The Future Submarine Project, 
More than just a Boat

Who’s A Pirate? In Court, A Duel 
Over Definitions

One Third of their Combat 
Power – Developing a Quantitative 
Model for Intelligence Analysis of 
Morale in Armed Forces

The Indian Ocean is going to 
be massively more significant

Exclusive Interview with Kim Beazley
Proudly the leading mission systems integrator for the Royal Australia Navy, Raytheon Australia draws on a 1300 strong Australian workforce and the proven record of delivering systems integration for the Collins Class submarine, Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer and special mission aircraft. Raytheon Australia is focused on the needs of the Australian Defence Force and has the backing of Raytheon Company — one of the most innovative, high technology companies in the world — to provide NoDoubt® confidence to achieve our customer’s mission success.
Letter to the Editor

So it seems the knives are out for the 2009 White Paper with the familiar crowing of those who were once influential and continue to strive to remain so. Having advocated masses of submarines in the past we now see these same advocates questioning the basis of the size of the submarine force. Curiously I can’t recall the detailed basis of the force structure decisions ever being clearly articulated in declaratory policy such as White Papers – there is a good reason that detailed information such as this is both classified and closely held.

While one can argue about whether having more submarines than surface combatants will unbalance the fleet structure and reduce Navy’s overall day to day utility in contributing to the joint effect, you cannot argue with the central maritime premise of the White Paper itself. Anyone who attended the ANI’s Vernon Parker Oration last year to hear the White Paper’s chief author Mike Pezzullo could not help but be impressed with the clarity of his articulation of the key issues.

Whether the Government decides to revisit the White Paper before the planned five year strategic planning cycle requires is something we will have to wait and see. If it does, I doubt a fundamentally different answer will emerge unless of course it is handed over to the academic community to write. Australia’s academic Defence and strategic studies community is bedeviled with factionalism and acolytes following those who have had their day and whose dated commentary sadly passes for considered strategic discussion.

In Navy however we need to ensure we don’t declare victory and relax just because there were a raft of new projects slated in the 2009 document. We cannot afford to have mission creep on the Offshore Combatant Vessel, nor can we stop articulating the importance of acquiring the remaining pieces of the Amphibious deployment and sustainment system that seem to have been pushed back into the next decade. Similarly, we cannot be lulled into thinking that the most ill informed debate of all – surface ship survivability – has passed.

A lively debate on these issues is paramount and contributions by practitioners is critical to informing it. For far too long practitioners have remained relatively silent in our professional debate. We have ceded the intellectual discussion space to those with an intellect but little practical substance to make their musings useful – yet they seem to influence policy more than we. This is a maritime century, one where Navy will play a key role in the ADF’s contribution to the ongoing security of Australia and her interests. Headmark and the ANI offer us all the chance to keep this debate alive, to shape its direction and take back some of the ground we have given up. We need to close the metaphorical door to our offices and think and write about something else other than boarding ops and anti-piracy patrols – we need to write about our future.

“Melpomene”

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Front cover photograph: HMAS Labuan prepares for a beach landing on the coast of Lautaim, East Timor to disembark personnel and stores during Pacific Partnership 2010.
The Defence White Paper 2009 calls for a doubling of the present submarine force size to 12 under Project Sea 1000. It states that this number is required to ‘sustain a force at sea large enough in a conflict or crisis to be able to defend our approaches.’

The White Paper also outlines that the force may need to do this at ‘considerable distance’ from Australia, protect and support other ADF assets and undertake certain strategic missions where the stealth and other operating characteristics of highly-capable advanced submarines would be crucial.

The White Paper states an intent to expand, not only submarine numbers, but the role and reach of the present Collins Class based submarine force, while leaving open the design and size requirements for the future submarine. It states the submarines will be assembled in South Australia; however, it does not clarify if the design is to be completely Australian, Military off the Shelf (MOTS), or an Australianised version of MOTS. This leaves planners with the significant dilemma of taking the higher risk approach of designing a bespoke platform in Australia or considering lessons learnt from the Collins Class and accepting the lower risk MOTS approach.

Whatever option is taken the Defence White Paper clearly defines its expectations for the Future Submarine. It states that ‘The Future Submarine will have greater range, longer endurance on patrol, and expanded capabilities compared to the current Collins class submarine. It will also be equipped with very secure real-time communications and be able to carry different mission payloads such as uninhabited underwater vehicles (UUV’s).

The Future Submarine will be capable of a range of tasks such as anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare; strategic strike; mine detection and mine-laying operations; intelligence collection; supporting special forces (including infiltration and exfiltration missions); and gathering battlespace data in support of operations, making it, arguably, the most versatile and capable platform in the ADF’s inventory.

Current Submarine Capability

The introduction of the Collins Class to the Australian fleet promised to deliver the world’s largest and most capable conventionally powered submarine; however, it was marred by controversy about its performance, noise and cost. The Collins Class has undergone a number of upgrades to date in order to meet both original and modified specifications. These upgrades, which include the boats Combat System, have left the Australian Navy and wider ADF with a platform broadly capable of meeting its needs, both for training and operations; however, many difficulties still exist. The Navy has struggled to retain the skilled personnel to maintain the submarine force for some years. Recent gains in personnel due to the mining downturn in 2008/09 may be short lived as the industry recovers.

Additionally, the platform still has inherent design issues that will continue to be a challenge to both the Navy and the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) until class retirement. These issues aside, Navy has worked hard to recover submarine personnel numbers from the lows of 2008. In conjunction with ASC it has also improved hull availability in recent years.

From over a century ago... Artist rendering of future submarine warfare, where subs crawl out of the water and attack helpless lighthouses. (Public domain).
months, but given the Class is based on a late 1980’s design, it may struggle to provide a capability edge out to 2025.

**Designed to Suit**

Australia has over 36000km of coastline and open northern approaches to protect, presenting unique challenges regarding range and endurance issues for its submarine fleet. In order to meet these challenges, the Submarine Institute of Australia (SIA) estimate a submarine displacing approximately 4000 tonnes may be necessary. A new construction submarine comes with significant cost, as well as technological and project risk. ASC, as the previous builder of the Collins Class is a logical choice to construct the submarine, drawing on lessons learnt; however, a significant time has passed since the Collins Class was constructed. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has modelled cost estimates for the Future Submarine in an attempt to give some perspective on the scale of the project. It states that Collins Class submarine cost approximately $1 billion dollars each (2006 dollars) and a total of $5.7 billion as a project cost. Assuming the new submarine can be built at the same cost/tonne as the Collins Class would result in a unit cost of $1.4 billion in today’s dollars, or $16.8 billion for a build of 12.

The Institute argues that the real cost of building would be substantially greater because of the increased complexity of design and construction of a larger submarine, as physics precludes a simple scaling up of any previous design. It also notes that historical trending of submarines above 2,000 tonnes since 1916 has shown a 3.8% increase per year. Factoring this into the cost of Collins Class construction from two decades ago gives a per hull cost of $3.04 billion (2009) dollars or over $36 billion for the fleet of 12.

The government has not officially placed any price expectation for SEA 1000 against the Defence Capability Plan (DCP); however, the Minister for Defence Personnel, Materiel and Science has acknowledged that some approximations are in excess of $30 billion. This, at a time when Defence has assigned the Strategic Reform Program (SRP) one of the highest priorities over the next decade in order to return 20 billion dollars in savings back to operations. Expenditure on this scale will require significant justification, as outlined in the 2008 Mortimer Review.

**Military Off The Shelf Options**

There is no doubt that this is an ambitious project, what is uncertain is whether an Australian designed and built submarine is the answer, or an Australianised MOTS submarine is a more suitable solution. Off the shelf submarine solutions, such as the German Type 214 or Spanish S-80 are generally smaller than the current Collins Class boats; however, are modern by comparison and are more capable in most critical areas.

Submarine technology has changed greatly over the last 20 years, with the advent of new materials and active noise cancellation allowing more efficient use of space, without compromising habitability. Lithium
Oxide/Ion batteries are becoming viable replacements for the traditional Lead Acid varieties and promise a much greater charging capacity, higher energy density and no battery memory issues. They have no acid or hydrogen related dangers, improved life and can be charged at maximum rates to 100% capacity. Combined with a proven, marine diesel this would provide a significant tactical gain in a diesel electric submarine.9 Decoy technology has rapidly advanced, as has electro-optical periscopes, communications and hull design.

The smaller size of modern Diesel Electric submarines does not have to be a disadvantage, in fact small submarine capability compares favourably in almost all areas.20 They have a full suite of acoustic arrays, are acoustically very quiet, carry multiple torpedo, missile (including Land Attack variants) or mine combinations, with reloads and can deploy Special Operations personnel. The RAN operated the Oberon Class submarines for decades and at 2000 tonnes they provided a submarine capable of open ocean transit or littoral operations. Smaller submarines are well suited to the littoral environment and, given their size, exhibit a lower target strength than larger submarines. As ASW appears to be heading toward a variable depth sonar and multistatic future, this is an added advantage, given latest generation active sonar systems are low frequency and anechoic tiles have a reduced effect.

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A disadvantage they have in this field is a comparative decrease in weapon numbers over a submarine twice their size; however, it is difficult to imagine that an Australian submarine would have a requirement to empty its magazine, while on autonomous operations. Significant weapons expenditure would be the domain of coalition operations where the weapon load supplements other platforms and would need to be confirmed via force options testing in future weapons development.

The Future Submarine Project also requires some form of Air Independent Propulsion (AIP). AIP does not give an advantage at high speed, instead it allows the commander to extend the submarines submerged endurance while at patrol speeds. This allows persistence in areas where special operations insertions or Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions are being conducted, without having to snort to recharge the batteries. A greater persistence in area, combined with other technologies, such as UUVs, provides a substantial leap in capability, with lowered risk.

There are numerous AIP technologies, one of which is Fuel Cells. The German Type 214 submarines utilise two Fuel Cells, which have no moving parts and provide a 240 kW storage capacity, which will enable the submarine to stay submerged for over one month, at a four knot patrol speed.21 This is as the 1900 tonne submarine, with a significantly smaller crew, the Hotel load requirement is less than the current Collins Class; however, a larger design would need a substantially larger AIP capacity.

The Type 214 is a modern Diesel Electric submarine, designed in Germany and operated by a number of nations including South Korea, Pakistan, Turkey and Portugal. South Korea has recently ordered six Type 214 submarines at a contract price of USD350 million each. The submarines will be built by Hyundai Heavy Industries and will be tailored to South Korean requirements. This option would also be available to Australia.

ASC is capable of building the submarines, under licence from Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW), or another builder, and in conjunction with General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB). This complies with the intent of the White Paper, which is Australian assembly, sustaining jobs and expertise in the shipbuilding industry; however, negates vast amounts of design risk. Given Australia’s close relationship with the United States and drawing on the recent Collins Class Replacement Combat System experience, it is also logical to have significant input from GDEB and the United States Navy. Commonality with US combat and weapons systems is vital and GDEB have experience with construction of the Barbel Class SSK, as well as vast experience as SSN builders.

The current average price of a Diesel Electric Submarine is USD461.5 million.23 A fleet of 12 submarines would cost USD 5.538 billion, without training and through life logistics and maintenance support included.

The ASPI has estimated this cost as AUD8.8 billion in 2020.24 This cost represents massive savings when compared against an Australian design. The savings could be used to ensure funding for many other major DCP items and provide tax payers with optimum value for money. Recent examples of highly successful MOTS purchases are the RAAF C-17 and
Super Hornet. Both projects have been introduced rapidly and within (or under) budget due to the mature nature of the capability. Although the Future Submarine represents a larger, more complex purchase, the benefits of mature, but modular design is worthy of consideration.

**More than just the Submarine**

The Future Submarine Project will be a major design and construction program, but the program is more than just the submarine. Just as the construction of the submarine has a long lead time, so does the ability to raise, train and sustain a force capable of manning the submarine. As the RAN is already having difficulties manning six submarines, its ability to man 12, with the same, or greater complement per submarine, will require a substantial and prolonged recruiting effort, as well as a flexible approach to submarine basing.

As a comparison the Type 214 submarine complement is 27, vice the Collins Class’ 45. The ASPI note that 12 boats would give a fleet of eight available at any one time, or 360 personnel posted to a submarine, assuming a Collins Class complement and a single crew system. A smaller crew equates to a lower workforce risk and therefore a lower project risk.

Training of this force will take time and activities that significantly grow the capabilities and experience of the submarine workforce need to commence without delay. The Submarine Surveillance and Equipment Program and other similar programs will become integral to an expanded submarine force. Enhanced training programs should be designed to deliver the required outcomes in the years preceding the Future Submarines arrival, not started at that point. The art of ASW is a skill that takes years to master, depletes quickly and when considered across an entire fleet, regeneration times may be measured in decades. A modern, highly capable submarine loses its capability edge in the hands of an inexperienced or under trained crew; however, when similar platforms are pitted against each other, it is the training and skill of the crew that will determine the victor.

A submarine is an intelligence collection platform and as such needs to undertake prolonged and covert patrols. The strategic importance of this role is highlighted many times in the Defence White Paper; however, as well as collecting intelligence, a submarine also relies on it. Long term strategic warning is required to ensure correct defence posture; this is especially true for a submarine force. Enhanced alliances and international defence relationships will be required well in advance of the Future Submarine. This is particularly true of the Australian–US alliance that provides an associated capability, intelligence and technological partnership that the Defence White Paper describes as ‘indispensable to our security’. Enhancements to these partnerships will create immediate benefits for the present fleet and exponential benefits to the Future Submarine.

The Future Submarine will require an expansion to the current basing arrangements in order to achieve greater range and longer endurance on patrol. Flexibility in operations can be enhanced through a base in Darwin capable of providing minor maintenance support, in addition to AIP and stores replenishment. Departing to a patrol area from Darwin saves approximately 1900nm against departing from FBW and a fleet of 12 submarines will require facilities
The Future Submarine Project, More than just a Boat

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at more than one port, some outside of Australia. Options for facilities on the east coast of Australia would also allow increased flexibility for training evolutions and may be desirable for a number of fleet personnel. Flexible basing and crewing arrangements will give increased leverage to the Future Submarine fleet as well as allowing crew rotations and multi-crewing. This approach has the added advantage of lessening the impact of commercial recruitment in a single area.

Submarine Through Life Support and ASC

If Australia’s future strategic circumstances necessitate a substantially expanded submarine fleet, then the nation’s ability to build and sustain that capability must also be strategic. For this reason, the Government must retain majority ownership of ASC, to protect and further Australia’s interests. ASC could not only build and maintain the Future Submarine, if it adopted a more business oriented model, it could position itself to provide a service hub for other nations operating similar Diesel Electric boats. In conjunction with DSTO, ASC might also provide specialist technology such as UUV’s and Wake-homing torpedos to supplement submarine capability. As a middle power, Australia has the ability to lead and not follow on emerging specialist technologies, tailored to suit our own requirements. This work need not wait for the Future Submarine and could be currently utilised for the Collins Class.

In conclusion, the Future Submarine project must deliver Australia a highly capable fleet of 12 submarines to meet strategic requirements. Additional to the submarines, are the personnel, maintenance and logistics issues surrounding a doubling of the fleet size and a generational increase in capability.

With significant recruitment and training lead times, work needs to commence immediately to increase numbers, significantly up skill the workforce and provide a diverse experience base to the standards required. It will be a huge project with cost estimations for an Australian built and designed submarine running as high as 36 billion dollars. Australia needs a capable submarine force, but it needs to be affordable and balanced with a variety of other ADF requirements. Expenditure of tens of billions of dollars above that required for an Australianised MOTS solution must have an overwhelmingly persuasive business case. Selecting a modular design MOTS solution, built in Australia under a collaborative partnership complies with the intent of the White Paper with significantly less technical, financial and workforce risk. Australians expect that their money will be spent effectively and that Defence learn from some of the lessons of previous acquisitions and act on them. When Defence adopts these lessons it will be well on the way to fundamental Strategic Reform.

Notes

(Endnotes)

2 Ibid, Chapter 9.
6 G Combet, From Collins to Force 2030: the challenge of the future submarine’, Speech to the Sydney Institute, Sydney, 4 November 2009
7 The Strategic Reform Program 2009, Delivering Force 2030, p 3.
11 Ibid, p 35.
18 Defence White Paper, Chapter 9.
19 Ibid, Chapter 12.
20 Ibid, Chapter 6, Para 6.33.
21 Ibid, Chapter 9, Para 9.3.
22 Ibid, Chapter 8, Para 8.40.
Who’s A Pirate?
In Court, A Duel Over Definitions

Not since Lt. Robert Maynard of the Royal Navy sailed back triumphantly to nearby Hampton Roads in 1718 with the severed head of Blackbeard swinging from his bowsprit has this Navy town been so embroiled in the fight against piracy.

For the first time since the Civil War, accused pirates will be put on trial this fall in a federal courtroom. The defendants are six Somali men fished out of the Gulf of Aden, between Somalia and Yemen, in April after allegedly firing on a US Navy ship, which blew apart the tiny skiff they were on.

Prosecuting pirates, rather than hanging them from the yardarm, is the modern world’s approach to the scourge of Somali piracy that has turned huge swathes of the Indian Ocean into a no-go zone for commercial vessels.

But there’s a problem: Some 2,000 years after Cicero defined pirates as the “common enemy of all,” nobody seems able to say, legally, exactly what a pirate is. US law long ago made piracy a crime but didn’t define it. International law contains differing, even contradictory, definitions.

The confusion threatens to hamstring US efforts to crack down on modern-day Blackbeards. The central issue in Norfolk: If you try to waylay and rob a ship at sea—but you don’t succeed—are you still a pirate?

It may seem strange there should be doubt about an offence as old as this one. Piracy was the world’s first crime with universal jurisdiction, meaning that any country had the right to apprehend pirates on the high seas.

The Romans took piracy so seriously they overrode a cautious Senate and gave near dictatorial powers to an up-and-coming general named Pompey, who soon swept away piracy in the Mediterranean.

In more recent centuries, European countries such as Britain cracked down on pirates—except when busy enlisting certain ones, dubbed “privateers,” to help them fight their wars by raiding enemy ships.

Pirates even spurred the creation of the US Navy, after Thomas Jefferson erupted over the cost of paying tribute to the Barbary Corsairs for safe passage of US merchant ships. At the time, the US was paying about one-tenth of the federal budget to the pirates.

Supplied with warships, President Jefferson waged war on the Barbary pirates (whence the line “to the shores of Tripoli” in the Marines’ Hymn). By 1815, the North African pirate kingdoms had been subdued.

When Congress dealt with piracy in a statute four years later, the crime was so easy to recognize that legislators didn’t bother to describe it, just the punishment. The 1819 statute that made piracy a capital offence (since changed to mandatory life in prison) simply deferred to “the law of nations.” That legal punt has kept American jurists scrambling ever since.

The stage was set for the Norfolk trial on April 10 of this year when the USS Ashland, cruising in the Gulf of Aden about 330 miles off Djibouti, was fired upon at 5 a.m. by Somali men in a small skiff. The Navy vessel, an amphibious dock landing ship, returned fire with 25-mm cannon, wrecking the 18-foot skiff and sending its six occupants overboard.

The Ashland sent a search boat to recover the Somalis and photograph the smoking hulk of the skiff, which contained at least one weapon and what looked like a grappling hook or anchor. Though that boat was blasted to pieces, even when pirate skiffs survive, the ships they target are often loath to bring the skiffs aboard. One captured by a Navy force in 2006, according to the judge advocate’s testimony in a subsequent trial in Kenya, was crawling with “roaches the size of leopards.”

In Norfolk, the prosecution has begun its effort to convince the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia that the quickly foiled Somalis are guilty not just of lesser charges they face but of the main charge of piracy.

“Violent attacks on the high seas without lawful authority have always...
been piracy under the law of nations, in 1819 and today,” said the lead prosecutor, Benjamin Hatch, at a pre-trial hearing last month.

“So if one ship fires a bow-and-arrow,” asked Judge Raymond Jackson, rubbing his brow, “or a slingshot, or a rock, those are all acts of violence, and thus piracy?” The prosecutor nodded.

The public defender, Geremy Kamens, weighed in. “That a slingshot fired upon another ship would expose the defendant to a mandatory life sentence shows the absurd result of this reading,” he said. The defence added that under this broad definition, Greenpeace activists could be considered pirates for their anti-whaling antics on the seas.

The defence lawyers trawled through history books, coming to rest upon an obscure 1820 Supreme Court ruling. “We have, therefore, no hesitation in declaring that piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea,” Justice Joseph Story wrote for the majority in the case of United States v. Smith.

That gave the defence lawyers their main argument: Piracy is robbery on the high seas; it isn’t merely attempted robbery at sea, which is covered by a separate statute that the Somalis are charged with as well. Since the attack on the Ashland clearly failed, it wasn’t piracy, the defence argues, and therefore, the most serious charge should be dropped.

But the prosecutors, too, have probed early sources—17th-century Dutch jurists, 18th-century British writers, 19th-century maritime cases, an 1800 speech by then-congressman John Marshall, and a slew of international treaties.

The prosecution has leaned heavily on a 1934 ruling by Britain’s Privy Council, which pondered the case of a similarly failed attack at sea, near Hong Kong. In that case, the jury found the defendants guilty, but said its verdict was subject to the question of whether it’s really piracy if no actual robbery occurs. The court in Hong Kong said it isn’t, and acquitted the attackers.

The Privy Council members, however, after hacking through thickets of legal technicalities, ultimately reached a different conclusion. “Actual robbery is not an essential element in the crime of piracy,” they said; “A frustrated attempt to commit piratical robbery is equally piracy.”

They added, with more than a hint of exasperation: “Their Lordships are almost tempted to say that a little common sense is a valuable quality in the interpretation of international law.”

Beyond the legal wrangling and obscure historical references, the implications of the case in Norfolk are serious. Piracy’s golden age may have passed two centuries ago, but it remains a scourge in places like the Strait of Malacca in Indonesia and Malaysia, off the coast of Nigeria, and above all off the east coast of Africa, where the disintegration of Somalia has led to a major resurgence.

The first half of 2010 saw about 200 raids and unsuccessful attacks on ships at sea worldwide, the bulk of them off Somalia. In early August, two cargo ships were hijacked. In all, an estimated 18 ships and their crews are currently being held for ransom. To fight the problem, the US and the United Nations are counting on prosecuting pirates. Some UN officials dream of establishing an international piracy tribunal, similar to the one for war crimes in The Hague.

In the meantime, the US and other countries have helped Kenya, the closest stable country to the source, to put scores of pirates on trial. But Kenyan law is cumbersome, requiring witnesses to testify on three separate occasions, a tough order logistically for merchant sailors. The European Union is now trying to jump-start Kenya’s pirate prosecutions—the first sentence will come later this month—but progress is slow.

As a result, attackers captured by European warships in the Indian Ocean often are let go for lack of any real legal recourse. A Spanish warship caught seven Somali pirates red-handed in early August, men who had been trying to waylay a Norwegian chemical tanker. The Spanish frigate immediately
released them because it would have been difficult to prosecute them, the EU naval force off Somalia said.

That leaves courtrooms like the one in Norfolk as among the best hopes for bringing pirates to justice and deterring future ones. But even seemingly clear-cut cases don’t necessarily pass muster in court.

After a celebrated incident in April 2009, when US Navy Seals snipers killed three Somali men holding an American captain hostage on a small boat after a raid, rescuing him, the lone Somali survivor of that attack on the Maersk Alabama pleaded guilty to lesser charges in New York, not to piracy.

Indeed, the last US piracy conviction was in 1861, of a Confederate blockade runner. Now the court in Norfolk must contend with the defence motion to dismiss the piracy charge, which would leaving only such lesser charges as attempted plunder.

The prosecution argues that US courts should defer to international law, especially an 1982 UN Law of the Sea treaty the US never ratified. Aping the 1958 Geneva Convention, it offers an expansive definition of piracy as any illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation committed for private ends on the high seas.

Defence lawyers balk at that suggestion. “We do not interpret US law based on UN resolutions, but rather what Congress meant at the time,” says the public defender, Mr Kamens. Judge Jackson is expected to rule soon.

And following that: Piracy Developments Off Somalia

A federal judge in Virginia, USA, has dismissed the main count of piracy against six Somalis following an incident earlier this year.

In Virginia, Judge Jackson ruled that an incident off the coast of Somalia on April 10 did not meet the standards of “piracy as defined by the law of nations”. While pointing out that Congress enacted two separate standards to govern piracy, the judge took into account mitigating factors such as the fact that the defendants never boarded, nor attempted to board, the Ashland. The defendants’ skiff was destroyed by return fire after one of the occupants had fired at the Ashland.

Several other charges, including the lesser charge of (an unsuccessful) “attack to plunder a vessel”, remain in place against the six men. By way of illustration, an analogy may be drawn between this legal situation and the legal position following an attempted murder compared with that following an actual murder.

Morale, thought Napoleon, was to the physical as three is to one. In other words, a numerically smaller force, whose hearts are high, will carry the day in combat against a bigger force, even despite large numerical contrasts. The army of 10,000 will vanquish one of 20,000, and even hold its own against one of 30,000. How true is his suggestion in reality?

A study of the retreating Wermacht in WWII proves some of this point. The German armies were ‘on the back foot’, facing the Allied troops who had superior numbers, better supply lines, capable commanders and a clear aim. Yet the fiercely proud and professional army of the Germans proved time and again to be more than capable of effectively resisting, utilising a variety of means to slow their enemy. They often fell back in apparent retreat, only to let happily advancing Allied troops walk into a prepared artillery trap. The Germans surprised the Allies with their breakout in the Ardennes in late 1944. Although many of the wiser soldiers amongst them could see that they were doomed to defeat, their abilities and a fierce pride in their own capabilities and their nation made them much stronger – man for man – than the advancing Allied forces.

Similarly the North Vietnamese carried the day against their enemy in their long war to conquer the South. Although they were not proficient at winning in the tactical sense, their determination and belief in themselves enabled them to tenaciously engage, admittedly with a degree of coercion from their leaders. They became the victors when their opponents’ belief in themselves was destroyed by lack of support from home and a perception of hopelessness in their cause.

Numerically speaking, the Argentine Army should have held their conquered territory of the Falklands in 1982. In prepared positions of their own choosing, with time to make adequate defences and even better train their numerically-superior conscript troops, they should have been able to hold their ground against the British forces, who were advancing through hostile waters 6000 miles from home, to make an amphibious lodgement on enemy territory and then defeat the enemy. The professional, proud, and highly motivated troops of the British expeditionary force were more than keen to come to grips with their enemy. In the troopships T-shirts with aggressive slogans were prepared, and fiercely xenophobic songs sung. One of the best-trained and motivated armies in the world was coming south to dislodge the invasion, and the Argentines were uneasily aware of the calibre of their enemy. They were no match for their opponent, and the world knows the result.

Some commentators see three main motivators behind willingly undertaking military service: loyalty to a cause, personal gain, and desire for adventure. In some forces the first is an extremely powerful factor. Loyalty to a country, in the form of patriotism, can also reach extremely high levels: the motivation behind the troops of Israel, for example, is doubtless a factor in their victories over the last 50 years. We can see similar enthusiasm behind the willingness of some terrorists to give their lives in suicide bombings. It is important to note here that the dubious nature of the ethics or legal nature of an organisation behind such bombers in not important: the terrorists motivated by al-Qaida may hold questionable status in the eyes of some commentators but that is not a factor here. Rather, we are interested in the tenacity of the loyalty that drove them to such actions.

Motivators such as personal gain and a desire for adventure are less common and less of a force. While high pay is seen by many as worth taking a risk, it is doubtful whether it would result in a command being determined to die rather than surrender. But this was the common attribute of the Japanese Army in WWII: they would rather die than give in. British soldier (and later author) George MacDonald Fraser found this out when he was attacked by a soldier “…who came howling out of a thicket near the Sittang, full of spite and fury, in that first week of August. He was half-
starved and near-naked, and his only weapon was a bamboo stake, but he was in no mood to surrender.” Major General J. Lawton Collins noted:

The Japanese on both offensive and defense die determinedly rather than give up. Many cases are recorded of men so weak with hunger and disease that they could not stand who stayed by their weapons pulling the trigger as long as there was life. Surrenders by able-bodied, well Japanese were negligible…

A significant pair of photographs in Eric Bergerud’s comprehensive account of the theatre – Touched With Fire: the Land Warfare in the South Pacific – shows a Japanese soldier in the sea. The caption notes that he was one of four who would not surrender to some Australian troops. The Japanese held a grenade to his head, and then, the caption explains, he set it off. There was a lot of this sort of suicide. British Commando Peter Young was leading some men trying to take a prisoner; they came across a wounded Japanese who simply blew himself up with a grenade rather than be taken. General William Slim tells of a Japanese Army unit trying to withdraw over a river, while they were being pressed hard by Allied troops. Eventually, with most of their force cut down, the remaining Japanese formed up in ranks, and rather than come forward and surrender, instead “marched steadily into the river and drowned.” An account from a Japanese soldier describes how those too badly wounded to fight were treated: “It became a routine that a soldier who was emaciated and crippled, with no hope of recovery, was given a grenade and persuaded, without words, to sort himself out.” The Japanese Army’s conviction and loyalty was so strong that it acted as a major part of their capability.

Morale, it is clear, is an extremely important factor in assessing combat capability. So, how are we to tell whether an opposing force has high morale, or not? There are several indicators identified here that may be analysed to produce an answer.

**INDICATORS OF MORALE**

**HIGH RESIGNATION RATES**

The normalcy benchmark for resignation in armed forces is around 12 per cent. However, this can be altered by several factors to produce varied figures which in themselves are not abnormal. For example, a country may perceive a “peace dividend” as was apparent at the end of the Cold War. The United States Navy at that time, around 1989, had a platform total of around 600 vessels. By 2005, that number had dropped to under 300, and the USN had shrunk commensurately in personnel size. One would see more resignations than the norm in such a ‘downsizing’ operation.

In such indicators under discussion, it is therefore necessary to note that the findings need analysis to determine if they are indeed an abnormality.

**DIFFICULTIES IN RECRUITING**

The enthusiasm potential of a recruitment pool is affected by their perceptions of a present or potential conflict. Recruits demonstrate with their feet their willingness to become a member of the force seeking personnel. In the Vietnam War, around 100,000 potential draftees avoided the draft by fleeing the USA. Even given the USA’s population at the time of over 200 million, this represents a sample large enough to draw the conclusion that military service was unpopular.

Other methods of avoiding military service include:

- Conscientious objection, often coupled to religious faith or ethical resolve. This, and the other methods listed below, may be feigned to avoid military service.
- Health reasons: legitimate, feigned or overstated;
- Claiming to be homosexual, if the military in question excludes homosexuals;
• Becoming a tertiary student, if such status allows military deferment;
• Enlisting in a branch of the military, for example the United States National Guard during the Vietnam conflict, whose members are unlikely to be deployed into combat;
• Serving with the military in a non-combatant role (such as a medic) in which one is less likely (under traditional rules of warfare) to be exposed to enemy fire.
• Non-appearance upon request. Many countries with conscription systems will take a long time to physically arrest a non-complier.

HUMINT REPORTS

Conversations with target personnel can lead to indications of morale across a force. However, judgement has to be exercised as to the veracity of the comments. What should be made of expressed opinions from an air force officer who says ‘Everyone’s trying to get out’, or words to such effect? What does ‘everyone’ mean: is he discussing all ranks, or is he just referring to the officer corps, whose members may intend to separate for different reasons than non-commissioned personnel, for example, because an air force’s pilots are being offered extremely high salaries to join an airline. Has he surveyed all of the force’s officers and is he now summarising his findings? Obviously not. Has he a large circle of contacts and is he reflecting the majority of recent conversations? Perhaps so. Is he in fact trying to feed his interlocutor misinformation? That is up to the person relating this information to judge when making a report.

SUCCESS IN MEETING RECRUITING AND RETENTION TARGETS

Success in meeting recruiting targets needs to be tempered with analysis of the reasons behind this situation. Is the country’s economy in such a situation that people who would not normally sign up doing so because of the security of a government job? In a conscript force some analysis would need to be given to the measures of avoidance which people are undertaking in order to avoid service.

As regards keeping people in a volunteer force, too much retention does not in itself indicate high morale. It might simply be an indicator that to be an armed force member is a good job…we can imagine a force which sees little combat; has good pay levels, and where not much is asked from its members. Personnel may well want to stay on. Alternatively positions outside the force may be seen as being not an alternative.

LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF A FORCE’S CAPABILITY AND MORALE EFFECTS

The hypothetical air force of the hypothetical country of Banksia has an ageing fleet of Alpha jets, configured in air-to-air and ground attack roles. The country is uneasy about its neighbour, who is similarly equipped but who has ordered 48 Hornets. Banksia’s air force commanders have asked for an identical orbat, but to save money they have been forced to order 48 Hawks. How would we expect morale to be within the force following this decision? Later Banksia hears that the neighbour is equipping the Hornets with AMRAAM air to air missiles, a clearly superior weapon to Banksia’s Sidewinders. Morale, we reasonably analyse, is low, and will fall further.

Such a logical analysis is of value to any assessment. We can reasonably expect feelings of anger and resentment within a force made to cope with clearly inferior equipment. However, such judgements should not be allowed to dominate the analysis, for empirical evidence can show such analysis can be...
misleading. For example, a comparison of the weapons and abilities of the British force at Isandlwana against the Zulus would have led one to reasonably conclude that the latter were a far superior unit: the Martini-Henry rifle and bayonet against the assegai and shield. Yet seizing a momentary tactical advantage and with extremely high morale, the Zulu force won the day. Similarly the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army lacked air and naval forces, and they could not call upon the artillery support enjoyed by the US Army and its allied forces in Vietnam. However, the North Vietnam forces won by employing asymmetric tactics; good strategic planning, and exploiting the Allied forces’ lowered morale and collapse of home support.

**DISCIPLINARY OFFENCES**

Following a general premise that a disgruntled armed force commits more disciplinary offences than one whose hearts are high, it follows that a lengthy catalogue amongst personnel is a reasonable indicator of low morale. This would be of particular interest if it could be found that offences were common amongst non-commissioned officers, as this backbone of any force is generally one where minor infractions are comparatively rare.

**HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SURVEYS**

Modern armed forces employ a lot of people to manage their personnel. One of the methods of measuring happiness is by means of a survey, often equipped with interesting questions such as “Do you intend to separate within two, five, or 10 years”. Obtaining such survey results – often published within service newspapers – will give useful information as to morale levels.

In conclusion, there are a number of indicators that will give insights into an armed force’s morale situation. The above may not be an exhaustive list, but it serves as a general guide and also as an impetus to suggest that gathering such material, subjecting it to analysis, and factoring in the result will give us an insight into overall capability. The understanding of morale is an area that should be recognised, appreciated, and included in any assessment of a force.

Lieutenant Commander Tom Lewis, PhD OAM RAN, has served as an Intelligence Officer for a number of years, including in Baghdad for a combat tour. He is the author of eight books, and holds a Doctorate in Strategic Studies in addition to three other degrees.
In one of his last interviews before his departure to the US, Kim Beazley talks to Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe about the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean to Australia’s national interests. He illustrates how great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean has influenced Australia’s strategic thinking after World War II and how this has shaped Australia’s defence policy while he was Defence Minister in the 1980s. He also speaks about why the Indian Ocean is increasingly important to Australia and how it is likely to factor into his role as Australia’s Ambassador to the US.

Strategic Imperatives

“There was a big debate in the late 1940s early 1950s whether the Australian commitment to the Western alliance would be a Middle East commitment or a Southeast Asian commitment and there was constant tension between the two. Fundamentally in the Middle East and in Asia generally, we were supporting Western Imperial positions. Independent Australian initiatives were not many; the Colombo Plan would be the nearest thing to it. So our policy in the Indian Ocean Region and in the Far East was a policy largely related to what Britain or the US was doing. We didn’t really start to think these things through for ourselves until the 1960s as it became increasingly obvious that the British were pulling out east of the Suez and the US position was problematic. Then we started to think about it.

“Hence, the Indian Ocean re-rose to prominence in Australian strategic calculations starting in the late 1960’s. It’s first dramatic manifestation, was when the Foreign Minister of the day, Gordon Freeth, who was then also the Member for Forrest, Western Australia, looking at early reports of Soviet shipping moving through the Indian Ocean (establishing anchorages in the Red Sea area and the like) stated that this is pretty minimal and not to be worried about and that the Soviets were not a threat. The Democratic Labour Party decided that such a slippage in traditional liberal anti-Communism had to be seriously punished and they uniquely extended preferences to the Labor Party in the 1969 election, which led to Freeth’s defeat. That at least focussed the minds of both conservative and Labor politicians that perhaps there might be something here that required a bit of careful attention and thought.

“In the 1970’s there was a slow but steady build up of Soviet and US naval activity in the Indian Ocean and, as a result, the region was being drawn into Cold War calculations. This increasingly excited the Australian academic community who wrote a great deal on it; it excited me and I wrote something on it too. Aptly, there were several types of responses. Firstly, was the Indian Ocean a strategic entity? Secondly, did we have to have an Indian Ocean policy per se? Thirdly, was the Indian Ocean merely a transmission belt or thoroughfare or was the situation in different parts of the littoral important to us? Last and most critically, what was really drawing the external powers to the Indian Ocean region? Was it the significance of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, where there were serious interests that arose from its importance in world energy supplies and its instability? Hence, if you take all of those things together there was a discernable Western or global interest which emerged.
Indian Ocean Peace Zone

“There was another layer of activity going on, and that was the view that the Indian Ocean was a strategic entity in itself and should not be automatically drawn into the vortex of the super-power conflict. The thinking went that we should do something about it by proposing an Indian Ocean Peace Zone. With the relatively low level of interest by the super-powers, it had a chance of success. So for a long time in the 1970s and 1980s, on the table at the United Nations for regular discussion each year, was a proposal for an Indian Ocean Peace Zone. Australia sometimes ran that quite hard and ran it a bit harder when the Labor Party was elected, but it was there for continual discussion. I think in the Cold War era Australia’s relationships with countries in South Asia were undermined by the fact that they tended to take Third World neutralist positions, which basically diminished Australian interest. When we were turning to Asia, that meant South East Asia, it meant Japan, China and Korea. The two other countries that mattered to us a great deal were of course Malaysia and Singapore, hence the Five Power Defence Arrangement and so on.

“We were at a point when the Labor Party was elected to office in 1983, where I suppose you could characterize the Labor Party’s position as: Firstly, having noted that the Indian Ocean was now an area of more intense super-power competition. Secondly, we were fascinated by nuclear-free zones, peace zones and that sort of thing as a dimension of our foreign policy, though we were always mindful of US interests while pursuing it. We knew that even with a focus on the Arabian Sea it was a somewhat lesser concern than the Pacific or the Atlantic Oceans and the United States perhaps saw some value in continuing a conversation on the peace zone proposal. Thirdly, probably running somewhat counter to that, as we sat down and thought through the issues of defence self reliance, it became increasingly obvious to us that if we are going to defend all Australian approaches, we have to defend the approaches of the north and west as well as the east.

“The growing superpower focus on the region, which was a logical result of the experience of the 1973 Oil Embargo, and then the increasingly active contest between the Soviet Union and the US for influence in the littoral countries in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, basically meant that things like peace zones went off the boil. From the Australian point of view, one controversial foray you might say after the Soviet invasion...
of Afghanistan was the request from the US for gestures around the globe of hostility. The Fraser government decided they would regularly deploy Australian naval units in the Arabian Sea. Jimmy Carter had briefly invited Australia to consider the possibility of being part of a ready reaction force, but Australia did not endorse the idea. Also, there was some discussion on whether or not Australia's naval presence ought to be taken into the Gulf as opposed to simply the Arabian Sea, but that was also not to be the case.

“In many ways these are all contradictory positions, but they do have one underlying theme, that is, drawing us into the Indian Ocean more intensively, contemplating this as a strategic zone, or thinking about aspects of its strategic significance and its various parts. What all this did was to create in Australia a thorough understanding that we had two coasts and that we are a player in Pacific politics and also a player in Indian Ocean politics. We needed to comprehend that in the way we did our defence planning and the way we conducted our foreign policy. It’s always been difficult to discern why there has been such a vacuum over the years in Indian Ocean policy in Australia, because it is clearly a vital link with Britain and the rest of the world.

**Diego Garcia**

“The US acquired Diego Garcia from the British in the 1960s and began pretty well straight away a fairly serious build up. It was probably the Diego Garcia acquisition and build up that triggered the Indian Ocean littoral states to start arguing about a zone of peace, because the Soviets had not acquired anything like Diego Garcia. But once Diego Garcia was acquired then that showed to all the Indian Ocean littoral states; here was something pretty important. Diego Garcia itself was not that important to Australia. It plays no role in Australia’s capacity to deploy ships, although obviously, Australian ships call in there on the odd occasion, but of itself, it has never been of much significance to Australia. Our Indian Ocean policy, in so far as it has practical effect was driven in the first instance by our Southeast Asian commitments and, in the second instance, by the appearance of a vested interest in the Arabian and Persian Gulf. This dramatically manifested itself in government policy in two ways when I actually became Defence Minister.

**Two Ocean Navy**

“The idea of a Two Ocean Navy, in which the Indian Ocean was perceived as the logical point at which we ought to develop our naval capabilities; particularly the deployment of submarines as it’s a much more sensible place than it is on the east coast in defending our approaches, which tend to be in a north-westerly direction, at least as much Indian Ocean as they are Pacific. We sought to explain to the US how important the Australian contribution was to the Western alliance, even though we were pursuing a policy of defence self reliance. The one thing we drew as an example to the Americans of how an Australian independent capability would serve Western interests and, therefore, they ought not to be offended was the Soviet naval presence at Camranh Bay, Vietnam. The US now talks of a ‘string of pearls’, but the Soviets sort of had a ‘string of pearls’. At that point of time, the eastern extension of the string was Camranh Bay; which was their biggest base in terms of Soviet facilities immediately adjacent to the Indian Ocean and Australia.

“The commitment we had to the Five Power Defence Arrangement, and more particularly, the rights of access to the Malaysian airfield at Butterworth, gave us an important role in countering the Soviet presence. So we ran Operation Gateway, which was regular P3 flights basically monitoring Soviet shipping and providing a substantial amount of intelligence on their activities in the region. The Indian Ocean, at least in its constituent parts, featured considerably in our policy at the time and it was a comprehension about the Two Ocean Navy policy which entailed an Indian Ocean component. What dropped away while we were in office was the Indian Ocean Peace Zone. As the Cold War wound down, people lost interest in it. However, with our Arabian Sea deployments and interests we needed to think of the Indian Ocean as a strategic entity, be concerned about the point of ingress and digress from it and therefore we needed to be involved ourselves in the Gulf. That was the logic. Basically we involved ourselves in the Persian Gulf because the United States was engaged there.

**Tanker War**

“The start really of our commitment to the Gulf was not the Kuwait War but the Tanker War in 1987. During the 1980s Iraq and Iran were fighting a pretty nasty war, and by 1987 the war was focussing on tankers in the Gulf. Iran was attacking shipping and tankers going back and forth, and Australian
When the US indicated that they were willing to formally ask us to get involved; we decided that we would do something. We considered a series of propositions and in the end we committed RAN clearance divers to engage in countermining as that was the major weakness in the US posture. The Iranians were shooting rockets at ships going through the Gulf and they were floating mines as well. Hence, there was a countermining requirement as well as a sort of defensive requirement against rockets, which is what we decided to do at that point. Even after the Tanker War what remained constant was the immense importance of energy supplies from the Persian Gulf. Iraq's attack on Kuwait drew us in again basically because we discerned an Australian interest in ensuring that Iraq (or Iran for that matter), did not destabilize that focal point of essential energy supplies to our trading partners, and to the West generally.

"The Defence White Paper was also brought down in 1987. What we did was take the Cockburn Sound base, or HMAS Stirling, which was originally developed by Whitlam and Fraser and announced in the time of the McMahon government, and converted it into a full-blown naval base. We anticipated that the bulk of Australian submarine operations would be operating from it. Given that our submarines are normally expected to be deployed in Southeast Asian waters, I think the submarines' capacity to spend time on the station was improved by about 25% by being deployed from HMAS Stirling, rather than Sydney. Given that we were operating conventional submarines, that sort of time was significant. So when I was explaining the White Paper to the US in 1987, I not only talked about the Persian Gulf, but I also talked about the contribution we made countering the Soviet presence in Camranh Bay, which was our contribution to the Western alliance. But within a couple of months of the White Paper coming out, the US was suddenly engaged in the Tanker War. That was really a critical point as really from that point on the US has been more or less on the verge of or permanently engaged in war fighting in the Persian Gulf region and its hinterland.

**From Hawke to Rudd**

"When I was Defence Minister, there was a immense Caucus focus on what I was doing but not much of a government focus. Hawke's style of government was to give immense authority to ministers. So basically the first time the cabinet saw my White Paper was when I presented it, whereas the 2009 Defence White Paper went through repeated iterations at the National Security Committee of Cabinet and it's been much more a product of management by Kevin Rudd, than the White Paper of 1987 was a product of management by Bob Hawke.

"Actually Kevin Rudd's management is what brought the Indian Ocean to the White Paper. There's an interesting story. The White Paper strategic component was largely completed in 2008, but just before it was ready for production, Kevin Rudd had it re-committed (the strategic end of it) and incorporated within it a very strong paragraph of the Indian Ocean and our commitment to it. I think that reflected his geo-political perspective. He sat down and seriously thought about where his Asia-Pacific initiative was going and where the direction of geo-politics was moving. The White Paper, without a serious analysis of the Indian Ocean Region would be incomplete and maybe dated. So it was quite an interesting development that I think reflects his quite substantial enthusiasm for good relationships with countries in South Asia and a serious thinking-though of our strategic interests in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Islam is basically an Indian Ocean phenomenon and so the sorting out of what Islam needs is something of the Indian Ocean political activity. Presently, these are two big generators of global focus; the economy and Islam. If you take a very broad view, excessively broad some would say, about the hinterland, pretty well all of Islam is in the Indian Ocean or its hinterland such as the Middle East, East Africa, the Gulf, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and, of course, Indonesia, which is the biggest Islamic nation in the world.

"In the long-term the Indian Ocean is going to be massively more significant in global politics than it has ever been before and that is the function largely of the fact that the Asia-Pacific region is massively more significant. The Asia-Pacific region covers both the Pacific and the Indian Ocean littoral's northern extension. Energy security and resources are absolutely critical. The Indian Ocean region is immensely rich in that and therefore all developing societies need access to the new material produced around the Indian Ocean littoral. So these are now becoming vitally strategic trade routes. For big powers like the US and China, it's actually an easy game to play. Certainly the Persian Gulf and Iran is hard, but the Indian Ocean generally is not as challenging as we get full value from our maritime capability, which can is very easily extended, withdrawn and enhanced."
Western Australia and the Indian Ocean

“I do think that West Australians have a different perspective to those in the east. For instance, Southeast Asia is viewed from the Indian Ocean perspective and the Indian Ocean, and what happens with India has always been seen as slightly more important in Western Australia (WA) than in the east. There’s a sort of sense in WA, having a different focus, and one of the obsessions in Australia is that we’ve never been defended and when the eastern states say we have been and we say, ‘Where’s the evidence of it?’ This is what really gave some political impetus to the idea of a ‘Two Ocean Navy’ which was arrived at for strategic reasons. But West Australians like to see a substantial defence presence and very proud they are of the SAS and of serious air bases in the north. Also, they want indications that we are capable of protecting the offshore developments in Western Australia. People don’t think about that in Sydney and Melbourne, but people in Western Australia obsess about it, so coming from WA, I think I do have a different perspective.

Vision as Ambassador to the US

“I hope to see that the Australian initiatives, which require American support, get up. The biggest from Kevin Rudd’s point of view is the idea of an Asia-Pacific entity. That is being actively pursued by the Australian government and that will be one of my priorities. Furthermore, Kevin Rudd has successfully engaged the US on Climate Change issues and advancing that agenda is going to be particularly important to me. Also, this is the year in which we give Weapons of Mass Destruction removal our best shot. If we’re going to have an effective non-proliferation regime that will largely be obvious or not, as a product of the conferences that are going to be held in Washington in March, and the outcome of discussions of the potential Iranian weapon. My other big challenge will be is getting up the G-20 – as a feature of the international architecture. We succeeded in that, but keeping that going is vital, if you want to isolate four things that are going to be important to me, these are it.” Furthermore, with the focus of the Australia-US alliance centred on the Indian Ocean, particularly in support of US coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Kim Beazley is well placed to influence the development of Australia’s expanding strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. 

This interview is an expanded version of the original first published in Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, (April 2010, Vol. 36, No.3).
The RAN and the RNZN have a rich and still evolving history of working together in war and exercising together in peace. The history of the white ensign in Australasian waters dates back to the decades in the nineteenth century when Sydney and Auckland were both part of the Royal Navy’s Australian Station. But the naval story of both nations goes back to 1769 when Lieutenant James Cook, RN, placed both countries on his charts and therefore brought them indelibly to the world’s attention and consciousness. Fragmentary coastlines and vague unreliable reports took on a concrete reality which made them real to Europeans and therefore places where claims of sovereignty could be followed by settlement.

Cook’s 1769-71 voyage is the historic fault line between the Pacific as it was and the world we still know. Had Cook lost his ship and his life when Endeavour struck the Great Barrier reef in 1770 his detailed and accurate charts of both islands of New Zealand would have gone to the bottom with him. Cook’s voyage would have been a footnote in a quite different version of the history of our countries. He would have been remembered among the Maori tribes of New Zealand but his fate would have been unknown further. It might have taken a generation before New Zealand’s true geography was known to the world. With Joseph Banks drowned with Cook it is doubtful that the proposal for a convict settlement at Botany Bay would have received the political impetus necessary to get it approved in 1787 and started the following year. Cook’s saving of his ship and his charts had a profound impact on what happened next to Australia and New Zealand.

The next naval officer who intervened in New Zealand’s history was the wise and humane Captain William Hobson. He encouraged the Maori chiefs to sign a treaty that in theory made it possible for a peaceful passage of sovereignty to pass to Queen Victoria without changing life as the Maori lived it on their lands. His intentions were honourable. His aim was to protect both Maori and British residents from growing violence. In 1840 at Waitangi Hobson exercised a level of governmental responsibility on behalf of the Colonial Office which no “four ring” Captain will ever be given in modern times in this age of instant communications.

Hobson’s years in the tropics and the strain of his duties as New
Zealand's first governor caused him to have two strokes the second of which proved fatal. By the time of his death in 1841 settlements had been started in Auckland and Wellington. Importantly for the future Hobson had made clear to a ship load of French settlers who had bought land in the South Island that they would be living there under British sovereignty. Hobson sent a fast frigate to set up British courts where the French owned land at Akaroa near modern day Christchurch before the settlers arrived. That was the end of French settlement plans for Novelle Zelande and the possibility that the two islands might belong to London and Paris respectively. Both islands of New Zealand became a single crown colony, no longer administered from New South Wales but with its own Governor and administration. New Zealand owed its new-found colonial existence and its territorial integrity to the Royal Navy and this dedicated officer.

When Hobson's plan for a peaceful future between Maori and Pakeha broke down irretrievably in the 1860's the British government moved its nearest military and naval assets to New Zealand from Australia. This move included *HMS Orpheus* coming from Sydney to Auckland. The heavily laden frigate struck the sand bar as at the entrance to the west coast port of Manukau Harbour on February 7, 1863. She was beaten to piece by the incoming tide. The tragedy cost the lives of 188 British sailors and Royal Marines out of a complement of 256. This remains the worst maritime tragedy caused by the failure of the senior officer, Commodore Burnett, RN to heed semaphore signals warning him that *Orpheus* was standing into danger.

In the 1870's, when Britain and Russia came close to war over Afghanistan, Australians and New Zealander living in coastal cities felt threatened by the Russian fleet and installed heavy shore artillery to defend their cities from bombardment. *HMAS Watson* on the South Head of Sydney harbour still has its disappearing rampart guns. The North Head of Auckland harbour and Mount Victoria have them also. They are mementos of an era when a blue water approach to defence was impractical due to the lack of capital ships on station capable of defending the cities of Australasia. None of these expensive shore guns ever fired a shot in anger.

In the first decade of the twentieth century both nations bought a capital ship. The New Zealand people bought the Royal Navy a battlecruiser, named for their country, in the hope that this act of commitment and loyalty would be remembered if New Zealand was threatened. The school children of New Zealand put their pocket money together to buy the ship's bell. Like *HMAS Australia* she was a source of great patriotic pride. She visited New Zealand just once, in 1913, the same year that *HMAS Australia* steamed into Sydney harbour to provide the Australian Commonwealth with some much needed 12-inch teeth of its own.

In 1914 while the RAN's bluejackets were dealing with Germans in New Guinea New Zealanders were taking over German Samoa – the first enemy territory taken anywhere in World War One. *HMS New Zealand* and *HMAS Australia* were both Indefatigable-class battlecruisers. These sister ships, collided on 22 April 1916 in a fog off Rosyth. While under repair *Australia* missed the Battle of Jutland fought on May 30th. Her place as flagship of the 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron was taken by *New Zealand* in the line of battle under Admiral David Beatty. The battlecruisers took on Admiral Hipper’s deadly accurate ships and lost three battlecruisers to internal magazine explosions provoking the Admiral to remark “there appears to be something wrong with our bloody ships today.” Had it not been for the collision in April the equally...
vulnerable HMAS Australia would have been at Jutland. Battlecruisers were best described by Churchill as “eggshells armed with hammers.” What would have been the consequence for the young RAN if the flagship Australia being under a hail of German shells? Would it have been death or glory for her Australian ship’s company of 1000 men and boys? HMAS New Zealand was in action at the Battles of Heligoland Bight, Dogger Bank and Jutland, the three fleet actions in the North Sea. She was hit by shells several times but was allegedly protected by the Maori kiwi feather cloak given to her commanding officer, Captain Lionel Halsey, RN, when the ship was in New Zealand. The prophesy by the cloak’s Maori donor was that that the battlecruiser would be in action within a year; that Halsey would still be in command and that she would be hit, but would suffer no casualties provided that Halsey wore the cloak into action. Halsey expected to be relived when New Zealand returned to the UK but was left in command because war clouds were gathering. Every part of the prophesy then came true. Without such prophetic protection Australia might not have been so lucky.¹

In 1939 the New Zealand-manned HMS Achilles’ running fight with the Graf Spee at the Battle of the River Plate gave rise to the same swelling of national pride in New Zealand as Sydney’s sinking of the Bartolomeo Colleoni did a year later. The enduring image we have of Ajax and Achilles racing in under the Graf Spee’s 11-inch guns to fire 6-inch broadsides and draw fire away from the crippled and burning Exeter is one of those moments in naval history which will live forever in the minds of those who admire raw courage at sea. Not surprisingly in 1941 the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy was reborn as the Royal New Zealand Navy. The RAN and Australia’s tragedy when Sydney was lost is echoed in the tragedy of HMS Neptune, the Leander-class cruiser, sunk in a minefield in the Mediterranean – a preventable disaster – like Sydney’s sinking by Kormoran.

On the night of 19 December 1941 HMS Neptune ran into an Italian minefield off Tripoli, and sank with the loss of Captain Rory O’Connor and 764 of his officers and men. One hundred and fifty of them were New Zealanders. Just one man was rescued by an Italian torpedo boat, after five days in the water. This was a devastating blow to the young RNZN and to the whole nation.

The RNZN memorial recalls the tragedy. It reads:

This memorial commemorates 352 officers and men of the Royal New Zealand Navy, Royal New Zealand Naval Reserve and the Royal New Zealand Naval Volunteer Reserve who died in all parts of the world during the Second World War and who have no known grave; the greater part lost their lives at sea, but some died in captivity at the hands of the Japanese. Nearly half of those commemorated went down with H.M.S. Neptune in 1941.

In the last years of the war there were many acts of gallantry by small New Zealand ships. In 1943, New Zealand naval trawlers, Kiwi and Moa, rammed and wrecked a Japanese I-class submarine after a surface battle off Guadalcanal.

By the end of the war there were over 60 Kiwi ships in commission. HMNZS Gambia and Achilles fought in the British Pacific Fleet with HMAS Shropshire and Australia. Gambia was credited with firing the last salvo of the war at sea.

The ANZAC cooperation at sea continued after 1945. The RNZN was with the RAN on the gun line off Korea. New Zealand’s six Loch-class frigates wore out their 4-inch gun barrels firing at North Korean targets, just like HMAS Murchison. The RNZN’s role in the Malayan Emergency was in support of the RN and RAN’s blockade preventing

¹ Nowadays when Australia and New Zealand collide it is called the Bledisloe Cup and the result is usually much the same as when the ships did! Australia comes off second best.
weapons getting to the communist terrorists. It was a thankless task but a successful one.

New Zealand continued to operate cruisers on loan from the RN post war. In succession the Dido-class cruisers, Black Prince, Bellona and Royalist regularly exercised with the RAN’s aircraft carriers and destroyers “up top” in the Commonwealth Strategic reserve. These fine looking World War II gun platforms were never designed for the steamy heat of the tropics and lacked the means to make them comfortable for their large ship’s companies. Their aging engineering meant that as time went by they spent more time alongside than at sea.

Post-war the RAN first loaned, then gave to the RNZN two Bathurst-class minesweepers, Inverell and Kiama, and the River-class Lachlan. These three small ships sustained the RNZN’s inshore training and hydrographic surveying roles for a generation. Lachlan surveyed the waters that Cook had first sounded in Fiordland and the Marlborough Sounds and found that his charts were still as accurate as ever.

In 1973 the New Zealand, but not the Australian, government, decided to protest publically about the continuation of French nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere over Muroroa atoll. The decision was made to send the RNZN as witnesses to the tests and to collect evidence of the radiation released. The RNZN did not have the “legs” for the vast distances of the Pacific unaided and depended on an RAN tanker, HMAS Supply, to get Otago and Canterbury off Muroroa to make their protest. It was Supply’s fuel that kept the frigates on station. This gave a whole new meaning to ‘passing the ANZAC spirit!’ The French gave up atmospheric testing shortly afterwards.

During the Falklands war it was the RNZN which relieved the RN on patrol in the Persian Gulf. The RNZN has made a significant contribution to the Gulf at regular intervals since Gulf War One in 1991 and continues to do so. The black kiwi funnel ensign has been a welcome sight whenever it has appeared.

Operation Big Talk was the joint peace support operation at Bougainville in 1990. Conflict had broken out on the island in the late ’80s. In an effort to seek a settlement, New Zealand offered the Leander-class frigates Wellington and Waikato and the tanker Endeavour as the neutral sites for a conference between the warring parties. The ships provided assured security and neither of the two parties had to go into the other’s territory. This naval diplomacy paved the way for New Zealand’s efforts in later brokering a lasting peace arrangement in Bougainville. This successful initiative was much appreciated by Australia’s politicians who were able to step back and let a Pacific nation create a solution for a Pacific problem. The RNZN off East Timor made a significant and useful contribution in 1999 as did the whole of the NZDEF. New Zealand deployed both there and in the Solomon Islands a larger proportion of its total uniformed manpower than did the ADF.

In the new decade, about to commence, the two Navies will continue to share responsibility for a vast maritime domain. New Zealand probably has more sea miles of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) per head of population than any other nation with a navy. The protection of remaining Southern Ocean fish stocks is becoming a strategic imperative of great international significance.
Simultaneously there is a significant challenge to be faced by both countries in the Pacific where good governance cannot be assumed and where China’s commercial and strategic interest in the region grows more apparent every year.

The ever-present threat from sea level change and devastating hurricanes in the Pacific makes it imperative that the ADF and NZDEF remain interoperable and ready and able to bring relief, and if necessary evacuation, to the scattered low lying islands of the water hemisphere which is shared with vulnerable friends. Shared maritime doctrine, training and exchange of personnel and political will are the keys to keeping the relationship at sea simple and predictable. Regular exercising together is essential if short notice operations are to be successful.

The RN is only three years away from operating the first of Australia’s two Canberra-class Landing Helicopter Dock “fat ships”. Those large amphibious ships, along with the RAN’s three new Air Warfare Destroyers will transform the capability of both navies to engage in significant operations for combat or humanitarian purposes, or any combination, in the neighbourhood, or out of area, Large helicopter carriers are national assets with an international reach well suited to the vastness of the Pacific. The RNZN will undoubtedly exercise and operate with these ships in pursuit of common aims in the decades ahead.

Just where, when and under what circumstances the RNZN and RAN will operate together again to achieve their governments’ strategic intentions is unpredictable. Given the political and climatic volatility of the region that they will be so used is not much in doubt. Both governments understand that in the water hemisphere a modern, flexible maritime projection capability is not optional but central to national security and prosperity.

The nations’ navies are bound together by far more than shared naval history, important though that is. They work and plan together because they are more capable of shaping this part of the world together than either could be unaided by the other. As a diplomatic tool in the Pacific the NZDEF in general, and the RNZN in particular, have demonstrated that New Zealand troops have considerable skill in making themselves culturally acceptable ashore in micro-states. ²

As it takes delivery of the last of its new ships the RNZN is completing a period of rebuilding and restoration after a period of lean years. It is has been appropriately equipped for both blue water Pacific operations and its EEZ resource protection role. As the RNZN prepares to celebrate it 60th birthday in 2011 it is again living up to its vision statement as: The Best Small Navy in the World. ²

Lieutenant Commander Desmond Woods has served in the Royal New Zealand Navy, the Royal Navy and in the British Army of the Rhine. He is presently working in Canberra.
Climate change is perhaps the greatest challenge of the 21st century. It is a series of profound changes that impacts not only on the natural world, but on every aspect of our existence; our food, our water and our security.

I aim here not to solve climate change or even to analyse its impact on Australian national security, but rather to explore some of the connections between climate change and the Royal Australian Navy. I argue that climate change will have an impact on Australian national security in a way that specifically impacts on the Navy, and that the RAN contributes to climate change and that in the future will face increasing pressure to minimise that impact. I conclude that this pressure to change, rather than being a problem, offers an opportunity for the Royal Australian Navy to innovate and benefit from adapting to climate change.

The Science of Climate Change

The earth’s atmosphere is a complex and important part of world we live in, providing a myriad of services to the earth. The atmosphere’s mix of greenhouse gases; nitrogen dioxide, carbon dioxide, methane and water vapour provide the earth with a thermal blanket keeping our temperature within a habitable range. This system of gases is sensitive to change. Any alteration in amount or combination alters the heat retained or reflected.

Climatologists around the world have largely reached a consensus on climate change: that it is real and that man has caused it. The effects of climate change are relatively unpredictable; the climate is a complex system which makes modelling difficult. It is expected to have an effect on global temperatures, causing rises in some locations and falls in others and it is further expected to cause a rise in global sea level through impacts on polar ice. These changes are expected to have impacts on ecosystems, pushing many species to extinction as the climate changes too fast for them to adapt. These changes will perhaps be more keenly felt in Australia. It is expected that Australia will face increasing extreme weather such as droughts and storms. Grave fears are held that even natural icons such as the Great Barrier Reef may disappear. Although themselves devastating, changes to the natural world will have a greater impact as they interact with social, security and economic factors.

Climate Change, National Security, and Opportunity

Although rich nations will have an ability to adapt to fast changes in the natural environment, many of our closest neighbours will find the transition difficult. The effect on our
region is expected to be severe as the nations around South-East Asia are low-lying (prone to inundation) and poor (unable to finance protective measures). These effects will combine to have a devastating influence on the economic and social structures in the region as the Garnaut Report states:

Weather extremes and large fluctuations in rainfall and temperatures have the capacity to refashion Asia’s productive landscape and exacerbate food, water and energy scarcities in Asia and the south-west Pacific. Australia’s immediate neighbours are vulnerable developing countries with limited capacity to adapt to climate change. As the quotation suggests, lower agricultural production is one of the important mechanisms through which social and economic problems may arise. Low lying nations will face salinity problems in fertile areas as a result of rising sea levels, and will face dryer conditions as temperatures rise. These changes in food availability and the associated economic security are expected to increase the movement of people in this region.

In addition to food shortages, drinking water will also be in short supply. This raises concerns: analysts predict that in the future water shortages will be a driver of inter and intra state conflict. As states in our region suffer instability, it will impact on Australian security and lead to an increased need for military intervention. Military intervention may not be the only requirement our neighbours have. Though not as well defined there is a possibility that climate change will lead to increases in both severe weather events and in disease outbreaks. States within the region are both prone to these problems and ill equipped to deal with them. Though not necessarily requiring a military response the increase in these events would lead to a greater need for humanitarian support operations. The predictions of climate change impact in the South-East Asian region have implications for the Australian Defence Force.

Climate change will not only affect the region, but the globe. It will become the most important driver of strategic threats this century. The 2009 Defence White Paper recognises this reality pointing out that climate change, through food and water scarcity, will be the driving force behind regional conflict in the Middle East and Africa, and will therefore drive Australian involvement in those regions.

The changes that climate change will cause in strategic security will be of importance to the Royal Australian Navy. As South-East Asia becomes more mobile it is the Navy that will play the greatest role in border security. If migration increases as dramatically as predicted the role that the Navy already plays in Australian border patrols will increase exponentially. Also, if inter and intra state conflict in this region increases as predicted, it will be the Navy that is required to deliver combat forces in the area.

Although the impacts are long term, it is important to prepare for them soon given the dramatic nature of them. In the short term increasing severe weather, disease outbreak and rising sea levels will mean a greater need for humanitarian assistance from the Navy. Clearly, given the predications for the regional climate, the Navy will face an increased need for civil assistance and disaster relief both regionally and within Australia itself.

These devastating impacts will require an enhanced capability within the Navy to respond to the increased threat and need. Recent announcements by the Department of Defence have recognised the future needs of the Navy in response to climate change. These announcements include the purchase of the Canberra Class Helicopter Landing Docks, an important strategic response to the threat. These ships represent a huge investment in capability that the RAN has not previously had.
The Royal Australian Navy and Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities.

Importantly they are directly relevant for responding in both military intervention and humanitarian assistance within our region, and are therefore tailored to the strategic environment created by climate change.27

The Impact of the Royal Australian Navy on Climate Change

The relationship between the Royal Australian Navy and climate change is not one way. The Navy is not only affected by climate change, it also contributes to it. It does this in two ways; directly through the impact on regional climates that maritime warfare may possibly cause and indirectly through its contribution to greenhouse pollutants.

There is some historical evidence that naval warfare can have a significant role to play in the variation of the climate.28 Maritime scholar, Arnd Bermaerts conducted a study of weather patterns in Europe during World War II.29 He found that the start of naval warfare coincided with dramatic cooling in Europe.30 He argued that the series of severe winters experienced through the 1940s were a direct result of naval warfare through modification to the natural state of the sea.31 Whilst the study has not attracted mainstream scientific approval, climate scientists do recognise the oceans as one of the most important drivers of global climate change and that any impact on the oceans can have a dramatic effect on the regional or global climate.32

The indirect impact of the Navy is less controversial. As a large organisation the Navy utilises large amounts electricity that produces climate pollutants. Furthermore the navy operates a fleet of vessels that can utilise vast quantities of fuel, also releasing carbon. The Navy cannot escape the carbon pollution it is responsible for; it is part and parcel of fulfilling its mission.

Incentives to Act on Climate Change

The moral and economic importance of a global response to climate change has been a controversial topic in political debate. Despite this there are some relatively conservative reasons for the Royal Australian Navy to embrace climate change responses. These reasons are two-fold, firstly the economic risks and secondly the public relations benefits of being seen to be playing its part.

There is little doubt that the defence of Australia will remain a priority for the Government and as such the Navy will be provided for in future budgets. Unfortunately the fiscal conditions over the next century, exacerbated by the potential costs of climate change impacts and mitigation will lead to greater strain on the Australian budget overall.33 This in turn will place pressure on Defence to achieve more with less. The sort of pressure the Navy will face can already be seen in the Strategic Reform Program. Although this program is driven by different factors it is a program being implemented in response to increased budget strain.34 These pressures will force Defence to use its resources more efficiently to reduce costs. The economic pressure, however, is not the only incentive to address climate change.

Climate change is an issue close to many peoples’ hearts and has also been characterised as the greatest economic issue this world has to face, a moral issue and an issue of justice.35 This public interest means that organisations responsible to government, including Defence, will be placed under pressure to take action in relation to climate change.

Whatever the source, Defence will come under greater pressure to demonstrate it is able to manage our environmental risks effectively. “That means sustainable environmental management will need to become “second nature” for everyone in Defence – in Australian jurisdictions or in overseas theatres of operation.”36 In either event, managing Defence, and therefore the Navy, for climate risks is already imbedded in Australian Defence Force Policy. The Australian Defence Forces 2009 Environmental Strategic Plan shows that Defence is committed to minimising its impact on climate change and acting to reducing its carbon footprint.37

Minimising the Royal Australian Navy’s Carbon Footprint

The Royal Australian Navy has a plethora of options available to it in reducing its carbon footprint and implementing the Environmental Strategic Plan. It can embrace cutting edge ship design to reduce the fossil fuel use of its vessels, it can increase the energy efficiency of both its ship and shore based systems and it could potentially leverage its estate to engage in soil carbon capture and other carbon offsets. I now concentrate on improving the carbon footprint of the fleet, but will also touch on managing the defence estate for carbon capture.

The Royal Australian Navy has the opportunity to lead the maritime industry in Australia by becoming a leader in efficient ship technology. There is a range of options that exist for the Navy to improve the efficiency of both its current and future fleet. Importantly, this change will not be driven by international legal pressure (both commercial and military
shipping is outside of current climate change proposals) but will instead come from economic incentives. Part of this improvement will no doubt occur organically as the civilian vessels are pushed to higher and higher efficiency standards. Increasing political and economic pressure may also result in the Navy taking a lead in investing and testing new technology. Due to the lengthy ship design process, it will be important for the Navy to take a lead on efficiency as it begins to order new vessels in response to the White Paper. A failure to consider these issues will result in being left behind compared to the advancements in the civilian shipping world.

There are several key areas that have been earmarked already as fertile ground for improving design. In particular energy generation, hull design, propeller design and integration of equipment have all been identified as areas where improvement can be made that make fiscal sense. These areas are the least controversial of possible options with improvements in each area already being made in response to rising fuel prices.

Energy use for systems such as heating, lighting and water account for up to 30% of the fuel used aboard war vessels, and these systems are often outdated and inefficient. Studies have shown that using commercially available retrofitting technology could reduce this bill by up to 50%, with greater savings possible if these technologies are incorporated at a design stage. These reductions of anywhere between 10% and 25% of total fuel use equate to significant savings considering the million dollar fuel bills of warships. The extreme value of improving the energy efficiency of common objects aboard a ship can be seen from the following extract from a United States, Department of Defence Report:

Each percentage point of improved efficiency in a single 100-horsepower always-on motor is worth $1,000 a year. Each chiller could be improved to save its own capital cost's worth of electricity (about $120,000) every eight months. About $400,000 a year could be saved if — under non-critical, low-threat conditions — certain backup systems were set to come on automatically when needed rather than running all the time. Half that saving could come just from two 125-horsepower fire pumps that currently pump seawater continuously aboard, around the ship, and back overboard. Princeton's total electricity-saving potential could probably cut her energy costs by nearly $1 million a year, or about $10 million in present value [over the ship's life cycle], while improving her war fighting capability.

This saving analysis could be applied just as well to the Australian fleet, where relatively small savings in energy can lead to large financial savings over the lifetime of the vessel. There is also an opportunity to invest in designing more fuel efficient hulls. There is the option to invest in solutions including bulbous hull designs, which are estimated to be able to save seven times installation cost over the life time of a vessel. A further option is the installation of stern flaps, which extend the lower surface of the ship's hull; these are estimated to improve ships fuel efficiency by approximately 7%. These are just a small number of options already available and tested that could dramatically improve a ship's fuel efficiency and save large sums of money over the lifetime of a vessel.

A more innovative technology already in use by maritime shipping, which could be considered for the Navy fleet, is wind assistance. This is being trialled on MS Beluga and has reduced fuel consumption by 10%. These sails can be retrofitted and can be hauled in when not viable for operational reasons. Though some of these technologies seem novel, they should not be discounted. The Navy is a significant contributor to greenhouse gases and navies around the world including the US are looking to technology to reduce the fuel bill. Further fuel efficiency not only reduces cost, greenhouse gas emissions it also increases range, which in turn improves operational flexibility.

Reducing the Carbon Footprint Ashore

The Royal Australian Navy is blessed with a large estate used as land for bases and for training areas. The bases provide a clear opportunity to reduce electricity consumption and this will lead to lower costs for the Navy and lower greenhouse gas emissions for the planet. More importantly, this estate affords Navy with the opportunity to use the large areas of land to actively combat climate change. The estate could even provide economic benefits to the Navy, as the large area could be used for locking carbon in soils or underground and the sale of carbon credits. Carbon sequestration means transferring carbon from the air to the land, which can be done in a variety of ways. It can be done simply by the use of cropping and soil management techniques to increase the carbon in

1 Other opportunities include changing the way vessels operate to encourage standard operating procedures that are more fuel efficient; Intergroup on Sustainable Development, (2008), Shipping and Climate Change, Meeting Report, 16 July 2008, Brussels.
The Royal Australian Navy and Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities.

the soil. These techniques involve little disturbance and, in certain soil types, can lock up relatively large amounts of carbon.\textsuperscript{51} The carbon that is locked up is not only beneficial for the vegetation in the area but, in the future, may provide the basis for the sale of carbon credits. The money received from this could be used to offset the cost of maintaining such a large estate.

In conclusion, this paper has examined both the science and impact of climate change showing that it is predicted to have an impact both broad and geographically far reaching. The shifting climate will touch every facet of life on this planet; food production, water, health, and national security. The national security impact will be felt strongly in Australia, especially by the Navy. The predicted changes will mean a higher demand for the services Navy provide, such as border protection and humanitarian aid in the region. The paper acknowledges that Navy is having an impact on the climate through its carbon footprint. The fact that the Navy does have an impact on the climate means that it will face pressure to respond to climate change. Whilst this change may be interpreted as a cost on the Navy, this paper has argued that it is an opportunity to innovate and benefit from climate change.

The paper outlined a variety of ways that the Navy could adapt to climate change at sea and ashore. The ways outlined including ship design and energy efficiency are largely tried and tested. They offer not just a way to reduce a carbon footprint but also to improve operational efficiency. It is going to be vital to the future of the Royal Australian Navy to look at climate change not just a cost of business, but as a unique opportunity to innovate and improve operational and financial efficiency within the service.\textsuperscript{\textcopyright}

**Originally from Tasmania, Sub-Lieutenant David Midson RAN joined the RAN as a Legal Officer. He is currently on a workplace rotation based at ADFA.**

(Endnotes)

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- Increased efficiency in energy consumption, particularly fossil fuels
- Increased effectiveness in energy consumption
- Increased understanding and willingness of personnel to improve energy performance
- Increased access to up to date energy management information
- Increased use of green energy
- Increased inclusion of green building principles into infrastructure refurbishment and development
40. ibid, 100-102
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Let’s give the LHDs some names with meaning

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER PAUL GARAI, RAN

The names given to warships are highly significant for an important variety of reasons, not all of them Naval. The two new LHDs have been named HMA Ships Adelaide and Canberra. Proud and significant names both, however, not really in the tradition of what these ships are.

The LHDs should be given names that recognise their role as expeditionary ships and their importance to the nation. These are ships which will be the centrepieces of Australian military operations for a generation, carrying the honour, prestige and hopes of the Defence Force and the nation. They deserve names which recognise their importance to the Defence Force and the nation. Names that echo a proud past and carry the hopes of a strong future. Names which carry meaning and inspiration. And finally, names which are in synch with the role and purpose of the ships – joint expeditionary operations.

There is no greater name in Australian history than Gallipoli – coincidentally, a major expeditionary operation. And with the approaching 100th anniversary of the landing in 2015, there would be no more significant recognition of the seminal operation than to name an LHD in honour. Imagine, at the 100th anniversary, one of the largest warships present at Anzac Cove on 25 April 2015 will be an Australian LHD named in honour of the men and women who established the Anzac spirit. Standing in witness to the historic contribution they made to Australia, and the world. For Gallipoli was not only a milestone operation for the Anzacs, but was also the major influence on global amphibious operations for a generation.

The RAN has named one other ship Gallipoli, a destroyer of the inter-war years. And despite the iconic importance of Gallipoli to Australia and amphibious warfare, it has been overlooked as an obvious choice ever since. The LHDs will be the largest combat ships ever operated by the RAN, exceeding even the aircraft carriers of the 1950s-80s. They will be the poster ships of the fleet, and the nation, for decades to come (along with the new DDGs). They deserve iconic names which symbolise their strategic role and also carry national meaning and pride. While Adelaide and Canberra are names of capital cities and of ships with long histories, neither carries the significance; the ring of Gallipoli. What’s more, the name fits the role perfectly.

Gallipoli is an iconic event in Australian history, however, its significance in the history of
amphibious warfare is not well understood in Australia. Gallipoli is a very important campaign in the amphibious pantheon. It was the first attempt in modern warfare to land on unprepared beaches, innovative in its thinking and bold in its execution. The lessons of Gallipoli led to worldwide strategic reviews of the conduct of amphibious operations. These reviews led some to conclude that such operations were impossible in modern warfare, and others concluded that such operations are game-changers with the right specialised personnel and equipment. One of the critical innovators after Gallipoli was the US Marine Corps (USMC) who realised the need for specialised craft and personnel as the key to amphibious success. The journey of innovation that the USMC travelled after Gallipoli positioned it to take advantage of technology breakthroughs in the inter-war years and to be able to progress rapidly to the peak of amphibious operations in the Pacific War, starting at Guadalcanal. And this should be the second name – in honour of the first major amphibious operation of the Second World War, which protected Australia’s exposed position as we reconstituted from the Middle East. So why call a major Australian ship after an American campaign in the Solomons? There are a myriad of reasons. The Solomons campaign, along with the Kokoda campaign, stopped the Japanese land advances towards Australia, and with the Battle of the Coral Sea, were the three critical engagements which prevented the Japanese from achieving their aim of isolating Australia from the USA. Guadalcanal was the first major land counter-offensive of the Pacific War, an entirely amphibious operation applying the lessons learnt in such difficulty at Gallipoli. The heavy cruiser, HMAS Canberra, was lost in the Battle of Savo Island while defending the USMC ashore. In recognition, the US Navy named a post-war cruiser Canberra in honour of the sacrifice, the only US warship to have ever been named after a foreign capital city. Guadalcanal was the jump-off point for the amphibious operations in northern New Guinea and on to Borneo and the Philippines. The lessons learnt were invaluable for the victorious amphibious campaigns of the Pacific and also European landings in Italy and Normandy. And as the Australian Defence Force has expanded its amphibious capability in recent times, it has relied heavily on the USMC and USN to transfer skills lost since the Second World War. This exchange has renewed and strengthened the bonds between the ADF and the USN/USMC. Considering that the USN has already honoured Australia’s sacrifice at Guadalcanal, it would be fitting for Australia to recognise America’s sacrifice in its defence by naming a major amphibious ship in its honour. The Guadalcanal campaign carries enormous significance for the USMC and a ship named in its honour would cement the already close bonds across the Pacific.

Naming the LHDs Gallipoli and Guadalcanal is entirely fitting for the their role and the enormous significance both ships will have for the nation. They will be the capital ships of the RAN for decades to come, will be present in all significant defence operations and become the national and international face of the RAN, and of the nation. The names also represent Australia’s unique claim on the Gallipoli identity and honour America’s sacrifice in our defence, while recognising the growing strength of Australia’s amphibious relationship with the USN/USMC. Naming an LHD Gallipoli will be highly significant as the 100th anniversary approaches in 2015. Naming the other Guadalcanal will complement the class names and recognise the deep bonds of sacrifice established in the Solomons. 

Let’s give the LHDs some names with meaning

Lieutenant Commander Paul Garai, RAN, is the Commanding Officer of Patrol Boat Crew Attack Four. He has previously commanded HMAS Betano (LCH133) and has served extensively in expeditionary operations afloat and ashore. Paul is also a graduate of the USN/USMC Expeditionary Warfare Training Group – Pacific, San Diego, and is a member of the Australian and United States Naval Institutes.
This series examines selected traits of leadership to compare Royal Australian Navy leaders against a criteria. The first of the articles took Admiral Lord Nelson, the hero of Trafalgar in 1805, as a model, as well as examining the characteristics of other well-known leaders, both civilian and military.

Seven qualities of leadership measures the subject matter, suggesting a capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator.

ACHIEVEMENT
Did the person under discussion improve their organisation? Did they leave it a better place by being a member? Promotion is recognised as a measure of achievement. By many measures which traditionally mark out achievement – education; decorations; amassing of physical wealth perhaps – we gain some beginnings of whether a person is a success.

EXPERT IN ONE’S FIELD
Anyone who aspires to be a leader and an example to others must obviously have expertise in their craft. In naval terms, that translates as being an expert “ship-driver”; an aviator par excellence; an engineer possessing a wealth of theoretical and practical knowledge - and so on. Nelson, for example, was a master at strategy – which becomes a commander of fleets – but also of tactics, which behoves a ship captain. He was also an inspired man-manager.

INSPIRATIONAL
This leader inspires others to perform similar deeds. Often this is shown by the leader’s actions in front of their subordinates. Nelson inspired his followers in being resolute, courageous and honourable. It is one measure of the man that so many did: Hardy, who was with him when he died; his fellow admiral Collingwood whose battle line he raced to be first to engage at Trafalgar; ship commander Berry, who followed him from ship to ship, and Captain Hallowell, who after the Battle of the Nile made him a present of a coffin fashioned from the French ship L’Orient’s mainmast – Nelson kept it in his cabin and was indeed buried in it.

INITIATIVE
Sometimes described as “going in where angels fear to tread”, this measure means to use judgement and advance where necessary. The leader is brave in psychological terms and takes the lead where necessary. It does not mean going forward rashly.

Nelson was a man who had the courage of his own convictions, who could often have left off and blamed superiors for failure. Instead, he was a man who chose to use initiative and advance when he knew the defeat of the enemy was attainable and essential. At the Battle of Copenhagen, walking the deck while the guns roared their broadsides, and deadly splinters whistled about his ears, he confided to Colonel Stewart, commander of infantry, who was with him on the quarterdeck, that he would not be “elsewhere for thousands”. Whether he was fearful or not – and who would not have been – Nelson led by example. And when his uncertain superior, Admiral Parker, made the signal to leave off the action, Nelson refused to see it, putting his telescope to his blind eye and exclaiming: “I really do not see the signal”. The British won the battle with much help from Nelson’s use of initiative.

IMPRESSIVE PHYSICAL QUALITIES
This might be rephrased as “looking the part of a leader”. Would anyone have said that Horatio Nelson achieved this? Yes – and no. A short, thin man not blessed with good looks, he first entered the British navy in 1771 as a midshipman at 12 years and three months. Despite being prone to sickness: “I have had all the diseases that are”, he once said; he adapted well to the vigorous and often dangerous life that was the Navy.

Nelson was a man of raw physical courage who led by example. He lost an eye when an enemy shell, exploding during the siege of Calvi in Corsica, drove splinters and dust and rock fragments into his face. He suffered most terribly and often from wounds, quite willing to lead from the front. His right arm was amputated after the battle of Santa Cruz in Teneriffe due to his being hit by grapeshot.

This is what is meant by “looking the part of a leader”: behaving in such a way that people can be inspired. It means to look resolute and act with resolution – as did Nelson. To lead by example. To not show physical cowardice. It might include “panache”; “the almost untranslatable expression of dash, of valour, the ability to do things with an air of reckless courage and inspiring leadership”. Finally, we might add that the bearing, carriage and speech of a leader should be of the highest standards.

EMPATHY
The great soldier of the 18th century, Frederick the Great, had good advice on how to attain the next quality of the
leader – Empathy:

...talk with the soldiers, both when you pass their tents or when they are on the march. Sample often to see if the cookpots have something good; find out their small needs and do what you can to satisfy them; spare them unnecessary exertion. But let fall the full vigor of law on the mutinous soldier, the backbiter, the pillager...³

Empathy means to be able to imagine yourself – as leader – in the role of your people, and to show that. It is "the power of understanding and imaginatively entering into another person's feelings"⁴. General Montgomery said to his troops at the Battle of Alamein: "We will stand and fight here. If we can't stay here alive, then let us stay here dead."⁵

Montgomery was entering into the feelings of all of his people, who feared that they would die. Churchill's speech of WWII did the same: "We shall defend our island, whatever the cost. Your leader will be with you, no matter what the cost.

**Communication**

One needs to be understood at all times. Nelson employed in his leadership style something unusual for its day: the art of effective communication. One characteristic was to invite others to contribute their ideas for a campaign, or a battle, or a change of some sort; to educate his men and get them – and him – to know each others' minds. Nelson embarked upon the Battle of the Nile in 1798 by letting his captains engage in individual fashion. The French fleet, anchored by the bows in a line in shallow coastal water, engaged in ship to ship fashion by five British vessels sailing inside the line and anchoring, and the rest engaging from outside. Thus the French were caught between two forces. At the end of hours of fighting, the French had lost 1, 700 men to the British 200; their fleet was largely pounded to pieces, and Napoleon and his army were stranded in Egypt. Nelson had hoisted just two signals through the entire battle.⁶

For the autocratic manager this would have been disastrous: an authoritarian leader would not trust his subordinates to make momentous decisions and fight on their own. Nelson trusted his individual captains. So too, in the long pursuit of the French, years later in 1805, he had regular meetings with his "Band of Brothers" – the name applied to those who fought under him at the Nile.⁷

During the long chase the officers would pool their ideas for forthcoming battles; the best use of tactics; what a following ship would do when its fellow was sighted engaged and so on. Consequently even the necessity for signals within the ensuing battle was dispensed with; the captains knew each others’ minds.

Communication means to be able to use words effectively to persuade others. Winston Churchill was a great exponent of this. Eisenhower, then a US General and later President of the United States, experienced the British Prime Minister in action:

Churchill was a persuader. Indeed, his skill in the use of words and logic was so great that on several occasions when he and I disagreed on some important matter – even when I was convinced of my own view and when the responsibility was clearly mine – I had a very hard time withstanding his arguments.⁹

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A capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator. We have seen many great leaders who exhibited those traits. This series examines how many of Australia's naval leaders performed in these fields.

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Captain Harry Howden, CBE, RN

Studies in Trait Leadership – A Charismatic Warrior

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TOM LEWIS

One of the Royal Australian Navy’s “fighting captains”, Harry Howden almost belongs in another world compared to his Navy brothers.

Originally an RN officer, in manner Howden was fierce, single-minded, but very much a man of genuine kindness, firmness and enormous ability as a ship-handler and as a leader. In a peacetime world naval officers such as Howden are a rarity with limited survival prospects. In war, Howden compares well to the famous General Patton…

Being shipwrecked at an early age might deter any would-be naval officer, but not Harry Howden. As a boy in the years before World War I, he had spent much time in boats belonging to a friend whose family owned a fleet of large sailing-ships. Both boys went to Wellington College, and Howden’s last holiday from school was spent in one of the ships. Its voyage was adventurous: the ship met heavy weather, was dismasted, and finally wrecked. Howden thought that ‘useful’; presumably he learnt a lot from it.

Born in 1896 in New Zealand, to a family long given to seafaring - an uncle at one time was the youngest captain in the Royal Navy - Harry Howden was determined to join the Royal Navy. When war came in 1914, he prevailed on his father to let him go to England by sailing-ship about Cape Horn. He had not the normal RN qualifications as to age and sea-time but once before an interview board impressed his interviewers with his determination and was accepted as a midshipman in the Royal Naval Reserve.

Howden’s first sea appointment was to a minesweeper, then to the 10th Cruiser Squadron, patrolling the North Sea between Iceland and the Norwegian coast. In 1916 he transferred to the Royal Australian Navy. Attached to HMS Benbow, with the First Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet, he saw action at the Battle of Jutland: Benbow engaged several enemy ships and sank three destroyers.

In 1918 he was appointed to HMAS Sydney, and travelled to Australia in 1919; on May 5 promoted lieutenant. The day following his 23rd birthday he was given command of the old South Australian gunboat Protector. Howden conned her into Flinders Naval Depot, south-east of Melbourne, the first ship of war to be brought into the berth.

Howden remained at Flinders, standing by while the Depot was being built. For a time the Commander was ill; and as the only officer he ate in solitary state in an otherwise empty Mess, attended by two cooks and four stewards. He was the Executive Officer when Flinders commissioned and the first President of the Wardroom Mess.

He was given command of the destroyer HMAS Haun, and in 1924, after a course in England, HMAS Tasmania, an S-Class destroyer. His first reports in his new ship showed nervousness: the Captain of the 9th Flotilla noted: ‘His leadership is inclined to suffer from a lack of confidence in himself in the presence of other officers but this will improve as he gains experience.’

Any lack of confidence near senior members was not exhibited to those of his ship’s company. Henry Burrell (later Vice Admiral Sir Henry), serving with him as a lieutenant, recalled that Howden: ‘Kept on his desk a wooden plaque with an inscription from Nelson’s standing instructions: “The order of cruising will be the order of battle”.

Burrell recalled Howden’s boldness, with a particularly hair-raising incident where Tasmania was brought extremely close to the cliffs of Jervis Bay heads, at night. Burrell observed: ‘…I was not amused. The sailors knew that Harry was slightly eccentric, although he was sound in dealing with matters of importance. There was just room for Harry in a small navy.’

To this time, thousands of miles away, George S. Patton’s divisional commander was writing: ‘This officer would be invaluable in time of war but is a disturbing element in time of peace.’ Howden shared that same mercurial temperament that, like the great American General, would make him invaluable in combat.

Howden commanded Tasmania for two and a half years and in 1927 went to Japan for language studies. He had passed his preliminary exams in the language, but now lived among the country’s people for speech practice and to study the customs. Although lodging officially at the British Embassy in Tokyo, he took Japanese clothes and a Japanese name. (The 1970s Vice Admiral Sir Richard Peek, who served under Howden as a young officer, is of the opinion that this year was taken without pay.) He spent time in China and saw something of the civil wars in 1927.

This interlude is unusual for a serving naval officer proceeding up the ladder of experience. Japan had
been an Ally of the British Empire in the Great War, and its naval training and practices were so-derived. But militarism following the disastrous international politics of the 1920s was slowly emerging, and so perhaps Howden exhibited a far-sighted attitude.

Promoted Lieutenant Commander, he joined the newly-built battlecruiser Australia. Gunnery Officer Lieutenant John Collins (later Vice Admiral Sir John Collins) remembers an incident which gave some insight into the fiercely capable nature of the man’s character:

The inevitable storm in the Atlantic was encountered, and a party went to the forecastle to secure some gear that had come adrift. A heavy sea was shipped which swept a Petty Officer, the Captain of the Forecastle, overboard. Fortunately we had been by then some months in commission and the lifebuoy drill worked well. It was too rough to lower a boat, but the Captain, by very good seamanship brought the ship alongside the man. We were rolling heavily and he was obviously having difficulty in catching the rope jumping ladder, which was living up to its name. The forecastle officer, Lieut-Commander Howden, went down the ladder and was completely submerged on each roll. At last he contrived to come up right under the exhausted man and thus cradled him in his arms till the ladder was hauled the thirty feet to the upper deck.

Eighteen months later Howden went again to China, on RN exchange, to command HMS Mantis, a gun-boat on the Yangtse Kiang. He was also actively pursuing, via letter, a love interest with one Vanda Fiske, who he first met in Switzerland. She made a brave decision to join him in China where they were married in Hankow at the British Consulate, attended by with the Mantis officers and others from the flagship HMS Bee.

Howden was soon involved in the rescue of some Irish missionaries, captured by bandits who were demanding a ransom, which Howden duly transported up river, without a pilot, at night. A similar incident took place the next year, with a Chinese fort attacked at night by personnel from Mantis. The bandits’ flag was recovered, and later became the property of the HMAS Hobart Association.

Promoted to Commander, Howden voyaged with his wife to Australia in 1932, and after a spell as Commander of the seaplane tender Albatross, he went to England and brought back the destroyer Vampire, already a veteran though still far from her later fame as a member of the so-called ‘scrap-iron flotilla.’ The day after his arrival back in Sydney, Howden was appointed to the flagship, Canberra. Later-Rear Admiral Mesley noted that Howden introduced electro-plating to the ship to ‘tiddly up the quarterdeck and gangway fixtures and fittings.’

Bill Cook, then a midshipman, remembers this caused great comment in Australia: ‘we... thought it wasn’t quite within the spirit of the Service! Hal Farncomb, our Commander insisted on our davit being shone by hand with a pussers’ steel wire burnishing pad. It was probably the case that Howden paid for such decoration out of his own pocket. His generosity may have been helped by his finances being better than other naval officers: his father had left some bequests to him as the eldest son of the family. These included properties, amongst which was a commercial venture. Such acquisitions may well have given him complacency in his career which allowed him to indulge in risky behaviour.
Howden’s eccentricity went beyond that. A report of 1936 noted that he ‘kept two horses and regardless of late evening engagements always rides early in the morning and hunts when opportunity offers.’ This was a little ostentatious by the standards of the age, but the report went on to add: ‘An expert on paint, it’s (sic) mixing, application and properties but not in my opinion on colour schemes.’ Whether this was in reference to some decorative scheme for the Establishment in not known.

In January 1937 Howden was made an Officer of the Order of the British Empire. This is noted on his Service Record, but the reason for the award is not given. Several historical notes on Harry Howden suggest he received the honour for services on the China Station.

His Cerberus report of February 1937 was a mixed message. Here another Captain described him as possessing ‘boundless self-confidence but perhaps a fair amount of vanity, selfishness and stubborness.’ The reporting officer made the interesting remark that in war Howden would be the sort of person not to hesitate in taking responsibility and showing initiative, but in other circumstances would show too much authority and have a highhanded manner. There also seems to have been something in a background incident around this time which irritated Howden’s superior:

I think he is also possibly inclined to use unorthodox even ‘piratical’ methods to get what he wants for the service but the particular instance I have in mind came to light after his departure and I have been unable to hear his side of the matter.

There seems to be in Howden’s character an impatience with authority, if formed of petty or incompetent bureaucracy.

Howden was chosen to be the Australian naval representative in Westminster Abbey for the coronation of King George V1 in 1937, and then to Admiralty Intelligence in London. Promoted Captain and back in Australia he commanded the sloop Yarra. On 28 August 1939 he moved to the cruiser Hobart and the ship sailed from Sydney for the developing war in the Mediterranean. She was soon engaged on patrol and escort duties, mainly in the Bombay-Gulf of Aden area. Howden quickly stamped his own personality on the warship. On Christmas Day he provided 100 gallons of beer to provide ‘Christmas cheer’ for the ship’s sailors. He had previously arranged in Singapore a shore party for the ship’s company complete with liquid refreshments. As one of the ship histories notes: ‘…this was typical of him.’

Months of duty followed, with convoy escort a main feature as the war enveloped more countries. Italy joined the German forces as a main partner. The patrols were monotonous, tiring and hot. Hobart dragged her anchor in Berbera Harbour and went aground on a mudflat. Irritation was not only the captain’s: Syd Clark noted:

Fri 7: Heat rash becoming steadily worse and nothing being done about it so this morning something like 250 men muster(ed) for treatment. Some of the stokers are having a really cruel time and a few have just toppled over with the heat. One chap took a fit and had to be straightjacketed.

But eventually action was joined. Early in the morning of the 8th August 1940, three enemy fighter aircraft raided the Berbera airfield, and, thinking they might be from the nearby Zeila airfield and could be caught on the ground refuelling, Howden had Hobart’s amphibian catapulted. At 0530 the aircraft approached Zeila from the sea in a steady dive from eight thousand feet and dropped its two bombs from 800 feet, aiming at the Residency –
believed to be the Italian headquarters – for lack of other targets. The bombs fell close enough to blow in all the windows, after which the amphibian overtook the town at 250 feet and machine-gunned the Residency, motor-lorries, and enemy post and troops. It landed on the harbour at Berbera with two bullet holes in the port main lower plane, but no other damage. The Italians hit back three hours later, when two aircraft dropped eight bombs which fell in the harbour between Hobart, Auckland, and the armed trawler HMS Amber. They came nearer in an attack at 1050, when they straddled Hobart and armed merchant cruiser HMS Chakdina. Neither attack caused any official harm, although Syd Clark noted: ‘One did slight damage to the Captain’s cabin.’

In the evening of the following day, in response to a request for support from military headquarters, Howden landed a three-pounder Hotchkiss saluting gun on an improvised mounting with a crew of three and sixty-four rounds of ammunition. By four o’clock in the morning the gun was in position and supporting the garrison. From the 14th Hobart was involved with the evacuation of Berbera, then the capital of British Somaliland. After some discussion with the Base Commandant and an army representative it was decided that embarkation should begin at 1100 on the 16th.

Hobart’s shipwrights made from an old lighter an additional pontoon pier. Beachmasters were appointed, and ship to shore communications established with Hobart’s signalmen. Throughout the operation, ships’ armament was constantly manned in anticipation of a possible surface attack by enemy destroyers or torpedo boats, and in readiness for air attacks, which materialised on a number of occasions, in bomber and fighter raids. Seaward defence was afforded by the radar and anti-aircraft guns of Carlisle, and by an anti-submarine patrol of destroyers and sloops.

Embarkation into Chakdina began shortly after noon on the 16th, and by 1845 she had embarked 1,100 of the civilian population and sailed for Aden. On the 17th Ceres, patrolling the coast, engaged with gunfire an enemy column moving along the Zeila-Berbera road forty miles west of Berbera, and held up its advance. At 2030 intensive embarkation of troops at Berbera into Chantala, Laomedon, and Akbar began and continued through strong winds. Hobart herself evacuated 1300 members of the Black Watch

Post this operation the cruiser continued on her normal duties for the next four months. She was bombed numerous times by the Italian air force; escorted convoys, patrolled unceasingly, and interrogated numerous civilian ships. On 3 December 1940 Howden was awarded the CBE: ‘For distinguished services with the Somaliland Force.’ A copy of the Recommendation noted his ‘Untiring energy and exceptional ability in preliminary organisation were beyond all praise....To all these emergencies Captain Howden rose supreme and his cheery confidence inspired all.’

By 28 December the ship had left “the Med” and was alongside in Fremantle. No time ashore except for ‘wharf leave’ was given. The ship proceeded to Sydney arriving on 3 January 1941. Shore leave was given and the ship was deployed on convoy escort to and from New Zealand.

Meanwhile, apart from the withdrawal of the old destroyers, there were other changes in Australian naval representation in the Mediterranean. On 4 June the Australian War Cabinet considered a proposal that if permanent repairs needed to Perth could be made in Australia, she should return from the Mediterranean but be replaced by Hobart. This was agreed. The ship left Sydney on 20 June and reached Aden on 9 July.

Howden found that conditions in the Red Sea presented a contrast to those of 1940. Intelligence was that ‘all surface vessels could be considered friendly; no submarines would be encountered; and attack by aircraft could be considered most remote.’ He was quickly to find this last an over-optimistic appreciation. During July the Germans made heavy air attacks on Port Said, Ismailia, Port Tewfik, and Suez, and mined the Canal on several occasions.

Hobart left the Mediterranean on 9 December, after orders were received for her to return to the Pacific, where the Japanese had struck so successfully.

According to the history of the ship Howden ‘blatantly disobeyed’ an order to return a four barrelled ‘Pom Pom’ gun which had been on loan to her. His ‘piratical methods’ of obtaining what was necessary for the ship were
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sometimes imitated by his ship’s company. He told one of his stewards that a new engine was needed for his jolly boat. The steward arranged, for a bottle of scotch, for a suitable engine to be sourced from an American ship. A US Rear Admiral’s barge soon arrived alongside, and the query was made as to where the engine might be. The Americans remove the barge’s engine, had it hoisted aboard, and scuttled the boat on the spot! Howden asked his steward the next day how he had managed the engine’s acquisition, and was told, for a case of scotch, a battleship could be arranged.  

Back at sea, on 16 December 1941, bridge lookout Keith Barry noted in his diary:

Somewhere in the Indian Ocean Colombo bound. Now heard that a Wireless Station on Minokoki Island had not been heard from for 5 days. The island is 2 days steaming from Colombo and was once a Leper Island. It was believed it could be in Japanese hands. Hobart detailed to investigate. At 7:15pm a vessel was sighted when challenged it would not answer our challenge for quite awhile. Captain Howden ordered to train our eight 6” guns on the vessel in readiness to blow her out of the water. Then identified herself as a Norwegian. Hobart detailed to investigate.  

Howden was always suspicious of unidentified ships he encountered and took no chances. Seeing Hobart under Howden from the enemy viewpoint could be quite daunting. On 29 January, 1942, Brian Ogle was on board the corvette Maryborough in the Bangka Straits:

As was normal at dawn, the ship was closed up at action stations when the lookout on the bridge sighted smoke on the horizon

ahead and shortly afterwards masts and the bows of a large vessel closing fast….the largest ship (was) HMAS Hobart, which was accompanied by Tenedos and Stronghold…The relief was qualified by the need to exchange the recognition signal of the day. A number of Maryborough ratings had served in Hobart and were very much aware of Captain Harry Howden’s policy of when in doubt, shoot.  

Duties in the Pacific were immediate and difficult: escorting convoys, attacking submarine contacts and beating off Japanese aircraft. Keith Barry recorded in his diary for 1 February 1942 that Hobart was alongside in Keppel Harbour, Singapore. The ship endured eight air raids through the day, being ‘very nearly hit’ Hobart left harbour at 1800 after taking her full load of stores and fuel and with the ship’s company given permission to salvage anything useful from ashore. The ship took on board many residents of Singapore including Ah Yong, a young Chinese Amah, who later took up the position of nanny in the Howden household.  

The transport of the Dutch reinforcements was covered by a sweep to the north of Bangka by a small British force. Hobart, with the Norah Moller survivors, reached Tanjong Priok on 4 February, and sailed that night under orders from Commodore Collins to join Exeter, Jupiter, and Encounter in a search for enemy forces north of Bangka Island. No surface ships were sighted, but around midday on the 5th, the ships went through three separate high-level bombing attacks. Keith remembered:  

Attacks caught us by surprise as the bombs were on their way before we realised they were overhead. Bomb narrowly missing our bows by 5 yards and put a dent in the Paint Shop, showering the deck with shrapnel. I myself was hit and sent to Sick Bay treatment for days after.
The two other attacks missed us by miles. *Hobart* was officially near-missed, but without damage. Howden noted: “...bombs from Japanese high-level attacks have not the noisy shriek common to German or Italian bombs.” He observed, however, the Japanese accuracy was better, and the explosive effect more powerful, than those of the German or Italian bombs.41

Keith Barry related:

Arrived at Oostenhaven at 11am where we discovered the whole of the Dutch Fleet were there waiting consisting of 3 Cruisers De Ruyter, Java and Tromp plus 4 Dutch Destroyers. We secured alongside a Norwegian Tanker for refuelling and after securing alongside only to find she was carrying gasoline for aircraft and had to return to the Naval Anchorage.

At 1pm *Exeter* with 6 American four-funnel Destroyers arrived. Something brewing obviously. Anchors weigh at 4:30pm and *Hobart* leaves with 3 Dutch Cruisers, four Dutch Destroyers, the Six American Destroyers and *Exeter* at 27 knots – what a sight to see. Looks a formidable battle fleet, the only Force left to repel any Jap landings. Now proceeding to intercept a Japanese Convoy consisting of 6 Cruisers & 16 Destroyers headed for Java.

Bangka Straits. Received a report from Catalinas (our Patrol Aircraft) that in this reported convoy were 25 Troop Transports with their Escorts as previously stated, as opposed to our 5 Cruisers and 16 Destroyers. Captain Howden spoke to the Ship’s Company over the Intercom wishing us Good Luck and God speed. Everybody uneasy but all willing and eager to do battle with the Nips. Closed up at Action Stations for the rest of the Patrol.42

Speaking of the bombing attacks of February, Gordon Johnson, a telegraphist on *Hobart*, recalled later: There is little doubt that *Hobart*’s survival from these bomber onslaughts was a miracle. But important factors contributed. They were the extraordinary skill of our much revered Captain Harry Howden, together with a high level of competence of the ship’s company in all departments. *Hobart* was also an extremely happy ship with a great team spirit.43

Howden’s nicknames acquired over his career attest to the spirit of the man. ‘Lucky Harry’ was one, and ‘Captain Harry’ another. He was also known as ‘Collar and Cuffs’ by junior ratings at one period because of his liking for fine clothes and stiffly starched three inch collars and five inch cuffs. He gave others titles too. He was in the habit of referring to his *Hobart* Ship’s Company as his ‘Fighting Men’, a label they recalled proudly in post-war years.44

Patrick Hanley, who was a Writer (Clerk) on board, noted some of the reasons Howden was so popular:

- January-February would have been Captain Harry’s greatest days. We were almost continuously under air attack but about three times a week Harry addressed us and told us all he could. We had many near misses but Harry had the crew in the palm of his hand. We all thought he was wonderful. After we got through the Sunda Straits on 28-2-1942 around 30-40 unsigned letters were dropped into Harry’s sea-cabin – all 100% complimentary. We just wanted to say thank you for a wonderful job done.45

Rear Admiral Mesley agreed in a later address:

He was gregarious and talkative, friendly towards most but a fiery, quick temper and a villainously sharp tongue with an unprintable vocabulary when roused to his peppery best, or worst. But such outbursts, although common were generally shortlived and he rapidly returned to the normally kindly and thoughtful person he mostly was.46

On 13 March Howden received a signal from Collins telling him to join the striking force at Oosthaven. *Hobart* arrived to find a multitude of Dutch and American ships gathering for a strike against the oncoming Japanese. Speed was a necessity, and Bangka Strait was the quickest route by which to get at the enemy. But Japanese ships had been sighted at the north entrance of the passage, and there was a possibility of enemy minelaying in the strait. It was decided that Rear Admiral Doorman’s strike force should take the longer, difficult route north through the unlighted Gasper Strait; if possible attacking the enemy from the north of Bangka Island.47

The task force was deployed, but when it was obvious that the force had been reported, and conditions were favourable for enemy air attack, Doorman decided, in view of the absence of Allied air support, to return to Batavia. Course was reversed, but soon the ships were the target for 13 successive heavy air attacks. Ships were near-missed and often completely hidden in the columns of water raised by the exploding bombs, but due to skilful handling avoided major damage. Howden estimated a total of 109 enemy aircraft took part in the attacks, the heaviest when three formations, of nine, eight, and seven aircraft respectively, carried out a simultaneous attack on the Australian cruiser. The average...
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size of the enemy bomb was 500 lb, though some heavier were dropped. Howden later wrote: 'the bombs fell close enough for me to see the ugly red flash of their burst and to feel the heat of their explosions across my face – but the ship steamed clear.' He went on to commend the actions of the ship's company, noting that with a less alert engine-room team the results might have been different.\(^48\)
The task force was split up on its return to Tanjong Priok.\(^49\) On the 26th Hobart and her consorts left harbour at 2115, with an intention\(^50\) of joining Doorman, and steamed north about 90 miles until 0300, when they reversed course. 45 minutes later a signal from Collins told Howden, as Senior Officer of the force, of Japanese ships 55 miles north of him. As it would not be possible to establish contact before dawn, Howden continued south and awaited dawn reconnaissance results. The next morning he turned the force north, intending to attack if reconnaissance disclosed an enemy not overwhelmingly superior, but to withdraw to the eastward if the odds were too great. However, no further sightings were reported, and the force returned to Tanjong Priok, after being bombed by eight aircraft and near-missed, with slight damage to Hobart and five of her ratings wounded.\(^51\)

A day later Howden was instructed by Collins to take Hobart and the ships of the Western Striking Force on a northward sweep. The official historian, Gill, noted:

It was a token gesture, for it was obvious that a force which consisted (apart from HOBART) of old and obsolete ships and which was numerically and materially so much inferior to that the Japanese could oppose to it, would stand little chance in an engagement.\(^52\)

Howden's instructions were that if he failed to meet the enemy by 0430 on the 28th, he was to retire through Sunda Strait to Ceylon, calling at Padang on the way, to embark refugees from Singapore and Sumatra. In the northern part of Sunda Strait, Howden's force overtook a convoy escorted by HMAS Yarra and HMIS Jumna – the former would soon be overwhelmed by a Japanese force which would sink her and kill many of Lieutenant Commander Rankin's ship's company.\(^53\)

The ship's company were, apparently, united in their praise of their captain's '…cool courage and skill throughout the difficult operations. He was the idol of the lower deck,' as the ship's history later put it. Howden himself praised his ship's company:

'I have never in my life seen a more magnificent spirit of courage, loyalty, determination and high ability, than has been exemplified by officers and men throughout by whole ship's company during the recent operations.'\(^54\)

On 1 March, having sent the destroyers on ahead, the cruisers including Hobart arrived at Padang. The cruiser embarked 512 refugees: navy, army, air force and civilians, including women and children. On 6 March Hobart arrived at Trincomalee (Ceylon) Naval Base. The ship then proceeded to Fremantle escorting a convoy which included Australian troops from the Middle East.\(^55\) She arrived to some disbelief as popular opinion, emanating from rumours put about by the Japanese propaganda of 'Tokyo Rose', had spread the story that Hobart had been sunk.\(^56\) This may have arisen because of the occasion when the ship was having difficulties with damage to the bow sections, which caused her, in the words of (later Vice Admiral) Richard Peek, to mean they entered harbour: '…stern first in Fremantle Harbour – caused the locals to think we had our bows blown off.'\(^57\)

The ship continued to Melbourne. Howden had always been concerned for the welfare of his ships' companies over the years. However, now, he exhibited that even more. Chris Coulthard-Clark later wrote:

Crace had …been…told…that an extensive Japanese movement southwards from New Britain was expected after 3 May…The commanding officer of HOBART, Captain Harry Howden had been similarly forewarned…A later CNS, Sir Richard Peek, then the cruiser's gunnery officer, recalls that Howden promptly passed the news to the ship's company while steaming down Port Phillip Bay. Taking a risk with security, he announced from the bridge that the six weeks leave due to all ranks would be reduced to two…If anyone spoke of this, Howden said he expected to be court-martialled, but in the event his show of trust was not misplaced.\(^58\)

The ship arrived in Sydney on 4 April. Later-Commodore Dacre-Smyth recalled Hobart in April 1942: 'I saw her arrive in Sydney, with so many shrapnel holes still in her funnel and upper works that we christened her the 'pepperpot'.

Keith drafted off the ship, and later noted of Howden:

'I left the ship to do a Radar Course and later joined Warrego but we can all thank God for a great Skipper. They're maybe some who fell foul of him, who probably cursed him as it is with anyone who falls foul of discipline. Being an ex-Police Officer I know only too well. But they can thank him also. Roy Scrivener remembers Howden taking the ship's company into his confidence and that 'Captain Howden's trust was not broken by his loyal and admiring men…' Crew member Don Hewson summed that up over...’
This extended even to the unusual: the car that Howden had commandeered in Singapore was still on board, and it saw regular use ashore as Howden’s personal transport. Bill Wreford, one of the officers on board at the time, recalls that a pipe would be made:

‘Crane driver man the crane; Captain’s car-handling party muster on the iron deck.’ Whereas a hairy-arsed team of stokers would literally manhandle the car into the ship’s pinnace, accompany it to Man O’ War Steps and Harry’d step out of the jolly boat, pull on his gloves, thank the ‘car-handling party’ and saunter off...  

The ship remained alongside for a month, making repairs and undertaking thousands of maintenance tasks. Nearby was Australia, going through similar housekeeping. The two ships were soon to be united in one of their greatest tests.

Whilst alongside Howden took the opportunity to arrange an event which once again showed his concern for his men. He organised for afternoon tea to be held on board the cruiser as she swung at Number One Buoy, with every one of the 650 ship’s company to invite his mother, or wife, or girlfriend. Patrick Hanley later wrote: ‘I was delighted and proud with my mother and then-girlfriend – I even took them down to the Captain’s office where I worked. It is an interesting insight into how Howden handled his people. The massive afternoon tea would have been quite a bit of work, but by having each sailor bring a loved one aboard, the ship’s company ‘owned’ the evolution and therefore were in a position of being proud of their ship – an attitude that carried through to other activities.

After minor repairs to the end of April, Hobart sailed as part of Rear Admiral Crace’s Task Force 44, together with Australia to become part of what was to be called the Battle of the Coral Sea. On 7 May the aircraft from the Japanese fleet began their attacks on two of the detached Allied ships, while a little while later five vessels from the combined American-Australian force were deployed apart from the main body, under Admiral Crace, to seek out and destroy enemy ships.

Hobart was in company with the Australia, USS Chicago and three US destroyers. While the main body of the American aircraft in the main fleet engaged the enemy, Crace’s force was spotted, and in mid-afternoon attacked by land-based navy bombers. Later it was attacked by another large number of enemy aircraft, with the chief target Australia. Dacre-Smyth later recalled: ‘The Coral Sea Battle, where Hobart and my ship Australia, were the only Australian ships, and both escaped damage during heavy aircraft attacks. Hobart bagged 3 Jap bombers.

The ships escaped through skilful handling, with some wounded members, including Captain Howden, who received a flesh wound in the arm from fragments caused when one of the ship’s light anti-aircraft guns fired into the shield of another gun. The escape of the ship at this time is all the more remarkable, and all the more testimony to Howden’s command, in that the Japanese aerial bombing was probably at that stage the best in the world.

This was also the occasion when Howden exhibited the direct style of leadership which must have endeared him to many of his ships’ companies, even perhaps to the recipients of his unique brand of justice. Richard Peek remembered one such incident when the ship had been attacked by two torpedo bombers:

…one came close to the ship - you could have hit it with a cricket ball. We had two .5 machine guns mounted down below either side of the bridge, and one hadn’t fired at this plane. Howden sent me to find out why from the captain of the gun...I brought the leading hand up – this was a Leading Seaman, I don’t recall his name. Howden listened to the explanation – he’d forgotten to take the safety catch off – and then said very quietly, ‘Very interesting Able Seaman so and so’ - it was the quickest piece of justice I’d ever seen. That was the sort of man he was.

Peek thought a lot of his captain, even though at times life with Howden could be a mixture of excitement, trepidation and exhilaration. While the Admiral is of the opinion his CO was a ‘... tremendous character; the sailors loved him, and I think he loved the sailors’; he also remembered Howden as a ‘man of violent emotions; he threatened to have me shot at dawn once through a misunderstanding, but we became quite good friends after it was cleared up.’

With the bulk of the fighting taking place some 350 nautical miles away, the detached force escaped further punishment, with the exception of being mistakenly bombed by some US aircraft which fortunately missed their targets. Meanwhile the two opposing fleets’ aircraft hammered each other. The end result was a tactical victory for the Japanese, but a strategic one for the Allies, in that the enemy’s vision of cutting Australia off from United States support by dominating New Guinea and the Australian east coast was ultimately thwarted. Due primarily to her low fuel state, Hobart was eventually detached along with USS Walke, for Brisbane, then returning to Sydney. Captain Showers (from HMAS Adelaide) assumed command of Hobart on 8 June 1942.
Studies in Trait Leadership – A Charismatic Warrior

Captain Harry Howden, CBE, RAN

Bill Wreford, one of the ship’s officers, remembers that ‘…something died’ in the ship when Harry Howden left…Harry left an indelible reputation behind him in ‘Hobart’ and she was never the same ship again.’

Howden was brought ashore to travel Australia, interviewing and selecting candidates for the new Officers’ Training School. The recruits were amially known as ‘Howden’s Hussars.’ On 8 September 1942 he was awarded a Mention in Despatches: ‘for bravery and endurance when H.M.A.S Hobart was taking convoys across the China and Java seas in the face of sustained enemy air attacks.’

His Writer – Patrick Hanley – later recorded that he thought Howden had been unfairly treated: ‘…if ever a DSO or DSC was appropriate this was the occasion.’

In December 1942 Howden and his family moved once more to Cerberus. The Captain now held the title of Deputy Superintendent of Training. Probably around 7 February 1943 Howden had what may have been some form of stroke. He was subsequently moved to the Alfred Hospital in Melbourne. Upon recovery, he decided to separate himself from his family and went for recuperation into the Blue Mountains. From February until May 1943 he was posted as ‘Additional’ to Cerberus, and after that to Penguin in Sydney.

In September 1943, having recuperated, he was appointed Commanding Officer of HMAS Penguin in Sydney Harbour. Between the departure of Rear Admiral Muirhead-Gould and the arrival of Rear Admiral George Moore, Captain Howden acted as Naval Officer-in-Charge, Sydney. Howden’s subsequent service record certainly notes attendances to hospitals and sickbays with headaches. Although rated fit for duty to the highest category on 19 December 1945 the medical report noted that he had received ‘…a lesion of one of the arteries at the base of the brain, possibly due to the strain imposed by his very arduous War service…’ Sea duty was to be considered in the light of that injury.

He remained apart from his family. On 8 January 1946 Howden received a disappointing letter from Admiral Louis Hamilton, informing him there was little prospect of a sea-going command, with so many younger Captains looking for experience. Furthermore, he had limited opportunities for Flag rank given his lesser war and sea experience compared to others. In September he was posted as Naval Officer in Charge (NOIC) of Western Australia. He bought a house and moved much of his memorabilia there.

Post-war an HMAS Hobart Association was formed, with Roy Scrivener remembering that ‘Quite naturally, he (Howden) became founding Patron.’ Scrivener recalled a later occasion when a gathering of the Hobart members was being held and: …the visiting US top general of the day inspected us ‘veterans’ and invited our Captain to join him and all VIPs at the official function. Rejecting this fine thought, ‘Harry’ explained that he was here to enjoy his WW2 men, sharing their hospitality. That coupled with so many inspirational moments was enough to have me offer my next thirty or so years keeping that Association together…”

In retirement Howden travelled widely; invested in several companies; kept up with old shipmates and periodically spent time in hospital. He married again. His permanent home was in Applecross, WA, where a large and diverse collection of memorabilia was housed, including a binnacle from Tasmania, and a rangefinder from Hobart. His house had as a gateway two old mines. The 1939 Austin car from Singapore found a home there, resplendent in battleship-grey paint, and complete with naval-style ropework on the steering wheel, although it carried as mementoes bullet-holes from Japanese guns.

Howden had always had been a generous man, and as a result of years of donations was asked to become a Life Governor of the NSW Society for Crippled Children. He was involved with the Hastings and District Bush Nursing Hospital in Victoria, and the Benevolent Society of NSW. Reflecting his diverse range of interests, he was a member of the United Service Institute in London, the United Hunt Club of the same City, the Weld Club in Perth, and the Western Australian Hunt Club. His Secretary from his WA appointment in the 1950s, Mrs Abbott, later recalled his spontaneous generosity in retirement:

Some people thought he was an eccentric, but he was a very kind and thoughtful person. He did a lot of kind things. When the Navy was disposing of any whalers he would buy them with his personal cheque and give them to a group of sea scouts.

In 1962 what must have been a proud, but sad occasion took place: Hobart was paid off for scrap. In Sydney, Howden attended a get-together of some of her ship’s company members. Then the old ship was towed out of Sydney Harbour heads to the breakers.

Howden died in London 1969 at the age of 73. His ashes were brought back to Australia, and his son Merlin organised a Memorial Service to him, held in the Navy Chapel of Garden Island in Sydney. He is buried in the Rookwood Cemetery in Sydney. A memorial bronze has been raised to him in the wall of the naval section.
of a Sydney cemetery. Small bequests were settled on members of Howden’s family, but the bulk of his estate bequeathed over $2.7 million to his various charities – an enormous sum which must be multiplied by 10 to get some idea of its worth today.87

In studying Howden as an outstanding RAN leader, how may we sum up his qualities?

Howden achieved almost all things he tried to do, with illness preventing him from the higher ranks to which he would undoubtedly have been promoted. His primary achievement must be the great feat of bringing Hobart through much of WWII, although she was in the thick of the action, and at the same time proving that Australia’s relatively new Navy was as good as any other in combat. As a cruiser captain, few were his equal. The survival of Hobart against the all-conquering Japanese Navy in their great sweep south in the early parts of their attacks on the Allies was a testimony to his skill as a ship commander, but also as a leader of naval men, whom he welded into a formidable team.

Howden was a figure to be emulated in the eyes of many, and he received much loyalty from his ship’s company. Akin to another great fighting captain of the RAN – Hec Waller – he inspired devotion and almost love from his followers. We might recall, from the first explanation of trait leadership, the commander of the USS Benfold and his thoughts in It’s Your Ship. Howden had the same attitude of being a commander who expected the best but gave his people control over their part of the warships he commanded, and let them reap the rewards – or not. He was always in tune with what his people were experiencing, and he acted on his understandings. His fierce personality probably got in the way of this from time to time, but his people forgave him sudden flashes of temper because they knew that inside that fierce exterior Howden cared for them. By magnanimous gesture he showed his understanding of how seemingly small things were important.

Although personal communication was not his best field, for he could be too blunt, people always were in no doubt as to what he wanted. It is notable that he was in regular contact with his ships’ companies, and carried his trust of his people through to equipping them with information he thought they needed to know – as witnessed by the decision to tell Hobart’s ship’s company of their shortened leave.

Howden looked the part of a leader. He possessed perhaps more than any other RAN officer so far, that characteristic author Ronald Welch described: ‘panache’ - ‘...the almost untranslatable expression of dash, of valour, the ability to do things with an air of reckless courage and inspiring leadership.’98

Certainly one to go forward whenever necessary, Howden was a man of action. He often translated that into his ship’s strategic and tactical manoeuvres: handling a cruiser like a destroyer and always, but always, exhibiting that important Principle of War of Offensive Action; punching forward; looking for trouble, being aggressive even in defence. However, this sometimes set him at odds with others.

In conclusion, Howden must rate as one of the Royal Australian Navy’s foremost fighting captains. Together with Waller, he shares that enviable quality of inspiring fierce loyalty from those under his command. Harry Howden was truly a great leader of the RAN. ☘

Lieutenant Commander Tom Lewis
PhD, OAM, RAN has served in a variety of PNF and reserve roles within the Navy. He led US forces on deployment in Baghdad in 2006.

(Endnotes)
1 Gill. (299-301)
2 Gill, G. Hermon. Royal Australian Navy 1939-1941. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1968. (65-66). Note on Sources for this chapter: the official records concerning Captain Howden are far from complete. His file as held by Navy Records office seems to have disappeared, although his son Dr Pat Howden has a copy, which in itself has some sections missing, for example a record of a Mention in Dispatches. At some stage the file may have been copied to Australian Archives as file A39789/9 Howden HL, although this has not been ascertained.
3 Howden, Dr Patrick L ‘HMAS HOBART Hero of the Lower Deck’. Biographical account of Captain Harry Howden’s life by his son, written for the ‘King-Hall Naval History Conference’. Provided by Dr David Stephens, Head of the Naval History Directorate, to the author, 2001. (2)
4 As annotated in Howden’s Service Record.
6 Gill, G. Hermon. (299 - 301)
7 Gill, G. Hermon. (299 - 301)
8 Royal Australian Navy. Personal Record of Harry Leslie Howden, Navy Records, Canberra. (Copy now in the possession of Dr P J Howden, as are other Personal Reports referred to hereafter.)
11 As noted on Howden’s Service Record.
12 Mesley, JB, Rear Admiral, CBE, MVO, DSC, RAN (Rtd.). Memorial Address, Garden Island Dockyard Chapel. 30 March 1969.
13 Gill, G. Hermon. (299 - 301) Despite this and other authoritative accounts of Howden’s period in Japan, his Service
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Record does not bear a note of such a trip, whether as an official posting or otherwise. He may well, of course, have taken some leave to enable it.


16. Howden, HL. Report from H.M.S. Mantis, 7 December 1930. (In the possession of Dr P F Howden.)

17. As described by letter from Merlin Howden to the author, March 2003. The incidents were as recounted to Merlin by his mother and Lieutenant Commander Langley, godfather to Merlin Howden and the 1st Lieutenant of Mantis.


23. Howden, Dr Patrick f. (2)

24. For example, see HMS Hobart Association, NSW section. ‘The Buzz’: No. 102, 28 March 1994. (Courtesy Merlin Howden). ‘HMS Mantis completed her mission with distinction and returned to her station. Her Commanding Officer was awarded an OBE for his exploits’; and, Dr Patrick f. Howden’s ‘HMS Hobart Hero of the Lower Deck’ (3)

25. Gill, G. Hermon. (299-301)

26. Gill, G. Hermon. (132-133)

27. Lind, LD and MA Payne. (26)


29. Lind, LD and MA Payne. (13)

30. Paraphrased from Gill. (134)


32. Extract from Service Record. (In the possession of Dr P F Howden.)

33. Contained in papers supplied by Dr P F Howden.

34. Diary of Syd Clark.

35. Gill, G. Hermon. (405)

36. Lind, LD and MA Payne. (26)

37. Nye, William. Related to relatives and retold in an essay by his grandson, Midshipman Ben White, RAN. RAN College, Jervis Bay. Used by permission to the author.

38. Diary of Keith Barry, bridge anti-aircraft lookout during command of Captain Howden. Compiled and edited August 2000 by son Dr. Patrick f Howden. Supplied to the author.


42. Diary of Keith Barry, bridge anti-aircraft lookout during command of Captain Howden. Compiled and edited August 2000 by son Dr. Patrick f Howden; supplied to the author.


44. Mesley, JB, Rear Admiral, CBE, MVO, DSC, RAN (Rtd.) Memorial Address, Garden Island Dockyard Chapel. 30 March 1969.

45. Hanley, Patrick. Undated letter to Patrick Howden following the Memorial Service for Captain Howden. (Courtesy Merlin Howden)

46. Mesley, JB, Rear Admiral, CBE, MVO, DSC, RAN (Rtd.) Memorial Address, Garden Island Dockyard Chapel. 30 March 1969.

47. Gill, G. Hermon. (571)

48. Gill, G. Hermon. (573-574)

49. This location description is cited in Gill but has fallen into disuse in modern times.

50. Gill’s footnote on p. 608 of 1939-1941 explains this order from Admiral CEL Heftrich, Royal Netherlands Navy.

51. Gill, G. Hermon. (608)

52. Gill, G. Hermon. (609)

53. Gill, G. Hermon. (616-617)

54. Lind, LD and MA Payne. (40)

55. Gill, G. Hermon. (299-301)

56. Keith diary.

57. Peek. op. cit.


60. Abjorensen, Norman. ‘Nobody remembers her because she wasn’t sunk.’ Unidentified news clipping circa 1993. (Supplied to the author by Merlin Howden)


62. Hanley, Patrick. Undated letter to Patrick Howden following the Memorial Service for Captain Howden. (Courtesy Merlin Howden).


64. Address given by Commodore Dacre-Smyth RAN (ex-HMAS Australia) Aircraft Victorian HMAS Hobart Shrine Service on 20 July 1983. (Supplied to the author by Patrick Howden)


66. Peak, Sir Richard, Vice Admiral. Ibid.

67. Peak, Sir Richard, Vice Admiral. Ibid.


72. Gill, G. Hermon. (299-301)

73. Typewritten note copy of the text - in the possession of Dr P F Howden. (The MID does not appear in Howden’s record.)

74. Hanley, Patrick. Undated letter to Patrick Howden following the Memorial Service for Captain Howden. (Courtesy Merlin Howden)

75. Personal Record.

76. Gill, G. Hermon. (299-301)

77. Minute from ‘D.N.M.S. ‘ to Captain Howden. In the possession of Dr P F Howden.

78. In the possession of Dr P F Howden.


80. Correspondence with Dr P F Howden, 2002.

81. Colebatch, Hal. ‘Officer Lent Touch Of Color To W.A.’ The West Australian. (Undated clipping courtesy of Merlin Howden)

82. Menley, JB, Rear Admiral, CBM, MVO, DSC, RAN (Rtd.). Memorial Address, Garden Island Dockyard Chapel. 30 March 1969.

83. HMS Hobart Association, NSW section.

84. Correspondence with Dr P F Howden, 2003.

85. References in several letters from Dr P F Howden 2000-2001.

86. Correspondence with Dr P F Howden, 2003.

87. Australian Dictionary of Biography draft, and covering letter from Darryl Bennett, author. 15 April, 1993. (Courtesy Merlin Howden)

Subj: Passing Of VADM Sir Richard Peek, KBE, CB, DSC, RAN (Retd)

1. I regret to inform the Navy of the passing of VADM Sir Richard Peek, KBE, CB, DSC, RAN (Retd). At his request, a private cremation service was held today in Canberra. VADM Sir Richard Peek served as Chief Of Naval Staff from 1970 to 1973, as the culmination of a distinguished naval career in war and peace, and remained one of Australia’s active advisors in naval defence strategy until the end.

2. VADM Sir Richard Peek’s life was defined by the ideal of service. He entered the Royal Australian Naval College in 1928, graduating with maximum time, and specialised in gunnery early in his career. When the Second World War broke out he was serving in the battleship HMS Revenge. In 1941 he joined the light cruiser HMAS Hobart as Gunnery Officer, and served in the same capacity in heavy cruiser HMAS Australia Until 1944.

Admiral Peek was awarded the OBE (Military) for his actions at Leyte Gulf in HMAS Australia, and the DSC for skill and devotion to duty in action at Lingayen Gulf.

3. Fittingly, Admiral Peek led The RAN contingent in the victory celebrations in London in 1945, remaining to complete Staff Course. After several postings at sea and ashore he took command of the First Frigate Squadron and HMAS Shoalhaven in 1951 and later commanded the destroyers HMA Ships Bataan and Tobruk.

During the Korean War, while in command of HMAS Tobruk he was awarded the Us Legion Of Merit. He was Deputy Chief Of Naval Personnel in 1954 and again took command of Tobruk from 1956 to 1958 and as Captain (D) 10th Destroyer Squadron. Four years later, he commanded the aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney and subsequently the RAN Flagship HMAS Melbourne.

4. In 1964, he was promoted to Rear Admiral and was appointed Fourth Naval Member and Chief of Supply of the Commonwealth Naval Board, then Deputy Chief of Naval Staff in 1965 for two years. Admiral Peek’s next post was Flag Officer Commanding HMA Fleet in 1967, including oversight of the Far East Strategic Reserve, before his appointment as Second Naval Member and Chief of Naval Personnel in 1968 and then Chief of Naval Staff and First Naval Member in November 1970. During his tenure, RAN involvement in the Vietnam war came to an end and considerable effort was devoted to force structure development including plans for a Light Destroyer (DDL) and a replenishment ship. Navy also took charge of manning larger amphibious craft and personnel strength reached its post-1945 peak of 17 000 men and women.

5. Vice Admiral Peek retired on 23 November 1973 to life as a pastoralist but continued his lifelong involvement in Australia’s naval defence. He provided expert advice to Parliament as recently as the 2009 White Paper discussion process and was a tireless advocate for naval veterans of all campaigns.

6. Vice Admiral Sir Richard Peek’s passing marks the end of an era for the RAN. He personified the values we strive for from the most junior to the most senior among us – Honour, Courage, Loyalty and Devotion to Duty - whether in peacetime or in face of the challenges of war at sea. For himself, he never forgot the men under his command and their welfare was among his greatest concerns. He will be remembered as the quintessential naval officer and one of the most remarkable and respected destroyer captains the RAN has produced.

Bt
Drafted: Capt B.K. Gorringe, DNSOM
To CN

Released: Vadm R.H. Crane, CN
When the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is remembered in Vietnam, HMA Ships Vendetta, Hobart, Perth and Brisbane come to mind. ‘The Vung Tau Ferry’, Operation SEA DRAGON and other naval support operations are associated with the RAN in Vietnam far more readily than Bell UH-1 Iroquois ‘Huey’ landing in hot Landing Zones. Yet 192 Australian Naval personnel served over four years as pilots, observers, gunners, aircrew and maintainers with the 135th Assault Helicopter Company (AHC) United States Army.

The Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV) consisted of four contingents, each completing a 12 month deployment to Vietnam. The contingents comprised eight pilots, four observers, four aircrewmen, 24 maintenance personnel and six support staff. The difference for this unit, as compared to other Australians, was that they were fully integrated with the 135th AHC, away from RAN operational command. All members of the flight were assigned roles within the 135th according to rank and experience. The Officer-in-Charge (OIC) RANHFV was also the Executive officer of 135th AHC. What these men experienced and how the RAN handled their deployment both before and after their tour of duty is little known, yet it is an important part of history to remember and learn from.

Preparations before Deployment

In May 1967 the RAN was posting future members of HFV into 723 Squadron. As the further commitment of naval aviators to Vietnam had not been announced, the formation of the flight was top secret. This did not, however, prevent the knowledge that more Australians were on their way to Vietnam spreading exceptionally fast – naval wives recall being quizzed if their husbands were among those going.

As the Flight would be operating in an army, field environment, members were issued with uniform in accordance with Australian Army standards. This uniform was jungle green work dress, a sun hat and an army webbing belt as well as a naval beret with a metal cap badge. Members of the flight were also issued khaki walking-out attire which displayed appropriate rank and rate insignia. These naval badges had been dyed green in an attempt to provide continuity within the uniform. Flight kit was only issued to those in direct flight-related roles. On arrival in Vietnam, however, all RANHFV personnel were issued flight suits and some maintenance equipment, such as gloves, by the Americans due to the varied roles all members of the company undertook.

The Australians were disappointed by the RAN’s lack of support. Not only were they not issued the appropriate uniform and equipment for the jobs that they would be doing but also there were no flight benefits provided to the support personnel as there were no ‘Wings’ for Naval aircrew. Despite the fact that the Australian maintenance personnel acted also as door gunners and crew chiefs they were paid no allowances for their increased duty.

As recalled by NAMAE Waskin, the

1 HMAS Sydney provided logistical aid to the 1st Australian task force. Sydney transported troops to and from Vietnam. She undertook 24 visits to Vung Tau earning her the nickname of ‘Vung Tau Ferry’.

2 Operation SEA DRAGON was an ongoing American operation along the Vietnamese coast. This was the RAN’s principle commitment during the Vietnam war with a destroyer provided to the operation on a rotational basis. The ships involved were HMA Ships Hobart, Vendetta and Brisbane.

3 723 Squadron became the parent squadron for the HFV, with all HFV personnel posting in for pre-deployment training for all four contingents.

4 This was not actually army uniform but navy clothing dyed khaki.

5 A neater uniform consisting of a shirt, tie and trousers.

6 NAMAE Ivan Waskin was a member of the 1st Contingent RANHFV as an aircraft
American maintainers were paid more than double that of the Australians completing the same job.

Prior to departure all members of RANHFV received pre-deployment training. While the later contingents trained at the Australian Army jungle training base in Canungra, the first contingent received their field training in West Nowra. While this training did give the HFV an idea about conditions in the bush, it did very little to prepare the flight for the army environment to which they were entering. For the later contingents the RAN improved the training regime. Some time was spent at the jungle training base learning Australian Army field methods and maintenance and training was also undertaken at the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) base at Amberley completing escape and survival lessons, both theoretical and practical.

While never enough to completely prepare one for war, the training provided to the HFV gave the men enough of an idea of what was coming that soon after the third contingent arrived in Vietnam, a junior sailor commented that ‘it’s just like they said it would be.”

**Throughout the Tour of Duty**

The Experimental Military Unit (EMUs), comprising the 135th AHC and RANHFV, was the first fully integrated American-Australian unit since World War I. While a US Army officer was always commander of the unit, the executive officer was Australian and all other positions were allocated according to rank and experience. This placed the Australians in a unique position. As all Australians were ‘lifers’ their level of professional ability and conduct far exceeded that of their American counterparts allowing the Australians to attain a far higher percentage of command roles than their small numbers would have initially indicated. This was particularly unusual for the Americans as they would rarely relinquish control of their forces.

The ethos of the Australian personnel also varied greatly from the American attitude. While all considered the tour in Vietnam a harrowing experience, the professionalism of the Australians even in trying circumstances distinguished them from other units. The company motto was originally a quote of Australian Lieutenant, Max Speedy, who on 27 January 1969 when asked if the EMUs would stay after dark to extract the last men of a battalion replied that they would ‘Get the bloody job done.’ The motto was certainly apt. The EMUs were held in such high regard by other aviation companies that should a crisis occur ‘the cry went out “call for the EMUs”’. All levels of the U.S. Army from Command to enlisted personnel held the Australians in high regard for their ‘professional skill and ability.’

In Vietnam, the RAN HFV took more hits and lost more personnel than any other Australian aviation unit. Primarily this was due to the different rules of engagement that the HFV adhered to. To engage the enemy, the Australian Army had to confirm imminent fire and the Royal Australian Air Force were under orders not to enter ‘Hot’ LZs. Comparatively the US Army, under which the RAN HFV was commanded, was not only permitted to return fire but also to use suppressive force if they believed the enemy to be present.11

The Flight transported the 7th Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Division to where the enemy was found. Unlike the Australian task force, who worked in an enclosed space, the EMUs regularly inserted into areas known to have an active Viet Cong (VC) presence. They never gained ground or held a front line. Of the seven RAN deaths during the Vietnam War, five were members of the RAN HFV. LCDR Vickers, LEUT Casadio, PO Phillips, SBLT Huelin and LACM Shipp lost their lives during flying operations with the EMUs.12

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8 “Lifers”, the term American personnel used to describe career military members as opposed to conscripts or draftees. All Australians were lifers.


10 Crabb, G 1968, Letter to LCDR Ralph and Australian Personnel of the RANHFV. (Supplied by Fleet Air Arm Museum Historical Archives).

11 CMDR I.M. Speedy (then Lieutenant) 2IC RAN HFV 2nd Contingent. Interview conducted by MIDN C.E. HODGE 06 May 10.

12 In full those personnel are Lieutenant Commander Vickers, Lieutenant Casadio, Petty Officer Phillips, Sub-Lieutenant Huelin and Leading Aircraftsman Shipp, the
Back in Australia the families of the RAN HFV were experiencing difficulties due to the deployment of their husbands. Many of the men of the flight had lived on ‘the Patch’13 at HMAS Albatross. However when the flight deployed, they were posted to HMAS Penguin (Additional-Vietnam) and therefore could not retain their houses at Albatross. Moving away from the married quarters was not negotiable and many wives chose to move interstate to be closer to family. This led to a huge amount of disruption to the families involved and great resentment was developed towards the Navy for this callous attitude towards personnel deploying to a war zone.14 By the time the third contingent departed a more appropriate system had been implemented. After numerous complaints and a directive from the Chief of Staff Admiral VAT Smith, wives and families of the men of RAN HFV were able to retain their married quarters.

**ON THEIR RETURN**

Possibly the greatest failing of the RAN to the members of the flight was their treatment on their return to Australia. While it is common knowledge that the anti-war movement prevented many Vietnam veterans receiving a well-deserved welcome home, it would be assumed that the personnel would be well received by their own service. For the HFV this was not the case. On their return to Australia, the RAN gave the veterans no support, no welcome and very little acknowledgement of what they had accomplished. The members of the flight were flown into a back hanger of the airport during the early hours of the morning and met by a single representative from the Navy. They were given back-pay, leave passes and travel warrants before being left to find their own accommodation and transport. No transport had even been arranged to take them to their ‘posting’ at Penguin.15

Men returning from the flight were met with the attitude that they had not been in a real war. The Fleet Air Arm’s (FAA) attention was focussed on the embarked squadrons of HMAS Melbourne’s air group and despite having seen more combat than any other Australian unit; army, navy or air force;16 the RAN HFV was ostracised and forgotten.

Partially due to a lack of contact between the flight and the RAN during their deployment, a general ignorance of the experiences of the flight exists to this day, both internally and externally of the Australian Defence Force. Many junior HFV pilots, now with over 1000 combat flying hours were rotated from the FAA altogether. The HFV commander was criticised for having a lack of ‘Front-line’ experience17. The invaluable knowledge and experience gained by the men of the flight was lost as they were scattered across the fleet. No attempt was made to capitalise on the unique skill attained by the veterans while in Vietnam. NAMAE Waskiw, on his return to Albatross, was informed he lacked the training and rank to perform tasks simpler than those he had completed on a daily basis in Vietnam. The RAN seemed determined to ignore the lessons learned in Vietnam. When LCDR Neil

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13 Naval term for an area of an establishment where married personnel are accommodated
15 See paragraph 8
16 NAMAE Ivan Waskin (1st Contingent). Interview conducted by MIDN C.E. HODGE 26 Apr 10.
17 Eather, S 1998, *Get the Bloody Job Done*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, pp120.
Ralph attempted to incorporate some of these lessons into planning the response was simply that ‘they did not want to know’.18

The Australian government also took a particularly hard line towards foreign awards and honours. Members of the flight received numerous Australian and imperial honours including 34 Naval Board Commendations, 27 Mentioned in Dispatches, a Member of the British Empire medal; eight Distinguished Service crosses, six Distinguished Flying crosses and one British Empire medal. Yet as the RAN HFV was completely integrated with the Americans, it is hardly surprising that they were nominated for numerous American and Vietnamese awards.

Until recently however the Australian Government has not allowed any of these awards to be worn or even issued.19 It is unknown exactly how many foreign awards the Australians in the HFV were nominated for; however, the list includes a US Silver Star, a pair of US Distinguished Flying crosses and several Vietnamese Crosses of Gallantry. As a unit the 135th AHC received seven decorations; none of which were ever awarded to Australians.20 In 2002, more than 32 years after the HFV returned to Australia, the Australian Government finally allowed Australian personnel to wear their American honours.

In conclusion, the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam was a small but dedicated group of sailors who were thrust into a situation vastly different to what any other Australian unit experienced. Despite this they performed their duties with distinction earning them a reputation for professional excellence. They demonstrated the positive ethos associated with the RAN to all those they worked with and greatly developed our military relationship with America.

Unfortunately, the navy handled the flight on their return to Australia very poorly. Specifically the Navy did not welcome them home in any way, they did not utilise the skills that had been developed and they did not take care of their people. Had they been met and placed back within the Navy in positions where their unique skills were utilised, perhaps in teaching the next generation of combat pilots, the resentment felt towards the Navy would have been lessened and fewer exceptional combat-trained pilots, observers and aircrew would have left the Navy feeling as though their efforts were not appreciated.

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Richard ‘Dick’ Nossiter recently celebrated his 100th birthday and was also awarded the Medal of the Order of Australia (OAM) in the 2010 Queens Birthday Honours List for “Services to sailing through the circumnavigation of the Globe in the vessel Sirius 1935-37”.

Dick Nossiter was born in Sydney on 22 June 1910 and learned to sail in the Lane Cove area as a child. In 1935, aged 25, he joined his father Harold Nossister Sr and his younger brother Harold in their circumnavigation of the globe. They embarked in the family yacht Sirius (a 53 foot, 35 ton staysail schooner) and sailed to England via Bali, Malaysia, Colombo, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean before reaching Great Britain in June 1936. The Nossiters then returned to Australia via Madeira, Trinidad, the Panama Canal, Galapagos Islands, French Polynesia, the Cook Islands and Tonga before finally reaching Sydney in May 1937; thus becoming the first Australians to circumnavigate the world by sailing vessel.

Dick Nossiter was appointed as a probationary Sub-Lieutenant, in the RANVR, in February 1939 and was mobilised for war service in November of that year. After training as an Anti Submarine Warfare officer at HMAS Rushcutter, and onboard HMAS Moresby, he was promoted to Lieutenant and then dispatched to Britain for service with the Royal Navy in April 1940. In July 1940 he was appointed as First Lieutenant in the corvette HMS Mallow and served in her until April 1941 when he was given command of the ASW Trawler HMS Paynter during which time the ship was involved in convoy escort duties to Russia.

In August 1942 he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for “Bravery whilst serving in HMS Paynter taking convoys to and from Murmansk through the dangers of ice and heavy seas and in the face of relentless attacks by enemy U-boats, aircraft and surface forces”. Nossiter relinquished command of Paynter in October 1943 and was posted ashore to assist with the training of ASW Officers. In February 1944 he was joined the destroyer HMS Brilliant and then in May 1944 was given command of the newly commissioned Flower class corvette HMS Potentilla.

In April 1945 he was made an Acting Lieutenant Commander and served as Assistant Staff Officer Disarmament of Vessels as hundreds of vessels were disarmed and returned to their original owners after the end of the European theatre of war. He returned to Australia in early 1946 and was demobilised in April of that year although he remained a member of the RANVR and was promoted to Lieutenant Commander in June 1948. He later transferred to the RANR when the RANVR was disbanded and was placed on the Retired List in March 1958.

After the war he retained his interest in sailing and navigated in six Sydney to Hobart yacht races and is currently the longest serving member of the Royal Sydney Yacht Squadron. Dick Nossiter was also a member of the Lane Cove Council for nine years during the years 1968–1977; which included three years as Mayor. Dick was married in 1941 and he and his wife Nancy celebrated 67 years of married life before her death in 2008. He now lives in Cardiff Heights near Newcastle.

Note: The Yacht Sirius is also still going strong and is owned by retired British Airways pilot Simon Norris who resides in Thailand.

From It’s an Honour, the website of the Australian Honours and Awards system (http://www.itsanhonour.gov.au)

Name: NOSSTIER, Richard Harwin
Award: Medal of the Order of Australia
Post-nominal: OAM
Date granted: 14 June 2010
State: NSW
Suburb: Cardiff Heights
Postcode: 2285
Country: Australia
Citation: For service to sailing through the circumnavigation of the globe in the vessel Sirius, 1935-1937.
Saab Systems’ state of the art technology is making informed decisions enabling you to constantly evolve to meet changing needs and challenges.
**Book Reviews**

**HMAS Bataan, 1952: An Australian Warship in the Korean War**
By Anthony Cooper


Reviewed by Greg Swinden

When Able Seaman Geoff Cooper wrote letters home to his mother, from Tribal class destroyer HMAS Bataan off the coast of Korea in 1952, he probably never suspected that one day they would form the basis for a book concerning the Australian warships role in the war. His son Anthony Cooper has used his father’s letters as the background for an excellent description of the ship’s service during its second deployment to Korea during February–August 1952.

This is, however, no ordinary ship history working its way through the day by day events of the ship and its crew. Instead Anthony Cooper has used his father’s letters to provide a vivid account of the ship’s service in the Korean War.

Changi is interesting and the attempts by officers to get messages out the camp in statements authorised by the Japanese are analysed in detail. The hidden messages were not always comprehended by Allied Governments or the Red Cross and apparent praise for the Japanese led to resentment against their officers among other prisoners.

By focusing on this single camp, the author is able to trace the prisoners’ experience from the cramped hold of the SS Tottori Maru which carried 1,993 American prisoners from the Philippines, through the desperate journey to Manchuria in which many died and on to liberation by a resourceful OSS team that was dropped by parachute nearby in August 1945.

Unusually the author continues the story into the post-war era describing the need for rehabilitation when the prisoners returned home, the evidence some gave at war-crimes tribunals and even the return by a small number to one of the surviving buildings which has recently become a museum. The city is now known as Shenyang and still has a major aircraft production facility on its outskirts.

Linda Holmes has a reputation as the leading American authority on Allied prisoners of war and this work fully measures up to the standard that one would expect from her. She describes Japanese brutality not merely for its own sake but attempts to explain the mental attitudes that led to it and the effect it had on the prisoners. It is the first book to shed light on the medical experiments carried out on some American prisoners and the author’s research has allowed some of the survivors to better comprehend what happened to their fellow prisoners.

Guests of the Emperor is a work of clarity that sheds new light on a subject that has not, until recently been studied in sufficient depth and it is pleasing that it has proved possible to publish it while some of the former prisoners are still alive. All too soon the events described will have passed from living memory and it is important that future generations can read a work that was researched and written with the aid of people who were there. It is illustrated with contemporary sketches, photographs and maps and makes a positive addition to the available literature on the suffering of Allied prisoners in the hands of Japanese. I thoroughly recommend it.
crew. Cooper prepares the scene well outlining how Australia became involved in the war and describing the trials and tribulations of preparing a ship, and the RAN, for the conflict. The story flows easily through the experiences of the Lower Deck, Wardroom and Commanding Officer (Commander Warwick Bracegirdle, DSC and Bar, RAN) alike and makes comprehensive use of first hand sources such as the ship’s Reports of Proceedings, Captain’s Night Orders as well as private letters.

Cooper breaks the book down into interesting chapters analysing various aspects of shipboard life and operational deployments such as liberty in Japan, shipboard living, leadership and morale, air and sub-surface threats, navigating in hazardous water, shore bombardment and refuelling and ship-handling. The mundane tasks of plane guard duty are described as well as the few moments of sheer terror when _Bataan_ came under enemy fire. This resulted in the ship being straddled by several enemy shells; one of which one hit the Captain’s day cabin and tore a hole in his full dress uniform jacket which was fortunately the only casualty of the action!

He also discusses the similarity and differences between the RAN warships operating off Korea with that of the Royal Navy, United States Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy. The Canadian Navy comes into reasonably close analysis, both good and bad, because the Tribal class destroyers HMC Ships _Athabaskan_, _Cayuga_ and _Sioux_ also served in Korean waters during _Bataan’s_ first and second deployment to the war zone.

Books describing the Australian experience in the Korean War are few and those dealing with the RAN in the conflict are even fewer. This well researched and very easy to read book may signal the start of more written work concerning the Australian Navy during this often forgotten war. Highly recommended to all naval historians or those just interested in what it was like to serve in a warship during the Korean War.

### Kantian Thinking About Military Ethics

**By J. Carl Ficarrotta**

*Ashgate: Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, Vermont, 2010*  
*ISBN: 978-0-7546-7992-9*

**Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Richard Adams, RAN**

In a collection of eight essays written over the period of fifteen years, Ficarrotta presents a variety of important arguments, none of which require special training in philosophy to interpret. This is a work from which the generally interested reader will derive benefit. From that perspective alone it represents a meaningful contribution to the professional literature.

The title, therefore, is regrettable – for it implies that this is a work about Kant’s moral theory, examining closely argued claims about what Kant said, or what Kant might have said, regarding the problems Ficarrotta presents. This is not the case. Rather, opinions presented are intelligible and relevant as thinking inspired by Kant, and bearing a close relationship to what Kant might have thought.

For those who are concerned that this will therefore be irrelevant “philosophy-lite”, Ficarrotta explains that the essays are the result of trying to take his Kantian commitment seriously in the real world. Rather than a work bound up with meta-ethical fine-points, this is a practical, applicable and informative work which will enrich and elevate the quality of moral reasoning in the real world.

Chapter One: _Are Military Professionals Bound by a Higher Moral Standard_, has been presented previously in several fora. Inspired by Kant’s idea that “morals began with the noblest attribute of human nature” the essay takes issue with claims that serving military personnel are bound by a higher ethical standard than that which might apply to wider society.

Arguing against the famous claim of Hackett that “a bad person cannot be a good soldier, or sailor, or airman,” Ficarrotta presents a logical, thorough and compelling case. He concludes that “military personnel are bound by some unique and/or especially strict moral standards (which) do not encompass all of morality”. Closing with the assertion that “we cannot ask (military personnel) to be saints” Ficarrotta resonates with Kant’s argument against the “fancies of moral perfection,” but he ignores the powerful inspirational qualities of the “military ideal.” This is an ideal which, as Polanyi would have it, is “tacit” – real, powerful and yet unable to find expression in the unfeeling terms of Kantian logic.

In Chapter Two, Ficarrotta writes in address of women in combat. This discussion attracted recent interest in the press. Ficarrotta’s line, inspired by Kant’s maxim that “every member of the commonwealth must be entitled to reach any degree of rank which a subject can earn through talent, industry and good fortune” is unsurprising. Concluding a systematic argument, he argues that whilst some forms of discrimination are justifiable, excluding women from combat based upon gender alone is not a morally permissible form of discrimination.

Discussion in chapter three concerns the wrongs of “careerism” – the derivation of personal gain by professional failure. Ficarrotta challenges the reader to consider just what it is which the “ticket punching, boot licking (and other less flattering military colloquialisms for the same sort of activity), back stabbing, certain types of job-hunting or even in the extreme sending troops to unnecessary death for...
the sake of good appearance all have in common”. Though he is unable to afford a precise and specific definition of careerism, he does identify the least commendable and most corrosive elements of military culture. Ficarrotta’s resonant argument presents good reasons for “reform of promotion and retention policies” and concludes with a damnation of “institutionally and culturally sanctioned temptations to violate moral rules”.

Perhaps the most challenging essay in the collection is that which, in chapter eight, deals with just war theory – a theory Ficarrotta scorns as theoretically incoherent. Ficarrotta believes just war theory fails to cope with the problems posed by twenty-first century conflict; in particular, terrorism, genocide, weapons of mass destruction.

But Ficarrotta is a Kantian, and his argument reflects an unworkable Kantian meta-ethic – a sort of inflexible absolute deontology which presumes to prescribe unequivocal conditions for war, and for peace. Indeed, Ficarrotta recalls Kant’s romantic 1795 project – Perpetual Peace – in which he advocated a federation of free states bound by a covenant forbidding war.

Whilst Ficarrotta does not present a compelling alternative to just war theory he does present an interesting professionally relevant perspective. Ultimately his argument fails to counter the logic that war and conflict are more than legal constructs – they are profoundly moral constructs also, and in this regard they are esse est percipi, and not reducible to legalistic dogma.

In this impressive book Robert Stern describes the creation of the ‘Tokkotai’ special attack units and the aspects of Japanese culture that led men, many of whom were students with no significant military background, to volunteer to die for the Emperor in a way that is difficult for the Western mind to comprehend. He explains the distinction between ‘jibaku’ or ‘spur-of-the-moment’ decision to crash into a ship by a pilot who, for whatever reason, might not be able to return to his base and the ‘Kamikaze’ campaign in which the pilot took off with the deliberate intention of crashing into his target; a subtle distinction that men in the targeted ships may not have appreciated at the time.

It is thought that about 2,525 IJN and a further 1,388 Army aircrew died in suicide attacks and although all the aircraft used by the Tokkotai were capable of having been flown by a single pilot, those that could carry observers and air gunners still carried a full volunteer crew. At first Allied sailors were awed by this alien tactic but eventually developed defensive tactics and learned to endure the threat. Kamikaze aircraft were the most effective ‘ship-killing’ weapon of the war and of those that got through the fighter screen to commence a terminal dive into a chosen target, one in three hit it. Countermeasures were still evolving when the war ended but ‘defence in depth’ was critically important.

HMAS Australia, the ‘kamikaze magnet’, has a chapter devoted to the ship. She was the first to be hit on 21 October 1944 when her popular commanding officer Captain Emil Dechaineux RAN was killed on his bridge with five other officers and 23 men. Stern believes that this was a Jibaku, rather than a Kamikaze hit, because it pre-dated the ‘official’ start of the first Kamikaze campaign by four days. She was hit and damaged for the sixth and last time in January 1945, rather than any other warship. Like all the chapters, this one is well illustrated with contemporary photographs and one has to admire the courage of photographers who stood on deck using their cameras while, in some cases, aircraft dived right at them. All told, 66 Allied warships were sunk by Kamikaze attacks and a further 250, including Australia and five of the six aircraft carriers in the British Pacific Fleet were damaged. Allied casualties amounted to over 15,000 half of which were personnel killed in action.

Stern has made good use of an obvious wealth of research and his book includes detailed accounts the majority of attacks on American, Australian and British warships taken from contemporary combat reports. There are a large number of illustrations; they are well chosen and complement the text which is generally clear and easy to follow. USN-style terminology is used to describe decks, compartments and gun mountings and an appendix that explained them to the non-American reader would have been a useful addition to the work. Stern uses metric measurement in the text but the original feet and inches are retained in the quotations from combat reports.

Although Fire from the Sky is written mainly from the Allied perspective, this is the most comprehensive work I have read on the kamikaze subject, describing the evolution of tactics and countermeasures by both sides. It sheds new light on an unnerving form of warfare which has a contemporary resonance and adds significantly to earlier works on the War in the Pacific. I recommend this book highly.
Between 1924 and 1936 the RAN sent a succession of its cruisers on exchange service with the Royal Navy, primarily to improve training and interoperability, but also to encourage recruitment within Australia. HMAS Melbourne’s turn came in November 1925 and she subsequently operated in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The Australian cruiser’s equipment was out of date compared with the more modern British cruisers in her Squadron, but she performed creditably and on occasion even operated as flagship for a destroyer squadron. Her effectiveness may be judged by the Commander-in-Chief’s farewell signal which read in part: ‘If the Australian Fleet possesses other ships which are as efficient as Melbourne there can be no doubt as to the part they will play in the defence of the Empire should the occasion arise’. This picture was taken during a visit to Portsmouth and shows Melbourne’s officers with the Australian High Commissioner, The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook, GCMG. The future Vice Admiral Sir John Collins was serving as Melbourne’s Gunnery Officer at the time, and is standing on Cook’s left.
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Shark 22 prepares to land on number one spot which is on the forward flight deck of HMAS Kanimbla. It is one of three Sea King MK50A helicopters from 817 Squadron embarked on HMAS Kanimbla for Exercise RIMPAC 2010.