remains predominantly focused on submarines, with over 50 operational submarines to date, the structure of its surface flotilla is slowly changing. A key headmark in this change has been the acquisition and restoration of the ex-Soviet aircraft carrier now known as the Liaoning. Commissioned in 2012 and widely thought to be a training vessel, this acquisition none the less indicates China’s desire to possess a power projection capability.

The acquisition of the Liaoning is coupled with rumours that China is in the early stages of building two indigenous aircraft carriers. China has also sought to increase the technological edge of its surface fleet through the development of the Luyang II class indigenous destroyers rumoured to have a radar similar in performance to the American Aegis phased array radar systems, and the purchase of four Russian Sovremenny destroyers.

1 Japan Ministry of Defence, Defence of Japan, Japan, Tokyo, 2009 (White Paper) 4.
indicate an evolution in maritime strategy from access denial towards a limited power projection capability capable of protecting China’s SLOCs.²

However, China’s power projection capability is currently considered limited due to the small number of aircraft carriers being built and the paucity of replenishment vessels within its fleet.

The development of a limited power projection capability to provide protection of SLOCs is driven by three key factors; trade, energy security and strategic vulnerability. As China emerged from the stark economic times of the ‘great leap forward’, trade became a crucial component of the Chinese economy. Given China’s location in Asia, 95% of China’s traded goods flow across the oceans.⁴ In a deliberate policy to facilitate this trade, China has built one of the largest merchant fleets in the world.⁵ 15% of the world’s oil-tanker fleet are currently owned by China, a figure which is expected to rise to 40% in the near future.⁶

Any major interruption to China’s maritime trade would have a major impact on the countries economy and subsequently China’s security. China is designing a force capable of protecting both its major trade routes, and its mercantile fleet. China’s geographic vulnerability is a clear concern for her modern political elite, a factor driving China’s naval modernisation. Hu Jintao’s coining of the ‘Malacca dilemma’ in 2007,¹² highlights that China’s geographic vulnerability is a key concern when it comes to trade. The Malacca Strait is a key trade route for China and 80% of China’s imported oil passes through the Strait.¹³ Any disruption to mercantile traffic

appetite for energy. China is no longer self sufficient in terms of energy production and this has been the case since 1993.⁷ The country has become the third largest importer of Crude Oil with approximately a third of this oil being shipped through key SLOCs such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca.¹⁰

China’s concerns over energy security in part explain its aggressive approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Securing sovereignty of disputed islands such as the Spratly or Diaoyu/Senkaku islands ensures access to the sea bed and the potential energy sources held within. As Buszynski highlights, China ‘has been diversifying energy supplies to reduce its dependence upon imported oil’.¹¹ China’s attempt to diversify energy supplies shows an acknowledgement of its current dependence on oil supplies, and its change in maritime strategy signalled by naval modernisation demonstrates a desire to protect these oil supplies.

Furthermore, China’s naval modernisation program ensures it has the naval assets to support its claims in the South China Sea. In developing a limited power projection force, China is ensuring its ability to enhance energy security.

The third facet of China’s desire to provide naval protection to key SLOCs is China’s geographical vulnerability. China is geographically isolated from the Indian and Pacific oceans by the first and second island chains. In order to gain access to either of these oceans Chinese vessels must transit through a number of chokepoints between the island chains. Adding to China’s geographical isolation, the majority of islands within both island chains are allied with the US.

Subsequently, in the advent of a conflict between the US and China, China could quite easily be contained to the South and East China seas. In order to avoid this form of strategic encirclement China must develop a power projection capability; crucially aircraft carriers and mine clearance assets will be essential in keeping the SLOCs to the Indian and Pacific oceans open. China’s naval modernisation program includes a number of key assets including those listed above which are vital to ensuring they can transit to the Indian and Pacific oceans in the event of hostilities.

China’s geographic vulnerability extends beyond a hostilities context and is a clear concern for her modern day political elite, a factor driving China’s naval modernisation. Hu Jintao’s coining of the ‘Malacca dilemma’ in 2007,¹² highlights that China’s geographic vulnerability is a key concern when it comes to trade.

through the Malacca Strait would have a dramatic effect on both China’s economy and energy security.

In recognition of this, China has investigated other methods of transporting goods to China clear of this strategic chokepoint, including enhancing Chinese presence at its base in Gwadar, Pakistan or building a canal to transport oil through Thailand.14 Neither of these have come to fruition in part due to the cost, but also due to the political uncertainty of the two nations concerned. The only immediate solution to the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ is increasing China’s ability to protect the Malacca Strait, against both a terrorist action or a conventional adversary’s attempt to block it. In order to do this China recognises it requires a limited power projection naval force and China’s focus on protection of SLOCs is partially driven by this geographic vulnerability.

**Naval nationalism**

The second factor in driving naval modernisation in China is a growing sense of naval nationalism. It is well known that China is experiencing a resurgence of nationalism on all fronts; a by-product of this is an increase in naval nationalism. Naval nationalism is characterised by the desire to possess a navy comparable to other key players on the world stage. Academics such as Ross,15 have highlighted it as a pivotal factor in China’s maritime thinking. Although Ross somewhat oversells the point, grouping a number of complex issues under the idea of naval nationalism,16 it nevertheless is an important driving force. The growth of naval nationalism in China is evident in the increased presence of the PLAN within the media.

China’s contribution to counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have been a focal point in national media reports.17 China’s maritime strategy has gained increasing prominence in debates within journals and think tanks. Many of these debates have been centred on the purchase of an aircraft carrier for China; some extreme examples of naval nationalism have involved the mayor of a major city offering to provide financial backing to build an aircraft carrier for China.18

The growth of naval nationalism within China can be attributed to a number of factors; however, one of the prominent arguments is that possessing a blue water navy has become a matter of prestige.19 Ross,20 a keen proponent of this argument, is correct in his assertion that maritime capability has historically been used as a measure of prestige, however, to assume this is the case in the instance of China is to underestimate China’s strategic thinking.

Having endured what many in China refer to as a decade of humiliation, China is keen to assert itself on the world stage. This is evident in China’s increased involvement in UN deployments; China is now a major contributor to UN Peace Keeping Missions.21 A prominent facet in China’s naval nationalism is the increasing frustration with the lack of resolution of the Taiwan issue. A powerful navy is seen as a way to ensure a resolution. The importance of a power projection navy to resolve the Taiwan issue became apparent during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 when the US Navy deployed two carrier battle groups, centred around Nimitz and Independence, to the Strait.22 The deployment of the carrier battle groups highlighted the maritime capability gap between China and the US. China’s naval nationalism extends beyond the issue of Taiwan; it centres on a desire for regional influence.

In 2004 China was struck by their lack of naval capability when they observed both the US and Australia’s effective disaster relief in the devastation following the Tsunami in South East Asia.23 China is keen to assert itself in the region; this is clear in China’s interactions with neighbours, particularly Japan and the Philippines over territorial water disputes. China’s aggressive stance towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in particular is evident of her strategy. China’s drive to assert itself as a regional and global actor has resulted in naval nationalism, particularly because a blue water navy...
is seen as a way of achieving greater regional and global influence.

**Capacity**

The third facet in China’s naval modernisation is an increased capacity to fund, build and fight modern naval craft. The opening up of China post-Mao led to strong economic growth. Since the mid-nineties this growth has resulted in annual double digit increases in the defence budget.24 Due to the increasing security of China’s land borders, which are as secure as they have been for “200 years,”25 and a greater focus on the capability a maritime force can deliver, the PLAN’s budget has also increased. The increasing budget has been coupled with increased capacity for building complex maritime vessels.

The increased capacity for building naval vessels has come from two areas; firstly, China’s growing mercantile fleet has driven an increase in the number of ship yards within China creating greater capacity to build large numbers of vessels. Ship builders within China have also managed to hone their skills building merchant vessels and are now able to translate the lessons learnt in building naval vessels.26 The second increase in building capacity is due to the strengthening of science and technology within China. China is now becoming quite adept at engineering advanced technological systems from missiles, advanced anti-air radars to nuclear submarines. Technological advances within Chinese industry indicate that China may ‘well have caught up with the tail of the West’s current technology.’27 As Li correctly highlights, the long-held view of a generational gap in technology between China and the West may no longer be correct.28

The final transformation that has given China the capacity to drive naval modernisation has been a revolution in the training afforded to PLAN Officers and Sailors. The PLAN has made a conscious effort in recent years to increase the skill levels of its personnel through formalised training in understanding technological advances in core capabilities but also core maritime skills. The combination of increased funding, shipbuilding knowledge, science and technology and increased skill levels of personnel has been a significant driver in China’s naval modernisation.

There are a number of consequences of China’s growing sea power; two in particular have a direct impact on regional security. The first is what may be termed a naval arms race within Asia. The second is increasing political tension within the region, most often displayed in rhetoric over territorial water disputes between China and a number of its neighbours including Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan.

The trend of naval modernisation within Asia is not only confined to China, but appears to be a regional theme. A comparison of gross tonnage of Japan, China and South Korea conducted by the International Strategic Studies Institute demonstrates dramatic increases in regional fleet sizes between 2000 and 2012.29

Not only are fleet sizes increasing, but regional countries are seeking dramatic advances in capability. Vietnam has committed to the acquisition of six Kilo Class submarines, with the first expected to be delivered in 2013. Malaysia has accepted two French Scorpene class submarines into service whilst Japan has sought to increase their submarine fleet from 16 to 22.30 Underwater Warfare aside, South Korea is substantially ‘modernising and expanding its previously coastal focussed navy’.31 India has plans for a fleet containing three aircraft carriers and has commissioned its first nuclear submarine. It is clear something is happening in the Asian region that is creating an unparalleled era of naval modernisation.

There are a number of justifications for what may loosely be termed a naval arms race within Asia. The first rationale is that unprecedented economic growth has resulted in this developing region having the capacity to fund technological advancements in...
The Key Driver’s Behind China’s Naval Modernisation and their Consequences for Regional Security

order to replace obsolete platforms. To a certain extent this is true, and I have touched on previously how this aspect has affected China’s drive to naval modernisation. The second and most compelling rationale is that the naval build up is a direct reaction to China’s naval modernisation and increased aggression within the region.

Political tension within the region is increasing. There are a number of factors contributing to this, but undoubtedly China’s growing sea power is one. This political tension has manifested itself in a number of regional disputes since 2000. Of note is the increasing tension between China, Japan and Taiwan over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands. As eluded to above, the tense territorial water disputes can be partially attributed to regional concerns about energy security, but it can also be attributed to strategic positioning as neighbours become increasing concerned about China’s intentions. China’s military might has resulted in a number of South East Asian nations reassessing their strategies towards China. Hedging has become the predominant strategy used to deal with China in South East Asia, thereby increasing tension within the region.

The combination of a naval arms race and the increased political tension has led many observers to assess that a strategic or tactical miscalculation could lead to a regional conflict. China’s Defence Minister General Liang Guanglie alluded to this in 2010 when he stated, ‘looking at the current situation, full scale war is unlikely, but we cannot exclude the possibility that, in some local areas unexpected events may occur, or military friction may take place due to a misfire.’ In 2013 alone, tensions on the seas due to territorial disputes have resulted in a Chinese warship illuminating a Japanese Warship with a fire control radar, and Chinese submarines suspected of breaching Japanese territorial waters. Any one of these tactical miscalculations could result in a reaction that creates a regional conflict.

China’s growing sea power has resulted in a naval arms race and increased political tension within the region. The likely consequences of these two by-products are increasing regional instability and an increased potential for a strategic or tactical miscalculation to create a regional conflict.

China’s acquisition of naval platforms from submarines to aircraft carriers demonstrates an era on unparalleled naval modernisation as it refocuses its maritime strategy away from access denial to limited power projection. China’s naval modernisation is being driven by three key factors. The first and most prominent influence on naval modernisation is the drive to provide protection to SLOCs. The prominence of the protection of SLOCs as a key strategic task of the PLAN is reflected in the recent Chinese defence white paper and stems from three key concerns: trade, energy security and strategic vulnerability.

Disruption to trade flows, particularly in the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait would have a dramatic effect on China’s economic growth. China is also cognisant of the majority of its imported oil travels through the Malacca strait, which is clear by its attempts to find alternatives to this strategic chokepoint whilst at the same time developing a navy capable of protecting its mercantile fleet as it passes through the strait. Geographic vulnerability is inherent in China’s location in Asia, encircled by the first and second island chains, in the event of hostilities China would not enjoy free access to the Pacific or Indian oceans.

China’s uneasiness about its geographic vulnerability is reflective of increasing tensions within the region. China’s naval modernisation fuelled by a desire to protect SLOCs, growing naval nationalism and a new found capacity to fund, build and fight modern naval platforms has created a naval arms race in the Asian region and increased political tension within the region. With tensions running high in the region, a number of minor naval skirmishes have broken out over territorial water disputes with China. It is clear that one tactical miscalculation could have strategic consequences that lead to regional conflict.

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18 Ibid, 62.

19 Ibid.

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The Importance of Audience Perception in Communications from the Maritime Battlespace Environment of the Future

BY DR TOM LEWIS

At the beginning of the 21st century, the world media shows little sympathy for the challenges and awful ironies facing those who wield power; it upholds the safer virtue of sympathising only with the powerless.

WARRIOR POLITICS – ROBERT D. KAPLAN

I hate newspapermen. They come into camp and pick up their camp rumors and print them as facts. I regard them as spies, which, in truth, they are.

– GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN

Only when the schooner Pickle reached Britain, bearing news of success at Trafalgar, was the effect of the battle realised. Perhaps half of the impact had already been seen: much of the French and Spanish navies’ effective force lay smashed at the bottom of the sea. \(^1\) But the realisation of the new limits of Napoleon’s Empire was contained in the other fifty percent of the equation: communication of the success. Now the trade lines of the French were limited; now her power was hemmed in by sea rather than advanced by it; now her global reach would be fully contained by those waters dominated by the Royal Navy. The importance of the victory lay in the news of the triumph. So from 1808 Wellington’s armies were able to operate in Spain, and be supplied from Britain; a course of action only allowable by the fruits of Trafalgar.

So too was such a message understood – at least dimly – by the Israeli Navy in 2006 when one of their warships was hit by a missile launched by Lebanon’s forces. The immediate effect was bad enough, with the damage, to people and material, deadly and shocking. But the secondary and perhaps more important impact of the message was also significant: Lebanon’s forces, it proved, were able and willing to operate in a theatre previously unrealised by themselves, and their perceived calibre as an enemy was instantly ratcheted upwards by a significant degree. I will repeat “perceived calibre” again: perceptions matter, and can be the difference between your enemy continuing to fight, and laying down his arms: if he thinks you are the undoubted winner that might be all that matters.

The two incidents, two hundred and two years apart, are significant for both their message and the realisation that the delivery systems of the messages have changed over time. The message from Pickle was weeks in the carriage. The message about the Israeli Navy’s loss – and its vulnerability – was immediately transmitted around the world in a matter of hours. Significantly, it was realised by Israel’s enemy in the same timeframe, and within hours the effects of that message’s reception were being analysed, and pursued further for what could be gained. So too, will any future images and messages of war at sea be transmitted.

Does this matter? This paper argues that modern media, and communications from the battlespace, play an important part of warfare today, and this realisation will have important ramifications both from the perspectives of the tactical commander, organic intelligence, and strategic high command. If, and how, such realisations will be understood in future conflicts is an important part of military success.

One appreciable difference between the Iraqi war, to pick a single example, and Trafalgar, is that there are wildly different levels of media coverage: from none at all, to the enemy and the general public knowing everything. Does information being released mean much, apart from the obvious technical secrets which deny a weapon to the enemy? Yes, it does. In the case of the Pickle, it mattered quite a bit, especially if you wanted to get rich. If you gained the information of Trafalgar’s victory first, perhaps with an advance warning of a few hours – a hoist of flags saying such and such, or perhaps a ship’s company member able to transmit something to a waiting, faster, vessel – then you were off. Get that information to the right people holding the right stocks and bonds ashore, put about a rumour of a terrible loss, sell hard on an uncertain market, buy frantically - and you were made financially when the news of victory came in and the market soared. Not that anyone on the Pickle was any part of such a scheme, as far as I know.

So too does all sorts of information...
and its doings a direct extension of the body politic? A military force is a part of the society it serves and protects, and therefore the societal group which brought it into being has a right to know of the successes and failures of its forces. Should that though come from journalists or from the military itself?

It is difficult for journalists to get their work published in a war. They face a considerable range of difficulties: direct harm, eg getting murdered, which was the leading risk in Iraq from 2003, where “137 journalists and media staff have been killed [making it]… the deadliest conflict for media professionals since the Second World War”, according to UNESCO. Other difficulties include collateral risk – getting in the way of a random rocket; the fact that quite often the information the journalist is after is protected; a degree of communication difficulty – you’re on an aircraft carrier in the Atlantic and signals bandwidth is rare; and some degree of editorial interference back home. Some analysis though might lead us to brood over the difficulties of several wars – and perhaps the job is getting harder.

For a time-travelling journalist covering these wars, what were the chances of death and difficulty in the job?

Footnotes explain why the assessments have been given this numerical score

Nevertheless, the “truth is out there”, for many journalists, and in general, we would agree that in a free society there should be truthful representation of what goes on in the battlespace, even though with some journalists it seems to be a matter of inserting their opinion rather than simply reporting the facts.

But how far do we go? In World War II it was simply a matter of allowing the journalists to come along for the ride. They mostly provided their own rationing, sometimes their own transport, and just reported. But even then there was enough opinion inserted to become a concern. Consider these cartoons of Bill Maudlin, the famous American correspondent and cartoonist, whose works appeared in Stars and Stripes. The cartoons beautifully capture the phlegmatic nature of many a soldier;
The Importance of Audience Perception in Communications from the Maritime Battlespace Environment of the Future

and the inevitability of the situation they found themselves in, but also sometimes the despair of the situation. Personally, I think they’re all great value at accepting your risky job on the front lines, but imagine the effect of the last two especially on newly arrived infantry.

Moving to the more modern and the maritime, we might brood over the wisdom of bringing along journalists, as was done in the Falklands conflict. As the 2nd Parachute Regiment was preparing to make a land advance:

"...it was at this moment that men listening to the BBC's World Service news bulletin heard its London defence correspondent's statement that 2 Para was within five miles of its target. The battalion, and above all its colonel ["H". Jones] were first shocked and then enraged. They hastily began to disperse and prepare defences against the air or artillery attacks which seemed inevitable – it is not known whether the defences would include Robert Fox, the BBC correspondent accompanying the soldiers."

T-shirts proclaimed the intentions of the wearer. "Falk off, Galtieri" sent a message to the Argentine leader; but others simply proclaimed the lethality of the British. "Start Crying for Us, Argentina, we’re Coming to Bomb the Shit out of you" recalled the famous rock-opera song "Don’t Cry for Me Argentina" , and shirts proclaiming “X Troop, Plastic Killers” spoke of the effectiveness of the plastic bullet.

This was in 1982, and in the days before the Internet. When instant communication from the battlespace was the norm 25 years later, a British Army colonel resigned over a description of nicknames used in physical training. Admiral Sir Henry Leach, First Sea Lord, commented on the BBC leak in the Falklands: "None of us had any experience of modern war with modern media technology".

Indeed, but they very quickly had to learn to adapt to what they had then – and a quarter of a century later, the messages from the front are still evolving in speed and type – and the military is still playing catch-up – hence this paper...

The brave new world is much more savage, as Tony Blair commented:

The media had become dangerous because of its desire for stories with "impact" that would allow it to stand apart from the rest of the media.

This, he said, came second to accuracy. "It is this necessary devotion to impact that is unravelling standards, driving them down...something that is interesting is less powerful than...

We’re all going to the Malvinas,
We’re all going to kill a Spic or two,
We’re all going on a pusser’s holiday,
For a month or two...

We’re going to kill the wops with phosphorous
We’ll get them with our GPMG’s
They’d better not try to take cover,
Cos there ain’t no fucking trees.
something that makes you angry or shocked.

So what are the implications of today’s communications on the modern maritime battlespace. Timeliness is one. In 1982, when *HMS Glamorgan* was hit by an Exocet land-based missile, it took hours or days for the news to reach the front pages – the communications from the ship were strictly controlled. Now mobile phones, whenever they come within coastal range, can leak information quickly, and the front pages are screens linked to the Internet. Back then, the only program running on British TV at 3am in the morning was the Open University, and the bad news had to wait until morning. Now, it's a 24 hour a day game. Then, journalists worked for newspapers and radio and TV; now, anyone can be a reporter in the big bad world of “blogging” – web logs, sites set up by anyone, and run for very little cost. Then, there was some control, and some censorship, even self-imposed. Now, so-called celebrities such as Paris Hilton become dubiously famous because her boyfriend “posted a clip on the Net”, and the comments and information released of many a person is uncontrolled and uncontrollable by their own country, because the computer servers upon which the blog sits are in another nation.

But enough whinging. Today the media is becoming a tool in the war of perceptions being fought against terrorism. And it is one we are losing, as the-then US Secretary of Defence noted in 2006:

In a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, Mr Rumsfeld said some of the US’s most critical battles were now in the “newsrooms”.

“Our enemies have skilfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media age, but... our country has not,” he said.

Mr Rumsfeld said al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremists were bombarding Muslims with negative images of the West...

Michael Novak, the George Frederick Jewett Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, suggests that the war in Vietnam was lost “when America’s leaders decided that they could not resist the unrelenting storyline of the enemy, which had long prevailed in their own press”. Similarly, the Cold War was lost by the USSR “when the Soviet elites no longer believed their own storyline.” He thinks that the war against terrorism is psychological, and Islamists know that if they can keep constant defeat in front of the West’s cameras, then eventually the perception will be instilled into the minds of its people that there is no solution for victory.

It is clearly admitted enough by terrorists. In a letter to a colleague the-then second-in-charge of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, wrote to the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, saying “I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.”

The Hezbollah movement, proclaimed a terrorist organisation by the United States operates a satellite television station, Al-Manar TV (“the Lighthouse”), a radio station al-Nour (“the Light”), a monthly magazine Kabdat Alla (“The Fist of God”), and of course a website.

Let me return to more maritime matters. On 14 July 2006 an Israeli warship, the Hanit (translation: Spear) was operating in waters off Lebanon, firing shells into the Beirut airport, as part of the ongoing war between...
Israel and Hezbollah, their sworn enemy operating out of Lebanon. The conflict, precipitated when Hezbollah kidnapped two Israelis, was seeing short and medium range missiles fired into Israel from the north, and attacks by Israel's air and sea assets preceding a land push.

The Hanit was hit by a missile, in the starboard stern area underneath her flight deck. By the looks of the damage caused the warhead did not explode, but the impact and the resultant fire were enough to kill four men, and injure many others. An Egyptian vessel, according to the Israelis, was hit by the second missile, and sunk.

The weapon, either a C801 or more likely a C802 “Silkworm” was probably fired from a mobile platform: “…a truck-mounted launcher cued by a coastal radar installation.” The Hanit’s onboard defences should have been enough to deal with the incoming threat: she had a Barak anti-missile system installed, and also possessed further defences: a Phalanx Close-In Weapons System, two 20mm anti-aircraft guns, and probably numerous .50 calibre machine guns. It seems from later analysis that the Barak system was turned off, Jane’s Information Group later noted:

Although Hanit should have been able to defend itself against an anti-ship missile attack, the ship was operating with its self-defence systems deactivated, according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. The newspaper suggested that this decision had been taken in part because of the number of Israeli combat aircraft operating in the area and a perceived risk that the ship’s defensive systems might fail to recognise these as ‘friendly’ and initiate an engagement. However, why the ship’s chaff launchers or machineguns did not intercept the Silkworm is not known, but it also seems true that Israel was not counting on being attacked by such a missile.

What is of interest here is the behaviour of Hezbollah following the strike. The next day their television station broadcast “a videotape showed a blurred object looking like a small unmanned aircraft purportedly packed with explosives exploding in the water.” This was an attempt at deceiving the Israelis into thinking they had a capability they didn’t. Next came a supposed picture of the Hanit exploding. This actually was – as many Australians naval personnel recognized – a cropped and blurred version of HMAS Torrens being used as a test target by the Australian Collins-class submarine Farncomb firing a Mk.48 torpedo. Lacking a picture of their victim, Hezbollah doubtless figured that in a world where Western reporters stand in front of pictures of aircraft carriers and call them battleships, that it would convince many.

It sounds incredible Hezbollah believed it could get away with such deception, but indeed it was part of ongoing media manipulation operations conducted throughout the whole war. The point is though that the immediate message is the one that gets the attention. A denial by the adversary is about as valuable as a “correction” printed in the next edition of a newspaper. These were standard Hezbollah tactics. Supposed bodies were paraded for the cameras via supplied footage to show that Israel routinely targeted civilians, although in some shots they appeared to have made a mistake, for some “bodies” were seen to getting up too soon. And there was the famous case of the ambulance that wasn’t: how could this vehicle be the survivor of a missile strike – a missile that apparently did not kill the people inside the ambulance. But the effect caused by the story was done.

As one analyst put it: …the worldwide outcry over Israel’s purported malfeasance grew so strident that the country was pressured into a ceasefire. The media’s depictions of Israel’s actions so influenced public opinion that Israel felt compelled to end the fighting right at the moment it was starting to gain the upper hand. Hezbollah calculated quite rightly that world perception is what matters in a political fight, not how much damage they could inflict on the other side.

The world’s naval fights in the foreseeable future are going to increasingly be fought in the littoral, with the presence of cameras, drones, mobile phones, small civilian craft and many other attendant problems being present. I would never go so far as to say the day of the ship to ship blue water engagement is finished, but it would seem on hold for the time being. So the Hezbollah-Israel scenario might be the first of many such “public” clashes.

How to cope? This needs thought and analysis, but timeliness of response would seem at once to be paramount. If Israel’s response to the supposed Hanit photo (which wasn’t) was immediate deniison, then the photo loses its value, and indeed there is “blowback” from the attempt to deceive, and Hezbollah would have been left with some of the proverbial egg on its metaphorical face. Not enough to give Israel a victory as much as the Silkworm achieved, but something all the same. The timeliness needs to be in hours though, not days – fast enough to catch the attention of those who are still fulminating over the story.

Another response might be not to join with the enemy at his own game – or at least don’t get caught if you do engage in deception operations. This way you can take the moral high
ground, and show yourself off as a non-deceiver, and everyone likes one of those.

One final awful thought. Does this mean an unholy alliance of the public relations expert and the intelligence officer – a union of formerly oil and water? 

Dr Tom Lewis OAM’s Lethality in Combat was published in 2011, and analysed the reality versus the public perception of what goes on in war zones.

(Footnotes)

1 Newspaper sources in the Crimea were clearly marked individuals, such as Billy Russell for The Times, who remained within their own country’s lines.

2 The risk of indirect fire sources such as long-range artillery being well off-target were remote: artillery by then was reasonably accurate.

3 Knowledge was not freely available to people who did not have a clearly defined reason for having access to it; nevertheless a good reporter would have been able to learn much from loose talk; embittered conversations, and deliberate leakage.

4 Information was very difficult to get home: it was physically brought as opposed to electronically transmitted; it was well open to theft; it took a long time to reach home, and the transport system was less reliable – a communication could “go down with the ship”.

5 It was difficult for an editor to physically interfere; the reputations of some journalists preceded them and made them independent.

6 Crimea was further away than the American newspapers for which you might work.

7 Very big battles; lots of artillery, and rather set-piece in approach. Unless you were deliberately foolish the chances of being hit was slight.

8 The telegraph was in wide use.

9 Newspaper owners saw it as very much their duty to promote patriotism; very little questioning of the evidence is seen, especially once London was bombed, or indirect fire sources such as V1 rockets began to hit Britain.

10 Newspapers found it more and more difficult to get information out of militaries who were learning that information leaked could be very dangerous. The disinformation campaigns of D-Day worked very well, for example, as a result of not letting journalists near them, although the footnote preceding is of importance.

11 Telephones were in widespread use.

12 The British newspapers, for example, were still patriotic but sometimes would question official reports. For example, RAF losses in the Battle of Britain were doubted by many US newspapers.

13 Anti-ship missiles and gravity bombs did not discriminate.

(Endnotes)

1 Martin van Creveld reports: “In the newspapers, sob stories took the place of war.” Their sufferings were widely believed to be the outcome of shortcomings in signals, logistics, organisation, auxiliary services, and a competent staff organisation to co-ordinate the lot.” Creveld, Martin van. The Training of Officers. London: Collier Macmillan, 1990. (p. 46)


5 McGowan and Hands, Don’t Cry for Me, Sergeant-Major, 40.

6 Guardian Unlimited. “Tory MP sacked over ‘black bastard’ comments.” March 8, 2007. “The Conservative homeland security spokesman, Patrick Mercer, today stepped down after saying that being called a ‘black bastard’ was part-and-parcel of life in the armed forces. The party leader, David Cameron, said the remarks by the MP for Newark and Retford were “totally unacceptable”. Mr Mercer becomes the first frontbench resignation of Mr Cameron’s 15-month reign as leader. In an interview with Times Online he said it was “the way it is” a black soldier would be called a “black bastard”, and that some ‘idle and useless’ ethnic minority soldiers “used racism as cover for their misdemeanours.” http://politics.guardian.co.uk/conservatives/story/0,2029424,00.html 15 June 2007.


8 The Australian. “Blair’s last spray at ‘f’eral’ media.” 14 June 2007. (p. 8)


12 Israeli Government Official website.


15 Jane’s Information Group


Chief of the Navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, distinguished guests, senior naval and military officers from all over the globe, ladies and gentlemen.

Before proceeding further, I want to congratulate the Chief of Navy and all ranks of the RAN on attaining that marvelous milestone in your service to the nation. Yet tempering that joy is the recognition that many of your ranks have also died during that service and it is imperative and most appropriate that we mark their sacrifice as well.

Despite some good natured rivalry, the bonds between our services are deep and enduring, forged in the crucible of war with its shared perils and losses. Ray – on behalf of the Army, I salute you and the Navy team.

For reasons, which I intend to address, I believe that we as a nation sometimes fall prey to a collective amnesia about the extraordinary service of the Royal Australian Navy. Over a century ago, the great sea power theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote eloquently of the silent, inexorable and invisible operation of the blockade which crushed the innards of Napoleon’s Empire.

The achievements of our soldiers, enhanced, indeed perhaps even distorted by the ANZAC mythology, has, in my view, created a foundation narrative that has led to our Nation accepting the fruits of our maritime security as a free public good. It is as invisible as Mahan’s blockade.

Yet, despite universal lip service to the innately maritime character of our geography, the western civilization that has grown here since European settlement has not, in my view, developed a deep, intrinsic link to that character.

As another Maritime theorist, my friend Ray Griggs told the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in 2011, that a more appropriate wording in the first stanza of our national anthem may have been ‘girt by beach’ rather than ‘girt by sea.’ He was pointing to the underdeveloped consciousness which should properly underscore mature, true sea mindedness in Australia. His point was well made and it concerns me every bit as much as it bothers him.

Our trade flows freely, our petrol stations are replenished, our supermarket shelves are full to meet our whims and our commerce flourishes. Yet, Australians collectively do not reflect on the enormous national investment involved in sustaining the maritime conditions for that happy state of affairs, nor do they consider overly that much of it is also underwritten by the United States as the leading global power of our era.

While many of Mahan’s insights are today of primarily historical value, his assertion that the oceans of the world constitute ubiquitous highways is so profoundly obvious as to conceal its genius, in much the same way that Clausewitz’s observation that war is the violent prosecution of policy now sounds self-evidently banal, having become conventional wisdom. That Australia is an island, albeit one of immense mass, is equally as obvious. So our survival, even in peace time, depends on the sea.

Our strategic culture, and the strategic policy which incubates in it, are the poorer for that cognitive failure, which is derived from a deeply entrenched continental mindset.

Last week I conducted my military history conference, the theme of which was Armies and Maritime Strategy. There I heard an insightful presentation from Professor Michael Evans, who I believe to be the most innovative and influential strategic thinkers currently working in Australia. He expounded on the lack of sea mindedness to which Ray Griggs had alluded in that eloquent quip in 2011.

He described Australia as a maritime nation with a continental culture. His hypothesis was carefully arrived at through delving into the national psyche and soul. He analysed the narrative of the Australian settlement, and the degree to which we define ourselves as a sunburnt country. Scrutiny of the stories we tell ourselves about who we are, show a people pitted against a harsh, implacable and ultimately forbidding continental environment.

And so, while we revere the sacrifice of our diggers at Gallipoli, how many people really understand the naval and amphibious campaign which lodged us on what Chris Masters has termed The Fatal Shore? The digger legend is powerful, but it skews the way Australians view security, especially the wider contribution of this nation to the global order of the last Century.
and our obligations to maintaining that benign order in this one.

Yet, this absence of pervasive oceanic consciousness, disguises the fact that European settlement of this Great Southern land was achieved by the leading maritime power of that era. Likewise, it ignores the reality that our security was initially founded in no small part on Great Britain and, later, on its liberal democratic successor the United States.

In plain language, our prosperity and role in the world is reliant on freedom of navigation and the unimpeded use of Mahan’s great highways which is guaranteed by the dominant maritime power of the day, at a most significant discount to the expenditure of our own national treasure.

The naval and military professionals in this room grasp this reality, but too few of our fellow citizens do as well. More worryingly, I fear the same may be true of many of some who seek to advise our policy makers.

However, this is not the counsel of despair. Australians are nothing if not pragmatic. Regardless of this myopia, our strategic practice has been intuitively shrewd. We have collaborated with the dominant liberal, democratic maritime power du jour since Federation and have benefitted immensely from that choice.

Again, as I reflected on Mike Evan’s call to raise public consciousness about our maritime future in the rapidly growing, dynamically changing, Indo-Pacific region, I recalled former Prime Minister John Howard’s pithy, yet insightful, warning that Australia need not choose between its history and its geography.

Read in conjunction with Paul Keating’s similarly profound insight that Australia must seek its security in Asia rather than from Asia we can discern the rapid progress Australia has made from the aberrant years when we sought to secure Australia behind the moat of the so-called sea-air gap.

There is a warning in this – that because of our lack of an oceanic mindset, we risk forfeiting all those other natural elements of maritime power with which we are lavishly endowed. However, as soldier and capability manager I am optimistic about our current strategic focus. Here is why.

We have come a very long way since the strategic shock of 1999 in East Timor roused us from the torpor of the mindset of the Defence of Australia, narrowly construed as continental defence. In that regard, I would demur from John Howard in a minor, though not purely semantic, manner. As he sagely argued, we need not make a false, binary choice between our European origins and Asian geography to achieve Paul Keating’s vision of security ‘in Asia.’ But we must choose our TRUE history.

We need to recognise that despite the prodigious feats of arms of our soldiers, and the romance of the bush, our soldiers have never fought a battle on our continent. May that remain so. But as long as the gap between myth and reality in our national identity and ancillary strategic culture remains so great, we will struggle to achieve our potential as a second-tier maritime power.

For that classification I am indebted to that fine strategic scholar Beatrice Heuser who would situate Australia among relatively sophisticated medium powers for whom local sea control, albeit for particular periods of time, is both possible and indeed a strongly desirable capability objective. However, area sea control is unachievable for us and it remains the monopoly of great naval powers.

Of necessity we can only collaborate with compatible major powers and contribute to good order at sea and achieve limited force projection in coalition with our allies.

We are well on the way to achieving that level of maritime capability in Australia with political support across the spectrum. That vision, of a seamlessly joint ADF, structured to implement a maritime strategy in the defence of Australia, through denial of the use of our land, sea and air approaches to our nation is correct. It is supported by the ADF senior leadership and is underpinned by a Defence Capability Plan which will put flesh on the bones of that vision.

Of course it will require a shift in national resources to fund and sustain it. And in the aftermath of our longest war, fought primarily in a land-locked country, we must take the intellectual lead in explaining this to the Australian public.

After all they must fund it, and provide their sons and daughters to serve in this joint force in an era when individual opportunity and self-actualisation have reduced the appeal of service careers. That is why our deficit in oceanic consciousness has the potential to undermine our centre of gravity in the pursuit of professional mastery of joint maritime warfare.

Perhaps the thousands of proud Australians who cheered the arrival of that first flotilla 100 years ago understood better than we do the nexus between an actively engaged citizenship and maritime power than we do.

As senior advisers to the Government, we must take a moral and professional lead in this. Moreover, we must be truly joint in our advocacy. As I have stated somewhat ad nauseam, Australia needs its ADF more than it needs its Army, Navy and Air Force and a joint maritime strategy is only as strong as its weakest service. None of us can afford the dubious luxury of short-term single service ‘wins’ at
the expense of the coherence of our maritime capability.

Again, I have never been more optimistic as to our future notwithstanding the climate of austerity which is setting the tenor of our strategic debate. In my remaining time today I shall explain how Army’s modernisation axis of advance is inherently joint and postures us to take play our role in our maritime strategy as described under extant strategic guidance.

In general, Armies modernise by drawing lessons from their operations and calibrating their experience against history and the changing character of war as determined by technological change and politico-cultural trends. After a decade at war, and even longer on sustained operations across a diverse range of threat environments, against a range of foes, we have moved quickly to enhance our firepower, to digitise our sensor shooter links and better align our command and control systems to our higher joint-operational headquarters. Internally we have also better aligned our force generation cycles to strategic guidance.

We are in the midst of the most comprehensive re-equipment and modernisation program since the end of World War II. The end state will be an army that can generate combined arms effects in a joint coalition setting while surviving against either a peer competitor or a potent irregular enemy.

We are re-organising to field three standard multi-role medium weight combat brigades. We are shifting from a light infantry army to a light mechanised army deployable by sea rather than just air and capable of implementing the guidance of the government which decrees that we be able to deploy a battalion group for a contingency with our Primary Operating Environment, while simultaneously sustaining a brigade group on operations in the immediate neighbourhood.

Plan Beersheba rounds out the improvements begun in the wake of the 1999 East Timor crisis, which spawned that guidance and the derivative roles and tasks for the Army and ADF.

Significantly, the introduction of the Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD) will be a transformative development. Developing an army component capable of ‘wet soldiering’.

The devil will be in the detail. The range of specialist skills, trades and employment codes to conduct even permissive entry operations is formidable. Delivering land effects from sea platforms is the most demanding military task that can be asked of a joint force. Few nations on earth can achieve it. We will soon be joining that elite club. But the price of admission is high and we need to bring our society with us if we are to achieve it. It requires a national commitment not an ADF plan.

There is much to be done. But as we reflect on the challenges that our remote nation overcame to fund, design and build that majestic fleet which steamed into this great harbour 100 years ago, we must surely conclude that we are capable of meeting any future challenge if we can muster even a portion of their resolve and patriotism.

Lieutenant General DL Morrison, AO
Lieutenant General David Morrison joined the Army in 1979, after completing a BA at the Australian National University. He graduated from the Officer Cadet School, Portsea to the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. He was the Commanding Officer of the Second Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment in 1997 and 1998. Lieutenant General Morrison was made a Member of the Order of Australia (AM) in 1999 for his services as Brigade Major, Director of Preparedness and Mobilisation and as CO 2RAR.

He was promoted to Colonel in October 1999 and took up the position of Colonel Operations, Headquarters International Force East Timor (INTERFET). He was promoted to Brigadier in November 2002 and commanded the 3rd Brigade from December 2002 until December 2004. He was appointed as Land Commander Australia in December 2008 and became Army’s first Forces Commander on 1 July 2009. On 24 June 2011, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and on 27 June 2011 he assumed his current appointment of Chief of Army.

For his service to the Australian Army in the fields of training and education, military strategic commitments and force structure and capability; in particular, as Commander Australian Defence College, Head Military Strategic Commitments and Deputy Chief of Army he was appointed as an Officer in the Order of Australia in the 2010 Australia Day Honours list.
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Image: Eye In The Sky
Indian Carrier Developments
all at sea via the Russians

BY DR NORMAN FRIEDMAN

Early in July the Indian Navy announced that it was finally running acceptance trials for its Russian-built carrier Vikramaditya. The ship, which began life as the Soviet carrier Admiral Gorshkov, was rebuilt by the north Russian yard Sevmash for the Indians. The deal must have seemed good at the time: the Russians were desperate. In return for an order for carrier-capable aircraft, they offered the carrier, the Indians to pay only for the cost of modernization. As a Soviet carrier, Gorshkov operated STOVL Yak-38 fighter-bombers plus various missiles, most notably a battery of long-range anti-ship missiles. They filled both part of the flight deck and a considerable volume forward of her hangar. Reconstruction, including removal of the missiles, suited the ship to higher-performance MiG-29K aircraft, which are to take off using a ski-jump forward and to land on an angled deck using arrester gear.

All of that had to be built in. The combination of ski-jump and arresting gear is used on board the somewhat larger (55,000 rather than 45,000 ton) Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetzov and her Chinese half-sister Liaoning (the former Russian Varyag).

None of these ships has US-style steam catapults. Conventional (non-STOVL) aircraft can operate off their ski-jumps, the ship providing the necessary wind over her deck, but they suffer a penalty in payload compared to aircraft which can rely on catapults. Moreover, it takes a high ratio of thrust to weight to operate off a ski-jump, as the airplane benefits heavily from the upward force its engines exert as she is forced up by the deck. Ski-jump carriers are ill-equipped to operate lower-performance aircraft such as E-2 Hawkeyes. That is why the Chinese, and probably the Indians, are currently working on catapults for future carriers. Without those lower-performance radar aircraft, a carrier is much more vulnerable to air attack from beyond her horizon. The Indians are relying on a Russian-supplied radar helicopter (the Ka-31), but it cannot fly as high as a conventional airplane, nor does its radar have anything like the performance of that on board an E-2.

Perhaps more significantly, when the Russians sold her, the carrier had no usable powerplant, due to a fire in her boilers. Replacing or repairing the boilers was a major job, given the amount of ship structure between them and the flight deck. When Vikramaditya ran her first sea trials last year, when she was to have been delivered, her engines suddenly cut out when she reached 30 knots. It turned out that seven of her eight boilers had failed because the fire (insulating) bricks in them had melted. The Russians later blamed that on low-quality Chinese brick (the Chinese hotly denied that).

The fire-brick problem suggests that other Russian steam-powered warships may not be as capable as might be imagined, and they may exemplify a deeper problem the Russians face. They are still contending with the effect of the breakup of the old Soviet Union two decades ago. Before the breakup, supply chains stretched throughout the country. The Soviet Union had a deliberate policy of placing different parts of its supply chains in different Republics, in attempts both to bind the country together and to industrialize all the Republics. For example, when Khrushchev was in power, a sonar development center was set up in his native Ukraine, supplementing (and competing with) the main center in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). The Ukrainian center produced, for example, the sonar in a ‘Charlie’ class cruise missile submarine, and all Soviet dipping sonars and sonobuoys. When Ukraine broke with the other Republics in 1991, the Russians lost their source of airborne sonars.

The Ukrainians would still sell to the Russians, but the operative word was sell, and for that the Russians needed...
cash. In the past, all that had been needed was an order from the Kremlin. Soviet internal documents certainly referred to payments in rubles, but from a Western point of view that was nearly meaningless. We still have no way of calculating what defense actually cost the old Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union had collapsed, the Russians and the other republics found themselves operating Western-style cash economies. Some of the big Russian defense organizations, which were in deep trouble, were willing to work the old way, trusting for later payment, but that could not last. That is why Russian forces have found themselves so badly starved in recent years. Their situation is beginning to improve only because Russia is benefiting heavily from its trade in oil and other natural resources.

That does not solve the supply-chain problem. Many of the organizations which used to produce the components going into weapons and weapon systems have been starved of that business for two decades. They have disappeared altogether, or they have gone into other businesses and have lost the necessary expertise. This capacity has to be recreated if large orders for new equipment, even of existing design, are to be fulfilled.

The Russian government is painfully aware that the hiatus in buying equipment has left it with an ageing force, and now that it has more money it is trying to make up for lost time. The Russians are now publishing their planned defense programs for the period through 2020 (a shocking departure from past secrecy), and they show just how much production is needed. The announced plans are to provide 70 to 100 new aircraft by 2020, plus 120 helicopters, 600 armored vehicles, and eight or nine ships (including submarines). These numbers include what is already on order (47 percent of the submarines involved are to be delivered this year, which means that they represent long-past orders). In the past, the Russian forces were fortunate to receive six new aircraft per year. Undoubtedly money is being allocated, but it is not clear that the Russian Ministry of Defense understands what it will cost to bring component (Tier II and below) suppliers on line.

The Russian Ministry of Defense cannot afford the mass of inspectors and other officials who guaranteed quality. Problems with some ballistic missiles, such as the Bulava planned for strategic missile submarines, have been blamed on sub-component failures. There have also been suggestions that the normal extended test programs of the past, which would have caught minor (but fatal) design flaws, have been curtailed as unaffordable. As a consequence, much of what is currently produced is far less reliable.
than one might imagine. Customers have sometimes complained publicly. Algeria went so far as to return some MiG-29s because of engine unreliability.

Moreover, the businesses which remain are desperate for cash to keep them afloat. They sometimes find themselves taking advances for one project and spending them on a more urgent one, leaving them without the ability to complete what they have promised. The Indian carrier is the most public example. Originally the modernization was to have cost the Indians $947 million (as stated in 2005), which would have been a bargain price for a modern carrier. While the project was beginning, Sevmash (which was basically a submarine-building yard) was struggling to complete new missile and attack submarines for the Russian Navy – a much higher-priority project. The Russian Navy, moreover, was in a far stronger negotiating position than the Indians. It had its own limited budget, and it could make sure that Sevmash delivered at a promised price. Sevmash may also have diverted payments made for some tankers for Norway.

Sevmash had no deep carrier experience; the Soviet carriers were all built in Novorossisk, which is now in Ukraine. Its last experience building large surface ships was with Sverdlov-class cruisers in the 1950s. It had also laid down (but never completed) a Stalin-era battleship. None of that had much to do with rebuilding a carrier. The lack of expertise beyond Novorossisk was so bad that the Russian Navy discarded three of its VSTOL carriers because they could not be refitted in Ukraine. Admiral Gorshkov would have followed them off the Russian navy list had the Indians not turned up as willing buyers.

Sevmash engineers knew about the boiler problem. They do not appear to have taken into account the need to replace internal wiring and to renew considerable hull plating, presumably much of it inside a double bottom and side protection spaces. Sevmash asked for more money. It had bought into the project, and it could not complete it. Several times the Indians talked of walking away, but the Russians knew they had no other way to buy an carrier to replace their ageing ex-British Viraat. The Indians announced a project for an indigenous carrier (now to be named Vikrant), possibly to goad the Russians. The latest estimate of the total cost of the Vikramaditya is $2.3 billion. That may not seem much compared to the estimated cost of the new U.S. carrier Gerald R. Ford (currently estimated as $9 billion, including considerable entirely new equipment) but then again the Indians are not getting nearly as much carrier capability for their money. The current estimate is that the ship will operate no more than 16 MiG-29s. A U.S. carrier can operate nearly 100 aircraft, although in practice air wings are considerably smaller. That is aside from the advantages associated with nuclear power.
The Indian Navy is trying to expand, which means trying to shift its government’s outlook from the land to the sea. Senior Indian naval officers often point to the country’s dependence on seaborne trade, including for critical energy supply. They also claim that China is building a naval presence in the Indian Ocean (the Chinese generally deny that claim). They have managed to increase Navy spending towards a quarter of the Indian defense budget, which means that plans have been approved for two home-built carriers. The first, now described as 40,000 tons, is to be named *Vikrant*, after the first Indian carrier. Work has been proceeding since 2007, and current reports have the ship ready for launch in August 2013 and at sea in 2018 (the date was formerly given as 2017). A much larger carrier, the 65,000 ton *Vishal*, is to be completed in 2025. An official drawing of *Vikrant* shows a ski-jump like that on *Vikramaditya*, but presumably the much larger carrier will have catapults.

This article is the result of the Naval Review Centenary Fellowship Award 2013, sponsored by Ultra Electronics. The award provides six weeks for a Royal Navy Junior Officer to attach to the Royal Australian Navy for a chosen area of study. I chose to study Junior Officer Development; primarily due to the prominence of recent NR articles on the topic, and of the dynamic nature of training which will always be a balance between the fleet requirements, and training resources. Without doubt, both Navies have met significant changes and challenges in this area in recent years – and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Methods of Research

In order to build the best picture of Junior Officer Training and Development, I attempted to see as much of the training ‘pipeline’ as possible during my time in Australia. The very definition of ‘Junior Officer’ is open to debate, however, for the purposes of my research I have taken this as from recruitment and selection through to PWO or charge equivalent. Using my own knowledge base, and the need to confine this potentially vast research area; I have for the most part confined my study to Officers of the Warfare branch, but many areas are equally relevant to other branches.

As far as possible, the study is based on the current RN training pipeline as a model for comparison. However, the dynamic nature of training design means that some elements of training may have changed in the time from my own career training, and the writing of this study.

The Australian Navy Today

From beginnings as a small colonial force, the RAN has grown to 14,000 personnel, equipped with the latest warship technology and the capability to regularly patrol the defence and economic interests of Australia, covering 10% of the Earth’s surface. Spread at bases across a vast country, the RAN has extensive capabilities in patrol boats, submarines, escorts and soon, an enhanced amphibious capability utilising the Canberra Class LHD. None of this comes without challenges, and in many areas strains on procurement, maintenance, manning and operational tempo are evident – symptoms common with many naval forces today. The variety of tasking, travel and force expansion attracts many potential officers to the RAN. The tasking provides significant challenges to them both in training and on operations, such as Middle East deployments, or the daily struggle to deter illegal immigration to Australia’s Northern Coast.

Initial Officer Training

All types of Officer entry to the RAN attend HMAS Creswell, Jarvis Bay, ACT. The main throughput is the New Entry Officers Course (NEOC), the first training the Officer Cadet (OC) will receive prior to undergoing specialist training, or attending the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA). Unsurprisingly, the main modules of the course are very similar to that of the Initial Naval Training (Officers) – INT(O), course at BRNC Dartmouth - ‘marinisation’ and sea training. Very broadly, these modules have the aim of turning the OC from a civilian in to a military officer, then preparing them for the maritime environment, and finally consolidating this through a period of training onboard an active warship. In both establishments, the modules are arranged around key leadership assessments as cadets progress through the course. Like many naval training organisations, the key challenges are resources and manning.

Resources at Creswell are notably different to BRNC with regards to boatwork and early ‘marinisation’ training. BRNC uses a robust fleet of motor whalers, picket boats and a few powerboats to progressively introduce OCs to boathandling and basic
seamanship. These boats are effective and reliable for training, but it has been some time since motor whalers were used as RN ships boats. Creswell has recently changed their initial training to incorporate teaching each OC to drive the modern, powerful jet-RHIB boats. They are required to pass a stringent test, including bringing the boat alongside a moving ship at night for personnel transfer. This training is given to all branches; in many cases post graduating the OCs may not be required to operate a RHIB again, however, this relatively minor training module provides some significant benefits. The most important gain is the realistic appreciation of boat operations and the limitations and risks involved. In my short experience as an OOW, I have seen many requests for boat transfers by personnel clearly with no regard for either. Furthermore, for those actually responsible for the safety of boat transfers, having completed the training course on the boat can only be a positive aid to understanding the evolution. Finally, it provides some credibility to the officer detailing the Coxswain to conduct a transfer or recover a man overboard that they understand the task they are ordering.

With regards to personnel challenges, the quality of staff engaged in Phase One training has been noted as vital for the OCs development1, and RN Phase 1 staff now require a positive recommendation for instructional duties before appointment at BRNC. The Commanding Officer of HMAS Creswell, Captain Chandler RAN, has recently undertaken benchmarking of recruit training through Europe and the US – and has acquired a remarkable depth of knowledge of the different training systems and styles. He is committed to ensuring there is a high quality of staff at Creswell, and also that the training roles compare favourably with other seagoing or operational appointments. Whilst realising that it is unrealistic to handpick each role, Capt Chandler is adamant he retains the right to veto unsuitable candidates for Phase One instructional roles, and works closely with the career managers to integrate an appointment to the staff of Creswell into a Junior Officer’s career structure. The parallel requirements for quality instruction of trainees, and that of the positive career progression of the Junior Officer trainer could both be met by this reinforcement of the concept that instruction can be at least as demanding, and therefore merit worthy, as a seagoing appointment at the same career stage.

Professional Training

As explained in my introduction, the professional training pipeline studied is that of a Junior Warfare Officer, titled Maritime Warfare Officer (MWO) in the RAN. Over the previous year, the RAN has made major changes to the process of MWO training, most notably by a substantial increase in Bridge simulator training. The bulk of this simulator training occurs at the point where a RN officer would be undergoing training for their Bridge Warfare Qualification (BWQ), already appointed in their first complement job. Indeed, the RAN MWOs will leave Training Authority-Maritime Warfare (TA-MW), HMAS Watson – the training establishment roughly equivalent to the RN Maritime Warfare School (MWS) at HMS Collingwood – already with their Bridge Warfare Certificate. The positives and negatives of simulation training form another substantial debate, but what is guaranteed is availability and uniformity of training. With regards to personnel challenges, the quality of staff engaged in Phase One training has been noted as vital for the OCs development1, and RN Phase 1 staff now require a positive recommendation for instructional duties before appointment at BRNC. The Commanding Officer of HMAS Creswell, Captain Chandler RAN, has recently undertaken benchmarking of recruit training through Europe and the US – and has acquired a remarkable depth of knowledge of the different training systems and styles. He is committed to ensuring there is a high quality of staff at Creswell, and also that the training roles compare favourably with other seagoing or operational appointments. Whilst realising that it is unrealistic to handpick each role, Capt Chandler is adamant he retains the right to veto unsuitable candidates for Phase One instructional roles, and works closely with the career managers to integrate an appointment to the staff of Creswell into a Junior Officer’s career structure. The parallel requirements for quality instruction of trainees, and that of the positive career progression of the Junior Officer trainer could both be met by this reinforcement of the concept that instruction can be at least as demanding, and therefore merit worthy, as a seagoing appointment at the same career stage.

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to watch patterns and programming, or because there is a minimum level of competence required for the specific serial, and the ship needs a ‘satisfactory’ pass. The other element of uniformity in the Australian BWC, is that it provides training to the highest standard required – based on an ANZAC-class Frigate simulation, currently the RANs most modern platform. The British system, endorsed by the CO on the first platform the complement OOW serves on, may be a MM/PP, FF/DD or Capital Ship. The types of Warfare knowledge will clearly be radically different for each platform, and inevitably the type of exercises the OOW predominantly undertakes will reflect the capability of the ship.

One other, more general value of the simulator BWC, is that it allows the OOW to make developmental ‘mistakes’ out of the way of immediate subordinates. Of course, much of being a Young Officer is just about learning from these mistakes, but by this career point the Junior OOW will have a variety of other wholesale and divisional responsibilities, and errors in the relatively specific area of Bridge Warfare can easily be transposed by subordinates to make wider generalisations of competence, however accurate or otherwise that assumption may be.

The cost, perhaps, is that the simulator time is not used understanding the running of a ship (including mechanical, systematic and human terms), or of the wider roles of a Naval Officer – somewhat limited whilst watchkeeping at a shore training establishment. Trainees spend 22 weeks in total at TA-MW training for the BWC – in comparison, it is also a reasonable time to obtain a platform endorsement and RN BWQ in a first complement appointment, on an active FF/DD. The financial cost of running and manning the simulators also involves a significant investment. TA-MW provides 24-hour running of two tactical simulators for BWC training with a qualified PWO and Yeoman closed up for each watch. Other smaller simulators are provided for navigation training.

Apart from the experience and numbers of professional training staff required, the support organisation is also configured for the training, with technical support and even catering arranged to provide the watch system. These are delivered by many different contractors with a balanced mix of Naval and civilian staff. In theory, it seems viable that MWS could run a similar system, but would require significant resources, investment and probably contract-renegotiation to support the already very busy Navigation staff.

The first of the RAN simulator-trained OOWs are only now in their first appointments. However, early feedback from their Navigating Officers suggest that the level of Warfare knowledge is considerably higher, and allows plenty of extra capacity to deal with other training challenges and consolidation. So much so, that many of the legacy system OOWs are understandably jealous of the new system trainees! The value of equal, high, standards for BWQ/BWC award is hard to contest.

**Joint Service Training**

When applying to join the British Armed Forces, the applicant will usually have made a decision to apply for the Army, RN or RAF. Indeed, it used to be the case that the applicant was quite literally left in the cold outside the Chatham AFCO until one of the three appropriate buttons had been pressed to summon the appropriate service. The Australian approach is for applicants to join the Australian Defence Force (ADF), without being confined to a particular service, and the initial process reflects this accordingly. All applicants, regardless of their preference of service or enlistment/commission, are invited to a comprehensive presentation on the ADF, a filter interview from an NCO of any service, and an aptitude test.

Why does this Joint Service element matter at this stage? The gains appear twofold. An applicant may find that, unsuccessful or unsuitable for a certain specialisation, they find that they are able to undertake a similar specialisation in a different service. Conversely, they can find they are in fact qualified for many positions they had not previously considered.

The other wider training benefit is the increase in general Joint Service knowledge acquired by the Careers office staff. Whilst a level is only required to probe the applicants’ knowledge to the level of the initial filter, this is nonetheless a broad range of knowledge which rapidly accumulates during the SNCO’s three year tours. The view of Captain AIB is that they must increase the throughput of applicants to AIB – surely this means we cannot afford to miss the qualified and competent applicants that have made it as far as the Careers office, even if initially for another service.

The Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) is the next clear example of Joint Service interaction in training. ADFA is a unique mix of academic study for Officer Cadets, provided by the University of New South Wales, and regular Joint Service military training and leadership enhancement over the course of three or four years. The RAAF/Army cadets will join ADFA direct from selection whilst RAN cadets will have

1 The TA-MW simulators have serving AB quartermasters (who can also qualify as a QM for the ANZAC platform in them) but the training OOW has no reporting responsibility for them.
already completed NEOC and a sea training appointment. Remarkably in comparison with Britain, all the ADFA cadets study on full salary, benefits, and do not pay tuition fees. Unsurprisingly, most cadets interviewed stated that the education provided by ADFA, and the financial stability whilst doing so, was a significant factor in their decision to join the ADF.

So whilst the financial cost to the ADF is obviously substantial; what are the benefits? At this early stage of professional development the cadets are unlikely to have substantial service experience to share their individual service knowledge. RAAF and Army Cadets currently join ADFA before Initial Training, whilst the RAN midshipmen now attend ADFA post sea training, some returning with operational experience. It seems that more could be made of the shared service experience by all services attending post Initial Training, and thereby also reducing the duplication of training that occurs for the RAN midshipmen in the current arrangement. However, they will all work alongside cadets from the other services, developing an appreciation of service cultures and networking valuable future colleagues. Indeed, as the early ADFA graduates now reach OF-5 and beyond in Joint Service appointments, the value of this networking is all the more evident.

The RAN also operates a separate Undergraduate Sponsorship programme, which may be undertaken at a civilian University. However, ADFA has shown the additional focus on study and support available has a positive return on pass rates. For Engineering, ADFA has achieved a 75% pass rate, compared with just 54% being the average for a regional University. Comparison with the British system is difficult, as there simply isn’t an equivalent. The nearest environment may be establishments such as Welbeck Defence Sixth Form College, or the training and sponsorships available by University Air Squadrons, Officer Training Corps or the University Royal Naval Units. All these establishments offer some level of financial support, but are fundamentally different in the level of support offered and the objectives of ADFA. Political will is probably unlikely to favour construction of a dedicated UK MoD Officer Training University at present in a background of the wake of the SDSR and soaring higher education costs. However, the power of such establishment as a modern recruiting tool and an effective system for developing and broadening Junior Officers cannot be underestimated.

Retention and Career Progression

“Expand their horizons faster than they can themselves”

Rear Admiral J Goldrick RAN

Retention of Junior Officers, particularly Warfare Officers, usually makes a regular appearance on RN personnel policies. This seems to be a challenge for RAN alike; though the ‘push/pull’ factors may differ, and the structure of career progression differs considerably. Indeed, the RN has formed a dedicated team to analyse and identify trends, not just of retention, but wider issues concerning the efficient management of RN personnel and the formation of a more flexible career structure. Considerations such as ‘talent management’, flexible regular/reserve transitions and realistic career break options are just a few of the examples being considered. Though there may be many factors in the decision to continue a career as a Naval Officer, one almost always appears early in the list: that of career progression. The differences between
RN/RAN Warfare Officers seem quite marked. A RN Warfare officer will usually have a very clear route to Command – so clear that it is easily available as a flow chart from the Career Manager. The Command Qualification (CQ) exams and boards must be passed, and a suitable progression of seagoing appointments will be required. Junior Warfare Officers will either be working towards this, or a specialist role, or at the very least will be able to provide the above command ‘staff answer’ when asked. The declining number of seagoing command opportunities appears to increase the competition further.

The RAN does not use the CQ process in the same form as the RN. Though subject to a Command appointments board, they do not require the same progressive exams or CQ assessments. There is a comparable CO Designates course – but of course, this is only relevant once appointed to Command. Observation of my RN colleagues has shown that the RN CQ process provides not only a competence check, but a significant measure of motivation on the route to command – and recognition for doing so. RAN officers of a similar seniority, whatever their aspirations, do not have this measurement of competence – and so early Command potential may be easier to overlook. Early Command, of course, being a strong indicator of potential career progressions, and as previously described, likely to be a key motivating factor.

For Junior Officers to qualify for many career courses, there is an element of selection or Aptitude testing. This can vary from short recommendations from the divisional officer, through to a thorough assessment – such as aircrew aptitude testing or Mine Clearance Diving Officer selection. The important consideration for any career course is that the candidate is correctly prepared for the course, and has the academic or physical potential to pass the course. By ensuring this is so, maximum benefit can be gained from the training, and the risk of withdrawing a candidate from training should be reduced.

The RN People Strategy team have recently completed a review of all the aptitude testing that takes place for all courses, including RN, RM, RAF and Army. The study details the various course aptitude tests and concludes that “long term usage of the test data is in its infancy.” Essentially, whilst there are many different types of test (with 12 RN tests detailed in this paper alone), the combined use of the results and continued link to officer career development is not yet established.

The RAN has proposed a variation on the usual aptitude process, by requiring course applicants to complete ‘Diagnostic Testing’ at least six weeks before attending a course. The computer-based exams would be sent directly to the Maritime Warfare Training Authority, and the results signalled back to the ship or establishment. The aim is to ensure that candidates arrive on the course with a minimum of sustained base knowledge, and identify any shortfalls early and sufficiently far in advance that they can be addressed. This could also reduce the potential ‘learn-exam-forget’ cycle – hence cutting down on the necessary course content and time for professional courses.

**Divisional**

The very concept of formal Divisional Training is something of a relative newcomer in Officer Training. Where in the past, the vast majority of
divisional training could be learnt ‘on the job’, the recognition of modern employment practices means that the Junior Officer will need a minimum skillset to deal with the potential litigation challenges – on top of those caused by the highly irregular living and working conditions of a warship. It is the variety of, for example, a case of discipline or substance abuse, or simply guidance for domestic issues when there seems to be no one else for the rating to talk to.

Both the RN and RAN recognise this, and have formal Divisional training at the Royal Navy Leadership Academy (RNLA), and the RAN Institute of Leadership, Training and Management (ILTM). Both provide legal and litigation framework knowledge, and enable the Junior Officer to practice their Divisional manner in a training environment before being faced with real issues, with real consequences for getting it wrong.

Two things can be drawn from the differing approaches that can be learned from. ‘The first is the concept of ‘360 degree feedback’ – reports collected on a Junior Officer prior to attending a RAN leadership course. Unlike the standard ‘First/Second Reporting Officer’ report, this also gives an opinion from other Junior Officers and subordinates. This is also compiled in their normal working environment, away from a more directed training environment – and may lead to some significant Leadership and Management traits that would otherwise be missed in a traditional report.

The second is the use by the RNLA of a dedicated CCTV system to allow a training Divisional Officer to face role-playing divisional members in a realistic environment (the two way discussion will happen ‘alone’, whilst the rest of the class can observe the CCTV in another room). The RAN have considered this before, but it is not currently in use. Though it is fair to say nothing can ever prepare you for every possible divisional challenge – this seems a very effective way to prepare for the inevitable awkward conversations that are part of being a Divisional Officer, and providing a service that the Division deserves.

Conclusions

Contained within this paper are some of the more prominent contrasts I have observed in Junior Officer Training. In particular I believe the aspects of Joint Service officer training and recruitment, in addition to the new training for the Bridge Warfare Qualification, appear to be most applicable and beneficial for adoption by the RN. Meanwhile, a defined Command Qualification system for the RAN could rapidly help focus Junior Officers with strong Naval career ambition.

A direct comparison for training systems between the two Navies becomes a challenge due to the variety of external political and cultural factors, and the difference in scale. However, Australia has some evolving and innovative solutions to the challenges of Junior Officer Development and continues to experiment and reform training systems. The background and ethos of their historical training establishments has been preserved, whilst new ideas, staff and resources strive to meet the ever-evolving demands of the service.

Many of the ideas and training systems studied in this paper may be suitable for application to the other Navy, and serve to demonstrate that both navies are adapting to modern training challenges. This should then ensure the Junior Officer is prepared for the wide variety of challenges presented during a commission in a modern versatile Naval force.

(Endnotes)
2 Interview with Capt R G Stewart, Captain Admiralty Interview Board, March 2013.
3 Interview with RAdM J Goldrick, Former ADFA Commandant, April 2013.
6 Loose Minute, RAN School of Maritime Warfare: Diagnostic Testing – SMW Course, 19 Apr 2013.

Lieutenant Matthew Winwood RN completed Navigation and Warfare training in the Arabian Gulf as an Officer of the Watch, before his first appointment in the RN Flagship, HMS Bulwark. Following deployment for the London 2012 Olympics, he was awarded the annual Naval Review Fellowship to Australia. On returning to the UK, he joined OP ATALANTA, the EU contribution to counter-piracy in the Somalia region.
In 1907, the pulsating extremity of the Maritime Entity known as the British Empire celebrated its elevation to Dominion status. Its joyful citizens sang lustily:

God Defend Our Freeland
Guard Pacific’s Triple Star
From the Shafts of Strife and War
And Make Her Praises Heard Afar

Keep that last line in mind as New Zealand sought praise far from home by the means of a battleship. Why a battleship? When the offer was made it was understood that the Dominion was promised a battleship rather than the Indefatigable-class battlecruiser that eventually arrived.

“That splendid piece of practical patriotism”, the gift battlecruiser HMS New Zealand, played a role in the war at sea during the First World War. This ship had a unique history before the war and fought at all three major engagements in the North Sea. Using contemporary accounts, newspaper reports, and objects will illustrate experiences aboard the ship in order to explain the unique story that the Dominion’s gift played in the war. These are lasting evidence of a special connection between the Dominion and its “battleship” which was a “source of joy and pride to every loyal New Zealander.”

In 1909, the newest Dominion filled with Imperial spirit agreed to fund the purchase of one battleship for the defence of the Empire. The Prime Minister Joseph Ward made the decision unilaterally and after getting approval, suspended parliament so he could attend the 1909 Imperial Conference. There he bathed in the glow of admiration of this noble gesture from the uttermost ends of the earth. Ward explained his decision in his usual colourful rhetoric:

We distant sons desire to stand in any peril beside the lion mother of our race, and to the utmost of our resources prove to her and to the world how dear to us is Britain’s name and greatness. We recognise that Britain’s acknowledged supremacy of the seas goes for the maintenance of peace, and that any weakness, either in the Homeland or abroad, makes what ought to be a dominant position a dangerous one. Sacrifices must be made to show competitive nations that, although separated by seas, we are in reality one for the preservation of our Empire’s greatness.

The cost was £2.3 million pounds [approx. $350m NZ], or 2 pounds & 3 shillings for every man, woman and child living in New Zealand in 1909. Not every New Zealander was happy with Ward’s generosity. That socialist rag the Maoriland Worker accused Ward of dancing to a jingo tune but Churchill described the gift as far-seeing statesmanship.

In 1913 she was sent on a cruise to New Zealand to show the Dominion what its money had purchased. She was proudly displayed as a symbol of the Royal Navy’s might, British industry, and of New Zealand’s nationhood – our country’s name proudly borne by one of the front line units of the Navy that would defend the Empire. She arrived at Wellington on 12 April 1913 and during her time in New Zealand waters she hosted nearly 500,000 visitors, equal to half the population at the time. She left New Zealand at the end of June to return to Britain. In July 1914 New Zealand requested two Bristol-class cruisers. It was reported in London that the zealous nature of New Zealand’s request was worthy but not realistic. It did acknowledge that the Dominion had a right to be annoyed based on the gift of the New Zealand that the Admiralty had not met its promise for three battlecruisers to be maintained on the New Zealand Station.

From a naval historical perspective, what marks New Zealand’s wartime service is the objects that were presented when she visited New Zealand in 1913 and became talismans for her ship’s company. Firstly, there were pieces of greenstone [jade] given by the Maori to the ship when it visited ports around the country. We have some in the
collection that was kept in the Warrant Officers' mess during the war. Secondly, there was the piupiu and tiki. When Halsey visited in 1913 he was presented with a sacred tiki and piupiu by a Maori Chief at Rotorua. The Chief asked the Commanding Officer, Captain Halsey whether he would wear the gifts if he was ever in battle. Halsey agreed to do so not thinking he would ever have to honour this promise. Finally, there was the national flag which had been presented to the ship in May 1913 by the proud Women of New Zealand's Timaru Branch.

The Navy Museum has identified four New Zealanders who served in the battlecruiser during the First World War. Lieutenant Alexander Boyle served in the ship during all three engagements; he was in command of X Turret at the Battle of Jutland. He was joined by Midshipman H. Anderson. Chief Quartermaster Eddie Fitzgerald brought the ship out to New Zealand in 1913 and served in New Zealand for the duration of the war. Alongside him was Petty Officer Allan Mclnnes.

In August 1914 New Zealand was part of the Grand Fleet and would serve alongside her sister battlecruisers for all three major engagements. At the outbreak of the war Halsey was still in command. After the declaration of war he sent a message to the Prime Minister William Massey that "all of war he sent a message to the Prime Minister William Massey that “all on board HMS New Zealand will endeavour to uphold the honour of the Dominion.”

New Zealand's first action was Heligoland Bight on 28 August 1914. She was part of the First Battlecruiser Squadron and fought alongside HMS Invincible. Before she went into action Halsey donned the piupiu over his uniform, and as he recalled:

1. A tiki is a ceremonial wood and stone carving of humanoid forms found in Central Eastern Polynesian cultures of the Pacific Ocean. A piupiu is a ceremonial skirt-like garment made of flax strands that hang from a belt.

Officers and men who were in the Conning Tower... were so startled at seeing me in this extraordinary clothing that they appeared to be quite incapable of carrying on with their very important personal duties and I had quickly to explain why I was thus attired. The ship was not damaged or hit during this action and a rating reported back to New Zealand that the whole engagement had lasted 14 minutes. He also mentioned that the "torpedoers in the fight had a hot time. It was reported that she fired 82 rounds from her guns and one of her torpedoes sank the light cruiser SMS Koln. This was also the first time that the new national flag of New Zealand was taken into combat. During the action it was laced to the foremost.

After the battle New Zealand papers reported that praise for the ship was being reported in Britain and Canada. A rating wrote to his parents letting them know that the ship was safe and sound. He went on: “We have a fine recipe in this ship for cooking German sausage, and I must say that it goes down very well with a little Jellioce sauce.” In 1917 bounty money for the battle was paid ranging from ninety-two pounds for flag officers to ninety-two pounds for every member of the ship’s company.

By mid-January 1915 New Zealand was part of the battlecruiser element of the anti-invasion force under Beatty. At the Battle of Dogger Bank she carried the flag of Rear Admiral Sir Archibald Moore. Halsey again wore the tiki and piupiu. Before the action he “got many messages from all over the ship hoping that the [piupiu & tiki] was again going to be worn”. At 9:35 New Zealand was within range of Blücher which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her along with Tiger and Princess Royal. Most of her 139 rounds fired in the battle were directed to this target. Reportedly Blücher was the only German vessel to have fired on New Zealand.

Once again there were no hits on the ship. In his Despatch Beatty gave credit to the Engineering staff aboard New Zealand for being able to steam at 28.5 knots, “greatly exceeding their normal speed”. Moreover, the excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a conspicuous feature of the battlecruisers. The Official History notes that the men in the engine room of “knew it was a chance of a lifetime.” The Engineer Commander and senior ratings of the engineroom were given a Mention in Despatches. The national flag was laced to the foremost during the chase and engagement. After the battle it was much blown out and had to be repaired. Tattered parts were cut off and given to Captain Halsey and sent back to New Zealand as trophies.

On 26 January the Times reported that:

One point requiring further emphasis is the proof of Imperial solidarity supplied by the participation of the New Zealand in the North Sea fight. The whole Empire may be proud of this fine warship built by our brethren at the other end of the world. It was able to do excellent
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A few days later Halsey telegraphed the New Zealand High Commissioner that the ship’s company “are proud to have represented the Dominion” at the battle. In 1917 it was announced that the battlecruiser would share prize money totalling fifty-two hundred pounds for Blücher with 48 other ships. Senior officers would receive seventy-nine pounds while the most junior rating would receive a shilling.

In May 1915, when Halsey was promoted and appointed to another command, he passed the piupiu and tiki over to his successor as Commanding Officer of New Zealand, Captain John Green who had commanded the cruiser HMS Natal.

As he left, Halsey wrote to the Navy League in Wellington:

We fully realise how much we are thought of in the Dominion, and I trust that New Zealand will always have a good reason to be proud of her ship. I can only say without any hesitation that all on board fully realise how the eyes of the whole Dominion are on us, and we are fully determined that, come what may, we shall do our utmost for ‘New Zealand and the Empire.’

Taking over command, Captain Green was told of the Maori Chief’s request and agreed to wear the piupiu and tiki into action. Unfortunately Green was more rotund than Halsey and could not wear the piupiu. Halsey wrote to a friend in Dunedin that Captain Green was made aware that “every New Zealander has the welfare of the ship in mind.” Later in 1915 Green wrote to the New Zealand government that he would maintain the standards of the ship to be a credit to the Dominion and to be a worthy response to the people’s patriotism and foresight on the next occasion of a naval battle.

Now let me turn to a moment of unpleasantness in the Anzac relationship. It is the precursor to the infamous 1981 “underarm incident.” This was the collision between New Zealand and HMAS Australia on 22 April 1916. At the time both vessels as part of the 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron were cruising north of Jutland in line abreast. As an anti-submarine measure they were on this day zig-zagging at 19.5 knots. Suddenly thick fog descended and in limited visibility the two battlecruisers collided twice.

New Zealand was damaged above the waterline which was never properly repaired. Australia sustained such damage that she had to go into dock for repairs. This left her out of the fleet for the forthcoming battle. The Australian Official History states that the collision was no way her fault – but then the author would say that. In late 1918 Sydney papers reported an Australian rating’s claim that New Zealand was at fault and it was due to an error in executing an order and the fog had saved Australia from being torpedoed as she crawled back to port. The wound to the ship’s company was such that the Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes had to visit the jinxed battlecruiser in May to exhort the ship’s company.

A month later New Zealand was flagship of Rear-Admiral William Pakenham, commanding the 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron consisting of New Zealand and HMS Indefatigable. Normally Australia was the Squadron flagship but it is fair to say Rear-Admiral Pakenham wanted to use the “lucky ship” rather than the ill-starred ship that managed to miss all three major engagements. It should be pointed out that Pakenham upon his appointment to command the battlecruiser force in November 1916 was directed to retain Australia as his flagship but pointed out that HMS Lion was a more suitable ship and allowed to move his flag to her. If more evidence is required of underarm tactics it should be noted that Australia was at it again in 1917. On 12 December she collided with HMS Repluse which kept her in dock for three weeks.

The Battle of Jutland

In May 1916 New Zealand was part of the 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron with her sister ship Indefatigable still under the flag of Rear-Admiral Pakenham. Captain Green, while not being able to wear the piupiu, wore the tiki and had a hook for the piupiu mounted in the conning tower where it hung during the battle. Just before the ship entered battle a rating was seen climb a ladder to the bridge and on sighting the talismans shouted down “it’s all right, he’s got them on.”
It is suggested that the reason that the ship was hit during the battle was because the piupiu was not worn.

On 30 May **New Zealand** weighed anchor and proceeded to sea with the rest of the Battlecruiser Force.\(^45\) The next afternoon she was scouting southward ahead of the Battle Fleet.\(^46\) She sighted five German battlecruisers about 3.30pm and both forces opened fire at 3.50pm as **New Zealand** was called into line astern by Beatty.\(^47\) She trained her fire onto **SMS Moltke**.\(^48\) At 4.26pm **HMS Queen Mary** received a salvo which caused a massive explosion and caused her to begin to sink by the bows as **HMS Tiger** passed to port and **New Zealand** to starboard.\(^49\) A piece of **Queen Mary** landed on the deck of **New Zealand** from the explosion.\(^50\)

Lieutenant Alexander Boyle in X Turret wondered if **New Zealand**’s turn to blow up was coming. He chose not to tell his crew that two battlecruisers had been lost to catastrophic explosions. He looked out of his armoured slit and noticed:

> I have never seen anything like it as we seemed to be not only fighting the German battle cruisers but most of the High Sea Fleet as well. There were literally miles of ships and the sea was boiling with the falling shells. It seemed utterly impossible that a ship this size could live in this inferno. She did without being hit again. Immediately after her sister-ship and **Queen Mary** had been destroyed, **New Zealand** received a hit on ‘X’ Turret, from **SMS Von Der Tann**. The turret was filled with dense yellow smoke, but no one was injured. At first the turret continued to operate, but then it was found it would not train. Lieutenant Boyle and a rating exited the turret to inspect the roller path. They found a 500kg piece of armour plate on the rollers, which they moved and some splinters which they also removed. However the turret still wouldn’t train and a further inspection was necessary. This revealed some more splinters which when removed cleared the problem and the turret returned to action.\(^51\)

One large splinter entered the engineer’s workshop and wrecked the grindstone without injuring anyone. Two of the ship’s boats were holed by splinters; the silk jack had a shell pass through it, and the ensign staff was damaged. Later on the Gunnery Officer of **New Zealand** reported that at around 5.50pm the Paymaster had come on deck for some fresh air and was standing abaf the forecast when ‘P’ turret opened fire, and the blast was such that he lost his uniform and was thrown stunned on the deckhouse. He was the ship’s only casualty.\(^52\)

As evening descended, **New Zealand** and **Indomitable** engaged another enemy vessel which was reported to have hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. **New Zealand**’s target was **SMS Seydlitz**, which was hit three times.\(^53\) Around 8pm a strong shock was felt aboard the ship. The popular explanation was an unexploded torpedo but no damage was reported.\(^54\) After the Grand Fleet returned to port, Beatty was able to report that **New Zealand** was ready and able to go to sea if required.\(^55\)

The New Zealand ensign hoisted in the afternoon and kept flying throughout the battle was badly torn and was returned to New Zealand in late 1916.\(^56\) Pieces were cut off and given to Captain Green who returned them to the Dominion for exhibition.\(^57\) It was accompanied by pieces of the damaged staff, silk jack, and some splinters.\(^58\) After the battle, Jellicoe stated that the probable reason **New Zealand** only received one hit was that her fire had crushed the fire of the enemy and thought it a sign of good shooting when the enemy did not hit back at the battlecruiser.\(^59\) It is believed that **New Zealand** assisted in the destruction of two German cruisers during the battle. Her 12” guns fired 430 shells during the battle but it is recorded that she only achieved three hits on her opponents.

As the news of Jutland reached home the proud Dominion celebrated her success. Massey telegraphed Captain Green:

> The whole Dominion is thrilled with pride at the conspicuous bravery and gallantry displayed by her officers and men. We rejoice that **New Zealand** was in the battle a played a magnificent part...the Dominion knows that British sailors can be depended upon worthily to uphold the fighting traditions of His Majesty’s Navy.\(^60\)

In response Captain Green replied:

> Officers and men **HMS New Zealand** very highly appreciate congratulations from New Zealand. We are all proud to belong to New Zealand’s ship, and to have the opportunity of upholding the honour of the Dominion.\(^61\)

In the Anzac spirit the Australian Governor-General telegraphed his counterpart in New Zealand and offered Australia’s:

> ...hearty congratulations to its sister Dominion on the success of the battle-cruiser in action in the North Sea and hopes that the **Australia** will go into action alongside the **New Zealand**.\(^62\)

I can well imagine the Australians’ hurt feelings that they missed **Jutland** but they did get a conciliatory visit from His Majesty George V in early June to compliment them on their services to the Empire including trying to take **New Zealand** on display at the Torpedo Bay Navy Museum in Auckland.
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Zealand out of action. The Secretary of State for the Colonies telegraphed the Government “to place on record the debt of the Mother Country to New Zealand for the generosity which enabled the navy to place so valuable a unit in the fighting line.”

As was the practice the Grand Fleet was showered with medals and decorations. Captain Green was made a Companion of the Bath and also received the French Legion of Honour. Chief Quartermaster Eddie Fitzgerald and Stoker James Sims were awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and Lieutenant Boyle received a Mention in Despatches.

The New Zealand press reported that the ship’s part in the battle was being given prominence in the British papers.

Later in 1916 a medal was struck by New Zealand War Contingent Association for the ship’s company to celebrate her part in the battle and sent to the ship for issuing. Many accounts noted at the time that she was “singularly fortunate” and she had come through the fight “practically unscathed.” Green in a letter to a friend in Christchurch remarked that “we certainly bore a charmed life at the Jutland Battle, and I trust we may continue that luck.”

The ship’s charmed life was also noted in a meeting of the British Imperial Council of Commerce.

A few days after the battle Alexander Boyle wrote to his parents about his part and impressions of the battle:

The conclusions I draw from the show are that the Huns are very good at the beginning of an action but cannot keep it going. At the end they were rotten and defeated. New Zealand was in the thick of it and came out with hardly a scratch to ship or person. The other ships in the fleet where hit many more times than we were. The sailors say the Maori face we have painted on the central top saved the ship. If we painted it out now I am sure they would mutiny [so] we are not going to try. When the enemy fire you can see the dull red flash of their guns and then a cluster of dots getting bigger and bigger as they tear towards you. One knows it is no good ducking or getting behind anything as the only thing to do is sit still and hope they do not hit you. It is like somebody throwing heavy stones at you whilst you sit still in a chair.

From June 1916 to December 1918 the “lucky” battlecruiser served with the Grand Fleet. The tiki and piupiu remained on board the ship until war’s end when they were returned to Halsey as a gift. In November 1916 ratings from New Zealand were given the honour of taking the bridal car through the streets of London when Prince George of Battenberg married a Russian countess. Prince George was a gunnery officer on the battlecruiser as well as movie officer. Sir Joseph Ward, the instigator of the gift, speaking on a visit to the Grand Fleet in 1917 stated that the Dominion had a right to have a voice in the peace terms. He also stated that the Dominions were entitled in the future to equal responsibility for the Empire navy and it was their duty to provide a large portion of that cost.

Also in 1917, Green was replaced by Captain Richard Webb. He wrote to his brother back in New Zealand that “New Zealanders will have every reason to be proud of the vessel!” In October 1917 the New Zealand High Commissioner visited the battlecruiser and was assured by Webb that in all his years of command he had not found a ship with such an imbued spirit of discipline and duty.

The following month the battlecruiser took part in another action in the Heligoland Bight. Reinforcing the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, she took part in the sweep across the North Sea to a point outside the German minefields. From the accounts it seems as if she did not play any part in the main action between the fleets and seems to have been an onlooker.

At Christmas time the Admiralty gave permission for a flag presented to Captain Webb by Nga Tahu which was the 1834 independence flag. This is a very unusual and unofficial flag to have been flown on a warship of the same name.
the Royal Navy. The Christmas card sent to New Zealand in 1917 from the battlecruiser features three ratings drinking from mugs labelled Jutland, Heligoland and Dogger Bank with the motto “another little drink wouldn’t do us any harm”.

On 21 November 1918 [Der Tag] the ship was present for the surrender of the High Seas Fleet joined aboard by Australian representatives. The New Zealand flag was displayed at the starboard yardarm for the occasion. The surrendered SMS Derfflinger was assigned to New Zealand boarding parties.

So what are we to make of this? The Dominion’s Gift had a proud war service and was indeed a very lucky ship when the fate of the battlecruisers is considered. It is amazing to think that two Royal Navy Captains would wear a native grass skirt and a token in that two Royal Navy Captains would wear a native grass skirt and a token in the psyche of the ship’s company in wartime.

Despite never visiting home during the war and having few New Zealanders serving in the ship, the gift warship always maintained its identity as a New Zealand battlecruiser through the strong links with the Dominion, reporting in the local papers, fundraising for the men, and personal contacts. At the battles of Heligoland Bight, Dogger Bank and Jutland, the gift battlecruiser repaid the smallest and proudest Dominion with honour and glory. And so our lucky ship defended the freeland, guarded Pacific’s triple star from the shafts and strife of the war at sea, and made the throbbing extremity of the Maritime Empire’s praises heard afar.

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Michael Wynd is a researcher at the Navy Museum in New Zealand.

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**Namesake:** Dominion of New Zealand
**Builder:** Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering, Govan
**Laid down:** 20 June 1910
**Launched:** 1 July 1911
**Commissioned:** 19 November 1912
**Struck:** 19 December 1922
**Fate:** Sold for scrap, 19 December 1922

**General characteristics**
**Class & type:** Indefatigable-class battlecruiser
**Displacement:** 18,500 long tons (18,800 t) at normal load
22,130 long tons (22,490 t) at deep load
**Length:** 590 ft 3.5 in (179.9 m)
**Beam:** 80 ft (24.4 m)
**Draught:** 27 ft (8.2 m)
**Installed power:** 44,000 shp (33,000 kW)
**Propulsion:** Four-shaft Parsons direct-drive steam turbines
31 Babcock & Wilcox water-tube boilers
**Speed:** 25 knots (46 km/h; 29 mph)
**Range:** 6,690 nautical miles (12,390 km; 7,700 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph)
**Complement:** 800
**Armament:** 4 × 2 - 8L 12-inch Mk X guns
16 × 1 - 8L 4-inch Mk VII guns
2 × 1 - submerged 18-inch torpedo tubes
**Armour:** Belt: 4–6 in (102–152 mm)
**Decks:** 1–2.5 in (25–64 mm)
**Barbettes:** 7 in (178 mm)
**Turrets:** 7 in (178 mm)
**Conning tower:** 4–10 in (102–254 mm)
**Torpedo bulkheads:** 2.5 in (64 mm)

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1916, p. 8.
6 Marlborough Express, *Volume XLVIII*, Issue 157, 7 July 1914, p. 5.
The piece had been run in the *Pall Mall Gazette* by their ‘naval expert’.
7 This is the best guess of the museum. Te Papa Museum has a large piece of greenstone that was donated and returned to New Zealand when she was scrapped.
8 Diary of Mrs Joan Wood, entry for Monday 4 December 1933 [provided by John Wood]
9 Both men’s medals are in the Museum’s collection.
11 Beatty’s Despatch No. 28948 on the Battle of Heligoland Bight dated 1 September 1914. His flagship was *HMS Lion*
12 Copy of letter from Lionel Halsey, dated 17 February 1939 in the Museum’s collection.
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13 Marlborough Express, Volume XLVIII, Issue 225, 24 September 1914, p. 8. See also article published on 10 September 1914, p. 5.
14 Marlborough Express, Volume XLVIII, Issue 213, 10 September 1914, p. 5.
16 Colonialist, Volume: LVI Issue 13565, 4 September 1914, p. 6. Halsey sent a telegram to New Zealand to ‘inform the women of New Zealand that their ensign flew on board HMS New Zealand during the action of Heligoland.
20 Hawera & Normandy Star, Volume LXIX, 9 January 1915, p. 5.
21 Hawera & Normandy Star, Volume LXIX, 9 January 1915, p. 5.
25 ‘The North Sea Fight’, Grey River Argus, 4 March 1915 that carried a report of Beauty’s Despatch. See also a transcript of Beauty’s Despatch No. 29088 on the Battle of Dogger Bank dated 2 February 1915. HMS Indomitable was also given credit for her efforts and was signalled by Beauty in appreciation for its speed.
26 Beauty’s Despatch No. 29088 on the Battle of Dogger Bank dated 2 February 1915.
50 This is on display in the Museum.
57 Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2941, 29 November 1916, p. 6.
60 Grant Howard, *The Navy in New Zealand: An Illustrated History*, Wellington: Reed, 1981, p. 31. Other accounts state it was 420.
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71 Marlborough Express, Volume L, Issue 136, 10 June 1916, p. 5.
74 Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 15, 12 October 1917, p. 5.
76 HMS New Zealand, Dominion, Volume II, Issue 223, 8 June 1918, p. 9.
77 Hawera & Normandy Star, Issue LXIV, 19 February 1918, p. 5.
Admiral Helfrich RNN, Captain Waller RAN, Captain Rooks USN & the Loss of HMAS Perth and USS Houston

BY MATTHEW B WILLS

The individual with the greatest responsibility for the loss of HMAS Perth and USS Houston was a Dutch admiral who was in overall command of all Allied warships during the Battle of the Java Sea (27 February 1942) and Battle of the Sundra Strait (28 February 1942 to 1 March 1942). Admiral Helfrich, born in Java, undoubtedly felt closer emotional ties to the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) than he did to distant Holland.

Unlike France, who surrendered to Germany, the Netherlands continued her war with Germany after that country was overrun. On 13 May 1940 Queen Wilhelmina narrowly avoided capture by boarding a British destroyer which took her and her family to England. The Netherlands set up a government-in-exile in London. Most of its small but modern Navy escaped destruction as did the Netherlands’ large merchant marine.

By far the Netherlands East Indies were that country’s most important colony and their Navy was assigned the task of defending that far-flung archipelago. The obvious threat was from Japan. Admiral Helfrich was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all Dutch naval forces in the East Indies. His largest warships were Java (launched in 1921), De Ruyter (1935) and Tromp, dating from 1937. Of the three De Ruyter was his most powerful. Her main armament consisted of seven 5.9-inch guns. For a ship that was commissioned pre-war she was exceptionally well equipped with antiaircraft guns. She had ten 40mm AA in twin mountings and eight 12.7mm AA also in twin mountings. Admiral Helfrich was justly proud of De Ruyter. In 1942 she would become the flagship of an Allied striking force in the Battle of the Java Sea, the largest surface engagement since the Battle of Jutland.

Long before the Japanese onslaught Admiral Helfrich had ambitious plans for expanding the size of the Navy and the capacity of his main naval base at Surabaya on the island of Java. In the spring of 1941 a correspondent for National Broadcasting Company and a writer for National Geographic magazine, Dee Bredin, spent several weeks in Java. She was extended every courtesy by the NEI government in part because she was born in Sumatra and spoke Dutch fluently. She learned that the Dutch manufactured their own shells and mines. At the Surabaya Naval Base she went aboard one of the Navy’s brand new all-steel torpedo motorboats that had been built in Java.

Ms Bredin was given an interview by Admiral Helfrich who showed her the plans for a new naval base three times the size of the present one. In her article for the National Geographic magazine she quoted Admiral Helfrich:

‘This one [the new naval base] will accommodate the biggest Allied warships. A whole river is being diverted in the construction, but that is no problem for a Dutch engineer.’

In the spring of 1941 Admiral Helfrich had no way of knowing that before the year was out the US Navy would lose four battleships in a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the Royal Navy would lose one of its newest battleships and a battle cruiser in the South China Sea with the consequence that no American or British battleships would be available to reinforce the Dutch Navy.

The only Australian ship to participate in the Battle of the Java Sea was HMAS Perth, a light cruiser armed with eight 6-inch guns in twin turrets and eight 21-inch torpedo tubes in quadruple mountings.

Her captain, Hec Waller, was considered by the British and by his peers as one of the most distinguished captains in the Royal Australian Navy. He had won his spurs commanding a division of destroyers in the Mediterranean. He quickly came to the attention of Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean fleet. In his autobiography Cunningham recounted Waller’s role in HMAS Stuart on 22 January 1941. Cunningham wrote:

Captain Waller, Royal Australian Navy, in the Stuart with the destroyers Vampire and Defender, broke into the outer defences at Tobruk at dawn on January 22nd, and by midday the town and harbour were in our hands. This naval attack coincided with a land attack by the 6th Australian Division. Cunningham’s greatest victory over the Italian fleet was the Battle of Matapan. The British admiral was fully apprised of Stuart’s participation...
in an exciting night action between 10:25 pm and 11:36 pm on 28 March 1941. Ironically, exactly one year later in the South Pacific Waller, as Captain of HMAS Perth, would fight his final battle.

In the latter part of 1941 Captain Waller relieved Commander Sir Philip Bower-Smyth RN in command of HMAS Perth. The Australian Naval Board had intended to retain Perth in the ANZAC area until HMAS Canberra, an 8-inch gun cruiser, had completed her refit; however due to an urgent request from Washington Perth was allotted to the ABDA (American, British, Dutch, and Australian) area for the desperate effort to save Java.

Ultimately Perth would become part of a strike force which would include the Dutch cruiser De Ruyter (flag), the British heavy cruiser Exeter and the American heavy cruiser Houston. The US ship was under the command of one of the US Navy’s best and brightest, Captain Albert Harold Rooks.

Captain Rooks, who had graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1914, had made captain in February 1941 and seemed bound for flag rank. On 30 August 1941 Captain Rooks relieved Captain Jesse B. Oldendorf as commanding officer of Houston in a ceremony in Manila Harbour. She was the flagship of the US Asiatic fleet; she would be a prime target of the Japanese in the event of war.

In 1941 few American naval officers faced such odds as did Captain Rooks. Unless the US Asiatic fleet was immediately reinforced by the main battle fleet at Pearl Harbor there was no possibility of a successful engagement with Japanese cruisers, much less with Japanese battleships.

American naval historians have never questioned Captain Rooks’ fitness to command Houston. One of them described him:

By acclamation Rooks was one of the brightest lights to wear four gold bars in the pre-war US Navy. He had been Admiral Hart’s aide when the Asiatic fleet boss was superintendent of the Naval Academy. On the teaching staff at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island in 1940, Rooks showed a keen analytical mind, and it was with no evident sarcasm that colleagues called him the second coming of the great naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan. In the few months since taking over the Houston in Manila, the quietly authoritative skipper had moved out of the shadow of a beloved predecessor and won, it seems, a reputation as a sort of minor deity.3

Houston’s last two battles were surface engagements which she fought without the benefit of her after turret. The loss of one third of her main armament was caused by a 500 lb. bomb dropped from a Japanese naval aircraft, a G3M Nell, the same aircraft type instrumental in sinking the Prince of Wales and Repulse two months earlier.

The day after Houston absorbed the Japanese bomb Admiral Hart, who commanded the naval component of ABDA which included American, British, Dutch and Australian ships, received a telegram from Admiral Ernest J. King, the commander of the United States fleet, urging him to request that he be relieved of his command for health reasons and yield his command to Admiral Helfrich.

The overall commander of ABDA, Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, had lost confidence in Hart and had conveyed his concern to Churchill. Indeed Hart had lost confidence in himself. There is historical evidence that Hart, who was 64, felt that he was too old for the demands of his job.

A few days after King’s telegram Helfrich became the top naval commander of all Allied ships operating in the theatre. Helfrich had wanted the top job all along and had bitterly resented having to serve under a foreigner in his own country.

In the next few weeks Helfrich would make the decision that would seal the fate of Perth and Houston. He was determined to use Perth, Houston and Exeter together with his own light cruisers to attack any Japanese invasion fleet that approached Java. What would be the consequences in the event that such attack failed? Unless this makeshift, multinational force destroyed the Japanese the remnants of Helfrich’s fleet might well be trapped in the Java Sea.
The escape routes were the Sundra Strait west of Java, the Bali Strait east of Java, and the Lombok Strait east of Bali. The Bali Strait was too shallow for ships larger than destroyers. The other two straits would not remain open for any appreciable time. The Japanese had sufficient naval assets in the area to close the Sundra Strait and the Lombok Strait whenever they chose to do so.

The Battle of the Java Sea lasted from 1616 to midnight on 27 February 1942. Admiral Doorman, who had been placed in command by Helfrich, made valiant efforts to destroy that Japanese fleet consisting of two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and 10 to 15 destroyers. The Dutch admiral was severely handicapped by the lack of a common code of tactical signals and by a multinational force that had not had the opportunity to work together.

The almost simultaneous loss of Java and De Ruyter guaranteed a decisive Japanese victory. Both ships were hit by Long Lance torpedoes at about 2300. Java blew up and sank almost immediately. De Ruyter sank after she had been dead in the water for 40 minutes. Admiral Doorman went down with his ship. Exeter had already departed the scene due to extensive damage to a boiler from an 8-inch shell. Captain Waller was now the senior officer afloat and, therefore, the commander of the now sadly depleted strike force.

Neither Houston nor Perth had been seriously damaged in this eight-hour battle. Immediately after taking command of the force Captain Waller issued the order to break off the engagement and to steam to Tanjung Priok, the port for Batavia. Captain Waller clearly made the right decision.

He had no destroyers. Houston’s six 8-inch guns were no match for the twenty 8-inch guns of the Japanese heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro. Furthermore, Perth and Houston were getting low on fuel and they had both expended most of the shells for their 6-inch and 8-inch guns. Long afterward Helfrich would claim that Waller, by breaking off the engagement, had disobeyed his orders to engage and destroy the enemy. His claim failed to appreciate the impossible situation with which Waller was faced.

Helfrich could have played a vital role in facilitating Captain Waller’s efforts to extract Perth and Houston from the deadly Java Sea. He could have ordered them to proceed to the Sundra Strait as soon as possible. He could have ordered that Perth and Houston be refuelled forthwith. He could have, perhaps, provided these ships with limited fighter cover. Most importantly he could have informed Captain Waller and Captain Rooks of the most recent Dutch intelligence. Admiral Helfrich did none of this.

From approximately 1330 to approximately 1900 Perth and Houston languished in the Tanjung Priok harbour where they were sitting ducks for Japanese dive bombers. They were unable to obtain 6-inch and 8-inch shells because there were none available. The Dutch ships used 5.9-inch shells. There was difficulty in refuelling because the Dutch authorities had been ordered to save fuel for the Dutch warships. Eventually Perth got enough fuel to bring her bunkers to half capacity. Houston received somewhat less.

The last meeting between the Australian captain and the American captain took place ashore. They were taken by staff car to the British Naval Liaison Office in Batavia. The office was in a building that also housed the headquarters of Maj. Gen. Wijbrandus Schilling, commander of the Dutch East Indies First Army in western Java. Schilling possessed the latest Dutch air intelligence on the sightings of Japanese ships, but Waller and Rooks never saw him.

Schilling was an expert horseman who had represented his country in the 1936 summer Olympics. He was apparently a youthful and brave officer, but it was the worst of times for the Dutch. When the ABDA command was dissolved on 25 February Helfrich, Schilling and the other senior officers in the Dutch military knew that their situation was virtually hopeless.

While Waller and Rooks were receiving their intelligence briefing from an unknown Royal Navy officer
they could hardly have failed to be aware of the pervasive atmosphere of defeatism in the military command centre. After receiving word that the Sundra Strait was clear Waller and Rooks returned to their respective ships. Each was in a state of near exhaustion from the stress of battle and lack of sleep. These two exceptional captains never saw one another again.

As they steamed out of the harbour, with Perth in the lead, ‘Captain Waller … received new air intelligence of an enemy convoy (ten transports escorted by two cruisers and their destroyers) about 50 miles north-east of Batavia at 4.00 pm steering east.’

Waller discussed this report with his navigator, Lieutenant JA Harper RN. They agreed that it was unlikely that these Japanese warships would trouble Perth and Houston because they had a convoy to look after.

Was there a window of opportunity for these two proud vessels to reach Sundra Strait earlier that day? On a straight course the distance from Batavia’s port to the entrance of the Sundra Strait is less than 80 miles. One nautical mile equals approximately 1.15 statute miles. If both ships steamed at 25 knots they could have reached the strait in approximately 2 ¾ hours. Assuming a departure time of 1500 Perth and Houston would have arrived at the entrance to the strait at 1745, not long before the brief tropical twilight. The most that can be said is they might have avoided the Japanese invasion fleet which did not enter Bantam Bay until shortly after 2200.

That night Perth and Houston hugged the Java coast. The sea was calm, the air still; there was a clear sky and full moon. Around 2330 Houston sent a signal that was the last from either ship. It was sent to Admiral Glassford (senior American naval officer in Java) to the commander of the Sixteenth Naval District, to Radio Corregidor, and to the Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Rooks sent out three words: ‘ENEMY FORCES ENGAGED.’

Perth and Houston’s only advantage was their sudden appearance that totally surprised the Japanese. With a surfeit of targets it was difficult for Captain Waller and Captain Rooks to take full advantage of the situation. The quiet night was completely transformed into a battle scene the like of which few of the participants had ever seen before. The noise of guns firing and shells exploding was overwhelming. As Perth zigzagged on a north-westerly course she fired everything she had, her eight 6-inch guns, her eight 4-inch guns, and her torpedo tubes. Houston astern of Perth made good use of her two forward turrets and her secondary armament of eight 5-inch guns. Houston had no torpedo tubes.

It is impossible to know exactly how many hits the guns of the two ships inflicted on the Japanese ships. The Japanese reported their entire losses as one minesweeper and one troop transport and several vessels seriously damaged. It is believed that three other transports were sunk but later salvaged. The Houston in the last stage of the battle sank two enemy motor torpedo boats.

Around midnight Captain Waller learned that very little 6-inch ammunition remained. He decided to force a passage through Sundra Strait and ordered full speed and set a course for Toppers Island. At five minutes past midnight a torpedo struck on the starboard side knocking out the forward engine room. After a brief interval when Perth was steaming at reduced speed a second torpedo struck...
under the bridge also on the starboard side. Captain Waller ordered abandon ship to which Lieutenant PSF Hancox, his gunnery officer, asked: ‘Prepare to abandon ship, Sir?’ “No. Abandon ship.” The captain was last seen standing with his arms on the front of the bridge looking down at his silent guns that had no shells.

Houston’s first hit was to the forecastle that started a fire in the paint locker which was put out in 15 minutes. Houston was then hit by numerous other shells, none of which struck a vital point. When Captain Rooks saw Perth dead in the water and apparently sinking he realized that escape was impossible. He turned Houston back towards the transports determined to sell his ship dearly. At about 0015 Houston took a grievous hit from either a shell or a torpedo on the starboard side. This was the beginning of the end because it shattered the after engine room. When Houston’s Turret Two was struck by a heavy shell that failed to explode there was an intense array of sparks. These ignited powder bags causing a flash fire. Only seven of 58 men in Turret Two’s assembly escaped alive.

Moments later two enemy torpedo boats sped towards Houston from the starboard side. Houston’s 50 calibre machine gunners and 1.1-inch gunners sank both, but not before the second launched a torpedo that hit Houston forward of the catapult tower. The ship was already sinking, but this torpedo hit accelerated the end.

When the flames from Turret Two forced Captain Rooks to leave the conn he summoned the ship’s marine bugler and ordered, ‘Bugler, sound abandon ship.” Rooks was fatally wounded just as he descended a ladder from the signal bridge. He was struck in the head and the upper torso by a torrent of shrapnel.

Thus ended the lives of two gallant captains. Most of the details surrounding their final battles would not be known for three and one half years after the Japanese surrender. Captain Albert H Rooks US Navy was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor in June 1942. It was unusual for America’s highest military decoration to be awarded before the witnesses to his valour were carefully interviewed. Nevertheless the stories of Houston’s survivors that finally emerged were more than sufficient to persuade naval historian James D Hornfischer that Rooks richly deserved the Medal of Honor. Few historians would question his opinion that the final battle of Perth and Houston was “one of the great naval epics of this or any century.”

Captain Waller was not given his country’s highest military decoration. Awarding the Victoria Cross to Waller was reconsidered as recently as 2013. It was denied. It appears that the paramount reason for refusing to grant him the Victoria Cross was a lack of evidence from officers and rating whose action stations were near him during his ship’s final battle. Nothing, however, will gainsay his uncommon valour or his place of honour in the annals of the Royal Australian Navy.

Over sixty years ago a great admiral wrote of Waller:

Hector Macdonald Laws Waller will always remain in my mind as one of the very finest types of Australian naval officer. Full of good cheer, with a great sense of humour, undefeated and always burning to get at the enemy, he kept the old ships of his flotilla – the Stuart, Vampire, Vendetta, Voyager, Waterhen – hard at it always. Greatly loved and admired by everyone, his loss in HMAS Perth in the Java Sea in March, 1942, was a heavy deprivation for the young Navy of Australia. Well said, Sir.  

(Matthew B Wills is an historian based in Colorado, USA. His latest book In the Highest Traditions of the Royal Navy: The Life of Captain John Leach MVO DSO was favourably reviewed in The Times.)
In light of emerging trends in the regional strategic environment, Australia and Indonesia should expand their defence cooperation in the maritime domain.

Sharing a long maritime boundary, Australia and Indonesia should mate their futures together at sea. The maritime security challenges that both nations face mainly revolve around non-traditional security issues, particularly people smuggling, illegal fishing, and marine pollution. However, in light of three inter-related emerging trends in the regional strategic environment, both countries should move beyond these to expand their defence cooperation in the maritime domain.

New emerging trends

First, as noted in the white paper "Australia in the Asian Century" the world’s economy is gradually gravitating toward Asia, which gives more strategic weight to the region. As a result, many regional countries, including Australia and Indonesia, are modernising their militaries, with a priority on maritime capabilities. A US naval analysis firm, AMI International, projects that Asia-Pacific navies will spend a combined US$180 billion on almost 800 new ships, surface craft, and submarines through 2031.

While military modernisation is a legitimate consequence of economic rise, it could provoke misunderstanding and miscalculation if not cautiously deployed. In response to this trend, the US has engaged in the “rebalancing,” including repositioning more maritime forces in Asia, to maintain regional stability. Second, the military rebalancing also emphasises Australia’s role as a US ally. Aside from the US Marines deployed in Darwin, the rebalancing also involves rotational deployments of US navy and air force in Western Australia and Northern Territory.

While the rebalancing has been well-publicised throughout the region, some countries are still suspicious of an increased US regional military presence, especially China. Beijing could respond by, for example, conducting surveillance activities within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of countries which host US military forces, like Australia. These kind of activities would require China’s maritime forces, particularly submarines, to expand into the Indian Ocean through the Indonesian archipelago.

Third, the Indonesian archipelagic waters could become more saturated by transiting foreign maritime forces, particularly along the maritime chokepoints like the Sunda and Lombok Straits. Owing to their greater depth and lesser commercial shipping traffic than the Malacca Strait, the Sunda and Lombok Straits offer an attractive transit alternative for maritime forces. For instance, the Lombok Strait has the required depth for operations and safe navigation of nuclear submarines. Besides the US, Chinese and Indian nuclear submarines might also transit these straits to conduct patrols along the Indo-Pacific rim. A recent Indian Navy report, which confirmed Chinese submarine operations in the Indian Ocean, further supports this possibility.

As a result, the Sunda and Lombok Straits, as well as the maritime areas along the Australia-Indonesia boundary, could become more crowded with submarines and other types of maritime forces from different countries. These maritime areas, however, form the backyards of littoral states Australia and Indonesia, which have direct interests at stake. For example, a collision between opposing maritime units, like nuclear submarines, could result in politically and militarily destabilising consequences which undermine the security of littoral states, apart from creating an environmental disaster.

Moreover, these areas harbour a large number of offshore infrastructures, which could risk collateral damage from incidents at sea between naval forces.
Maritime strategic partnership

In response to these trends, Australia and Indonesia should deepen defence cooperation in the maritime domain, especially along their shared maritime boundary, as provided for by Article 14 of the 2006 Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation Framework Agreement, also known as the Lombok Treaty.

At the strategic level, both governments should form a maritime strategic partnership and strategic discussion forum, to complement the existing meetings of foreign and defence ministers, as well as annual military leaders’ meetings.

To start with, both countries could hold more substantive and frank discussions leading to a genuine ‘strategic trust’ about the potential implications of Australia’s role in the US military rebalancing for Indonesia’s national security, as well as China’s potential military responses. More importantly, they should conduct mutual strategic consultation with regards to specific responses to these trends. For example, there should be a consultation about whether and how they could be militarily involved in regional flashpoints, such as the territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas.

At the operational and tactical levels, both countries may translate their strategic initiatives into joint operational arrangements. For example, a joint maritime surveillance system could improve mutual situational awareness, which should include a joint operational command and control centre. Manned by defence personnel from both countries, this centre could coordinate the activities of military surveillance assets, such as ships, aircraft, and radar systems, to generate a common picture of mutually designated surveillance areas, such as the Timor Sea and southern approaches of the Lombok Strait.

For instance, Australia’s future acquisitions of high-end surveillance platforms, such as the Triton drones and P-8A Poseidon aircraft, could support Indonesia’s awareness over the waters to its south. Joint maritime warfare training and exercises could contribute to enhanced interoperability in a combat environment, specifically in undersea warfare. Indonesia could also participate in the US-Australia bilateral security arrangements, such as trilateral naval exercises in the Indian Ocean.

As Indonesia and Australia also plan to field a large submarine fleet, they should discuss the possibility of bilateral submarine search and rescue (SAR) cooperation. Finally, a joint maritime doctrine planning should be contemplated to ensure smooth operational and tactical collaboration between their maritime forces during joint deployments.

Potential challenges

Challenges to such a deep partnership should be expected, especially on the Indonesian side. Many would criticise and protest that Indonesia has abandoned its “free and active” foreign policy by joining a coalition to contain China’s military rise. Like Australia, Indonesia might well reject choosing between the US and China. However, juggling between Washington and Beijing indefinitely is also impossible. Indonesia’s central position along the Indo-Pacific rim means it could be caught in the crossfire should there be a Sino-US conflict. By partnering with Canberra, Jakarta could at least have a cushioning buffer down under from the potential flashpoints to its north.

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Scurvy: A Story of Medical Adventure & Bureaucratic Nonsense

‘The use of the juice of Lemmons is a precious medicine and well tried, being sound and good; let it have the chief place, for it will deserve it’ - John Woodall (1556-1643) Surgeon-General of the East India Company

BY COMMANDER STEWART DUNNE RAN

In perusing maritime and naval history the enthusiast is almost always drawn to feats of exploration and naval battles. In deciphering how battles were won, often thoughts turn to a commander’s decisions, superior forces and tactics or just plain luck.

Similarly, nautical exploration featured exploits of superior navigation, incredible curiosity and tenacity. Arguably the greatest determining factor in naval warfare and exploration for a great period of nautical history was disease and in particular scurvy.

Scurvy was responsible for more deaths at sea than storms, shipwreck, combat and all other diseases combined. Historians have conservatively estimated that more than two million sailors perished from scurvy during the Age of Sail - a period that began with Columbus’s voyages across the Atlantic and ended with the development of steam power and its adaptation for engines on ships in the mid-nineteenth century.

Noting the effect this disease had on voyages and campaigns, it must follow that those that worked towards a cure of such a devastating disease must rate alongside other maritime heroes, such as Nelson and John Harrison, but their efforts often are lost amongst the romanticism of other aspects of maritime history and naval warfare and the feats of well known heroes.

This article sheds some light on the scourge of scurvy, its historical significance and those that strove to cure it. While it centres primarily on the European experience it is interesting to compare the experiences of Asian mariners. Unfortunately the scope will not allow further investigation but I commend Mathieu Tork’s work into food provisioning and scurvy in the military and maritime history of China and wider East Asia as an informative and educative source.

The medical science history of most disease shows that its understanding and eventual treatment/cure typically goes through four phases. First is the description of the symptoms or presentation of a disease, more often than not of an unknown cause. Second may be the chance discovery of remedies for the disease. This is often followed by the identification of the specific cause of the malady, which again is not always obvious. Relevant to this particular period, the arrived at approach must fit the accepted concept of disease treatment among medical practitioners of that specific time.

The final phase is finding the mechanism of action or cause of the disease so that the affliction can be completely understood. Norton in his treatise, Maritime Occupational Disease, highlights that scurvy is a classic example of this linkage, but what makes the disease somewhat unique is the impact and relationship of scurvy to the maritime history of the western world.

A mariner, in particular the sailor, had to be tough to survive the rigours of service in a ship of the line or a merchantmen in the days of sail. He lived in acute discomfort in overcrowded ships, and that his food was insufficient and unwholesome and his pay was negligible can be deduced from the manning and victualling figures of the earliest surviving naval inventories.

It wasn’t until Victorian times that the lot of the mariner started to progress, bringing improvements to pay and health care, in the provision of uniform and regular leave and in the habitability of ships. While earlier journeys at sea were short, the conditions onboard were of no real account and could be managed, particularly with provisioning. As exploration flourished and empires grew, the vast distances travelled and the time needed to undertake them made the problem of diet and food storage difficult to solve. As a result, the ordinary sailor’s food at sea was always scarce and frequently putrid. Salt beef, salt fish, beer, biscuit and cheese were staple items, offering the best hope of preservation, but often it didn’t.

The difficulty of long term storage was often exacerbated by the quality of the foodstuffs procured in the first instance, where margins were kept at a minimum. For example, beer was brewed without hops and often quickly soured and promoted disease such as enteritis.

Not only did the quality of victuals suffer, quantity was lacking, often seeing a portion greatly reduced from that required for healthy living. The victualling and allocation of provisions also did not take into account wastage from decay and putrefaction. The lack of food and its poor quality led to a degenerating cycle, where weakened men became more susceptible to disease, exacerbated by the food they consumed.

In 1565, the agent victualler was paid four pence halfpenny per day per man in harbour and five pence per day per man whilst at sea. In 1587, the sum paid was sixpence halfpenny and seven pence, in spite of the cost of living having doubled. (Kemp, p.4)
While often calorie intake was sufficient and vitamin levels were adequate early in a voyage, perishable foods were quickly consumed and the diet at sea became monotonous and uneven.

The Rules of Oleron, introduced in 1154 into England by Eleanor of Aquitaine, established for the sailor certain rights of care, but long voyages only allowed for this to be undertaken onboard ships barely suitable to live in let alone recover from illness.\(^5\) Article VII of the Rules of Oleron stated:

If it happens that sickness seizes on any one of the mariners, while in the service of the ship, the master ought to set him ashore, to provide lodging and candlelight for him, and also to spare him one of the shipboys, or hire a woman to attend him, and likewise to afford him such diet as is usual in the ship; that is to say, so much as he had on shipboard in his health, and nothing more, unless it please the master to allow it him; and if he will have better diet, the master shall not be bound to provide it for him, unless it be at the mariner’s own cost and charges.\(^6\)

The code of maritime law dealt mainly with the rights and responsibilities of ship’s captains in relation to discipline, mutiny, pay, cargoes, sickness on board, pilotage and similar matters. They were subsequently codified into the Black Book of Admiralty in 1336.\(^7\)

Cramped conditions, poor food and fetid conditions below decks led to much disease. Often these were compounded by the effects of battle. In these times, one dreaded illness was that used in merchantmen.\(^8\) Inhibiting maritime enterprise and cruelly debilitating and then killing mariners, this curse was scurvy and in the first twenty years of Elizabeth’s reign it was estimated that 10000 men had died from this disease alone.

All of the conditions above were merely symptoms of a larger societal norm, where living and health conditions were not often better and the treatment of disease often left unchallenged. The proliferation of scurvy in Admiralty ships lasted longer than was needed due to a level of intransigence in supporting a cure.

We know now that scurvy is caused by a deficiency of vitamin C\(^2\) and that the provision of fresh fruit and vegetables is a remedy, but this was not fully acted upon until the late 1700’s, with the British Admiralty seemingly unwilling to address the issue. Kemp, in his novel The British Sailor, goes further stating that the Admiralty view was that scurvy was an automatic hazard of the sea which had to be accepted.\(^9\) Although Lind’s treatise, The Diseases of Seamen, and other illustrious scholars like Robert Boyle publicised the worth of lemons as a cure, this was not enacted as a Fleet wide initiative for many years. Ship’s captains often took up medical advice as an individual prerogative. Unfortunately the term “scurvy” became generic for a number of ills especially nutritional deficiencies exhibiting similar symptoms and outcomes. This imprecision in diagnosis made tracing scurvy’s appearance and treatment in the medical literature of the time very confusing.\(^10\)

Lind wasn’t the first to identify the effects of citrus juice on the symptoms of scurvy. There is enough evidence to suggest that remedies existed reasonably early into the start of long ocean voyages – during Vasco De Gama’s voyage in 1497 the disease was treated with citrus fruits, Jacque Cartier used spruce bark and leaves in 1536 and oranges and lemons were used on a voyage to the West Indies in 1564.\(^11\) Similar observations were made by Dutch seafarers throughout the 16th Century.

but sources of fruit were often elusive and as raised before, storage for the long term was problematic.\(^12\) In 1590, Sir Richard Hawkins bought hundreds of citrus fruits for his crew whilst in Brazil and remonstrated:

that which I have seen most fruitful is sower oranges and lemons….. I wish some learned man would write of it, for it is the plague of the sea, and the spoyle of mariners. Doubtlesse, it would be a meritorious work with God and man, and most beneficial for our countrie, for in twenty yeares, since that I have used the sea, I dare not take it upon me to give accoumt of ten thousand consumed with the disease.\(^13\)\(^14\)

The difficulty was that to some extent learned medical men and scientists essentially obscured the known facts of proven ad hoc and informal medical trials at sea, which had been documented but not scientifically proven.

By the 17th Century there were numerous, frequent reports of cures by citrus and other fruits, vegetables and plants.\(^15\) The therapeutic properties of citrus fruits and other fresh fruits and vegetables were known to another famous English seafarer, James Lancaster. In 1600 he was given command of the

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2 Fundamentally the essential food factor is ascorbic acid that in adequate quantities prevents and cures the disease.
Scurvy: A Story of Medical Adventure & Bureaucratic Nonsense

East India Company’s first fleet which sailed from Torbay on 22 April 1601, and conducted probably the first controlled scurvy trial. On the recommendation of natural scientist Sir Hugh Platt, Lancaster embarked lemon juice on his flagship Red Dragon, which was dispensed to his crew of 202 each day.

The other three platforms in the fleet did not partake due to a provisioning error. Whilst there were essentially equal amounts of deaths on each of the vessels due to provisioning during the voyage, what did emerge from the experience was an understanding of the problem of the loss of efficacy of citrus juices over time.16 The Dutch East India Company kept scurvy at bay by the same means and also planted fruit trees along the Cape of Good Hope where its ships stopped to reprovision.17 In contrast, there was also a persistent belief that scurvy was caused by damp or fetid air, lazy sailors or overcrowding.

In 1607, Sir Hugh Platt, published a book on the provisions and foodstuffs of seaman which identified lemon juice as an infallible cure, based largely on Lancaster’s and others experiences. This ‘evidence’ was at odds with and challenged by the unyielding adherence of the profession to Galen’s Theory of Humours, which essentially precluded any view that an ailment could be caused by the deficiency of a crucial ingredient rather than the presence of something harmful. Galen’s Theory of Humours was derived from the ancient medical works of the Greek medical practitioner, and influenced western medicine well into the 19th century. The theory substantiated that within every individual there were humours or principal fluids (black bile, yellow bile, phlegm and blood) produced by various organs in the body, which had to be in balance for a person to remain healthy.18 The balance of humours in humans could be achieved by diet, medicines and by bloodletting using leeches or the scalpel.

John Woodall, a long serving ship’s surgeon, delivered an influential and perceptive work in 1617 – The Chirurgeon’s Mate – in which he favoured fresh food and plenty of alcohol as a means to preserving health, with lemon juice, and failing that lime or orange juice or tamarind pulp, as the prime remedy for scurvy. Woodall’s work was interesting as he later became the first Surgeon-General of the East India Company and later again a surgeon at St Bartholomew’s Hospital in London. The cure for scurvy was a medical idea that was picked up and run with by numerous persons over the course of maritime medical history, in a revolving pattern. By the middle of the 1700’s, England’s scientific and medical community had for the most part arrived at the belief that fresh fruit and vegetables, particularly citrus varieties, could cure scurvy.19 The challenge still lay in establishing the cause of the disease.

Anson’s voyage of 1740-1744 reiter-ated this need. In his circumnavigation of the world, centuries of experience of mariners was essentially ignored by the Admiralty and instead the advice of the College of Physicians was taken which led to the fleet being supplied with elixir of vitriol – a mixture of sulphuric acid, alcohol, sugar and spices – with the view that the value of citrus fruits lay in their acidic nature.20 This of course had dire effects with Anson’s fleet of six warships and two supply ships carrying 1854 men, returning to England with only one ship crewed by 188 men. Nine hundred and ninety-seven of the 1415 deaths were attributed to scurvy and only four to battle. While Anson was feted as a hero on his return, the voyage had a significant impact upon him and drove a need to reform within the Admiralty. It was likely his patronage and influence enabled James Lind to undertake his investigation into scurvy and publicise the results.21 The very high mortality rate during Anson’s circumnavigation in 1740–4 did much to emphasise the importance of this disease to mariners. Most physicians ignored evidence of the lay therapy use of oranges and lemons to overcome the disease, favouring instead extant, baseless theories or excessive or unnecessary polypharmacy. As discussed, one of the chief protagonists in this extensive but conflicting medical history was James Lind.

Lind initially joined the Royal Navy as a surgeon’s mate in 1739 and spent his first eight years solely at sea, which incorporated voyages to Africa, the Caribbean and the Mediterranean.

The longest intervals at sea were spent on patrol in the English Channel and it was these periods that provided the time to use and comment on the numerous treatments for scurvy and other ailments. This included the Admiralty endorsed Doctor James’ Fever Powder, concocted by Robert James who obtained his medical degree through royal mandate. Consisting of a concoction of antimony and phosphate of lime, John Millar in his Observations on Antimony (1774), claimed that Dr James’ Fever Powder was ineffective and dangerous. Anson’s voyage was similarly provisioned with another “remedy” peddled by William Cockburn called Electuary, which earned him influence and wealth but ultimately contributed to the deaths of many of Anson’s men. Lind was very aware of James and Cockburn’s position, of which the later believed that scurvy was caused by the ‘abidingly work-shy nature of sailors’.22

In 1746 Lind became surgeon on HMS Salisbury, and it was during this tenure that he conducted a small clinical trial in 1747 that established that scurvy was primarily a disease which could be cured by citrus fruits. He chose 12 sufferers of scurvy, at comparable stages of the disease and placed them in a controlled environment within the ship’s sickbay. With all having a similar diet, pairs were given individual treatments for two weeks of either a quart of cider a day, 25 drops of elixir vitriol three times a day, two spoonfuls of vinegar three times a day, a half-pint of seawater every day or a dose of electuary three times a day with none being cured. The exception was the pair that was given two oranges and one lemon every day for six days, with this pair showing the curative effects of the treatment.23

As detailed in his later work in 1753, A Treatise of the Scurvy, the results were that ‘sudden and visible good effects were perceived from the use of the oranges and lemons; one of those who had taken them being at the end of six days fit four duty . . . [I] observe that the result of all my experiments was that oranges and lemons were the most effectual remedies for this distemper at sea.’24

Lind left the Royal Navy in 1748, returning to his hometown of Edinburgh to work towards the academic award of his medical credentials and practice as a physician. This time was spent conducting a literature review of scurvy and expounding his views, eventually publishing his Treatise
dedicated to Anson, who provided much patronage and support. Jeremy Baron, in his article Sailor's scurvy before and after James Lind – a reassessment, highlights deficiencies in Lind's work. He particularly detailed Lind's lack of reference to works by other authors recommending citrus fruits as preventative cures. This deficiency included Woodall's publication *The Chirurgeon's Mate*, with its suggestion to provision ships with lemon juice to prevent scurvy.

Other commentators have criticised Lind's approach and his Treatise is often said to be monumental yet muddled, whereas Lind thought many written efforts on scurvy were nonsensical. Without a doubt Lind was a well-respected and successful physician, whose papers were often presented at renowned scientific and medical Society gatherings. His other published classics, on naval hygiene and tropical diseases, were equally highly regarded. Subsequent work by Gilbert Blane (1749–1834) and Thomas Trotter (1760–1832) established the accuracy of Lind's observations, with Blane's 1815 summary confirming the virtual disappearance of scurvy from the Royal Navy.

Lind's chief disappointment was perhaps his failure to persuade the influential and aristocratic regime that could have furthered his work and promoted his ideas. His self-effacing approach coupled with his support for his boiled citrus juice (which was largely ineffective as a cure) proved to defeat him again and again. Lind in recognising the need to maintain the effect of lemon juice for long voyages sought to preserve the curative power by urging the use of 'rob', an extract that was prepared by boiling orange and lemon juice into syrup that was then bottled for easy storage. While the result was added to rum or water and could be stored for years, the boiling process destroyed the ascorbic acid which was the active constituent that acted against scurvy.

It wasn't until years later that Lind had to accept that his process was flawed and he again championed the use of fresh fruit. Whereas Lind was on the right track, other more well placed interlocutors in the scurvy debate were not and as result the Admiralty recommended 'cures' such as MacBride's Malt rather than lemon juice as a scurvy prophylaxis even as late as the time of the voyages of Captain James Cook. Again, the Admiralty failed to appreciate the worth of citrus fruits. It was a blot on the naval administration of these years that it was left to individual captains to work out ways to combat disease onboard.

On Cook's first voyage of 1768-1771, there were three outbreaks of scurvy and renowned botanist, Sir Joseph Banks, cured his own bout of scurvy using a personal supply of lemon juice after taking the advice of Naval Surgeon Nathaniel Hulme to take his own supply on the voyage. Cook was asked to test a range of antiscorbutics on his three world voyages, but the lack of scurvy is best attributed to his insistence of the use of fresh vegetables and fruit at every opportunity.

Certainly from the 1760’s onwards it became increasingly accepted by mariners and naval physicians that Lind's remedy in using lemon juice was correct and more and more medical writers referred to it. Ironically, the slave trade still pervaded some maritime endeavours, for example, convicts being transported to Australia regularly suffered the effects.

An 8 December 1841 entry in Henry Mahon's (surgeon of the convict ship *Barossa*) journal shows vivid, remarkably intimate sketches in a report on scurvy. Each picture depicts the swellings, bruising and eruptions of scurvy in the groin and limbs of several of the convicts. In addition, the affliction was also common amongst the fledgling American navy and was reported by those sailing for the American gold rush and even whaling fleets well into the 19th Century. In 1867, Lachlan Rose patented a method used to preserve citrus juice without alcohol, creating a lime juice concentrate known as Rose's lime juice, which exists today. The Merchant Shipping
Act of that same year required all ships of the Royal Navy and Merchant Navy to provide a daily lime ration to sailors to prevent scurvy. Under the Act, it became compulsory for the ship's captain to provide lime juice of good quality to all men under his command.

The Act stipulated that only lime or lemon juice containing 15% of proper and palatable proof spirits obtained from a Bonded Warehouse was acceptable and that it must be accompanied by a Certificate signed by an Inspector appointed by the Board of Trade. The master of every ship was required to serve out an ounce of lime or lemon juice or other such anti-scorbutics every day to each member of the crew as soon as they have been at sea for 10 days, and during the remainder of the voyage, except when they were in harbour and supplied with fresh provisions. There was a sharp decline in the numbers of cases of scurvy admitted to naval hospitals after this Act had come into effect, but despite the stringent provisions outlined in the Act, cases of scurvy continued to be seen the world over, but at a lesser rate.

His statement is generous and apt, and quite rightly places this unlikely outcome, which saved countless lives, at the feet of those persons who worked towards a cure. The search for the treatment of scurvy, particularly at sea, is a story that mixes pioneering feats with medical officialdom often mired in bureaucratic stasis. This one disease profoundly affected early maritime history and warfare when much of the world was being explored and contributed to horrendous loss of life. Those that doggedly sought a cure should rate alongside other maritime heroes.

Commander Stewart Dunne joined the RAN in 1990, and served in a variety of postings, both at sea and ashore. In 1999 he completed the Hydrographic Officers Basic Course at Penguin, and is now a Charge qualified Hydrographic Surveyor. He has commanded an SML, MHC and an HS and is currently posted to HQOC as the Military Options Regional Planner. He has achieved a Master of International Relations from Deakin University and is currently studying towards a Master of Arts (Strategy and Security) through ADFA. He has never suffered from scurvy.

(Endnotes)

2. Ibid., p.58.  
4. Ibid., p. xiii.  

6. Ibid.  
9. Ibid., p.94.  

Bibliography


Ibid., p.119.

Cook, p. 225.


Service anchored in experience and skill

- Fleet operations and management
- Fleet maintenance and management
- Vessel and port services
- Integrated logistics management
- Marine systems support
- Vessel build and modification
- Maritime project management
- Maritime training
Admiral Sir John ‘Sandy’ Woodward, who has died aged 81, commanded the carrier battle group, Task Force 317.8, during the Falklands War in 1982.

In March 1982 Woodward was a rear admiral and as Flag Officer, First Flotilla commanded a group of ships on their spring exercise off Gibraltar. On March 29, as the news from the South Atlantic worsened, Woodward joined the Commander in Chief Fleet, John Fieldhouse in his temporary flagship, the destroyer Glamorgan. That evening, with Captain Mike Barrow, the captain of Glamorgan, they discussed ‘what if’ the Falkland Islands were to be invaded and they were asked to re-take them.

Argentina had long claimed the islands and on April 2, 1982, impatient at the progress of diplomatic talks and wishing to distract their people from domestic woes, the Argentine junta ordered their forces to invade the Falklands. Woodward divided his fleet, part to rush south immediately, others to follow, and yet others to return to the UK for more stores and ammunition.

Woodward’s problems were acute: while it was clear that the Argentines would not give in without a fight, he lacked good intelligence about the Argentine navy and air force, and even charts of the region. The time of year and the 8,000 miles distance to the islands gave only a two-month window in which to achieve success. No opportunity could be lost.

Other dice were stacked against him, as Woodward recalled: “The United States considered the recapture of the Falklands a military impossibility. The Ministry of Defence at Whitehall regarded the whole venture as simply too risky. The British Army considered the operation ill-advised because we didn’t out-number the Argentineans by enough on land to guarantee success. The Royal Air Force agreed with everyone else that the operation would fail because the RN couldn’t possibly survive in the face of an Argentine air onslaught. And of course the then Defence Secretary, John Nott, was against the operation because if it was a success it would prove that his decision to get rid of our assault ships and carriers in his 1981 Defence Review was wrong.”

On the other hand, his commanding officers and the staff at the Northwood headquarters of the Commander in Chief knew each other, had attended the same schools and courses, and read each others’ minds well. Also in his favour was the rapid development of Ascension as a logistics base, albeit still 2,500 miles away. And, of course, Woodward was the right man in the right man at the right time.

On the passage south Woodward visited as many ships as he could, though his message to the various ships’ companies of the destroyers and frigates was uncompromising: “You’ve taken the Queen’s shilling. Now you’re going to have to bloody earn it. And your best way of getting back alive is to do your absolute utmost. So go and do it.”

The war was a maritime campaign from beginning to end, characterised by a struggle for air superiority between Woodward’s ships and aircraft and the Argentine air force, and by a series of amphibious landings. On April 25 British forces recaptured South Georgia after sinking the Argentine submarine Santa Fe. Five days later Woodward’s ships closed the Falklands to begin a bombardment, and Sea Harriers from the carriers Hermes and Invincible attacked several targets, while an aerial battle continued over the islands in which three Argentine aircraft were shot down.

On May 1, the submarine Conqueror on patrol south of the islands sighted the light cruiser General Belgrano. Woodward sought a change to the rules of engagement which would allow Conqueror to open fire as he considered the cruiser and its escorts a threat to the British task force, and Conqueror, controversially, sank the Argentine warship. As a result the Argentine fleet remained in port for the rest of the war. Two days later, an anti-ship missile, launched from the air, struck the destroyer Sheffield, one of Woodward’s previous commands, setting her ablaze.

On May 21, the Royal Marines, reinforced by the army, landed at San Carlos, and on June 14 the ability of the Royal Navy to project power was amply demonstrated when the Argentines Port Stanley were compelled to surrender.

Woodward was seen by many as the architect of victory, but the victory was marred by there not being a ‘band of brothers’ at the Falklands. There were some who, from the outset, expressed their view that the Flag Officer Third Flotilla (in charge of carriers and amphibious shipping) should be in command of the Task Force and criticised Woodward’s tactics in deploying the carriers too far to the east of the islands. Woodward himself thought that some of his captains were not fitted for their role, and after the war he was dismayed to learn that it was policy that other officers, who had proved themselves in battle, would not be recognised by suitable appointments and promotion afterwards. However, there was a surprising empathy between the intellectual Woodward (who some thought too submariner-minded) and mavericks such as the air ace Sharkey Ward. Woodward strongly endorsed the importance of organic, maritime air power and warmly applauded the fighting achievements of Ward’s Sea Harriers.

Woodward was knighted KCB.
John Forster Woodward was born in Penzance on May 1, 1932, the son of a bank clerk, and educated at Stubbington House School, once known as the cradle of the Navy, and he entered the Royal Naval College Dartmouth in 1946.

As a junior officer Woodward spent time in the Home Fleet, before specialising as a submariner in 1954. He served in three generations of submarines: the Second World War vintage submarine Sanguine; the post-war designed, diesel-powered Porpoise; and Valiant, the second of Britain’s nuclear-powered submarines. In 1960 he passed the Navy's rigorous submarine command course, the 'Perisher', and commanded the diesel-powered submarines Tireless 1960-61 and Grampus. Subsequently he was second in command of the nuclear-powered Valiant, before promotion to commander when he became the officer-in-charge or 'teacher' on the 'Perisher'.

In December 1969 he took command of Warspite which was newly repaired after an underwater collision, according to government sources in northern waters with an 'iceberg': several members of the crew were still shaken by the incident and Woodward did much to restore their confidence in the safety of the boat and its manoeuvrability. He recalled that his nickname in submarines was 'Spock': “I was quite pleased because Spock does everything by logic.” Promoted to captain in 1972 he attended the Royal College of Defence Studies, where he did not like the paperwork, and in 1974, he became Captain of Submarine Training. In 1976 Woodward returned to general service, for the first time in over 20 years, to command the Type 42 guided missile destroyer Sheffield.

As Director of Naval Plans, 1978–81, during the Strategic Defence Review, also known as the Nott Review, in the first term of Margaret Thatcher's administration, Woodward had fought and lost John Nott's determination to meet the threat of Soviet forces in Germany at the expense of severe cuts to the Navy. The cuts included one-fifth of its destroyers and frigates, one aircraft carrier, which was to be sold to the Royal Australian Navy, and two amphibious ships, and the ice patrol ship Endurance whose declared withdrawal from the Antarctic cued the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in April 1982. Woodward felt keenly the irony that as Flag Officer, First Flotilla, 1981–83 he should have to clear up the mess created by politicians. After the Falklands war Woodward was Flag Officer Submarines and Commander Submarines Eastern Atlantic, 1983–84. His chief of staff recalled that he was a tremendous man to work for “I have very fond memories of him as the Flag Officer Submarines clearing the dining table after a jolly good lunch with his senior staff officers, spreading out large charts of the North Norwegian Sea and lying prone on the table top as we discussed and plotted our reaction to a breakout of Soviet submarines from the Barents Sea heading into the Atlantic. He was thoroughly in his element and he was just like one of the boys.”

Although Woodward had made prolific use of the radio-telephone during the war, talking to some of his subordinate commanders and to the Task Group Commander at Northwood, he never spoke to Mrs Thatcher. Indeed he did not come to know her until he was Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) 1985–88 when he attended several Cabinet meetings. At his first meeting, the Prime Minister’s advisers had not all taken their seats when she announced that she had read all the papers and began to explain what the government should do. Woodward realised that she had missed a point of detail and raised a hand to attract her attention: “If looks could kill, I was done for, but I persisted, gave her the information she had missed and bought time for the other officials to gather their wits before further decisions were made.” Woodward’s opinion of her skills was one of respect, but not of great liking. Later when a senior civil servant told him, “You were very lucky today. You interrupted the PM – most don’t survive that,” Woodward replied: “She was talking – and needed some fearless advice, which she got.” Woodward believed that his relations with Mrs Thatcher were founded on mutual respect, and he regarded her as the best top executive he had ever met.

Of politicians generally Woodward had no respect, believing that they did not have a clue about Defence,” and he was a virulent critic of the Coalition government’s Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2010.

His detractors thought he was a cold fish and were irritated by what they thought was private in him, paranoid, and school-masterly. He had an open mind and enjoyed vigorous debate, but could be ruthless if anybody argued against him without full possession of the facts. If Woodward lacked what is commonly thought of as the outward and visible signs of a leader, the wife of one of his officers in Warspite commented: “We may not like him very much, but we do expect to get our husbands back.” Those who knew him even better realised that he was sensitive, humorous, highly-intelligent and self-critical.

He had been a maths prodigy at school and an avid bridge player since school days. His personal philosophy was that a truly good leader should seek respect and regard any liking simply as profit. He was also modest and never sought to exploit his fame except in his memoirs, which are a frank account of the pressures on a commander fighting a war. One Hundred Days: the memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, co-written with Patrick Robinson, have been revised three times and are told with self-deprecatory humour.

His last appointment in the service was as Commander-in-Chief Naval Home Command, 1987–89 when he retired after 45 years in the Navy, aged 57, and he was knighted GBE. In retirement he was chairman of the Falklands Islands Memorial Chapel Trust, which raised £2.3 million and was opened at Pangbourne College by Her Majesty The Queen in 2000, and an honorary liveryman of the Glass Sellers’ Company.

He settled in Bosham where he could indulge his life-long passion for sailing; in 1983 he won his class at Cowes week in his Sonata Cry Havoc.

Woodward, who died on August 4, 2013, married Charlotte McMurtrie in 1960: they separated and since 1993 his companion has been Winifred ‘Prim’ Hoult. Both ladies survive him as does a son and a daughter.
Book Reviews

A PARTING SHOT
By Terry Jones and Steven Carruthers
Cooper Publishing
319 pages; soft cover
Reviewed by Jack Aubrey

Even small actions of World War II history are now being covered by the efforts of researchers. This new book by Terry Jones and Steven Carruthers is only about a small part of Australia’s war, but it is a welcome addition to papering over the cracks.

The shelling of parts of Sydney and Newcastle by Japanese submarines in 1942 has been known about for many years – the incidents were widely covered by the press at the time. But a forensic analysis of the events has not been attempted, as far as I know. This book rectifies that gap, and does it well. Eleven chapters cover the incidents themselves, where the shells ended up; the damage they did, and even which actually exploded – many did not.

A mix of archival research; interviews with those subjects still available, and analysis of the events and their timeline constitutes the narrative. The Japanese angle is not covered in anything more than outline, and this would have been nice to see, but its coverage presents significant difficulties.

A Parting Shot is well illustrated with both black and white photographs of the times, and modern colour shots; and numerous maps. Recommended.

THE ART OF LEADERSHIP – THE USN AND WORLD WAR II
Brayton Harris, Admiral Nimitz, The Commander of the Pacific Ocean Theatre.
Walter Borneman, The Admirals: The Five-Star Admirals who won the war at sea.
Reviewed by Mike Fogarty

The United States Navy promoted four of its admirals to five-star rank during WWII and after. Effectively, they were all styled and titled in the rank of Fleet Admiral. This was a subtle tilt at the Royal Navy, some of whose own top-ranking (and equivalent) naval officers were appointed as Admiral of the Fleet. Some USN officers were theatre combat commanders whereas the others were Washington-based throughout the war. For the sweep and nature of the global conflict, these so-called desk warriors at home were hardly idle as they accompanied their president, F D Roosevelt, on top-level diplomatic missions abroad or to the extreme fringes of the sea battlefields themselves. To survive on the political front, whether at home or abroad, was not without inherent dangers, whether personal or career-wise. The war was total. Even flying or sailing to obscure conferences in foreign lands posed as much a risk as a heavily contested sea war. Two recent books are reviewed under.

To be blunt, Admiral Nimitz, The Commander of the Pacific Ocean Theatre is an unashamed hagiography. Yet it is still a worthy study as there is much to like about Chester Nimitz. Of German stock, he was clearly ambitious, yet in a modest way. He had sufficient reserves of personal character, mental toughness and moral courage, as expected in any sailor, of whatever rank and in any navy. Surely he was avuncular and connected with those men and women under his command. He could be forgiving and was prepared to back his navy people if they had done their best, despite often failing in their assigned task. For that quality, he was conscious of morale effects and public relations generally. This officer sought to encourage the best out of those he led. At once, he earned fierce loyalty from those who respected the responsibilities invested in him. Clearly, he was not vain-glorious or ego-centric like a rival, General Douglas MacArthur. “Chesty” was measured in his command role preferring to delegate responsibility to trusted subordinates. Equally, he was prepared to share any blame, which might also reflect on his own judgement.

The book is replete with countless examples of his adroit touch of command. Far removed from the events, seventy years on, any naval type can only regard with awe the weight of command responsibilities placed upon him. We may never see the like of these people again in such a life and death experience when the very vestiges of Western civilisation were being threatened. Nimitz stood by fellow combat commander “Bull” Halsey. This feisty junior was everything Nimitz was not. To his credit, Nimitz backed Halsey when less-confident seniors might have abandoned him as personally and professionally dispensable. For all his setbacks, Halsey was as much an architect of victory as any senior officer during those perilous wartime days.

Nimitz was punctual and expected no less in others. Socially, he was also considerate and solicitous of his personal retinue in celebrating birthdays and making teams function. Moreover, he knew how to relax and achieve the work-life balance in his career, even amidst the crushing demands of wartime command. Nimitz enjoyed a sound
working relationship with his president in FDR. Nimitz could mediate and cope with all the inter and intra-service rivalries. He may have been occasionally exasperated but he played the ball and not the man. He looked for the best in people and invariably he was rewarded by them. Obviously, he proved to be both resilient and flexible in his myriad of relationships. Chesty got his fifth star and also the coveted appointment as Chief of Naval Operations. He will be remembered as a great leader. The Chiefs of Staff during wartime America always backed his command role.

The question must be both asked and answered. How relevant is and was Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, USN to the RAN, or in fact, any navy? The Nimitz career service provides its own answer. He was personally ambitious as his guild expected of him. In time, he became a consummate professional, worthy of the increasingly higher level appointments he was assigned to discharge. He outfitted them to optimal advantage which rewarded the confidence of his political leaders. His highest personal quality was the respect and loyalty he garnered from his navy folk. In good and bad times, he led and set a shining example so others could instinctively follow. In short, he treated his people well by encouraging them to do their best in the grim face of telling adversity. He led and created the conditions where his sailors would willingly follow. Nimitz had a capacity for leadership which would make any navy go forward to achieve its stated remit. For this, history will regard him as a fine sea warrior.

The Admirals: The Five-Star Admirals who won the war at sea is a wider survey as it also includes the three other five-star admirals who were promoted alongside Nimitz during the war. In order of seniority, they were: William D. Leahy (15 December, 1944), Ernest J. King (17 December, 1944), Chester W. Nimitz (19 December, 1944 and William F. Halsey (11 December, 1945). For that, this review obviates the need to return to Nimitz who is more adequately covered in the book by Harris. Borneman is thus a better book, in many ways, as it allows us to compare and contrast all the four admirals. Nimitz and Halsey spent their war at sea. In contrast, Leahy and King saw the war from Washington. Both proved as indispensable as their two distant peers, tied down by the War in the Pacific, and doing their best to advance a victorious war to Japan where they would lead the US Fleet, and other allied navies, into a silenced Tokyo Bay. Leahy and King helped FDR win the war. They, too, were resolute leaders.

Leahy was the President’s Chief Military Adviser. Not as flamboyant as Halsey, he proved to be a skilled diplomat. He had a role to play which he performed admirably. King was the Chief of Naval Operations and also a Chief of Staff. King had a formidable presence and he proved his worth by backing Nimitz and Halsey. King was never given to self-doubt and his contribution was just as effective as General George Marshall. Both men were leaders, but to survive, they also had to display an array of political and diplomatic skills. In WWII, Nimitz as CINCPAC, commanded two million men (and women) and the 1,000 ships which won the war in the Pacific. He suffered reverses but he could only share in the USN victory. The complexity of those management tasks could only be imagined. History has shown that EDR picked wisely and he was well-served by all his four five-stars. Despite that, a navy is only as good as the sum of its parts. All proved vital in winning the war.

The last word should go to Vice Admiral Sir Tim Laurence, RN. In reviewing Borneman, he makes a compelling observation (Naval Review, February, 2013, page 91). “There is no single successful model of leadership. You have to forge your own individual style, hone it to perfection, drive yourself hard and hope that events give you the opportunity to show what you’re made of. These four were all tested to the limit they passed, in the main, with flying colours.” In the promotion stakes, and for naval valour itself, there are more stars than there are stars to give. They were not just in the right spot at the right time. They were leaders.

STEEL CAT: THE STORY OF HMAS BRISBANE, VIETNAM AND GULF WAR VETERAN

RRP $22 +$10 postage
Reviewed by Ian Pfennigwerth

Proud veteran of DDGs Brisbane and Perth

Why review a four-year-old book? Because I think that it is worth consideration, even more so now as international events have demonstrated ever more clearly the value to Australia of ships like our lost guided missile destroyers.

Ken Doolan was one of 25 fortunate men to have commanded Her Majesty’s Australian Ship Brisbane, last of three guided missile destroyers (DDG) commissioned into the RAN in the 1960s, and the story he tells is not of the ‘Boys’ Own’ variety, although the ships themselves inspired that kind of reaction.

At Brisbane’s decommissioning in October 2001 the Chief of Navy, another DDG veteran, remarked; “They were
the first, post-Second World War ships...that had real grunt. They had a missile system that worked. They had guns that were accurate and hit the target. They had sonar that worried submariners – and they travelled at a real destroyer's speed.'

Doolan's account, however, is measured and methodical, and his first chapter on the origins of the decision to purchase the DDGs is a significant contribution to Australia's naval history. Whether one can conclude that the RAN owed the DDGs to the Royal Australian Air Force overreaching itself in its purported capacity to provide air defence to the Fleet is a matter for the individual reader, but it was far from an off-the-cuff decision by Vice Admiral Burrell on his visit to the US in 1960. That it was a decision of enormous consequence, to the fighting power of the RAN and in cementing relationships with the United States, Doolan clearly demonstrates.

The author then describes the process of ordering and construction, fitting out, working up and reaching an appropriate level of proficiency in the operation of this new weapon system, which provided the RAN with its first real opportunity to benchmark itself against the performance standards of the larger navy. As he says, the flow-on effects on the rest of the fleet, regardless of its origins, were important for an RAN still struggling with post-Voyager issues.

The chapters on the ship's two deployments in comparison demanded of Brisbane a high standard of professional competence she demonstrated repeatedly.

A short chapter describes the ship's role in Operation NAVY HELP DARWIN in the wake of the Cyclone Tracy disaster. First ship to reach the stricken city on 31 December 1974, Brisbane was the last to depart on 31 January 1975. With an average of 160 of her men ashore during that month, the DDG accomplished much for the citizens and their city in that critical period. The following chapter outlines the ship's 1977 deployment to Europe for the Queen's Jubilee Review and exercises with NATO navies, an opportunity to test the ship's operational readiness in a different environment.

Chapter 8, dealing with the ship's capability upgrades in the 1980s and her North West Indian Ocean deployments of the late 1980s, is an interesting and timely introduction to the following chapter. More space could have been devoted to discussing the ramifications on the RAN and Australian Defence of the modernisations which took the RAN's DDG's from post-World War II competency into the late 20th century.

Ken Doolan rose to the rank of Rear Admiral and was the Maritime Commander during the first Gulf War in 1991. In this book he has lifted the corner of the veil over what admirals really do, just a little, to describe the activities behind the scenes which accompanied the RAN's deployment - Operation DAMASK. His remarks on p.124 on how the Government selected ships for its navy are worth the price of the book, as is his description of how the RAN struggled to get so-called 'Tier 2' ships up to the standards required for a 'Tier 1' war in a matter of weeks. The deployment was a triumph of hard work and ingenuity, and the commitment of men and women who served in and supported Brisbane and the other ships. The DDG spent a continuous 46 days in the front line in the Arabian Gulf – a tribute to her company and command.

The final chapters concern the rundown of the ship towards her decommissioning and an interesting one on the disposal of the ship, by no means a simple task of knocking holes in her bottom and sinking her off the Sunshine Coast. However, as a result there are plenty of reminders of Brisbane, not least her bridge superstructure and forward gun mount outside the Australian War Memorial in Canberra.

And the 'Steel Cat' nickname? It was certainly adopted during in Vietnam, as Doolan describes in his Preface, but it also alludes to the leopard that tops the crest of the City of Brisbane and which appears on the ship's crest. Heraldry experts tell us that the leopard conveys the attributes of 'valour, honour and high-mettle', all very surely associated with the long and distinguished career of HMAS Brisbane.
which the RAN has operated and fought will be grateful for the author’s thorough explanations. Lyne has also used his researcher’s prerogative to pass judgment on who or what was to blame for the losses.

A summary of Lyne’s research reveals that ten of the vessels, mostly those of the Naval Auxiliary Patrol (NAP) in WWII, were lost to fire, six to groundings or strandings, five to collisions and four to unknown causes. Two were lost in storms, one hit an Australian-laid mine and sank, and one was sunk when the wharf it was secured to collapsed on it! The remaining 16 were lost though enemy action, a terrible toll but, possibly, a source of pride in Australia’s navy as a fighting service – and preferable to running ships aground or having them collide.

Lyne has clearly spent his research time wisely and well. His analysis of the collision in Port Phillip that sank the minesweeper Goorangai with all hands in 1940 demonstrates that it was probably the liner Duntroon that caused the accident, but that a smart lawyer can work wonders to obscure the facts. Of course, there are no blameless parties in any collision, but this one seems to have been especially hard on the victim. He covers the loss of Sydney to SMS Kormoran, and introduces some interesting observations on a similar incident – fortunately ‘blue-on-blue’ - involving the cruiser HMS Neptune. A lack of sensible precautions while approaching a suspicious merchant ship is the common factor in both incidents.

For reasons not entirely clear (petrol in the bilges?), the NAP vessels were particularly prone to fire. The Japanese aerial attacks on Darwin accounted for five of the small craft lost to enemy action, precious vessels at a time when anything that could float and move was a valuable item. The stores tender Matafele probably foundered because the alterations made to her structure had not been properly assessed for the effects they might have on her stability; her wreck remains unlocated.

Lyne is understanding of the perils which faced Lieutenant Commander Robison at Betano in September 1942 and which led to the stranding of Voyager and her complete loss – there were certainly extenuating circumstances. He is less kind to Commodore Pope who launched Operation HAMBURGER, exposing two corvettes and the patrol vessel Kuru on a similar mission to Timor in December the same year to serious Japanese reprisals, and ordering it to continue when it was clearly fatally compromised. Perhaps it was the “fog of war” which clouded his judgement, but it cost the lives of 100 men and the RAN the corvette Armidale.

A board of inquiry into the loss of HMAS Canberra at Savo Island in August 1942 was unable to determine the reason she was lost so easily and the attempt by Bruce Loxton to sheet the blame home to a US destroyer’s torpedo was not totally satisfactory. Lyne comes up with no new evidence. There are no such mysteries about the loss of Vampire in April 1942, overwhelmed by Japanese bombs. ML-430 was the victim of an attack by fellow ML, very obviously a ‘fog of war’ incident, which fortunately cost no lives.

Of the peacetime losses, Lyne correctly observes that Voyager should have kept out of the path of Melbourne on 10 February 1964 and that why she did not will forever remain a mystery, whatever Royal Commissions might say. In the sinking of the stores ship Woomera in 1960 with the loss of four lives, humanupidity seems to be involved although if there was a board of inquiry – as there should have been – Lyne does not cite from it. Were the ship and these men lost because of the desire to salvage parachute silk from flares?

There are points in the book over which one might quibble. It is not appropriate to criticise the RAN for having no aircraft carriers in 1939: only three navies did, and the RAN had staged a remarkable comeback from almost disappearing during the Great Depression. Similarly, I’ve yet to see any evidence that a shortage of experienced senior NCOs affected the performance of the RAN in World War II. On the contrary, there is much to show that the RAN, while expanding from a force of 7,500 to close to 40,000, performed pretty well, especially as most of the new recruits were “hostilities only” personnel.

But these are quibbles only. Lyne’s book is an interesting and thought-provoking addition to our naval history, one which throws light on the debit side of the ledger. I thoroughly recommend it to a general audience and to experts alike.

FORCE Z SHIPWRECKS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

By Rod McDonald

Whittles; softback, 156 pages

Reviewed by Jack Aubrey

The shipwrecks of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse lie in relatively shallow water compared with the wrecks of HMAS Sydney and its opponent Kormoran. For many in Britain in WWII, the loss of the two British ships resonated throughout the community much as the loss of our own 645 brave sailors did with Australia’s sinking in 1941.

On 9 December 1941, both of these immense vessels – a
battleship and a battlecruiser – were lost to overwhelming air attack off Malaya. Swarms of Japanese torpedo-bombers overwhelmed their defences and smashed them with their air-launched weapons, which were often in the water racing towards the RN ships in groups and from different directions. The warships fought well, but their anti-aircraft defences were simply inadequate. *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* sank quickly, taking with them hundreds of their crews.

*Force Z Shipwrecks of the South China Sea* is an interesting book. It is not a minute recounting of the loss of the two ships, nor an analysis of the command decisions that sent them to their doom. Rather, it is a discussion of their technical design; some chapters devoted to the background of their loss, and then at the end, sections dealing with the wrecks as they are today, and what they can tell us about the physical aspects of the battle.

As such, if you know the story of these two vessels well already – and many readers of *Headmark* will do so – then you will skip over the first sections, although they are well written. The story of how the design of the two vessels came to be will hold such readers’ interests more. In particular, the textual wreck descriptions and colour photographs of the sites at the end of the work are quite fascinating. They are well shot, with enough light and detail to ponder over what exactly caused such damage, and various ancillary effects. There are labelled graphics which render assistance. For anyone who has studied the works of *Bismarck* and *Titanic* this is familiar territory.

The rest of the book is well illustrated, and there is a good bibliography. Recommended.

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**THROUGH ALBERT’S EYES**

*By Tony Bentley-Buckle*

*Edited by Captain Peter Hore RN*

Whittles Publishing, Caithness, 2013

www.whittlespublishing.com

Hardback; 143 pages with 44 b/w illustrations and end notes.

ISBN 978-184995-066-4

Reviewed by David Hobbs

This is the second in a series of autobiographical books, edited by Peter Hore, that focus on people connected with naval warfare and the sea. Tony Bentley-Buckle led a particularly adventurous life; he was the son of a rubber planter in Ceylon, born in Belgium while his parents were on holiday and subsequently raised in England by aunts before joining the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1938. In the early war years he served in the cruisers *Dunedin* and *Edinburgh* before joining the battleship *Revenge* in the Eastern Fleet during 1941.

Whilst on leave, staying with friends near Mombasa, he broke an arm badly riding and during his convalescence he volunteered for special service. After training in Scotland he joined the Royal Navy’s ‘G’ Commando as a Beachmaster during 1943, becoming one of the first allied officers ashore in both Sicily and at Reggio on the Italian mainland. At the latter he achieved some notoriety when General Montgomery started to address troops on a narrow trackway off the beach and Buckle ordered him to clear the landing area so that vital supplies could be moved towards men in action who needed them. The General and his audience moved.

Subsequently Buckle took part in operations with Yugoslav partisans during which he was captured, escaped, betrayed and captured again, together with the war artist John Worsley. Together they ended up in Marlag O prisoner of war camp where he helped Worsley to build a ‘dummy prisoner’ which subsequently became famous as ‘Albert RN’. Buckle repaired watches as a hobby and his input was to make a clockwork system inside the papier-mâché head that made the eyelids appear to blink; the eyeballs themselves were made from table-tennis balls. The dummy was dismantled and hidden in towels when prisoners marched out to a bath-house outside the wire, then assembled and ‘marched in’ to cover the absence of a single prisoner who escaped once the bath-house was vacated. Unfortunately Buckle himself was not able to escape before the Germans spotted the ruse.

After the war Worsley made a replica ‘Albert’ for the British film ‘Albert RN’ in 1953 and a second, without the blinking mechanism, which is now on display in the National Museum of the Royal Navy.

Post-war Buckle made his own way back to the UK before the official repatriation scheme got under way and underwent training to become a pilot in the Fleet Air Arm but, like many other former prisoners, could not settle back into the peace-time Navy and resigned. He subsequently bought a small coaster and began what proved to be a very successful shipping business in East Africa, despite bitter opposition from larger, more well-established concerns that tried to prevent him from breaking their monopoly.

This is a well-written and fascinating story and the descriptions of amphibious and asymmetric warfare have topical value in Australia as the RAN begins to establish its own ‘beachhead commando’ equivalents. Buckle was clearly a resourceful and determined man in both his naval and civilian careers; his story is an interesting one and it is enhanced by a number of John Worsley’s wartime sketches. It is a good read and I thoroughly recommend it.
The peoples of the region took note that dictators were at their most vulnerable when trying to hand over power to their sons and/or when they were exposed to coercion, active or latent, from the United States and the United Kingdom. All they had to do was to overcome fear itself, induced by the instruments of state terror such as the secret police, by mobilising their discontent on the streets of Arab and even Western capitals and pressuring the army or the Western powers to remove the dictators.

The result has been the replacement of a Sunni nationalist dictator in Iraq by a Shi’ite strongman, Nouri al-Maliki; an increase in Iranian power in the Fertile Crescent and the Persian Gulf, underlined by the development of a civil and military nuclear weapons capability; an emerging proxy war between Sunni and Shia Islam on several fronts, in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and North Africa and, lastly, distinct signs that the United States and the United Kingdom are again gearing up for military action in the Middle East to protect their friends and their interests from the eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aden, and thence to the Persian Gulf.

In doing so, the US and UK governments will rely, as they have in the past, on the deployment of their considerable naval power to shape events and the outcome. It will demonstrate again the utility of maritime power in defending Western interests in a region which has been traditionally reluctant to accept the permanent basing of Western forces on land.

This is the aftermath of the period covered by Ballantyne’s book, which provides some useful detail on UK and US naval deployments to the Middle East from the Abadan Crisis of 1951 to the Iraq War of 2003. He reminds us that the US and the UK did not always see eye-to-eye on how to react to the antics of the nationalist leaders, whether it be Mossadegh or Nasser. US pressure persuaded the British Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, not to sanction the Royal Navy’s intervention at Abadan, the site of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s refinery, to reverse Mossadegh’s nationalisation of this most precious British overseas asset. Given that the Labour Party had been nationalising key industries, such as coal and gas, in the UK, it had no sympathy with the fortunes of AIOC.

In contrast, when the Conservative Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, refused to bow to US pressure not to intervene militarily against Nasser during the Suez Crisis in 1956, he was deposed from power by a American-led run on sterling and a ministerial cabal in London. Ballantyne recalls the aggressive actions of the US Sixth Fleet towards the Anglo-French naval task force as it operated against Egypt. This was symbolised by a US Navy helicopter hovering over the flight deck of the Royal Navy carrier HMS Eagle to prevent the launch of Fleet Air Arm jets! Such an act would be unimaginable today, when the US and the UK armed forces, and especially their respective navies, co-operate so effectively in theatre.

But in the 1950s and 1960s US and UK strategic and military interests were not aligned in the Middle East. The US was not interested in the region and franchised its defence to the UK. This was undermined, however, by the anti-colonial ethos of US policy which saw Arab or Iranian nationalism as the wave of the future and the British imperial position as a hangover from the past which needed to be liquidated.

When the UK obliged by relinquishing its control over the key world choke points of the Suez Canal, the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Hormuz Strait between 1956 and 1971, the US government believed that its strategic allies, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia would be able to act as the new guardians of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The fallacy of this policy was soon revealed, following the continued closure of the Suez Canal, the steady rise in oil prices by OPEC, the intervention of the Soviet Union and is surrogates in South Yemen, Oman and the Horn of Africa and the fall of the Shah in 1979. The coming to power of a weak Islamist regime in Iran presented Saddam Hussein with the opportunity to make a bid for paramountcy in the Gulf, a bid which led to three successive wars in the region, between Iran and Iraq from 1980-88, over Kuwait in 1990-91 and in Iraq from 2003-2011.

This is the overall strategic context for this book, which helpfully details the nature of US and UK naval operations in the region, particularly in the period after 1979. That the US and the UK governments felt the need to send naval units back into the Persian Gulf, to keep the maritime peace there, as the UK had done for a century and a half before its over-hasty retreat in 1971, shows both the folly of leaving a strategic vacuum there in the 1970s and the endemically fractious nature of the region. Given the importance of Gulf
hydrocarbons to the world’s economy its policing simply could not be left to the littoral powers, who were divided by deadly rivalries.

The US and the UK have since 1979 tried to put the genie of insecurity in the Gulf back into the bottle. But the genie, in the shape of Saddam Hussein, or the Thief of Baghdad, grew to such great proportions that it required an increasing military, and especially naval, effort by the two main western powers to accomplish this herculean feat. As evidence of this, during the Iraq War in 2003 no less than five carrier battle groups were deployed by the US to the region, as Ballantyne details.

What is noteworthy is that the US Navy and the Royal Navy became bolder with regard to the deployment of their ‘big ships’ into the Gulf in the three wars fought there after 1979. In the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, the US and the UK kept their carriers out of the Gulf because of the mine threat. In the later stages of the Kuwait War, especially in February 1991, the US Navy was prepared to put its amphibious assault ships into the northern Gulf, alongside the battleship USS Missouri. But even here ‘Mine Danger Red’ led to both the USS Tripoli and the USS Princeton being struck by mines and having to limp into drydock for repairs in Dubai. The Missouri would have joined them if it had not been for the fast-reactions of HMS Gloucester, and its Sea Dart SAMs that brought down an Iraqi Silkworm missile seconds before it hit the iconic World War II symbol of US power.

By the Iraq War in 2003, the US Navy and the Royal Navy had such confidence in their multi-tiered defences that they deployed their carriers into the northern Gulf and had naval units up the Khaur al Abdullah (KAA) in support of the Royal Marine commando landings on the Fao Peninsula en route to Basra. Ballantyne is correct to highlight the imminent collapse of the UN sanctions regime against Saddam Hussein in 2002 and the danger that he would re-arm, with French and Russian help, as the reason for the decision of the US and UK governments to remove him from power. This fateful decision remains controversial to this day and Western liberals in particular are keen to vilify the reputations of the key decision-makers, George W. Bush and Tony Blair. But it is difficult to see what else could have been done if the US and the UK were not to suffer a catastrophic lost of prestige and position in the all-important Gulf, with its vital oil and gas supplies. Sanctions could no longer contain Saddam.

Ballantyne reveals that only about a quarter of all the oil smuggled out of Iraq by sea for sale on the black market was intercepted by the naval blockade. This reviewer remembers witnessing in the steamy August heat of 2002 in the northern Gulf the sterling efforts of Royal Marine and Royal Navy boarding parties from HMS Argyll to stop and search likely oil smuggling dhows as they emerged from the KAA. What was especially striking was the vulnerability of the Argyll and other Coalition warships to sudden attack from passing dhows or fast Iraqi craft packed with explosives based on their old oil terminals at Kaaot and Mabot out in the Gulf. It would have been touch and go if the 50 calibre MGs mounted by the Royal Marines on the wings of the bridge would have stopped such attacks in time. It is for this reason that this reviewer is not as confident as Iain Ballantyne about the effectiveness of the new counter-terrorism measures put in place by the Royal Navy by the summer of 2002, as evidenced by the visit of HMS Campbeltown to the notorious port of Aden, where the USS Cole had been attacked in 2000 by an al-Qaeda suicide squad. HMS Argyll cancelled a run-ashore in Gibraltar in May 2002 because of the heightened terror threat from an al-Qaeda cell operating from the Moroccan coast against US and UK navy ships in the Strait.

The continuing threat to Western interests in North Africa and the Middle East posed by the rising tide of militant Islam, whether of a Sunni or Shia hue, means that, as the overall commander-in-chief of coalition naval forces in the Gulf, Vice-Admiral Keating, USN, put it after the defeat of the Iraq in 2003, the clear and present danger remains and the story of conflict in the Gulf region is far from over.

The question remains, however, whether after four military interventions in the Gulf region (including Afghanistan) since 1979, the two key Western powers, the US and the UK, and their Anglo-phone allies, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have the continuing will and the means to defend those interests. The brewing crisis in the Middle East since the revolts of 2011 will soon bring an answer.

THE BATTLESHIP BUILDERS - CONSTRUCTING AND ARMING BRITISH CAPITAL SHIPS
by Ian Johnston & Ian Buxton
Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley
www.seafortmpublishing.com
£30.00 in the UK
Reviewed by David Hobbs

The British built more battleships than any other nation and this fascinating book contains a wealth of detail about...
the shipyards, dockyards, ordnance works, steel works, foundries and other sites where the hulls and their systems were built as well as the design and functioning of the ships themselves. There are maps of the various yards with explanatory notes about the processes that went on in their buildings; descriptions of how gun barrels, working chambers, turrets, boilers and turbines were assembled ashore and then dismantled to be taken to the ships for installation and a wealth of other detail, including the manpower in the factories.

Much of this might have been largely forgotten and lost were it not for this book which makes a unique contribution to the available published material about the battleship era. It is well illustrated with photographs of ships, weapons and machinery under construction and many other detailed elements including workshops and components. Tables give details of construction and cost; the battlecruiser HMAS Australia, for instance, is listed as costing £1,783,190 or £94.85 per ton. The ship’s four twin turrets, each containing two 12 inch Mark B.VIII* guns were constructed under contract 121G by Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness although the hull was built by John Brown & Co on Clydebank. Each turret cost £59,123 and their total cost was £236,494, yielding a substantial profit for Vickers.

In addition to the processes needed to build a battleship, the book describes the expansion of the industries prior to 1914, their dramatic decline after the Washington Naval Treaty, especially of those specialising in armour and gun manufacture and the inability of the run-down industry to cope with all the orders when re-armament began in the late 1930s. All of this is presented in a readable style that makes this book difficult to put down. Appendices give further information including an account of the industry created to scrap battleships at the end of their operational lives.

I found information that was both new to me and interesting on nearly every page and this must be considered the definitive book on the design and construction of these iconic vessels and the industries that created them. It also has a great deal to say about the relationship between British industry and the Royal Navy in the years between the late nineteenth and mid twentieth centuries. The authors must be congratulated for locating the surviving archives together with the fascinating collection of images. Battleship Builders is one of the best naval titles I have seen and I am delighted to have added it to my collection. I understand that it is selling rapidly in both the UK and the USA. I wholeheartedly recommend it and suggest you obtain a copy before stocks of the first edition run out.

**LAND BASED AIR POWER OR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS?**

*A Case Study of the British Debate about Maritime Air Power in the 1960s*

*by Gjert Lage Dyndal*

ISBN 978-1-4094-3335-4

Ashgate Publishing both in the UK and USA

www.ashgate.com

180 pages, 5 maps, 4 photographs

Reviewed by David Hobbs

This is the sixth in a series of studies by the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. The author is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force and Dean of Academics at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy who was awarded his PhD by the University of Glasgow in 2009. He has written three earlier books on military subjects.

This work has a bibliography that runs to 16 pages of published and unpublished reference material together with an index and useful list of abbreviations. The succinct preface is written by Professor Geoffrey Till who has lectured frequently in Australia; he notes that the origins of this debate can be traced back to the ‘battleships versus bombers’ debate of the 1930s, through the debate in the 1960s that forms the subject of this book into the present.

The book has relevance in Australia as many of the arguments are very similar to those which led to the withdrawal from service of HMAS Melbourne in 1982. Comparisons can also be made with the rationale behind the contemporary Australian Government position that land-based air power will meet all the nation’s requirements,
no matter what their distance from Australia may be, leaving no requirement for the LHDs to operate Australian STOVL fighters in support of amphibious operations.

The author has located and identified a number of original documents that are relevant and informative but he uses them without wider explanation to provide context; nor does he comment on which arguments, in his opinion and with the wisdom of hindsight, had the greater merit. Similar arguments in the USA over whether to build B-36 bombers or the aircraft carrier United States in the late 1940s are surely worth a mention if only to compare the outcomes. The author makes no mention of the Admiralty’s attempts to order new aircraft carriers from 1951 onwards or the reasons given by the Government for not funding them. There had been a good measure of inter-Service harmony in Britain during the 1950s with a succession of joint projects including the SR-177 fighter which was cancelled by one of the UK Government’s less comprehensible decisions in 1958; its continuation might have provided a more harmonious atmosphere in the 1960s and it surely deserves a mention.

The Hawker P-1154 supersonic STOVL strike aircraft is mentioned but the author fails to explain the full story of the politically inspired clash over the very different carrier and land-based variants of the type that led to rapidly increasing costs, its cancellation and the subsequent purchase of the American F-4 Phantom for both roles.

As arguments unfolded in the 1960s and it was clear that British politicians had little comprehension of what they were asking the Services to achieve in the longer term. Any sort of forward-deployed policy relied on a maritime strategy to underpin it and, rather than being seen simply as a fight between the RN and RAF for a share of the shrinking defence budget, the core of the problem surely lay with politicians who failed to articulate a sustainable defence policy and forced the Services into polarized arguments for the replacement of equipment they relied on to perform the designated tasks.

On page 179 the author states that politicians used the expert advice “of their choice” but offers little comment on how this impacted on the eventual outcome in which no-one got what they wanted.

The strongest aspect of the work is that Dyndal quotes a number of previously unpublished papers that shed their own new light on aspects of the debate. However, wider research and conclusions that are based on analytical judgement are needed to set the 1960s debate into its full context. This book does not provide them and the statement that “advocates for British carrier forces will most likely have to fight for this potent but costly capability in the coming years” is a weak conclusion which seems to indicate that the author is unable or unwilling to decide between the arguments he has set out in order to answer the question in his own title. He notes that the RN case for CVA-01 was less robust in 1965/66 than it had been in 1962/63 but fails to explain the different staff structures that followed the Admiralty secretariat being subsumed into the unified Ministry of Defence in 1964 or postulate what a major difference this made. A comparison with the Canadian decision to scrap the aircraft carrier Bonaventure soon after the creation of the unified Canadian Armed Forces might have been interesting and relevant, as would a comparison with the arguments over the replacement of Melbourne.

In summary this is a book that stimulates interest in the arguments that wrecked British defence policy in the mid-1960s but which provides neither opinion nor strong conclusions about the wealth of documents referred to. It really needs a chapter on British aircraft procurement in this most difficult period to give the full picture but it can, however, be considered a ‘stepping-stone’ towards gaining an understanding of what happened. The reader is left to form his or her own view on the arguments and, while some might prefer it that way, my own view is that, given the author’s military background and status at the RNoAF Academy, he could have added more value to his work by discussing the relative practical merits and de-merits of the arguments he outlines. If arguments over the need for aircraft carriers interest you, I would get a copy of this book from your library; it will give you some useful information but not all the answers you will want.

BRITISH CRUISERS
OF THE VICTORIAN ERA

By Norman Friedman
ISBN 978-1-84832-099-4
Seaforth Publishing
www.seaforthpublishing.com
352 pages including Bibliography, Notes, Appendices and ship Data. Extensively illustrated with photographs and drawings.

Reviewed by David Hobbs

The term “cruiser” came into general use in the 1880s to describe ships capable of both long endurance for the protection of Britain’s Imperial trade routes and, in the case of some of the larger examples, acting as a fast wing of the battle fleet. The new description replaced the terms frigate, sloop and corvette which gradually fell...
that led to the design of battlecruisers as an intelligence-informed strike force intended to hunt down hostile commerce raiders.

As always, Norman Friedman has carried out extensive research into his subject and has a masterly grasp of detail. The resulting book is written in a lively and informative style and includes a great deal of information about the ships that were deployed in the Australian Station of the Royal Navy and the cruisers that equipped the early RAN, including Encounter, Pioneer and Psyche. The final chapter gives insight into the design of the ultimate expression of the cruiser genre, the battle cruiser, of which Australia was an important example.

Cruisers of the Victorian Era contributes a great deal to our understanding of how warships evolved after the era of sail and is well up to the author’s usual high standards. It must be considered as the primary reference work on the Victorian cruiser force, giving fascinating insight into the ships that formed an important element of the Australian Station for many years as well as the early RAN. It also helps us to understand the thought processes of those who held high command in World War I having been trained in these ships. The book will be an essential acquisition for the collections in naval libraries, of course, but beside its obvious importance, it is also a thoroughly absorbing read and I recommend it highly for everyone with an interest in the generations of warships that preceded our own.

British Destroyers J-C and Battle Classes
by Les Brown
Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley
www.seaforthpublishing.com
Reviewed by David Hobbs

Number 21 in Seaforth’s Ship Craft series, this book follows logically on from number 11 which described the ‘A’ to ‘I’ and ‘Tribal’ classes. Although aimed primarily at ship model-makers, the book is well illustrated with black and white photographs of the actual ships; colour photographs of models and accurate coloured profile drawings showing representative wartime camouflage schemes. There are also line drawings in plan and profile and technical details for each class including text descriptions of their equipment fits and armament.

I have often thought that accurate scale models can give a better idea of a ships’ fixtures and fittings than the real vessel since you can see the whole thing in perspective and this book underlines that belief; some of the illustrated models are superb, especially that of HMS Vigo which could taken for the actual ship against the right background. Surprisingly, given the level of detail, it was originally intended to be a powered, floating model for use on a boat pond but it was completed without machinery and is now on display in the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich.

There is a fair amount of Australian interest with ships of the ‘N’, ‘Q’ and ‘Battle’ classes having served in the RAN. This book will be of interest to those who want an easy reference book that covers the British and Australian destroyers of this period, especially with regard to camouflage and overall appearance in service.
Anyone who might have considered making a model destroyer will find the section listing kits and accessories invaluable and the illustrations of completed models really do give a level of sophistication and skill to strive for. Overall this is good book that will appeal both to modellers and a wider readership interested in the ships themselves. I thoroughly recommend it.

Whereas the Marder-Roskill feud was history-related, the Fisher-Beresford campaign went to the core of the mighty Royal Navy, convulsing serving officers and politicians alike. Some readers may find their patience stretched in the face of Beresford’s disruptive insubordination – difficult to reconcile in a disciplined service. The book exposes the divisiveness that both Fisher and Beresford engendered in the service and is a fascinating window into the times.

Both actors in this drama are well known to naval history buffs. Fisher and Beresford were chalk and cheese. Fisher, born into the large family of an unsuccessful colonist in Ceylon, entered the Royal Navy “...penniless, friendless and forlorn” and rose to become First Sea Lord through ruthless pursuit of reform, both in officer education and in naval technology, scrapping dozens of ships “which could neither fight nor run away” and introducing the revolutionary “Dreadnought” and his favourite design – the battlecruisers. His reforms caused great division within the service; those opposing him resenting his relentless mission of change, while his supporters – those in the “Fishpond” – were progressives who rode to high rank in his wake.

Beresford, on the other hand, was the scion of a wealthy Irish family who lacked for nothing either materially or in influence. A magnificent seaman, totally fearless in action, charming to all, he was loved by officers and seamen alike and by the general public. However, his lifelong passion was incessant complaints to the Admiralty regarding his perception of the service’s lack of preparation for war. As he reached fleet commander status, he added a constant tirade against the claimed shortage of ships in his command, which he maintained was a slight against him personally. To this he added an intense detestation of Fisher.

In this campaign his unique parallel career as naval officer and sometime member of parliament sorely strained the Admiralty’s attempts to control him. From the age of 28, Beresford would periodically go on half pay and contest House of Commons seats which he invariably won, due to his immense popularity. How Beresford rose to the rank of admiral in command of the Royal Navy’s premier fleets, despite the Admiralty’s constant reprimands, speaks of the power of influence in the Victorian and Edwardian era.

The book records 23 official reprimands and expressions of disapprovals issued against Beresford – from his demotion from cadet captain on the same day he was promoted in 1860 to the 1908 circulation of letters criticising Home Fleet officers when he was Commander-In-Chief of the Channel Fleet. If parliament Beresford thundered against the Admiralty, which he continued when he returned to active service as a fleet commander. His ultimate ambition was either First Sea Lord (to replace Fisher) or to be political head of the navy as First Lord. He seethed with rage when Fisher was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet and extended as First Sea Lord in 1905. Had Fisher retired Beresford would, in all probability (and as Beresford expected), have assumed the leadership of the navy.

The Great Edwardian Naval Feud is well researched and painstakingly details Beresford’s rise and eventual fall, following the government enquiry established to investigate his complaints. The book requires the reader’s perseverance to negotiate the labyrinthine details; however, as a record of the culmination of Beresford’s disruptive career, that perseverance is needed to fully appreciate the issues of the feud and its effect on the navy and the government. Beresford’s naval demise prior to World War I freed the service from the imponderable “what if...” he had assumed the post of First Sea Lord in the immediate pre-war period.

Royal Navy enthusiasts of the Edwardian era will find in this book all their favourite tales of stultifying and hidebound attitudes which engendered in officers a narrow view of their profession, where they were not encouraged but actively dissuaded from thinking. The greatest navy in the world operated as appendages of the respective commanders-in-chief. Even Fisher, as commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet, rarely allowed his second-in-command, Beresford, to exercise the fleet independently. Beresford complained that he had nothing to do on the Mediterranean station in 1899. When Fisher arrived at Admiralty House Malta to assume command he reported “an absence of detailed preparation for war.”

The author continues: “This was an understatement. What he witnessed and indeed would have done so in any British fleet of the last 80 years, was an eye-catching collection of beautiful ships, brass sparkling, decks spotlessly whited, guns glistening with fresh paint…and not much more.”

The gunnery reformer, the firebrand Rear Admiral Percy
Scott (who Beresford would pillory) wrote that it was a time when “a ship had to look pretty; prettiness was necessary for promotion.” It was this attitude which Fisher fought so fiercely and why the likes of Beresford, as his influence grew, treated his later Channel Fleet command as a personal yacht club which he used as an prop to his exalted persona. The commander-in-chief’s flagship dictated every activity and all ships had to conform to the C–in-C’s movements; even as to when washing could be hoisted to dry. Junior squadron flag officers rarely exercised independence and initiative.

“War plans” remained in the heads of the First Sea Lord at the Admiralty. C-in-C’s were not privy to these plans, and this was at the core of Beresford’s relentless campaign against the Admiralty. This then was the setting for the great Edwardian naval feud. Fisher made a strategic error when he appointed Beresford as C-in-C Channel Fleet in April 1907 as this further strengthened Beresford’s decades-old crusade. From the outset Beresford bombarded the Admiralty with complaints regarding the perceived lack of ships under his command and the absence of war plans communicated to him as C-in-C.

Finally the Admiralty struck back and terminated Beresford’s nominal three year command after two years under the pretext of fleet reorganisation. The government set up an enquiry, comprising five cabinet ministers, within weeks of Beresford’s hauling down his flag in March 1909. The enquiry extended over 15 days and the proceedings are exhaustingly detailed in the book and it is the extent of this detail which might strain some readers’ forbearance.

While the enquiry found against Beresford’s claims, it was hardly critical of him and his constant insubordination. This gave Beresford more room to continue his campaign against the
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At the end of World War II the Royal Navy provided the RAN with five ‘Q’ class destroyers on permanent loan as replacements for the wartime ‘N’ class.

With the post-war Soviet threat increasing the need for improved ASW capabilities, in 1950, the RAN proposed converting the ‘Q’s to Type 15 fast anti-submarine frigates. The conversion involved some major redesign work, including the reduction of the gun armament in favour of the Limbo triple-barrelled anti-submarine mortar, a new aluminium superstructure, and the provision of an enclosed bridge and a dedicated operations room – the latter increasingly important as commanding officers sought to make best use of the information provided by the expanding variety of ship’s sensors.

HMAS Queenborough completed her conversion at the end of 1954 and the following year completed a global circumnavigation, in part to show off Australian technical capabilities. While in British waters she operated for a time with a Royal Navy squadron which used the ‘Red Hand of Ulster’ as a funnel emblem.

Determined to retain a visible Australian identity, Queenborough also displayed her own red kangaroo. Although kangaroo insignia had long been used by Australian warships to signify their nationality, this remains the first known use of a red kangaroo on the funnel. By the 1980s the insignia had been adopted across the RAN’s major surface fleet.

FIRST RED ROO
ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.

Our new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help you take full advantage of the new features.

Obtaining an account

In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member ID and password.

Logging in to your account

Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website (figure 1) and click the “Members Login” item (figure 2). Enter your member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click the “Login” button. The case of the member ID and password are important: i.e. “CaSe” and “case” are considered entirely different words by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as a single “*” to prevent others from seeing your password as you type.

If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.

Logging out of your account

In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the “Logout” link in the grey status bar (figure 4).

Changing your details

When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change your details, login and click the “Change Your Details” menu item (figure 5). Then select the “change” link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the “save” button (figure 7).

The personal information that you provide will be visible to other members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off-line records.

Participating in the forum

In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login and click the “Forum” menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that you would like to view by clicking its “View Topics” button (figure 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its “View this topic” link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, you may add your own by clicking the “Add New Topic” button (figure 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by clicking “Add New Post”. Fill in the heading and body of your reply and click the “Submit” button to add your reply to the topic. If you change your mind while writing your reply, you may click the “Cancel” button and your reply will not be added to the topic.

Further questions

If you have specific questions regarding website features or even a feature request, post a topic in the “Website Questions” forum and a site administrator will reply. Otherwise, happy browsing!
Thinking of Making a Contribution?

Style Notes for Headmark

In general, please present your work with the minimum of formatting.

**Paragraphs:**

Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Separate paragraphs by one line. Single spacing only. Use one space only after stops and colons.

**Conventions:**

Use numbers for 10 and above, words below. Ship names use italics in title case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals and italics. Book and Journal titles use italics.

Use single quotation marks for quotations. Do not use hyphens for any rank except Sub-Lieutenant.

**Citations:**

Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use footnotes to explain any points you want the reader to notice immediately. Book titles follow Author surname, first name, title if any. Title. Place of publication: publisher, year of that edition.

So:


Articles use quotation marks around their title, which is not in italics.

If citing web sites please use the convention:


So, web site name. Article title. Full date of accessing the site. Full URL.

**Bylines:**

Supply your everyday title for use at the beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At the end of the article, please supply full honours - Lieutenant Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless you would prefer not to use them. Then please supply a paragraph on yourself, to a maximum of 50 words, including any qualifications you would like listed, and any interesting biographical aspects. If possible please supply a colour or greyscale head and shoulders e-photo of yourself for use alongside the article title.

**Illustrations:**

Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use a minimum of 300 dpi. We are keen on colour images but will use greyscale if necessary. We are able to scan prints if necessary, but request a self-addressed stamped envelope for return – please insure adequately if necessary.

**Forwarding your article:**

Please send to the Editor on <talewis@bigpond.com>

**Editorial considerations:**

The Editor reserves the right to amend articles where necessary for the purposes of grammar correction, and to delete tables or figures for space considerations.
Australian Naval Institute

The Australian Naval Institute was formed as a self-supporting and non-profit making organisation; incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objectives of the Institute are:

- to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.

Membership subscription rates are located on the next page. Further information can be obtained from the: Business Manager, Australian Naval Institute, PO Box 241, Deakin West ACT 2600, ph +61 2 6290 1505, fax +61 2 6290 1580, email: a_n_i@bigpond.com or via the website at http://www.navalinstitute.com.au

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Headmark is published quarterly. The Editorial Board seeks letters and articles on naval or maritime issues. Articles concerning operations or administration/policy are of particular interest but papers on any relevant topic will be considered. As much of the RAN’s operational and administrative history is poorly recorded, the recollections of members (and others) on these topics are keenly sought.

Views and opinions expressed in Headmark are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Institute, the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Defence Organisation, or the institutions the authors may represent.

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A CDROM of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute covering the period 1975–2003 is available for $99; see the next page for ordering information.

Pen Names. Contributors can publish under a pen name. The Editor must be advised either in person or in writing of the identity of the individual that wishes to use the pen name. The Editor will confirm in writing to the member seeking to use a pen name that the name has been registered and can be used. More details are available on the Institute’s website.

Article Submission. Articles and correspondence should be submitted electronically in Microsoft Word, with limited formatting. (See the style guide in this issue for further details.)

Articles should ideally range in size from 3000-7000 words, but smaller articles will be considered, as will the occasional larger piece of work. Submissions should be sent to the Editor in the first instance, email: tom.lewis@darwinmilitarymuseum.com.au

Articles of greater length can be submitted to the Sea Power Centre-Australia for possible publication as a Working Paper (seapowercentre@defence.gov.au).

Editorial Sub Committee

The Board is largely drawn from the ANI Council but key roles are undertaken by the following members: Chairman: capt Justin Jones ran
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Strategy: cdre Greg Sammut, csc, ran
History: dr David Stevens
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Bequests

As a self-funding organisation the Institute relies on membership subscriptions and sponsorship to maintain its activities. Financial donations and/or bequests are welcome and will assist the ANI in undertaking its activities.

Sea Power Centre-Australia Research Collection

The Sea Power Centre-Australia research collection incorporates the ANI library, to which members have access. The research collection is normally available for use 0900-1630 each weekday, but it is not possible to borrow the books. Members are requested to ring the SPC to confirm access, particularly if visiting from outside Canberra.

The ANI/Sea Power Centre-Australia will gladly accept book donations on naval and maritime matters (where they will either be added to the collection or traded for difficult to obtain books). The point of contact for access to the collection, or to make arrangements for book/journal donations is the SPC-A Information Manager on (02) 6127 6512, email: seapowercentre@defence.gov.au
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### Membership Application

Complete the details below & return this form to the address shown above or email to admin@navalinstitute.com.au

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I agree to abide by the Constitution and by-laws of the Australian Naval Institute.

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