This for Rememberance

Fuel for Thought: Nuclear Propulsion and the RAN

Re-Introducing Spirituality to Character Training in the Royal Australian Navy

Navy Aircrew Remediation Training

People, Performance & Professionalism: How Navy's Signature Behaviours will manage a 'New Generation' of Sailors

Management of Executive Officers on Armidale Class Patrol Boats

The very name of the Canadian Navy is under question...

A brief look at Submarines before Oberon

Amphibious Warfare – The Rising Tide (And Beyond…)

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Image: Eye in the Sky
Letter to the Editor

“The Australians At Jutland”
Thanks to a number of readers some more information has come to light regarding the Australians at Jutland. It would appear my information regarding Chaplain Gibbons was slightly in error as he served in HMS New Zealand at Jutland and not HMAS Indomitable. After leaving the Navy he resided in Melbourne and, during the 1930s, gave a radio interview concerning the battle; in which he stated that ‘the sound of the German guns had a more sobering effect upon the ratings in New Zealand then any off his sermons could ever hope to achieve.’

Several RN officers and sailors who served at Jutland later served on exchange with the RAN during the war, and the 1920s, and some settled in Australia. Also several ex-RN men later immigrated to Australia. Amongst them was William George Hodges who worked as an accountant in Mackay in the 1950s. He told a friend that he had served at Jutland and following the battle his ship had gone alongside a badly damaged destroyer whose bow had been blown off - most likely HMS Broke which had been hit by nine shells and had 47 men killed and then collided with her consort HMS Sparrowhawk and had her bow demolished.

Hodges stated his Commanding Officer called, through a megaphone, to a young Midshipman standing on the bridge of the badly damaged destroyer, ‘Can I speak to one of your officers please,’ to which the young lad replied, ‘I am the only surviving officer Sir’.

If any readers have more information on Australians at Jutland I would be happy to hear from them.

Greg Swinden

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
This for Remembrance

BY RADM NIGEL COATES

Rear Admiral in Her Majesty’s Australian Fleet 1959–2010

In the aftermath of the First World War, John Buchan, author of The Thirty Nine Steps, wrote a memorial entitled These for Remembrance to six friends who had been killed in action. Intended for his children, it was tribute to the memory of men whom he had known and admired for many years and whose departure he deeply mourned. They were not the 19 year old subalterns who have passed into legend as the flower of a lost generation, for none died in his first youth. The youngest of the six was 38 and all had made a mark in the world. The poignancy of Buchan’s narrative comes not simply in the mourning for what might have been, as it would for teenagers of unspanned potential, but in recognition of the loss of so much achievement and wisdom, of the untimely passing of good men who had already proven that they had so much more to offer and to do.

This is my tribute to Nigel Coates and my remembrance of someone whom I admired immensely, whom I always thought would go to the top and for whom I grieve. Nigel did not die in war, but his passing only a few months after his 51st birthday, following a battle with cancer bravely fought, represents a deep loss for both his family and the navy in which he served. He had so much more to offer and to do, both personally and professionally, and we are all the less for his departure.

Nigel Coates had a remarkable career in the RAN. He came to the Service already steeped in the sea. His father was a master mariner and Nigel had a skill in and love of sailing that would be with him for his entire life. From the time he joined the Naval College in January 1975, he was the outstanding member of his cohort and his gifts of leadership and character were quickly recognised. From the first, Nigel displayed a combination of practical skills, intelligence and good sense and a self confidence that never tipped over into arrogance. Even more importantly, he maintained an unshakeable integrity and concern to do what was right that marked out all that he did in the years that followed. He combined this with a natural kindness and consideration for others. Where Nigel led others would follow, but he would never lead them where they should not go. And, wherever he took his people, Nigel would always bring them back.

Nigel was the last and perhaps the finest product of the old Naval College which had operated since 1913. Joining at 15, the Junior Entry continued for only a few years more, as did the construct of protracted education and training within the confines of Jervis Bay. It was when Nigel was Chief Cadet Captain in his fourth year at the College that its organisation changed utterly with the bringing to RANC of the other streams of officer entry and training and female officers. From this time on, the move of the College away from the era of a small, long serving group of boys brought up within what was effectively a boarding school would accelerate. Nigel helped make that change work and integrate the new streams with those of the General List on which RANC had hitherto focused.

Nigel was devoted to the RAN and always wanted to be with it, particularly the seagoing fleet. In part this might have been because, to an extent he did not fully realise, he represented change of another sort. He was in the first generation of Australian naval officers who received no training as junior officers in the Royal Navy; he did not undertake his warfare course with the British, nor did he serve on exchange with them or with another Service. Apart from a couple of months as a midshipman with the United States Navy, he did not have an overseas posting until he attended the US Naval War College at Newport, after selection for promotion to Captain.

Nigel was thus home grown in every sense of the word and the Australian Navy was both his professional vocation and his belonging place. His postings outside the RAN and away from the sea, extraordinarily fruitful as they all were, were essentially imposed on him rather than sought. I remember pacing up and down with him outside Government House in Canberra in an effort, eventually successful, to persuade him to maintain his volunteer status for selection as ADC to the Governor General. It had to be, there was simply no one else of like quality and I knew that the Governor General had already chosen Nigel from the panel. He made a wonderful
impression at Yarralumla during the year he served there. Nigel had also to be persuaded to go to Newport – in what proved to be a marvelous 18 months for himself and his family but also in which he was an outstanding representative, still remembered, of his nation and his navy.

To be Chief of Staff to the Chief of Defence Force on his return from sea command and the Persian Gulf was very much not his idea, but it was another post in which he did great things. Although he went on to do fine work as Chief of Staff in the Australian Theatre and as Director General Naval Personnel and Training, it was Nigel's return to the fleet as its commander on his promotion to Rear Admiral that really counted for him.

Nigel demonstrated again and again, particularly in operational situations, a facility for innovation, particularly in the context of pragmatically solving concrete and immediate problems. Yet Nigel was not one to initiate radical change lightly and he was comfortable to operate within whatever system he was placed. In that sense he was conservative by nature. Indeed, he was a system man in the very best sense because his qualities and talents were such that he made the best possible use of that system and led other people to do so as well. If change was necessary, then he would achieve that change, but his natural inclination was always to work with what was at hand and make it as perfect as possible.

This showed itself best in sea command. Nigel's performance as a junior officer at sea went from strength to strength and he made his mark in all that he did. But Nigel excelled above all as a ship captain and it was no coincidence that he was under his command that the frigates Canberra and Anzac each won the Gloucester Cup as the best ship in the Navy. His ships were both extremely efficient and very happy and the veterans of those commissions cherish the memory of their service and their captain. It was not only a matter of peacetime efficiency, either. Anzac's performance in the Persian Gulf in 2001 changed the nature of operations in that theatre. By implementing an aggressive campaign of interception and boarding of the oil smugglers seeking to evade the United Nations' embargo, Nigel and his crew played the key role in reducing the outflow of illegal oil from Iraq by more than 50%. They laid the groundwork for the Australian forces that followed, not only in completing the shut down of oil smuggling but in establishing the conditions which ensured that the coalition achieved command of the sea in the Persian Gulf during the 2003 war. While captain of the Anzac, Nigel also managed the very difficult demands of Operation Relex and the effort to contain illegal immigration, keeping his people focused on their task and alert to the ethical issues which they faced.

It was Nigel's completeness as a person and his unshakeable integrity that will remain with me as I remember him. They were matched by his abiding concern for others and an ability to connect at all levels that endeared him to his shipmates. Those qualities gave him a charisma that helped other people to do better and to be better than they otherwise would and this was invariably the case for Nigel's entire career, from Cadet Midshipman to Rear Admiral. That charisma was so strong that it affected not only his contemporaries and subordinates, but his seniors. It was well known when Nigel was a very junior officer that one of the most difficult and bullying personalities in the RAN of the day not only treated him very differently to the norm but even moderated his own behavior to others when Nigel was in the vicinity – despite a difference of three ranks and a quarter century in age. It was no coincidence that the tone and culture of the troubled Australian Defence Force Academy improved markedly during the three years that he spent as chief instructor and commanding officer of what was then the Corps of Officer Cadets. For both the military staff and the midshipmen and cadets he was as close to the ideal of what an officer – of what a human being – should be as it is possible to be.

As he was for us all. ☀

James Goldrick

They told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead
They brought me bitter news to hear
and bitter tears to shed…
…still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales awake
For Death, he taketh all away; but them he cannot take.

From William Johnson Cory's translation of 'Heraclitus' by Callimachus.
Australia strives to be on the forefront of modern technology when it comes to developing new Defence capabilities; however, as other nations around us become more technologically and tactically savvy, we become more vulnerable.

We are unique in our region and our allies are geographically distant, again adding to our vulnerability.

Apart from our size, a major element that separates us from the foremost navies of the world is nuclear propulsion. Nuclear propulsion is not a new concept by any means, but it is a radical one for Australians. If the topic were polled on the streets today, the result would not be a positive one, perhaps most probably due to misconceptions in the public eye and lack of education on the subject.

Perhaps before we become a nuclear powered navy, we must become a nuclear powered nation, or vice versa. Whilst such a concept may be a long way off in our future, it is an option that must be considered. This article explores some of the issues regarding naval nuclear propulsion, including what it is, the sort of navy it is suited to, some of its benefits, as well as some of the major considerations such as infrastructure, safety, environmental and economical matters.

**What is nuclear propulsion?**

Nuclear power comes from the fission of (primarily) uranium, more specifically the isotope U-235. The fission of one atom of uranium produced 10 million times the energy produced by the combustion of an atom of carbon from coal.

The nuclear reactor within a ship is made up of a high strength steel reactor vessel, heat exchangers and associated pipe work, pumps and valves and contains over 100 tons of lead shielding to ensure to radioactive components are safe to those personnel working in close proximity. The nuclear plant is used to generate heat, which in turn is converted to steam to drive the turbine generators (for ships power) and main propulsion turbines.

Naval reactors must be far more resilient and rugged than commercial reactors so as to withstand the motion of the vessel at sea and the ever changing demands for power. The naval reactor remains sealed and inaccessible for inspection or maintenance.

The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) transits the Elizabeth River towards Naval Station Norfolk. Roosevelt had just completed a nine-month availability period. (US Navy photo)
The ‘Father of the nuclear navy’ was Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN (1900-1986). As an electrical engineer in the United States navy, Rickover envisioned nuclear power as the ‘natural next phase’ for the propulsion and power of military vessels.

After the end of World War II, he was posted to the Bureau of Ships where he was appointed the Director of the Naval Reactors Branch. His biggest challenge was developing a way to reduce the size of the reactor to make it suitable for a ship or submarine, and to provide sufficient casing so as to minimise the radiation hazards such that they would not be a safety concern.

The result of his work, the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, USS Nautilus (SSN 571), was launched in 1954. By 2009, the navies of Great Britain, France, China, the United States, Russia and the Ukraine were all equipped with nuclear powered ships and submarines. These navies consider possessing nuclear-powered vessels as being a crucial element of the defence of their countries.

**Type of Navy suited to nuclear propulsion**

The RAN as it is today is not one appropriate for naval nuclear propulsion, nor is the future RAN as it stands in the 2009 White Paper. Naval nuclear propulsion is best suited to aircraft carriers and large submarines, and while the 2009 White Paper makes no mention whatsoever of aircraft carriers, it does discusses the need for an upgraded submarine force.

As outlined in the Paper, the future submarines must be capable of covering the far reaches of our strategic approaches and be suitable for long range, short notice and prolonged patrols. Whilst nuclear submarines are far more suited to all of these requirements than conventional diesel-electric submarines, the Government has ruled out nuclear propulsion. Presumably this is because they recognise this capability requirement falls well within the timeframe that is needed to develop the infrastructure and expertise in Australia to achieve a nuclear capable navy safely, efficiently and economically.

**Submarines – Nuclear vs. Conventional**

The pros and cons of nuclear versus diesel-electric submarines must be weighed up against the needs of the nation possessing them.

Diesel-electric, or Conventional, submarines are cheaper to build, are compact and almost silent when running on batteries. This gives them a great stealth advantage, but the major down side is that they must surface regularly to recharge batteries, which gives away their position. They are also much slower than a nuclear powered submarine and possess a much smaller weapon payload.

Conversely, nuclear powered submarines can stay submerged indefinitely, limited only by food/stores. They can travel at much faster speeds and are larger, thus carry more weaponry. Their major downfall is the noise they emit from the reactor cooling pumps and turbo machinery that must be running at all times. An ideal balance would be to have nuclear powered submarines for long range strategic purposes and diesel-electric for close-in defence.

**Some benefits of nuclear power**

Possessing a nuclear powered fleet (at least in part) gives that nation a number of unique benefits. These include, but are not limited to, greater flexibility, the ability to provided higher density power, energy independence and superiority of the sea as well as contribute to reducing carbon emissions in the interest of being an environmentally savvy nation.

Unparalleled flexibility – nuclear power, as opposed to conventionally fuelled ships, provides unparalleled surge ability, being able to move from one theatre to another at short notice and being able to stay on station for far longer periods of time. This is particularly pertinent to the Australian
Navy due to our geographical isolation from the rest of the world. Should tensions occur with our neighbours to the north, a nuclear-powered vessel would have the ability to sail to northern Asia without the need to refuel along the way, therefore speeding up the passage and producing an outcome sooner. The only restriction placed on the ship, from a logistical point of view, is that of food and of course, crew morale.

High power density. By replacing conventional propulsion systems, such as gas turbines, diesel generators etc, with a nuclear power reactor, a considerable about of space is opened up within the ship to carry mission essential supplies, such as ammunition, weapons, smaller craft, aircraft and jet fuel. This enables a ship to enter the theatre faster and deliver more impact, thus impacting the overall mission in a positive way. The increased amount of energy produced by nuclear fission may also be harnessed to power much more powerful radar and weapon systems.

Energy independence – being dependent on another nation for fossil fuel is a great vulnerability for nations. In the US alone, the use of nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers saves them 11 million barrels of oil annually. Australian uranium accounts for approximately 30% of uranium worldwide, which, for Australia holds a twofold benefit. Not only would we be less reliant on oil from other nations (i.e. the Middle Eastern nations) by using nuclear power, but due to our large reserves of uranium, Australia could be in a position of control as more and more navies’ worldwide move towards nuclear power as an alternative to fossil fuel.

Superiority on the seas – developing into a nuclear navy will allow us to expand and maintain maritime superiority in our region. As Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is more than twice the size of our land mass itself, allowing us greater sea control should be a priority.

Environment – nuclear power is an environmentally clean source of energy. This will be discussed further later.

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

Whether we buy nuclear powered ships or submarines directly from the US or UK, or build them ourselves, will be a lengthy debate when the time comes. Whilst nuclear power, and nuclear propulsion in naval vessels is not a new concept, it is new for Australia. We operate one small nuclear reactor for medical purposes and thus the extensive knowledge, expertise and infrastructure required to design, build and operate a nuclear powered vessel is not in existence in Australia.

The 2009 White Paper states that the Government will fund a ‘significant program of enhanced external engagement between the DSTO and its national and international partners’. This is based on the idea that Australia must be innovative so as to uphold its strategic capability advantage. The means by which this will be achieved is through The Technical Cooperation Program, a multilateral agreement between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.

The research and development of nuclear propulsion for the RAN could and should be explored through this avenue. Not only would this reduce the massive upfront costs that will be associated with the introduction of nuclear power to the RAN, but the wealth of knowledge possessed by naval nuclear scientists in both the US and the UK is overwhelming. The US alone have, in the last 55 years, built and operated nine nuclear powered cruisers, 10 aircraft carriers and nearly 200 submarines. The USN’s Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has trained more that 100 000 officers and technicians.
**SAFETY**

In over 50 years since the *Nautilus* set sail, there have been eight documented naval reactor accidents causing radiation casualties. These accidents occurred between 1960 and 1985, resulting in 33 deaths and 179 injuries (the accuracy of these figures is not reliable; if anything, they are probably higher). All of these accidents happened in the Russian Navy. In contrast, the United States Navy has accumulated over 5800 ‘reactor years’ and steamed over 136 million nautical miles without an accident and operates more than 80 nuclear powered ships/submarines and four testing/training reactors. Australia is known for having high safety standards, particularly compared to countries such as Russia. If and when Australia joins the nuclear navies of the world, we will be adopting/adapting the practices of the USN and RN, both of which have spotless records with respect to nuclear reactor safety.

**ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS**

The social conscience of today’s society is becoming increasingly influential in major decision making throughout the world. Many people want to reduce, reuse and recycle, drive hybrid cars and participate in Earth Hour, but we seem less concerned with the massive carbon emission produced by our defence force, and notably, our navy ships. Often the environmental benefits of a nuclear navy are overlooked due to the (irrational) fear of a nuclear incident. Nuclear powered ships are largely emission free, whilst their conventional counterparts emit large quantities of carbon dioxide, among other noxious gases.

The only waste from a naval nuclear vessel is that of the spent fuel in the reactor itself. Because nothing is actually burnt during the fission process, there is very little change in volume and mass of the original fuel source. It does, however, change considerably in terms of its radiation and chemical characteristics. Even some of the components of the reactor itself will have undergone a change such that they are also radioactive (this is why the casing must be so thick).

There are a number of methods of disposing of the radioactive elements. The first is that the entire ship can be placed in protective storage; however they need to be taken out of the water every 15 or so years to have the integrity of the hull examined.

The preferred method is to permanently dispose of it by burial. The entire de-fuelled reactor compartment needs to be removed from the ship and buried in a protected waste area. The actual spent fuel is removed from the reactor and buried in a deep geological repository. Whilst the idea of burying pockets of radioactive waste throughout the Australian outback may not sound appealing, it must be emphasised that this is only done once the vessel is decommissioned, so the impact is quite minimal, especially considering the size of the RAN.

The greatest roadblocks the Australian government will have to deal with if and when this becomes an issue is that of environmental impact (which can be easily managed, especially with the vast amounts of inhabitable space in Australia) and that of native land rights. This environmental impact will not of course be forever. Due to the rate of decay of the radioactive substances, it is estimated that after 10 years, it will be a thousand times less radioactive and after 500 years, the fission products will be less radioactive than the uranium ore from which they were originally derived.
Other issues that are bypassed as a result of nuclear propulsion include the fact that fuel/oil spills are reduced or eliminated and the need to ballast and the environmental issues that stem from that issue are eradicated.

**ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS**

The upfront costs associated with researching and developing a nuclear navy will be immense, but can be reduced by collaborating with our allies. The set-up costs must also be weighed up against the cost of fossil fuel that would be incurred during the life of the ship, as well as operations, maintenance and the cost of decommissioning the nuclear reactor. Other considerations that should be included in an economic analysis are the cost to protect fuel supply lines and the environmental cost.

In conclusion, the arguments for and against a nuclear propelled navy are varied. Whilst it will be difficult and expensive to establish the strategic benefits, particularly when you consider our geographical isolation and our potentially volatile neighbours, are immense. We also need to recognise that it will be a long and slow process. Our current White Paper does not allow for the development of this capability; however it is a process that needs to start. By embracing our relationships with the US and the UK, perhaps by sending Australian scientists and naval personnel to study nuclear physics with them, we will make the transition far more comfortable.

Nuclear power seems to be a taboo subject in Australia and it is considered to be committing political suicide to seriously suggest this be in our future. For Australia to take the next step and join the modern navies of the world, we need to think seriously about nuclear power as an alternative fuel source.

Whilst there is no talk of an Australian aircraft carrier on the horizon, and probably won’t be for a very long time, Australia’s strong submarine force, a recognised need of our nation, can be enhanced by adding a nuclear component.

We need to start thinking big and acting wisely. We are a nation known for taking risks when it comes to defence, yet our straightforward, down-to-earth Australian nature seems to guide us away from something as controversial as nuclear power. After all, a nuclear powered navy does not mean a nuclear weapon-carrying navy. The option must be considered; it must be fuel for thought.

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Figure 78

Figure 79

Figure 80

Figure 81
Character training in the Royal Australian Navy has had a mixed past. Delivery of character training has traditionally been the domain of Australian Defence Force Chaplains, however over time, as society has changed, so too has the concept of character training and how it is delivered. New Generation Navy (NGN) and its associated products, such as the Making the Change workshop, share many elements of character training and personal development, while regular and traditional character training, (delivered by chaplains with spiritual elements) has become less and less frequent. NGN has filled the gap and is now considered the primary vehicle for shaping and changing culture in the RAN.

This trend is somewhat concerning. Whilst Chaplaincy becomes less and less utilised as a tool for shaping serving members' beliefs, values and behavioural systems, other programs, developed using corporate tools are being used and relied on in their place. Whilst these have proven to work in the corporatized civilian sector, history has demonstrated just how important a spiritual element to character building and moral courage is to maintaining effective military operations in times of conflict.

In the place of Chaplaincy, Junior Officers (and other ranks) are leading their shipmates through this process of culture change, the Making the Change workshops being a typical example. Whilst they may be competent deliverers of such training, I argue that junior officers may not be the best method of delivering and effecting culture change programs, rather that Chaplaincy and the Ships’ Warrant Officer should have greater roles in delivery of such training systems on ships. Rather than Junior Officers, they can offer experience, wisdom, a greater understanding of longer term vision and thereby achieve longer lasting results from culture change initiatives such as NGN.

**The Advent of Character Training and the Importance of the Spiritual Element**

Character training first became a subject of interest in the wake of World War II. It produced a significant application for military psychology and psychiatry, the study and findings of which led to new policies that ensured high personal standards, morality and conduct within the military person and thereby increasing military effectiveness.

The watershed moment of character training occurred within the US Army during the Korean War. Prisoners of War were exposed to indoctrination (in this case, Communist) on a scale never before experienced. In this example, it was those that were able to demonstrate and practice their spirituality that were able to resist indoctrination most resiliently.1

Character training in the military has been heavily influenced by the experience of the US army in the Korean War, however in the last 60 or so years, the traditional Christian values on which it was developed have been questioned, challenged and reinterpreted by society at large and thus, also by the military. Societal spiritual values have changed as well, although not in isolation, as the methods of education itself also.2

The change is most evident when considering NGN and how it is presented as a platform for cultural change. It carries the hallmarks of utilising consultancy to achieve organisational and cultural change. Whilst cynics may view traditional character training as having too many religious overtones, so too will cynics note the corporate flavour of NGN, a program which is almost completely devoid of spirituality.

NGN as an Element of Character Training and Personal Development

Any discussion about character training and personal development...
would not be complete if the vision of NGN were not broached. NGN is a program being introduced into the RAN in order to develop and change naval culture. It has been developed through much research and has been ‘rolled out’ to every individual serving member. This is being conducted in a phased approach, firstly with the issue and establishment of the ‘Navy Signature Behaviours’, then the “Making the Change” program. Both of these tools are designed to challenge members to think about their beliefs, their personal value system, how it fits with the Navy values of honour, honesty, integrity, courage and loyalty, and finally how they behave in the context of these values.

A Desirable Character for the Navy

When comparing traditional character training and NGN, it is important to consider the result that both are aiming to achieve. In an extensive survey conducted by PCHAP G. Clayton in 1989, the following characteristics were identified by 130 serving military members with command experience as ideal for a member of the Navy.3

“In identifying a character-type appropriate for the modern Navy, the survey responses provided guidelines that suggested a profile generally leaning towards a service person who demonstrates or needs to acquire an understanding of tradition... The person’s first loyalty is to their family even above that to the Navy. There is no place in the Navy for a dishonest person or one who lacks a high degree of integrity... In relation to his/her work, he/ she should cultivate initiative and be diligent in his/her professional approach. The degree of individual professionalism is related to and in some instances reflects the level of character and moral development. Above all else, moral courage is seen as absolutely essential...”

This excerpt clearly shows the links between the Navy values and the Signature Behaviours, as an example of what senior leadership in the Navy require from serving members. Character training is an instrumental element in being able to impart these qualities to serving members, so that they may not only value these qualities but be able to live them. Provided that NGN is delivered in the most appropriate manner, it most certainly has the potential to achieve the results that the Chief of Navy is striving for.

Current Personal Development and Character Training

Both initial entry courses for sailors and officers offer some form of personal development and character training. Officers entering the RAN are exposed to at least 28 hours of personal development and character training, through a number of classroom activities as well as during outdoor leadership exercises. These 28 hours are used to explore topics such as self-awareness, value systems, ethics, stress and balance, grief and world religions.

Recruits engage in a much shorter syllabus, offering four hours of character training. This may seem much shorter than initial officer training; however it is in proportion when taken into account how much less time is spent at recruit school.

This training is delivered at HMAS Cerberus to recruits by one of the Cerberus Chaplains. However, with the introduction of MTC Workshops, character training and the MTC workshops have been amalgamated and incorporated into a four hour module.

The Chaplains at Cerberus have recognised that the MTC syllabus and examples may not have been entirely appropriate for members that have not yet been exposed to Navy culture. As a result, they have changed elements of
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The ‘People’ element is taught through an excerpt from ‘Band of Brothers’, focussing on contrasting people skills, and learning about how to interact with those that have fewer people skills than others. The ‘Performance’ element is taught using an excerpt from ‘Apollo 13’ and focuses on innovation and decisiveness whilst the ‘Professionalism’ module is taught using a documentary on HMAS Adelaide’s rescue of Tony Bullimore, focussing on pride in the Navy and making Australia proud.

To make room for elements of NGN, some of the other aspects of character training have been left out, or amalgamated, however it was considered that the marriage of the modules was a natural aspect considering their similarities.

At the moment, there is little formalised character training between initial entry and promotion courses, and that which does occur, is on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, if not for initiatives such as NGN, a sailor may not receive character training between initial entry and their category intermediate course, a period of approximately five years. Initiatives like NGN will be instrumental in changing Navy culture, however it is essential that regular and continual character training is conducted to ensure that a desirable Navy culture is maintained and sustained.

Delivering Character Training – the Most Effective Vehicle for Culture Change

It has been outlined in the history of character training as to why including a spiritual element to character training and personal development is imperative. Chaplains are still responsible for delivering traditional elements of character training during initial entry courses and leadership courses. However these courses cannot be relied on in order to maintain a healthy Navy culture in the long term.

NGN is the current vehicle for culture change in the RAN. It challenges every member of the Navy to consider their own beliefs and values, align them to the Navy values and demonstrate these values through the ten signature behaviours. Facilitators of NGN’s MTC can be Commanding Officers, junior officers and even Leading Seaman.

Anecdotally, many of the MTC workshops have been delivered by junior officers to ships’ crews. Whilst most junior officers are more than capable of delivering the content of such training, many lack the experience, wisdom, and understanding of the long term vision to be able to effect a long lasting culture change. This is not a poor reflection on junior officers in the Navy; it is simply a factor of their age and thereby limited life experiences. Most will have no or little training in spiritual or cultural leadership. In contrast, Chaplains are not employed by the Navy until they have demonstrated sufficient life and parish experience and the primary focus of their vocational training is spiritual and cultural leadership.

In conclusion, character training, including a spiritual element, is essential to ensure that the progress made with culture change initiatives such as NGN are not only continued but maintained. Historical evidence indicates that character training must contain a spiritual element in order to contribute to an individual’s ability to withstand the psychological components that are ever increasingly...
being used in modern conflict. It is essential that the most suitable people, such as Chaplains, deliver this training to ensure that the training itself, retains its integrity of purpose.

**It is recommended Navy:**

Combine culture change initiatives such as NGN with regular and compulsory, traditional character training. Culture change not only needs to be instilled, but also needs to be maintained. Traditional character training with elements of spirituality, should be attended to regularly by all individuals, and be delivered by the most appropriate means available.

Increase the number of Chaplains in sea-going billets. Currently there are 24 Permanent Navy billets for Chaplains. Of those, six are seagoing. More seagoing billets would be beneficial to increase crew members’ understanding of the spiritual element of character training, as well as providing many more opportunities for regular character training delivered from the most beneficial source. In current financial conditions this is unlikely to become feasible within the Permanent Navy. In terms of Naval Reserve, Chaplaincy has recently received a reduction in funding. For example in the southern states, funding has been cut from 220 Reserve days to 190, paid at Lieutenant level.

Involve Ships’ Warrant Officers in character training. Ships’ Warrant Officers are in themselves, a wealth of experience, wisdom and knowledge and are generally well respected by Command and the rest of Ship’s Company. Whilst they work closely with Chaplains in maintaining welfare of crew members outside the divisional system, they are an ideal choice for delivering character training to members of ship’s company. The potential for extending SWO’s knowledge in the spiritual elements of character training should be examined if the opportunity to meet the previous recommendation is unfeasible.

Ensure character training is a compulsory element of Monthly Divisional Meetings. Divisional meetings are an ideal setting for character training; they occur regularly, they are compulsory and are flexible enough to include 20 minutes of character training.

If the afore mentioned recommendations were included, this would increase opportunity and exposure to Chaplaincy and thereby spirituality as a factor of character training.

Bibliography


Notes


4. Author conversation with CHAP M. Lund, Chaplain at CERBERUS, in charge of combining character training module delivery and amalgamation with NGN Workshops.

Members of Transit Security Element 57, from 1 Platoon ‘A’ Company 8/9 RAR, conduct Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) Training with members of ASSAIL TWO whilst aboard HMAS BROOME during an Operation RESOLUTE Patrol.
The Royal Australian Navy operates a selection of capable helicopters, and requires competent and skilled helicopter aircrew to fly them. The helicopter force is set to increase in the near future and the complexity of the future aircraft systems will make the quality of aircrew training even more important.

RAN aircrew receive category dependant training in preparation for Operational Flying Training (OFT). Pilots receive initial fixed-wing training at Basic Flying Training School (BFTS) and No 2 Flying Training School (2FTS) before receiving RAN-specific helicopter training at 723 Squadron. Observers receive initial fixed-wing training at the School of Air Warfare (SAW) before commencing RAN-specific helicopter training at 723 Squadron. Aircrewmen receive training at 723 Squadron.

The aim of aircrew training is to ensure all personnel possess the required skills and competencies to safely and effectively operate the relevant helicopter at the completion of training. Due to varying baseline skills, backgrounds and abilities, some trainees are unable to achieve the required standard in the allocated time. The training system features processes to deal with this situation, and in the first instance offers additional training, known as remediation training. If the trainee is still unable to achieve the mandated standard after remediation training, they will be removed from the course.

Wastage rates due to failure vary for each course: for pilot training at BFTS and 2FTS, wastage is around 35%. For observer training at SAW, wastage is around 35%. For training conducted at 723 Squadron, wastage for pilots and observers is approaching zero, and for aircrewmen it is around 30%. A reduction in the wastage rate would be a significant saving for the RAN, as money spent on training aircrew who are ultimately removed from training cannot be recovered.

Trainees usually receive the same or similar instruction during the course of their training. If the group of trainees was homogenous, all would achieve the exact same standard at the end of the course. This is not the case, and in order to identify why some trainees can meet the standard easily where others cannot, an examination of the differences between trainees is required. This analysis may also serve to highlight strategies to improve the output of future aircrew from the training system.

This article examines the effectiveness of RAN aircrew remediation training, and assess options for improving or augmenting the existing process.

**RAN Aircrew Training System**

RAN pilot training is conducted in four discrete phases:

- basic fixed wing training is delivered at BFTS, using the simple CT4-B aircraft, managed by BAE Systems, utilising military instructors;
- advanced fixed wing training is delivered at 2FTS, using the more advanced PC-9/A aircraft, managed by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) utilising military instructors;
- helicopter training and RAN-specific training is delivered as the Pilot Rotary Course (PRC) at 723 Squadron, with RAN instructors using the AS350BA helicopter; and
- Operational Flying Training (OFT) is delivered at operational squadrons (currently 816 and 817 Squadrons) using operational helicopters (currently Seahawk and Sea King).

RAN observer training is conducted in three discrete phases:

- Basic Observer Course (BOC) is delivered at SAW, using the Super King Air, managed by the RAAF utilising military instructors;
- Observer Rotary Course (ORC) is delivered at 723 Squadron with RAN instructors using the AS350BA helicopter; and
- OFT is delivered at operational squadrons using operational helicopters.

RAN aircrewman training is conducted in two discrete phases:

- Aircrewman Rotary Course (ARC) is delivered at 723 Squadron with RAN instructors using the AS350BA helicopter; and
- OFT is delivered at operational squadrons using operational helicopters.

**Delivery of Instruction**

All aircrew training outlined above is delivered as a combination of ground theory and airborne practical training. The broad sequence of learning in all phases is as follows:

- the syllabus outlines the learning outcomes;
- theoretical knowledge is delivered in ground school;
- specific flying sequences are described in a student study guide (or Flying Guide);
- mass briefs are delivered to students as a group, elaborating on each specific flying sequence;
- sortie briefs are conducted before each flight, revising the sequences to be conducted.
during the flight;
• airborne instruction introducing new sequences and revising previously learnt sequences; and
• post flight debriefs conducted to appraise the trainee’s performance and discuss strategies for improvement3.

The Demonstrate-Direct-Monitor (DDM) sequence of instruction is used throughout for airborne training.4 The main areas of learning are described in AAP 2518.001 as:
• Knowledge – the ‘thinking’ or ‘cognitive’ domain;
• Skills – the ‘psycho-motor’ domain; and
• Attitudes – the ‘affective’ or ‘feeling’ domain5.

Analysis
REASONS FOR FAILURE
Trainees fail to meet the required standard because of an inability to acquire one or more of the main areas of learning. Trainees may struggle with knowledge, skills and/or attitudes (KSA).

AAP 2518.001 lists the barriers to trainee participation as follows:
a. over-confidence,
b. under-confidence,
c. forgetfulness,
d. inconsistency, and
e. apathy.6

Flying involves a complex situation, and requires aircrew to receive inputs from a number of sources, process the information, project the implications and implement an appropriate response. Situational Awareness (SA) is the common term used to describe the ability of aircrew to appreciate what is going on around them and formulate an appropriate response. A simplified representation of this process is illustrated in figure 1.

An alternate aviation-specific model for SA is illustrated in figure 2.

Trainee aircrew who fail to meet the required standard have generally failed to grasp a specific knowledge, skill or attitude, or may have a broader failing in situational awareness underlying, and manifesting as, a problem with a specific KSA.

System Response to Failure
When a trainee is unable to meet the required standard, RAN policy dictates that the Training Progress Reporting (TPR) system be invoked.9 This system serves to highlight the problem to training officers and command, and formally notify the trainee of the problem. The TPR system also triggers remediation training.

Remediation training is described in the Navy Flying Instructors Standardisation Guide, and the process is individually tailored for each case, generally consisting of the following:
a. a one-on-one tutorial session, covering the underlying theory of the problem sequences;
b. airborne instructional sorties (usually up to two flights), specifically targeting the identified problems; and
c. return to training to reattempt the failed sortie.10

The phases of remediation training are designed to correct problems as follows:
a. the tutorial is intended to address problems with knowledge factors,
b. the airborne sorties are intended to address problems with skills and attitudes, and
c. the return to training is intended to assess the success of the remediation training.

Outcomes of Remediation Training
Remediation training can be effective when the trainee has a simple problem relating to one of the KSA areas. If a problem occurs as a result of substandard instruction, remediation training may correct introduced errors.

In the case of the more complex SA problems, the effectiveness of remediation training is reduced. The model for remediation training does not specifically target SA. There may be some coincidental improvement in SA for the trainee as a result of remediation training, but
generally this occurs only through the additional flying practice that occurs in the airborne sorties included in the remediation.

Considering the entire aircrew training pipeline, it is apparent that remediation training is limited in effectiveness. Pilot training has around a 35% wastage rate, observer training has around 35% and aircrewman training has around 30%. The trainees that make up these wastage rates have passed the relevant aptitude testing, and received remediation training, but have still been unable to meet the required standard. These wastage figures have been accepted because it is thought that some trainees simply do not possess the “capacity” to achieve the required standard.

**Alternatives**

**Options to Improve Remediation Training**

To improve the outcome of remediation training, there are three key areas for examination:

- increasing the amount of remediation training in the existing format,
- adjusting the format and content of remediation training, and
- specifically targeting improvement of SA in remediation training.

**Increase.** In almost all cases, increasing the number of flights, and providing additional airborne practice for trainees has the potential to improve both KSA and SA. Cost is a limiting factor, and training courses must have a maximum duration for programming purposes. Policy dictates that a maximum increase of 20% is allowed for aircrew training.\(^{11}\) If a trainee cannot achieve the required standard within an additional 20 percent of flying hours, the trainee must be removed from the course. Additional flights may improve the outcome of remediation training, but published guidance limits the amount of extra training available.

**Adjust.** The existing format of remediation training is focussed on problems with KSA. Where KSA are problematic, remediation training is effective. There is no published basis to alter the format of remediation training for KSA. To address SA problems, remediation training would need to specifically target SA.

**Target.** Modifying or augmenting remediation training to target situational awareness is a desirable alternative, and has the potential to reduce wastage rates and improve the end product of aircrew training. To determine a suitable method to achieve this, an analysis of how to improve the SA of a trainee is required.

**Enhancing Situational Awareness**

A simplified illustration of the processes associated with SA is in figure 3.

Traditional remediation training has focussed on the ‘Processing’ and ‘Projection’ areas, the KSA-based component. The traditional view that ‘capacity’ is fixed and cannot be changed, has meant that improving the amount of information being received by the brain, the link between seeing/hearing and processing, has largely been ignored.

Traditional models of the human brain have described ‘capacity’ as fixed from about the age of 18 years onwards. However, modern ideas of ‘neuroplasticity’ describe the brain as constantly changing, and capable of increasing ‘capacity’ at any age.\(^{12}\) These ideas have significant implications for aircrew training, and indicate that it may be possible to improve the capacity of the brain, and enhance or increase the input of information to improve SA.

Scientists at the forefront of neuroplasticity research have developed a range of training programs aimed at enhancing the ability of the brain to receive and process auditory inputs, and visual inputs. The initial targets of these programs were children with learning difficulties, but later programs have been developed for normally functioning adults. Posit Science is one of the leading...
proponents of this research, and they offer two programs in particular:

- Brain Fitness Program, aimed at improving auditory processing and memory; and
- Cortex with InSight, aimed at improving visual processing.

**Brain Fitness Program**
The Posit Science Brain Fitness Program (BFP) is a commercially available program that has been developed to target auditory processing and memory. BFP is a computer-based program, intended to be used for one hour per day, five days per week for eight weeks. The program has been the subject of numerous clinical studies, and the exercises increase processing speed and make basic signals stronger, sharper, and more accurate, while stimulating the brain [...].

**Cortex with InSight**
The Posit Science Cortex with InSight program is a commercially available program that has been developed to target visual processing. Cortex with InSight is a computer-based program, intended to be used for one hour per day, five days per week for eight or more weeks. The program has been demonstrated to increase useful field of view and improve visual attention in clinical studies.

**Applicability of Posit Science Programs to Aircrew**
Most of the published clinical studies of the two Posit Science programs have examined the effects on older subjects. Improvements in these older subjects have been dramatic and easily measured. In the absence of specific studies of younger people, or aircrew, it is not possible to predict with certainty how successful these programs might be for trainee aircrew. The large, easily measured improvements seen in older users would not be necessary for trainee aircrew to yield an improvement in SA and flying performance. Even a small improvement in the throughput of information (auditory and visual) is desirable.

Both Posit Science programs start with a baseline assessment of the user. The program then tailors the difficulty to the user’s baseline level, ensuring that they start at their natural level, and then progress in difficulty as they use the program. This baselining ensures that the program can benefit even those users already at an above average level.

Based on the measurable results the Posit Science programs have been demonstrated to achieve, and the tailoring of difficulty through baselining, it is highly likely that the programs will yield some benefit for aircrew trainees.

In summary, RAN aircrew training is complex and difficult, and faces significant wastage rates. Current remediation training practices are successful for trainees exhibiting simple problems, but are less effective for trainees with complex problems, in particular, reduced SA.

SA is linked to the ability to receive auditory, visual and other inputs, process those inputs, project them into the future, and formulate and execute an appropriate response. Traditional views of learning and the human brain have described a person’s capacity for these tasks as fixed, but modern neuroscience offers alternative theories.

Research in modern neuroscience has led to the development of a small number of training programs aimed at auditory processing, memory and visual processing. The programs offered by Posit Science have proven results, and are expected to offer some benefit to trainee aircrew.

**Bibliography**
- Department of Defence 2009, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century –*
Notes


5. ibid, Sec 1, Ch 1, p 1.

6. ibid, Sec 1, Ch 4, p 5.


12. Doigle, Dr N. 2007, The Brain That Changes Itself, Viking Adult, Ch 3, p 84.

13. ibid, Ch 3, p 88.


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They have no idea what a broken record is or what you mean when you say they sound like one.1

Many organisations are facing the challenge of managing a workplace that has been inundated by a new cohort of talented, well educated, techno-savvy, open-minded young workers known as Generation Y.2 These young adults, often portrayed as lazy and self-interested, are one of the most misunderstood generations in recent history.3

The Royal Australian Navy is not immune to the trials faced by other organisations. Navy has realised the need to recruit, manage and retain Gen Y and has a strategy to take on this challenge. Getting underway early in 2009, the New Generation Navy (NGN) initiative is a reform program designed to transform the RAN into an organisation fit to deliver future capability outlined in the Defence White Paper.4

In order “to support its new capability”,5 the Navy will change course to focus “on the management and engagement of its people.”6 Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Russ Crane, reiterated this point relaying that NGN was designed “to transform our Navy into a more sustainable and people focused organisation.”7

To kick-start NGN’s cultural change, a set of ten ‘Signature Behaviours’ were developed. Seen as “core to NGN”,8 the Signature Behaviours are designed for Navy personnel to demonstrate in order for Navy to “successfully adopt and sustain [its] desired culture.”9

Within this article I profile Navy personnel according to their generation to demonstrate how adopting and accepting the New Generation Navy Signature Behaviours is a crucial part of attracting and retaining personnel to enable Navy to meet future capability.

To do so I explore:

a. Generational Theory – including profiling Navy personnel according to their age and rank; and
b. Navy’s Signature Behaviours – how the adoption of the behaviours will ensure Navy’s culture is aligned to the expectations of recent generations.

Generational Theory

The Oxford Compact English Dictionary defines the word ‘generation’ as “all of the people born and living at about the same time, regarded collectively”10. Twentieth Century generations typically represent a period of twenty years. There are many theories on the exact birth years for each generation. For the purpose of this paper the five main generations of the Twentieth Century are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth Years</th>
<th>Age at Year 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Builders*</td>
<td>Early 1900s – mid 1940s</td>
<td>65 – 110 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby Boomers</td>
<td>Mid 1940s – mid 1960s</td>
<td>45 – 65 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation X</td>
<td>Mid 1960s – early 1980s</td>
<td>29 – 45 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation Y</td>
<td>Early 1980s – late 1990s</td>
<td>13 – 29 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation Z</td>
<td>Late 1990s -</td>
<td>0 – 13 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Builders = a combination of the ‘Interbellum’ and ‘Silent’ Generations

Source: McQueen (2008, p. 14)

Generalisation

Attempting to characterise people based on the year they were born does have limitations. Some writers even dismiss the concept altogether. However there is enough recent research on generational theory to confirm that profiling generations is a valid study producing useful tools for parents, teachers and managers.11

It is important to realise that a person’s generation is

Generations within Navy - Chief of Navy VADM Russ Crane; Able Seaman Kristy Debnam and Warrant Officer of the Navy Mark Tandy cut the cake to celebrate the first birthday of NGN.
only one factor that helps understand their behaviour. Also it must be realised that characteristics describing a generation will not always fit every member of the group. For example, not all students in the 1960s were hippies. Generational theory aims to “highlight and examine the patterns and trends of the significant majority of a cohort” while recognising there is always “a place for diversity and non-conformism”.

**Characteristics**

Behaviour and characteristics of generations are influenced by events and circumstances its members experience. Characteristics of the Baby Boomers, Gen X and Gen Y can be summarised as follows:

### Table 2: Summary of Characteristics of Baby Boomers, Gen X and Gen Y

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Baby Boomers</th>
<th>Gen X</th>
<th>Gen Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment Attitudes</td>
<td>Jobs are hard to find</td>
<td>I’ll work if I have to</td>
<td>Jobs are a dime a dozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty to employer</td>
<td>I’ll work my way to the top</td>
<td>This could lead to the top</td>
<td>If I can’t take Saturday off, I’ll quit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Models</td>
<td>Men of character</td>
<td>Men and women of character</td>
<td>What’s character?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respecting Elders</td>
<td>Is automatic</td>
<td>Is polite</td>
<td>Is earned not assumed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Tell me what to do</td>
<td>Show me how to do it</td>
<td>Show me why to do it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Dislike</td>
<td>Accept</td>
<td>Demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Ignorant of</td>
<td>Comfortable with</td>
<td>Masters of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Via parents’ phone</td>
<td>Via personal phone</td>
<td>Mobile phone, email, chat rooms, facebook, etc, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>I’ll earn it</td>
<td>I don’t care that much about it</td>
<td>Gimme, or I’ll take it</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: McQueen (2008, p. 45)

**Statistics**

Using the information from table 1 combined with data from the Australian Defence Organisation Personnel Report, the following tables represent the percentage of Navy personnel representing each generation at different rank levels.

### Table 3: Percentage of Navy Personnel Representing Each Generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Percentage of Navy Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEN Y</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN X</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby Boomers</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4: Percentage of Navy Personnel Representing Each Generation Across Different Rank Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Gen Y</th>
<th>Gen X</th>
<th>Baby boomer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seaman / Able Seaman</td>
<td>86.77%</td>
<td>12.01%</td>
<td>1.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Seaman / Petty Officer</td>
<td>40.16%</td>
<td>53.84%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Petty Officer / Warrant Officer</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>61.28%</td>
<td>38.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>45.53%</td>
<td>11.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Commander / Commander</td>
<td>0.64%</td>
<td>51.28%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DWI (2010, p. D-8). Note: Information reflects data reported on PMKeyS as at 31 January 2010. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

**Analysis**

Looking at table 4 it is clear that those personnel given the responsibility to manage most departments and ships (LCDR/CMDR) mostly represent Gen X and Baby Boomers. Senior Middle managers (WO / CPO) are predominately Gen X and Baby Boomers. Frontline supervisors (LS / PO) are mainly Gen X, and Able Seamen / Seamen have a large majority of Gen Y.

In the coming years the percentage of Gen Y in the workforce will increase. Therefore it is important for organisations to position themselves in such a way that embraces Gen Y’s strengths and develops them as tomorrow’s leaders.

Characteristic differences between generations have created new challenges for many organisations in how they manage their workforce. Inevitable differences between generations can frustrate all members. Understanding each other is the key to working together more effectively.

In particular if Baby Boomer and Gen X managers can understand why their Gen Y subordinates behave the way they do, workplace morale will improve, more members will be retained, Navy will become a more attractive employer and expected future capability will be met. As Gilburg says, “you need to understand what makes them tick and how to work with its members to bring out their high potential.”

**New Generation Navy – Signature Behaviours**

Signature Behaviours are designed to be lived by all Navy personnel, however it is evident that personnel at the Commander / Lieutenant Commander and Warrant Officer / Chief Petty Officer level (predominately Gen X and Baby Boomers) are the key to the implementation of NGN.
PEOPLE, PERFORMANCE & PROFESSIONALISM: How Navy’s Signature Behaviours will manage a ‘New Generation’ of Sailors

These personnel were also given responsibility to deliver the NGN message in the workplace. Navy places significant importance on the Signature Behaviours that must be considered during every decision made. Put simply, “if it doesn’t fit the signature behaviours – don’t do it, or change course so it does.”

Now I will look at how Navy’s ten Signature Behaviours relate to Gen Y and why their Gen X and Baby Boomer managers need to accept and adopt them in order to attract and retain Gen Y.

Table 5 – Navy’s Signature Behaviours 1, 2 & 3: focus on People

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How we behave towards each other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Respect the contribution of every individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recognise the value of each person’s contribution to Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Be respectful of role, experience and background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Value diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Promote the well being and development of all Navy people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop Navy people to their full potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Know and care for people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Keep people at the core of all decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Build the team – provide guidance and challenge their abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Communicate well and regularly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Keep your team informed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Be clear, consistent, timely and accurate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engage thoughtfully and check for understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Express and receive feedback gracefully</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Crane (Sep 2009[b])

HOW SIGNATURE BEHAVIOURS 1, 2 & 3 RELATE TO GEN Y

Gen Y desires a workplace where their opinions and ideas count. Utilising and recognising peoples’ unique skills can boost individuals’ self worth and help them recognise their importance to the team. Blanchard & Bowles share this sentiment by suggesting that part of a team’s success relies on developing individuals’ skills for the benefit of the whole team.

Mutual respect and flexibility are taking the place of power and experience in the workplace. Gen Y wants to work for people they respect and can learn from. They do not respect someone because of age or seniority. Managers must earn respect – measured by what they do and what they achieve.

McGee lists ‘Build personal relationships’ as one of five key ways to manage Gen Y. Managers need to talk and listen to their Gen Y employees in or to know and understand them. Gen X and Baby Boomer managers need to realise that not all employees want the same thing they want.

Table 6 – Navy’s Signature Behaviours 4, 5, 6 & 7: focus on Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How we behave in the way we perform our duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Challenge and innovate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Challenge, question and be open to change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Generate new ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support creative solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Be cost conscious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Understand the cost implication of the decisions you make</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Find solutions that are enduring, efficient and add value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use it like you own it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fix problems, take action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Seek and accept responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Take ownership of what you say you will do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Turn your ideas into actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Be a part of an effective solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Drive decision making down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Make sound, timely decisions based on principles not just rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Drive decision to the appropriate level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Trust and support people make good decisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Crane (Sep 2009[b])

HOW SIGNATURE BEHAVIOURS 4, 5, 6 & 7 RELATE TO GEN Y

Gen Y is known for their sense of entitlement, outspokenness and inability to take criticism. Feedback and critique needs to be delivered gracefully as they have been overpraised and protected from feeling unsuccessful. Managers who probably received a more robust style of feedback in years past will need to adopt this more refined approach.

Gen Y tends to place high-achievement objectives on themselves. Providing challenging work will help the workplace take advantage of this approach.

Gen Y seeks more feedback, responsibility and involvement in decision-making. Without effective leadership at the top of the organisation, other leaders
throughout the organisation are less likely to be empowered to exercise their own leadership skills.  

Table5 – Navy’s Signature Behaviours 8, 9 & 10: focus on Professionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How we behave while representing Navy in a professional manner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Strengthen relationships across and beyond Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work together to identify and achieve common purposes and objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Build inclusive partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deliver on Navy’s promises, and do it well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Be the best I can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strive for professional excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Know yourself and seek self-improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintain your personal wellbeing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Make Navy proud, make Australia proud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lead by example</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Value Navy’s identity and reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Live Navy’s Values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Crane (Sep 2009/bj)

HOW SIGNATURE BEHAVIOURS 8, 9 & 10 RELATE TO GEN Y

According to Gen Y, you should have ‘one life’. They do not distinguish between work, home and social life and therefore expect to shape their jobs to fit their lives. As they personally experienced the cost of their parents’ ‘workaholism’: stress; broken marriages; and absent parenting, they do not wish to be slaves to their jobs like their Baby Boomer parents were. In order to create a more flexible workplace, Navy has introduced Flexible Work Practices. Such reforms are also likely to be welcomed by Gen X who have been battling for years against their Baby Boomer managers for more flexible work arrangements.

Obviously, Gen Y will become Navy’s future senior managers. Gen Y leaders will be civic minded, visionary, confident, optimistic, moralistic, principled and value driven. These traits fit directly into NGN principles.

Regardless of our generation, cultural background and upbringing, we all desire a positive workplace. Society’s culture is ever-evolving and organisations such as Navy need to consistently update their leadership culture in order to sustain their workforce. Managers have a choice – be part of the problem or part of the solution – embrace change or resist it.

A crucial step in embracing cultural change is understanding those we work with. In particular, taking the time to self-educate about the characteristics of people you manage will go a long way to breaking down the frustrating generational barriers that hinder understanding and communication.

Navy has identified a need for cultural change in order to meet future capability. New Generation Navy will attract and retain a new generation of sailors, while emphasising the importance of managers to accept and adopt Navy’s Signature Behaviours.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to enhance managers’ understanding of the people they command, the following recommendations are presented:

a. Add a ‘Generational Theory’ component to management courses. In order to target the right people, it is suggested that generational theory components be added to the: Junior Officers Leadership Course (JOLC) and/or the Junior Officers Management and Strategic Studies Course (JOMSSC); CPO Promotion Course; and WO Promotion Course.

b. A ‘Generational Theory Awareness’ course could be developed for delivery through CAMPUS to provide ‘catch-up’ education to those who have already completed the courses above; and

c. Elements of this paper could be added to the NGN Toolbox to give managers easy access to key information. For example, table 2 could be used as a quick reference guide.

Lieutenant Andrew Stokes, GDipAppMus, RAN joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1990 and has served in a number of appointments based around the need to provide music for important occasions. He gained his commission in 2003 and has continued to lead and motivate teams in this area. He is currently serving within the position of Assistant Director of Music – Navy.
PEOPLE, PERFORMANCE & PROFESSIONALISM: How Navy's Signature Behaviours will manage a ‘New Generation’ of Sailors

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AUSNAVSTRATCOM – see Australian Navy Strategic Command.


The Executive Officer of an Armidale Class Patrol Boat (ACPB) has at least twelve separate jobs onboard (sometimes more depending on the Officer and their experience/competency), not the least of which, being the Second in Command, as well as the Navigation Officer and Operations Officer. At present there is a lot of discussion in the Fleet regarding whether current XOs are too overburdened with such a high workload, and not having the experience levels to cope with the added stress levels associated, to be an effective Second in Command as well as the Navigator of an ACPB. The purpose of this paper is to explore this statement and will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the XO position, taking into account the constraints imposed by manning difficulties in the RAN.

This article discusses the difficulties the Fleet is having in filling this difficult position and what effects these difficulties are having on current and potential XOs on ACPBs. It will discuss the management techniques currently being utilised as well as future techniques that could be used to fill this position. Correct implementation of these techniques could make the job popular and considered a stepping-stone in a Seaman Officer’s career rather than a sideways step. This will ensure constancy of postings for the ACPB XO position and the ability to recruit the right personnel for the job.

The article determines what if any are the best management strategies for ensuring the achievement of an ACPB XO position is the optimal step in a Seaman Officer’s career progression.

When the composition of the crew of the ACPB was originally announced there was a chorus of disapproval throughout the Navy regarding the logic behind having the XO also performing the role of Navigation Officer (NO) and Operations Officer (OPSO). This train of thought still exists today due to the misinformation of Seaman Officers and an incorrect understanding of the position. The most commonly expressed arguments that I have come across throughout the fleet when discussing the ACPB XO position are:

a. ‘The XO will be over-burdened, will burn out quickly and become ineffective’; and
b. ‘Not having a full time navigator means the risk of collision or grounding is greater’.

More recently, due to the introduction of promotion to Lieutenant 12 months post Bridge Warfare Certificate has caused an influx of junior Seaman Officers becoming XOs, there is another argument that has been widely expressed. It is argued ‘Officers are being sent to be XOs without enough experience, particularly leadership/navigation experience’.

Rationale
So why was the decision made to make an ACPB XO position encompass the jobs of NO and OPSO? Whilst there are numerous reasons for this, the two major reasons are:

c. On the Fremantle Class Patrol Boats the XO was the Boarding Officer, Explosive Custodian Officer, and Personnel and Physical Security Officer (PERSEO and PHYSECO), however, on the ACPB, the strategic structure is different. The Boarding Party is now the ‘Primary Weapon System’ of the Patrol Boat, and when utilising a Primary Weapon System you need a cohesive C2 structure to ensure its effective operation. Therefore
utilising the XO in the ACPB C2 structure when conducting Boarding Party Operations no matter how complex means ACPBs are operationally very effective and efficient – a point which is critical in a minimum manned vessel.

d. The second reason for having the XO as both the NO and OPSO is that ACPBs are restricted to a 21 person crew with only two billets available for officers. (The BO billet is a LEUT/CPO billet) There have been various efforts to try and increase officer billets to three, however, due to RAN manning constraints this was considered unachievable. Although COs are Navigators on our Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) ships, it was determined the task would be far too burdensome in ACPBs given the nature of the duties being performed. It is argued that navigation is so important that COs should not be the NO on LCHs. Thus the workload and responsibility of the NO on ACPBs falls to the XO.

After discussions with current XOs it leads me to believe that most XOs are happy with the job. However by the time their posting is up, they are more than ready to move on due to the high work loads and stress involved, more often than not looking for shore postings. The reason for this change in attitudes over the last two years is due to the management techniques – discussed below – that are currently in place in an attempt to manage the XO’s workload thus making the job more realistic and achievable.

As mentioned, the heavy workload of the XO position stems from the many requirements of the role, not just those mentioned in the duty statement. As the workload waxes and wanes, as is the case in any position throughout the fleet, it ranges from a medium workload to a peak of very high to almost unrealistic at times. “It is this unrealistic workload that causes stress which leads to frustrated and discontented XOs”. In addition, these unrealistic workloads mean certain aspects of the job are missed or discounted as being less important due to other pressing tasks. Of particular concern is when it is the Navigation responsibilities that are discounted or corners cut, which is a significant safety concern.

A prolonged state of undermanning of Seaman Officers in combination with a negative perception of the XO position has meant new XOs are not experienced enough, particularly in management skills and leadership.

The major concern expressed by prospective XOs is that the posting will interrupt the individual’s career choices and not allow them to continue with their career progression; and through utilisation of reservists the ACPB XO concern is at present being barely managed. In addition the recent influx of Potential Irregular Immigrants; the press coverage allocated to this; and the massive increase in work load and stress could reduce the number of volunteer junior officers leading to less XOs than crews. This results in XOs being recalled as Operational Reliefs during Off Crew rotations, when they should be on leave or conducting career progression courses. This leads to the job becoming more stressful and unmanageable even for the most energetic XOs due to the lack of respite. This occurred in 2008 when several XOs left their jobs because of stress related issues and over 20 Lieutenants refused the posting.

The following list is what assists to make the job more enjoyable and achievable:

e. CO/XO relationship (essential to the successful conduct of the posting);
f. Experienced, motivated and enthusiastic crew;
g. Experience of the BO;
h. Competence and confidence of the XO, with particular regard to leadership, management and motivational ability; and
i. Variety of the job.

The management techniques for making the ACPB XO position a step in the optimal career progression of Seaman Officer Lieutenants should therefore focus on these.

Developing Management Techniques

Courses such as Junior Officer...
Leadership Course, Junior Officer Management Staff Skills Course, as well as the current Mentoring initiative are all in place due to the realisation that these skills are not only a nice to have, but also a basic necessity for an XO. These courses give the XO the ability and belief that they are prepared for all that will be required of them during their tenure.

The CO/XO Desig Course is designed to allow both COs and XOs to see what will be required of them during their tenure, and to give them the tools they will need to perform their assigned duties at an acceptable level.

Even though it generally means more work for the XO, breaks from operational tasking are usually beneficial by providing job variety and increased motivation for the XO and the crew, particularly domestic and overseas deployments. Since the beginning of 2008 there have been an increasing number of deployments given to ACPBs.

**Future Management**

There is no career, posting or monetary advantage at present to persuade personnel to become a MWV XO, as opposed to staying on Major Fleet Units (MFUs) for consolidation with possibly two ancillary duties. This is despite there being “a general agreement amongst senior naval officers that being an XO creates a more rounded officer”.

The problem with this is that whilst it would seem XOs are considered the more rounded officer, as far as career progression is concerned, becoming an ACPB XO means a disadvantage compared to staying on an MFU, as this is not taken into consideration until many years later when applying for promotion to CMDR and above, or seeking Charge (Commanding Officer) jobs, when 'breadth of experience' is considered.

This is due to the fact that an XO of an ACPB is required to become adept at time management in order to keep up with the demanding workload. The XO is also better adapted to changing situations due to the uncertain nature of Patrol Boat life. They are able to manage personnel to a high standard due to their whole ship responsibilities not just departmental.

To reward this high workload and considerable stress levels, consideration must be given to increasing MWV XO/Nav to pay group five. This will attract a large amount of popularity in the position as well as providing an incentive to those Officers with more experience.

In addition to this, some form of visible recognition to all personnel who have given a significant commitment to Operation RESOLUTE in Patrol Boats would also boost the willingness of personnel to take on the demanding role of an ACPB XO.

**Development of Experienced XOs**

The XO is involved in a great deal onboard ACPBs from the day to day routine running of the Ship, to ensuring the crew is sufficiently manned; the morale of the crew motivation, as well as the jobs of NO, OPSO, Divisional Officer; Safety Officer; Environmental Officer; Training Officer; Canteen Manager; Welfare Chairman, as well as being a watch keeper. Noting this, the best thing would be to have OOWs, who have a reasonable level of experience and who have developed at least some leadership, personnel and time management skills. Experience shows that XOs who have consolidated properly i.e. more than 12 months on different platforms, have improved leadership, personnel and time management skills, as well as performing at a much better standard than those who do not. The jobs that would best prepare an OOW for the XO role would be:

- A/PWO (currently only conducted after being an XO),
- NO of a Mine Hunter or Hydrographic ship or
- (the best example) the role of a ACPB BO, as this provides the officer with appropriate ACPB experience as well.

XOs of MWVs have high workloads already. Add to that the extra duties of an ACPB XO and the result is an extremely high workload, and someone that is required to conduct a large number of roles often multitasking during busy periods. However, as the position creates a more cohesive C2 structure in the Patrol Boat, and there are not enough Seaman Officers to fill three officer billets, the workload and diversity must be effectively managed.

With continued effective management practices, as well as practical solutions the role of an ACPB XO can be seen as a fulfilling and positive position, as well as being beneficial to the career of the Officer.

With these measures in place and an effective ongoing system to review the effectiveness of these management strategies, the role of an ACPB can become one that is appealing to both senior and junior Lieutenant Seaman Officers.

**Acknowledgements**

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Rixon, CAPT V, RAN  
Santos, LEUT A., RAN  
Spagnol, LEUT J., RAN  
Stewart, LEUT F., RAN
Service anchored in experience and skill

- Fleet operations and management
- Fleet maintenance and management
- Vessel and port services
- Integrated logistics management
- Marine systems support
- Vessel build and modification
- Maritime project management
- Maritime training
The very name of the Canadian Navy is under question... from their Hansard equivalent we read...

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was the title of the country's maritime forces from 1911 to 1968. In the 1960s unification of land, air and sea services was appropriate: all three were unified forming the Canadian Forces. The naval component was known as Canadian Forces Maritime Command (MARCOM), which has continued despite some reversal of the unification idea.

Hon. Bill Rompkey, pursuant to notice of May 4, 2010, moved:

That the Senate of Canada encourage the Minister of National Defence, in view of the long service, sacrifice and courage of Canadian Naval forces and personnel, to change the official structural name of the Canadian Navy from “Maritime Command” to “Canadian Navy” effective from this year, as part of the celebration of the Canadian Navy Centennial, with that title being used in all official and operational materials, in both official languages, as soon as possible.

He said: Honourable senators, this motion is about restoring pride of place to a world-class national service with its own history and culture forged in war but operating effectively in restoring peace and dealing with disaster. This motion is about acknowledging a modern navy giving outstanding performance both at home and abroad.

Recently, HMCS Fredericton returned home to Halifax in time for the May 4 celebrations marking the one hundredth anniversary of the navy. The frigate had been deployed for six months to the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa, conducting counter-piracy and anti-terrorism operations alongside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, and coalition partners. Such is the modern role of our navy: protecting our own shores but able to operate proudly and successfully in blue water anywhere in the world.

Canadians acquitted themselves well in the naval conflict of this war. The first naval flying ace in the world was a Canadian - Redford “Red” Mullock of Winnipeg. Canadian Raymond Collishaw of Nanaimo, B.C., was the leading naval ace of the First World War with 60 confirmed victories. Of 936 Canadian naval aviators of World War I, 53 gained the status of air ace in combat.

It was World War II that saw the navy come to maturity. When war with Germany broke out in 1939, the RCN, although remarkably efficient, had so long been underfunded and shorthanded that it was still little more than an offshoot of the Royal Navy.
Enormous Canadian naval expansion became necessary to meet enemy threats in the Atlantic. At the beginning of World War II, the navy consisted of 13 ships and under 3,000 personnel. However, ships poured out of shipyards all across Canada, and men and women volunteered in huge numbers. Throughout the war, Canada commissioned 434 vessels of which 341 were fighting ships. Of those ships, 31 were lost. Just under 400,000 men and women passed through its ranks. Well over 2,000 paid the supreme sacrifice. Canada played a pivotal role in the Battle of the Atlantic – that long and relentless battle that, more than anything else, made possible the liberation of Europe. The navy engaged in virtually every type of operation in every theatre of war. Canadian naval airmen flew with the Fleet Air Arm.

The RCN, no longer only an offshoot of the Royal Navy, had become a major national institution by 1945. However, it was still at risk. Cut back from nearly 100,000 to 7,500 personnel, morale suffered.

Brooke Claxton, then Minister of National Defence, ordered a commission of inquiry in 1949. The subsequent report of Rear Admiral Rollo Mainguy has been called the Canadian navy’s “Magna Carta.” Initiating major changes to “Canadianize” the navy, it came just as the Cold War gave the RCN new and meaningful roles. An apparently imminent threat of war with the Soviet Union gave Canada the NATO role of convoy escort and anti-submarine warfare. Thus, when the navy celebrated its fiftieth birthday in 1960, the RCN, with about 20,000 men and women, had grown to well over 50 vessels.

Once more, the navy was threatened. After the election of 1963, the Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, set about modernizing Canadian defence capabilities. To the navy’s chagrin, Hellyer succeeded first in integration and, finally, in the unification of the Armed Forces.

The navy battled for its survival and its identity, but lost the fight against the politicians. Admirals who opposed Hellyer’s policies were retired early, if they had not already been fired. Many other officers retired early as a form of protest, and most of those who remained did so to preserve a navy that had been recast in the form of Maritime Command.

For a number of years confusion reigned at National Defence Headquarters and morale took a serious hit. The new green uniform disregarded naval tradition, and the new rank structure, based on army practice and culture, had little relation to naval requirements.

Other navies did not emulate Canada’s example as Hellyer had predicted. Yet in spite of it all, the navy rose above the setbacks. It continued to meet all national and NATO requirements. Its contribution was noted and some of its ambitions realized when in 1985 sailors got back the blue uniform. The return of this universal symbol of identity was met with great rejoicing, ushering in a new era.

As we celebrate the centennial, there is renewed interest in naval matters. A recent editorial in The Globe and Mail urged the return of the Royal Canadian Navy, the title King George V approved in 1911. The response from sailors has been instructive, the vast majority of whom never served in the RCN. In general, they reject what they see as a backward step. They want to be seen as moving forward, not backward.

That view was anticipated by Lieutenant-Commander Alan Easton in his excellent account of his World War II sea service in his book 50 North. He recalls a wartime conversation with a senior Royal Navy officer:

We went on to speak of tradition. He said that in the RN tradition was a heritage of which they were very proud, and in a sense was the moral backbone of the service. “You are not far removed from it yourselves, you know. You are part of the Empire and much of our stock is British.”

That’s so, sir, I acknowledged. But, although we learned your customs and in fact were patterned after the Royal Navy, I feel, and I think most of us feel, that we have no direct right to your traditions. Nor, could they apply really,
The very name of the Canadian Navy is under question... from their Hansard equivalent we read...

because, what made them occurred mainly before we were in existence.

Our tradition, I suggested, is possibly being made now. That point of view, I believe, would be shared by the majority of those serving in the navy today and by many who have retired.

For half of the hundred years that the navy has existed, those who enlisted did not serve in the RCN. The RCN disappeared with a wave of Paul Hellyer’s wand. Unification was seen as an insult to the many who had served in the RCN because it instantly and arbitrarily took away symbols and traditions that were part of their long and distinguished legacy of service.

Surely, bringing back the designation RCN today would be doing the same thing to those who have served over the past 42 years. What of the innovations that are truly Canadian? Now women serve and command at sea; now we have bilingual warships; now we have a diversity of people from many ethnic and racial backgrounds reflecting the unique mix that is Canada itself. These are traditions that are in part handed down and are in part earned by Canadian sailors who never served in the RCN but who proudly served in what is commonly known as the Canadian navy. Like those who suffered from unification they should not have their accomplishments cast aside.

The men and women of today’s navy know that for some time they have been working more and more closely with the USN whose continent we share. Indeed, they interface more and more with foreign navies who identify them as the Canadian Navy. Francophones have been in what is now Canada longer than any, except for the First Nations and Inuit. Francophones do not use “Maritime Command” when identifying the navy. For them, the French word for navy is “La Marine.”

Navy/marine is a term that has survived 42 years of official, political and statutory deletion.

Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden has pointed out how closely the story of the navy parallels the development of Canada. Both came from humble beginnings but aspired to contribute beyond the shores of the country. Both modelled themselves on remarkable institutions of Great Britain. Both came of age in the crucible of war. He could have added that just as Canada has emerged from the shadow of Britain to tread the world stage as a respected and able nation in its own right, so did the Canadian Navy emerge from the shadow of the RN to become a world-renowned navy in its own right. It has become a navy reflecting the diversity, creativity, competence and multiculturalism of the country itself.

This chamber is not the Royal Canadian Senate, although we owe much to British origins; we are the Senate of Canada. We are Canadians with our own constitution and identity. So it is with the Canadian Navy, with its own insignia, customs, practices and history.

The connection with the sovereign is acknowledged through the presentation of the Queen’s Colours, which recently occurred for the third time in Halifax. Additionally, the use of HMCS is a practice well accepted by today’s sailors.

The face of young Canada is rapidly changing. The demographic is no longer one of British, or even European, ancestry. The talent pool for the future navy has no connection with the royal designation. As the population ages, the navy is in an almost life and death competition with every other industry. If the navy does not attract more Aboriginals, more francophones, more of the anglophone and francophone immigrant communities and visible minorities, it will die a slow death.

Maritime Command is a bland nonentity that has no synergy with other naval forces and has no discernible character with which the Canadian public can identify. Everyone knows the navy. The time has come to institutionalize the name “Canadian Navy/La Marine Canadienne.” This motion is simple: Let us throw Maritime Canada overboard and signal that the Canadian Navy will be called officially the Canadian Navy/La Marine Canadienne.

(On motion of Senator Comeau, debate adjourned.)
A brief look at Submarines before Oberon and their Significance for the RAN

BY MIDSHIPMAN JOHN LEE

Unheard they work, unseen they win.
That is the custom of 'the Trade.'

Rudyard Kipling

The then-Prime Minister Rudd recently highlighted the importance of submarines for maintaining the security of our country. Historically however, the same level of support has not always been received and since federation there has been debate as to whether submarines are the best option for the RAN. Prior to the first Oberon class Submarine in 1967, the RAN acquired four different classes of submarines with varying degrees of success and significance.

Here I examine the four classes of submarines prior to the Oberon class highlighting major events; evaluate the level of significance of each class, weigh any lessons learnt and finally decide whether they were an effective use of defence spending.

The 'E' Class

The first submarines acquired by Australia were of the 'E' type, ordered from Vickers Maxim in England, in 1910, and commissioned into the RAN in February, 1914. Two submarines were acquired and given the designation AE1 and AE2. After commissioning in England, both boats commenced an 83 day transit to Port Jackson, in Australia, setting a submarine endurance record on the way. AE1 is the subject of one of the greatest mysteries of the RAN. During a patrol off Papua New Guinea in September 1914, AE1 disappeared without a trace and to this day has never been found. AE1 was the first loss to the Australian fleet and the first allied submarine sunk during World War 1. It is not believed that she was sunk by enemy action but more likely by accident.

AE2 has become very well known for her exploits in the Dardanelles. The Turkish forces at Gallipoli relied on shipping for resupply, and it was believed that if a submarine could penetrate the 35 mile Dardanelle Strait and reach the Sea of Marmara, it would create havoc amongst the enemy shipping, thus assisting the ANZAC landing at Gallipoli. Two submarines tried and failed before AE2 penetrated the Dardanelles on April 25, 1915. She spent the next five days harassing the enemy in which time she sunk a Turkish mine laying cruiser, and caused confusion for the Turkish fleet. She was eventually sunk on 29 April after hits from a Turkish gunboat.

The 'E' class was a very short, however significant foray into submarines for the RAN. During what was described at the time as, ‘the finest feat in submarine history’, AE2 significantly contributed to the efforts of the ANZAC landing at Gallipoli and thoroughly enhanced the reputation of the RAN. For this reason alone, the E-Class submarines proved to be a very good use of defence spending.

J-Class

After World War I the British Admiralty gifted Australia with six J-Class submarines. These were considered too large and expensive to remain in British service. The six submarines arrived in Sydney in July 1919, where it was discovered that the boats were in poor repair after years of war service, and were put into immediate refit. This refit proved slow and expensive and was fraught with difficulty. The facilities utilised were inadequate to cope with submarine refit and very few technical personnel had sufficient knowledge of the requirements of submarine maintenance. This resulted in the cost of refitting the six boats blowing out from the original maintenance cost estimates provided by the Admiralty.

Tony Woodland took this shot of a crowded Sydney skyline, featuring Daring-class destroyer HMAS Vampire and Oberon-class submarine HMAS Onslow, both now features of the Australian Maritime Museum.
A BRIEF LOOK AT SUBMARINES BEFORE OBERON AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE RAN

Despite these difficulties a submarine flotilla was formed at Osborne House in Geelong. This flotilla remained in operation until August 1922 when due to pressure to decrease Navy expenditure, the J-Class boats were decommissioned.9

Through acquiring the J-Class, the RAN gained a high level of experience in submarine maintenance. The lessons learnt during this time assist the RAN to be better prepared for the maintenance of submarine squadrons in the future. There were no costs associated with purchasing the boats but the overwhelming costs of getting them to an operational level were unacceptable and the funds could have been better spent elsewhere.

O-Boats

After decommissioning the J-Boats, it was decided to purchase two new submarines. Two O-Class submarines were ordered and were commissioned on 1 April 1928. These submarines were advanced for the time and were ordered with unproven engines. During the transit to Australia, these engines failed resulting in a nine month delay in Malta.10 This restarted the debate in Australia as to the future in submarine maintenance. Due to these factors and the onset of the great depression in 1931 it was decided to return the boats to the RN.11

Given the financial position of Australia at the time the O-Class boats should never have been purchased. Once again the costs involved were enormous, yet only two years of effective use were gained. The lessons learnt with the acquisition of the unproven engines are important and are relevant considering that Australia is currently investigating options for propulsion for its latest generation submarines.

K-IX

In 1942 a Dutch K-Class submarine was offered to the RAN for use as an Anti-Submarine Warfare training boat. The Navy accepted the offer and set out to complete a major refit on the 21 year old boat. In 1944 K-IX suffered a battery explosion and due to costs involved it was decided not to proceed with repairs.12

The K-IX proved once again that shortcuts are not possible in gaining a submarine capability. The K-IX refits were expensive and virtually no effective service was gained from her.

Through time submarines have become necessary for the defence of Australia. Before the acquisition of the Oberon Class, their importance was questionable. The E-Class boats proved to be an important part of our history; however the other three classes proved to be expensive blunders. By purchasing boats second hand, the RAN inherited the costs required to return the boats to a suitable state of repair. Prior to gaining these submarines, suitable infrastructure for the maintenance should have been put in place. Without this infrastructure, the boats were simply an overly expensive piece of steel.13

K-IX under Dutch colours (Courtesy Tom Lewis).

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Handover of AIP-submarine NRP Tridente

The Portuguese Navy class 209PN AIP-submarine, NRP Tridente is handed over to the Portuguese Navy at Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) shipyard in Kiel, Germany.

The opened hatches/launchers are for deployment of the CIRCE system (Containerised Integrated Reaction Countermeasures Effectors). CIRCE is a rapid reaction multi-effect soft kill torpedo countermeasures system designed to defeat modern lightweight wire and non wire-guided acoustic homing heavyweight torpedoes.

The second of class 209PN submarine NRP Arpao has conducted deep-water sea trials off Kristiansand in Norwegian waters. Arpao will be commissioned in 2011.
After a crew familiarisation period and additional crew training at sea Tridente was expected to leave Germany to head for Lisbon, Portugal, where the submarine will be commissioned.

The two class 209PN submarines replace three French-designed Albacora-class submarines; the last operational boat Barracuda will be decommissioned in December 2010.

The two-class 209PN submarines have a contract value of EUR 800 million.

Photo and story by Michael Nitz
Amphibious warfare is the new black. Amphibious operations are the here and now and future of RAN capability and doctrine and they will be the ADF’s modus operandi for many years to come. With the advent in particular of major ADF projects such as the LHD, AWD, MRH 90 amongst others, it is imperative that we all take the hint and strap in for the paradigm shift that will occur with the arrival of these assets.

This article is written in an attempt to contextualise amphibious operations in the light of these new capabilities and also to light the spark in people’s minds to start thinking seriously about the way we will be operating in the very near future. Current ADF amphibious doctrine, contained primarily in ADDP 3.2 and its supporting documents, provides a highly detailed description of the various parts that make up an amphibious force, ant also outlines the overall concept of operations that would be applied to an ADF mission. This overall concept holds true for the main part when applied to future operations, however, being a lengthy and fairly complex publication, it is hopelessly here to provide a more succinct hypothesis of how a “whole of ADF” amphibious operation may unfold.

In doing so I will focus on the key areas of assets and their deployment, force integration and training. From this précis it is further hoped to reinvigorate change in the areas of individual and collective training to better prepare our people and our thinking for the significant challenge that lies ahead.

**Background**

In order to see where we might go in regard to amphibious capability we must look both at what assets and structures we have currently in place and also in what circumstances we might conceivably have to stand up as operation. The requirement to conduct amphibious operations, or operations “from the sea”, has been understood within the ADF for some time and we can see this in the purchases in the mid-90s of the two LPA's, HMA Ships Kanimbla and Manoora. Since their entry into service, they have continually proven their worth in the amphibious realm, most notably in the area of humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR).

Combined with current assets such as the Army’s S70A Blackhawk or the Navy’s SK50 Seaking, and with the LCM8 or LCH landing craft, the ADF has been able to deliver and support forces “from the sea”. These include a number of capabilities ranging from infantry, medical teams, light and armoured vehicles and aviation assets. Additionally, forces not deployed ashore are also supported with the embarkation of deployable headquarters staffs and medical teams who can conduct operations whilst afloat. This has been particularly useful in the earlier phases of operations when the necessary infrastructure has not been available ashore, or when an LPA’s services can be used supplementary to those ashore.

The challenge faced by the bulk of the ADF’s current amphibious inventory is that of age (obsolescence) and an increasing capability gap brought about by the increasing size of operations (particularly disaster relief), the greater public focus and subsequent political demand for force options and finally, the increased distance from Australia at which these operations will likely be conducted. Fortunately, we are in a phase of major acquisition which is providing the ADF with the new and improved capabilities required of our amphibious future.

In acquiring the Navantia-designed Canberra-class LHD, the ADF will have the ability to project a Battalion-level Ready Group (BRG) into an Amphibious Operating Area (AOA) many miles from our shores. Through the procurement of the Hobart-class AWD, and the upgrade of the fleet of Anzac-class frigates, the RAN is positioning itself to be able to provide a significant level of multi-threat protection to the amphibious mission.

The role of the highly capable Collins-class submarine force in the conduct of an amphibious operation should also be remembered, where (current availability issues aside) the addition of only one or two submarines to an amphibious mission is vital in preparing and shaping the future battlespace.

As I will demonstrate, to the benefit of the Army, the introduction of MRH...
90 and ARH will, when embarked and operated from the LHD, greatly improve both the speed at which force can be applied to (and beyond) the sea/shore interface and also the supporting firepower which can be provided to the landing force, if required. In a disaster relief situation, the use of the MRH 90 will greatly increase the speed and effectiveness of any delivery of aid or stores and also the evacuation of personnel from affected areas, either back to the ships or to other unaffected reception facilities. There are also a significant number of smaller projects and capabilities that will have to come together if we are to maximise the effectiveness of our future amphibious operations and these will be introduced as I move through my proposed concept of operations (CONOPS).

In crafting a CONOPS though, we need to consider the types of amphibious missions we will be conducting. Current doctrine offers four principal types of amphibious operation I however, in attempting to paint a picture of future amphibious operations I will consider three scenarios which I believe more accurately reflect the future amphibious mission: HADR, Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) and finally, the more traditional military amphibious landing or operation which I will term Amphibious Combat Mission (ACM – inclusive of the current assault, raid, demonstration and withdrawal). It should be noted that I have ordered these, ie the likely order these operations will be conducted here, leaning more towards the latter which is where I believe more work needs to be done in preparing the ADF for such a mission.

So now that we have our three types of future amphibious operations, let us turn to how our CONOPS for each of these should be supported by a vast range of capabilities, platforms and doctrines and how, by considering these supporting factors in context, we can see that amphibious warfare is one of the primary warfare disciplines of the future; one which requires bold and dedicated change in which to prepare and train our current force.

**The HADR Mission and NEO**

HADR is an amphibious operation in which the ADF has a distinguished history, particularly in recent times. Noteworthy operations such as SUMATRA ASSIST (2004-2005) and PADANG ASSIST (2009) have shown that ADF assets can be organised and dedicated to a HADR area quickly and with great success. Primarily, the amphibious component of these operations has consisted of an LPA operating with embarked elements of helicopters, medical teams, landing craft and a combined HQ staff (DJFHQ, HQDIV). HADR stores and logistical components have also been transported and managed utilising the LPA.

Using these assets, and in consideration of the success achieved so far using this construct, we can easily expect that future HADR missions will involve the online LHD being activated and then integrating the various supporting elements. While this is an expectation that I hold to be generally true, it is ultimately one which, to achieve optimum effect, must undergo significant change, particularly in how the various enabling elements integrate with the LHD and each other.

In providing an optimum outcome, we should expect that ideally (and this is where bold decisions and dedicated change comes into play) the helicopter element is stationed on the LHD and will be activated at the same time, providing the first assets, say up to six or eight MRH 90s. Added to this comes the online Company- or Battalion Ready Group to provide the boots on the ground, the size of the group to be determined by the extent of the mission.

Also available *in situ* is the embarked HQ, most likely the Amphibious Task Group (ATG) or Fleet Battle Staff (DJFHQ-M), who can take initial carriage of C2 requirements until the arrival of the dedicated CTG/CTF. The ADF medical team will embark, and conceivably, based on the capacity and facilities of the LHD augmented by any civilian medical agencies assisting relief operations. Standby HADR stores are most likely loaded in Sydney, Darwin and possibly Townsville, or via STRATAIR to the nearest port and within 48-72hrs the HADR amphibious mission is underway. Within a week this force will be in position off the coast of the affected area, providing the first aid response and preparing the AO for the arrival of further support elements such as STRATAIR (RAAF C-130 and C-17), Non-Government Organisations (NGO) and further support forces from other contributing nations.

In many ways, the conduct of an amphibious evacuation operation will be almost identical to that of a HADR mission with the key components being the LHD with embarked MRH 90 flight, Ready Group, embarked HQ and medical team. Again, on order, these elements will stand-to and within the 48-72hr period will be *en route to*
Amphibious Warfare – The Rising Tide (And Beyond…)

the affected area. Once again, the size and capacity of the LHD will be a key factor. The awe-inspiring sight, as dawn breaks, of this huge ship sitting off the coast will instil both confidence and hope in the minds of evacuees, who will then be further reassured as the LHD’s attached helicopters and landing craft arrive at the Evacuation Point where, speedily, they will establish initial Reception and Processing Areas.

Amphibious Combat Mission

So far, the two scenarios we have seen have relied heavily on the involvement of the LHD and its attached elements. There has been no real requirement for capabilities from other warfare spheres to be included, given the generally permissive nature of the operations. Combat missions within the amphibious environment however, will involve a wide range of ADF capabilities contributing to what will be a complex and challenging plan. To see the nature of this operation, let us conduct a hypothetical amphibious operation where I will attempt to highlight the contribution of each of the respective elements and capabilities. Consider the following scenario:

Country X is a small island nation known to be a central training area for a regional insurgency group. While traditionally non-aligned, it has in recent years been receiving overt support from its larger neighbour, Country Y. Country Y is a semi-closed society ruled by a fundamentalist government and its military capabilities closely resemble that of Australia. While publicly, Country Y’s support has been primarily economic, it has increased political support to Country X in light of recent claims through the UN regarding its harbouring and support to terrorist organisations. It is also known through improved intelligence sharing networks that Country Y has been providing military equipment to Country X in the form of small arms, basic vehicles and explosives. Due to the militant nature of Country X’s armed forces, it is reasonably assessed that a significant amount of this equipment is being filtered through to the insurgent group.

With a marked increase in terrorist activities and their connection to the training camps on Country X, the UN has been presented with a request for military action against those camps within Country X. This will be conducted by a Coalition force drawn from a small number of regional players including the US and Australia, with the aim to eliminate the insurgent group in Country X and restore stability to the region. This proposed action has been met with defiance by Country X and Y with the later stating it will take such action as necessary to protect the sovereignty of Country X.

Having obtained a supporting UNSC Resolution, the Coalition is now in the process of mobilising the amphibious task force that will conduct the operations against the insurgent groups on Country X.

While the above scenario is simplistic, it contains the main components of a future ACM. We have a requirement for a military force to be inserted into a hostile area at great distance from Australia; the amphibious transit will potentially be opposed by a comparable force; and the AOA will contain significant threats to both the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) and the Landing Force (LF). Taking these into account we can now develop a picture of how our forces will be utilised for the conduct of the mission.

The first phases of the operation will focus on battlespace preparation and ISR efforts. Primary amongst the assets used in this area will be our intelligence agencies, submarine force, Special Forces and Clearance Diving elements. With the re-introduction of the Intelligence Officer qualification in the RAN and the subsequent
creation of the Maritime Intelligence Support Centre (MISC) we have an organisational position to provide an initial assessment of the battlespace, its key players and the threats these pose to the mission. It will also form a key component of the ongoing intelligence support to the operation. The submarine force, through the clandestine insertion of SF and CDT forces will provide key updates and ISR support to the force both leading up to and during the amphibious mission. The submarine too, will provide invaluable intelligence and surveillance for the force and will have the secondary ability to combat the ASW threat posed from Country Y. The use of the submarine in an offensive mining role must also be considered in an effort to deter Country Y involvement and limit its freedom of manoeuvre; if only in theory as part of a well coordinated Information Operations campaign. Likewise, our CD forces will conduct defensive MCM at the proposed landing sites.

At this initial stage our geospatial agencies will have a major role to play in assessing and proposing the most suitable landing sites and time windows. Their participation will continue throughout the operation with Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA), beach surveys and other ongoing support to CATF being vital to choosing the right place and time to conduct the landings.

In preparing for departure, the LHD would embark the assigned CJTF/CATF personnel, augmenting the standing Staff already onboard. Any additional vehicles, armour and ammunition required by the embarked Ready Group would also arrive and a flight of ARH helicopters would embark to supplement the MRH 90 aircraft.

Upon sailing, the final Task Group would consist of an AWD with two or three FFH (upgraded with the latest ASMD systems under SEA 1448) providing defence for the force, the LHD and a group of new heavy landing craft (Phase 5, Project JP 2048) and a fleet auxiliary providing logistical support. Closer to the AOA, this force would be further strengthened by a Task Unit of Armidale-class patrol boats or recently acquired multi-role Ocean Patrol Vessels (OPV - SEA 1180, Phase 1) who would provide the ATG surface force protection inside the forward areas of the AOA, where water depth and manoeuvring limitations may otherwise preclude the stationing of the escorting FFH and AWD. Additionally, in the Mine Warfare and hydrographic survey configurations, the OPVs would provide further depth and support to the Task Force through clearance of chokepoints and other suspected mine danger areas and the provision of continuing environmental data.

On transit, the surface force would be supported in its ASW and ASuW roles through the use of land- (eg, GlobalHawk) and sea-based UAVs (Scan Eagle, embarked on units of the task force such as the FFH or LHD) and the latest MPA (AIR 7000). Organic helicopters such as the NRH90 or MH60R, operating from the escorts and utilising capabilities such as dipping sonar, ISAR and advanced sonobuoy processing (ideally a capability also held by the surface combatants), would be utilised for closer contact prosecution and limited area searches. Air defence would be provided by the AWD and FFH until arrival in the AOA where they would combine with other AW assets of the multi-national force, in particular the carrier-borne aircraft that would undoubtedly form part of the overall contribution.

Having successfully reached the AOA, we see again the utilisation of the full suite of capabilities within the Task Force. Protecting the resupply Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and the approaches are the major surface combatants and submarines. Inshore, the patrol vessels actively seek out and eliminate force protection threats to the landing force of the LHD and heavy landing craft making their final internal preparations to disembark the LF. The operation is commenced with Naval Gunfire and land-attack missiles from the AWD/FFH engaging the shoreline, targets having been provided from rear-area targeting agencies in Australia or by imagery obtained from the UAV surveillance of the battlefield. MRH 90s conduct the airborne insertion of the first LF elements, escorted by ARHs (and potentially MH60Rs) who provide close-air support against the more mobile targets not neutralised...
from the previous naval bombardment. This support continues throughout the beach assault as the heavy landing craft and organic landing platforms from the LHD combine to disembark the bulk of the Battle Group onto the beach in the first wave.

Through the combination of mobility and firepower, supported by the speed of the amphibious lodgement, the land forces rapidly establish themselves ashore and quickly locate and destroy the overwhelmed insurgents' camp sites. Casualties are quickly withdrawn beyond the beachhead to the LHD where the medical reception and treatment team provides the necessary care. Prisoners, too, are withdrawn to the LHD for further processing.

As quickly as the amphibious raid was launched, shore forces are extracted and returned onboard the landing craft and LHD. The amphibious units return to the umbrella of protection provided by the major surface escorts and the combined joint task force withdraws, returning to their bases or further tasking. Through the utilisation of all spheres of warfare, and near-seamless integration in a joint and combined environment, the mission is achieved with surprise, minimal casualties and perceivably in timeframe of no more than a few days from amphibious lodgement to withdrawal.

The Way Ahead

As demonstrated, an amphibious operation will require participation from all areas of the RAN and the majority of the ADF. Even before troops hit the shore, the full ensemble of RAN capability will have been utilised. Naval units will have operated across all warfare spheres and within the challenging and often misunderstood joint combined warfighting environment. Specialist knowledge from all areas will have been put to the test with the ultimate success of the mission dependant on the ability of the men and women involved to do their jobs.

Due to its demanding and complex nature, the ACM is the scenario which must be considered at the forefront of current and future planning. While there are a number of recent initiatives (Intelligence Officer primary qualification, Aircraft Handler specialisation) and projects (JP 2048) supporting the amphibious nature of future operations there still remains a pressing requirement for significant change and improvement in many areas.

This change will not only be structural and procedural but will also require a dramatic shift in current thinking as to how we operate as a Navy and indeed as a Defence Force, particularly in the areas of embarked HQ, embarked aircraft flights/squadrons and embarked Company or Battalion Groups. The following is a summary of those key issues considered to require urgent action and resolution. It is by no means exhaustive nor does it profess to provide the only solution; its purpose is to provoke thought and where possible action throughout the relevant departments and authorities.

Training. Our people will need to be highly trained in existing and future specialisations. They must be trained today on the systems they will use tomorrow to avoid unnecessary delays during the introduction of capabilities into RAN service. This includes:

- Amphibious components to Bosun's Mate and Combat System Operator training to specifically address duties such as the control and operation of the LHD's well-dock and landing craft, or the development and maintenance of the Recognised Amphibious Picture (RAMP) and control of assault schedules and landing craft waves. Accelerated training in multi-TADIL operations (Link 16, 22), must also be implemented.

- PWOs must be trained to understand and use the specific components of an amphibious force; not just what their names are and how they fit into a neat diagram, but rather how all these elements interact, how they can be used by the CATF/CJTF and what effects they bring to the battlespace.

- Sea Training Group (STG) must be strengthened with the addition of specialists dedicated to the amphibious sphere in a similar fashion to the existing warfare disciplines.

- These specialists must then be further supported in the training scenarios used by STG to assess
a ship’s readiness. Amphibious operations must take prime position in a unit’s readiness training and assessments; not just for the LPA/LHD but also for frigates, destroyers, mine hunters, patrol boats and submarines. Scenarios must be re-written to assess a unit’s contribution to an amphibious operation and the use of more littoral areas, such as the Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA) is required.

- **Joint Exercises and Interoperability.** Single-service and joint exercises must be reviewed and rescheduled to support a systematic approach to building and maintaining (raise, train and sustain) interoperability and corporate knowledge across all areas involved in amphibious operations.

- Large-scale exercises such as Fleet Concentration Period must be shaped around amphibious scenarios and current dedicated amphibious exercises such as the SEALION and SWIFT EAGLE series must be further enhanced by the dedication of additional Fleet units to these. Providing these assets once every two years during TALISMAN SABRE is no longer suitable when none of the ship’s previous training and workup has included operations in, or in support of, an amphibious environment.

- There must be greater liaison between Services to synchronise training opportunities and exercises. Currently, the full potential of most exercises is not being realised due to the conflict of Service programming requirements. This conflict means that assets are not being made available or if they are, they are not being committed in sufficient strength or capability, ultimately to the detriment of the exercise outcome.

- Interoperability must be enhanced by the closer integration of key elements of the Amphibious Task Force. Manning and unit constructs must more readily reflect reality; we must train as we fight.

- LHDs should carry an embarked and fully integrated flight of up to eight MRH 90 aircraft. Carefully planned rotation of aircraft and personnel through a maintenance, training, embarkation cycle will ensure continuity and enhanced ability across both the aviation and surface ship communities.

- Companies of the online Ready Battalion should be stationed on the LHD in a similar fashion to the embarked Marine Expeditionary Units of the US or the Royal Marines of 3 Commando Brigade. By remaining embarked over a prolonged period (6 to 18 months), land forces will be more acclimatised to operating from the sea and will provide a seriously improved level of readiness in support of strategic level operational requirements.

- An afloat HQ element must be embarked. With vast improvements in habitability and communications with the introduction of the LHD, elements of an embarked HQ staff (DJFHQ, HQ 1DIV) would have little trouble in maintaining their current and future functions from the dedicated facilities onboard.

In conclusion, future operations will be conducted in the amphibious battlespace. They will be expeditionary in nature and involve capabilities across the entire ADF. We can no longer remain reactionary to emergent capability and its demands in regard to manning, training and procedures. Development of doctrine and procedures, training of our personnel, and establishment of support constructs – these key factors, along with many others, need to be enacted now. By correctly identifying requirements and implementing appropriate solutions, we will be well positioned to establish ourselves as highly skilled and capable proponents of future warfighting with the ability to achieve the Navy mission ‘to fight and win in the maritime environment.’

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*Lieutenant Duncan MacRae, RAN, joined the Navy in 1999, graduating from the Australian Defence Force Academy in 2001 with a Bachelor of Science. After graduating from PwO Course in 2007, Duncan conducted an operational deployment in HMAS Arunta and subsequent postings as the Fleet Force Protection Officer and more recently, Operations Officer in HMAS Manoora.*

(Endnotes)

1 Being assault, raid, demonstration and withdrawal, with military support operations being cited as another source of amphibious operations with focus on such things as humanitarian aid and disaster relief.
By examining selected qualities of leadership, we can compare Royal Australian Navy leaders against a set of criteria. To give an example, this article takes Admiral Lord Nelson, the hero of Trafalgar in 1805, as a model, as well as examining the characteristics of other well-known leaders, both civilian and military.

To become a true naval leader is difficult. US Navy Admiral William V. Pratt made some useful observations:

The greatest problem facing the career naval officer is leadership…. So many feel that if they follow the course of average naval life, experience will finally give them the qualities of the great leader, and opportunity may regard them with a high command. Few realise that the growth to sound leadership is a life’s work….it requires the wisdom and judgement of the statesman, the keen perception of the strategist and tactician… but above all, it requires sterling worth of character…

This study takes seven qualities of leadership and uses them to measure its subject matter. It is known as “trait leadership”, with some derivation from the “Great Man” model. The seven qualities are not exhaustive. This study suggests a capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator.

ACHIEVEMENT

This is not necessarily discussed by the means by which it is often measured in armed forces – by promotion – but rather in accomplished results. Did the person under discussion improve their organisation? Did they leave it a better place by being a member? Nevertheless, promotion can often mean the member has achieved, and so an understanding of it is germane here.

Any hierarchical organisation must have a certain number of second division leaders; third division leaders and so on. In the Royal Australian Navy that means at the top there will be a Vice Admiral, then some Rear Admirals; Commodores, Captains and so on.

In peacetime promotion is slow – hence the grim naval toast to “A bloody war and a sickly season.” (By comparison with promotion rates in times of conflict, the author knows of one RN member who joined as a midshipman at the outbreak of WWII, and by 1945 had been made Lieutenant Commander.) Admittedly, many wartime promotions are made to people who are members of a navy for “hostilities only” and in peacetime when the Navy contracts their positions disappear and in the main they return to their former life.

There are a diminishing number of positions as one climbs the promotion pyramid. A further difficulty is that promotion is within specialisation streams. A branch might have one Commodore, five Captains, ten Commanders, and so on. So even if there are eight excellent Commanders when it is necessary to promote six new ones, only half a dozen will be promoted.

Accordingly, promotion must
be recognised as a measure of achievement, but include the answer to whether the Royal Australian Navy was improved by this person?

**EXPERT IN ONE’S FIELD**

Sergeant Major Miller of the US Army served in Vietnam and won the Congressional Medal of Honour – America’s highest decoration – for his Special Forces role. He eventually trained US Army members in combat techniques. Many students asked him what the secret was to being a man who commands the loyalty and respect of his subordinates. His answer was twofold. The first was that “…you must show that you know more than the soldier you are leading. Your subordinate must be aware that you have knowledge he does not possess, and that you are trying to teach him.”

Anyone who aspires to be a leader and an example to others must obviously have expertise in their craft. In naval terms, that translates as being an expert “ship-driver”; an aviator par excellence; an engineer possessing a wealth of theoretical and practical knowledge - and so on. Nelson, for example, was a master at strategy – which becomes a commander of fleets – but also of tactics, which behoves a ship captain. He was also an inspired man-manager. How to measure greatness relies here on two marks of achievement: firstly superiors’ personal reports, and also the opinions of others.

**INSPIRATIONAL**

This leader inspires others to perform similar deeds as he or she does. In this manner, the leader’s followers may embark on actions they would not have attempted if they were leaderless. Often this is shown by the leader’s actions in front of their subordinates. For example, Admiral Nelson once engaged with his own two frigates two ships of equal size belonging to the Spanish Navy. Before the fight began, the following dialogue took place between the lead ships across the water:

“This is an English frigate. If you do not surrender, I will fire.”

“This is a Spanish frigate. You may begin as soon as you please.”

A fierce fight then took place, and the English began to win. Called upon several times to surrender, the senior Spanish officer, Don Jacobo Stuart, replied with: “No sir, not whilst I have the means of fighting left,” thus inspiring his men. When the Spanish commander eventually struck his colours, Don Jacobo was most generously treated. Nelson wrote personally to the captain-general to whom was given the prisoners, and asked that they be looked after, saying: “It becomes great nations to act with generosity to each other, and to soften the horrors of war”. Both leaders’ actions inspired their followers in being resolute, courageous and honourable.

There are many examples of how Nelson inspired his people, and it is one measure of the man that so many did: Hardy, who was with him when he died; his fellow admiral Collingwood whose battle line he raced to be first to engage at Trafalgar; ship commander Berry, who followed him from ship to ship, and Captain Hallowell, who after the Battle of the Nile made him a present of a coffin fashioned from the French ship L’Orient’s mainmast – Nelson kept it in his cabin and was indeed buried in it.

**INITIATIVE**

Sometimes described as “going in where angels fear to tread”, this measure means to use judgement and advance where necessary. It also means that the leader is brave in psychological terms, and takes the lead where necessary. It does not mean going forward rashly.

During the battle of Cape St Vincent, Nelson – a man of courage and action – led the charge of the men from HMS Captain up the side of the Spanish 80 gun San Nicolas, followed by “my old Agamemnon” - a detachment of the Sixty-Ninth Regiment of Foot. Together they stormed the ship, Nelson leading with a cry of “Westminster Abbey or Glorious Victory” and if that was not enough, when fired upon by the San Josef, which had collided with her sister ship, he seized the moment and led the way aboard her too. Together the men from Captain took this ship as well. By the end of the action Nelson’s ship had to be towed away, but the British fleet – outmanned and outgunned – had won the day, thanks to Admiral Jervis’s training and discipline of his men and Nelson’s initiative. The tactic was celebrated in the public’s acclaim as “Nelson’s Patent Bridge for Boarding First Rates”, with the man of the moment immediately promoted to Vice Admiral. His wife however, quite understandably begged him as an Admiral to “leave boarding to Captains”. Initiative, of course, often means acceptance of risk.

Nelson was a man who had the courage of his own convictions, who could often have left off and blamed superiors for failure. Instead, he was...
Qualities of Leadership

a man who chose to use initiative and advance when he knew the defeat of the enemy was attainable and essential. At the Battle of Copenhagen, walking the deck while the guns roared their broadsides, and deadly splinters whistled about his ears, he confided to Colonel Stewart, commander of infantry, who was with him on the quarterdeck, that he would not be “elsewhere for thousands”. Whether he was fearful or not – and who would not have been – Nelson led by example. And when his uncertain superior, Admiral Parker, made the signal to leave off the action, Nelson refused to see it, putting his telescope to his blind eye and exclaiming: “I really do not see the signal”. The British won the battle with much help from Nelson’s use of initiative.

Impressive Physical Qualities

What is meant by this? It might be rephrased as “looking the part of a leader”. Would anyone have said that Horatio Nelson achieved this? Yes – and no. A short, thin man not blessed with good looks, he first entered the British navy in 1771 as a midshipman at 12 years and three months. Despite being prone to sickness: “I have had all the diseases that are”, he once said; he adapted well to the vigorous and often dangerous life that was the Navy. He volunteered early in his service for a two-ship voyage to the Arctic, where he and a fellow midshipman left the ice-bound ship in the middle of the night to hunt polar bears. The two adventurers were later seen attacking a bear some distance from the ship; a signal was made for them to return; which they did reluctantly.

Nelson was a man of raw physical courage who led by example. He lost an eye when an enemy shell, exploding during the siege of Calvi in Corsica, drove splinters and dust and rock fragments into his face. He suffered most terribly and often from wounds, quite willing to lead from the front. His right arm was amputated after the battle of Santa Cruz in Tenerife due to his being hit by grapeshot. On the way back to the Theseus Nelson was lying in the bottom of the boat with a tourniquet around his arm, barely conscious. When they reached the ship, he was half-hauled on board, clinging to a rope with one arm while he climbed up the ship’s side. Once on board he gave orders for the surgeon to be called immediately, saying “for I know I must lose my arm, and the sooner it is off the better”.

This is what is meant by “looking the part of a leader”: behaving in such a way that people can be inspired. But it is also something more. It means to look resolute and act with resolution – as did Nelson. To lead by example. To not show physical cowardice. The great Russian soldier and writer Von Clausewitz said: “War is the province of danger, and therefore courage above all things is the first quality of a warrior”. The author WJ Wood defined “physical courage” in Leaders and Battles as involving “the exposure of the body to the threat of wounds or death”. One of the most famous generals of WWII, General Montgomery, as Wood later notes, added to that “moral courage: “…that resolution and that determination which will enable him to stand firm when the issue hangs in the balance”.

Another notable British General, Wavell, agrees: he calls it “robustness”, and notes: “The general is dealing with men’s lives, and must have a certain mental robustness to stand the strain of this responsibility”. It might include “panache”, which the military novelist Ronald Welch once described as: “…the almost untranslatable expression of dash, of valour, the ability to do things with an air of reckless courage and inspiring leadership.” Finally, we might add that the bearing, carriage and speech of a leader should be of the highest standards.

Empathy

The great soldier of the 18th century, Frederick the Great, had good advice on how to attain the next quality of the leader – Empathy:

...talk with the soldiers, both when you pass their tents or when they are on the march. Sample often to see if the cookpots have something good; find out their small needs and do what you can to satisfy them; spare them unnecessary exertion. But let fall the full vigor of law on the mutinous soldier, the backbiter, the pillager...

Empathy is difficult to define, and even more difficult to live up to. It means to be able to imagine yourself – as leader – in the role of your people, and to show that. According to the Collins English Dictionary, it is: “the power of understanding and imaginatively entering into another person’s feelings”. What does it mean in example?

General Montgomery said to his troops at the Battle of Alamein: “We will stand and fight here. If we can’t stay here alive, then let us stay here dead!” The word to notice here is “we” – Montgomery was, as the definition above says, entering into the feelings of all of his people, who feared that they would die. Churchill’s best known speech of WWII did the same: “We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills: we shall never surrender.”

Such statements say to you – the listener – that your leader will be with you, no matter what the cost.

It was said of Isambard Kingdom Brunel, builder and designer of
railways, bridges, tunnels and ships: “Like a true leader, he inspired willing work by occasionally rolling up his sleeves and working alongside them.”

For the leader of warriors it is the same: share their burden; put yourself last where you can, and realise that the privilege of rank is actually the privilege of being allowed to lead fine people, not material benefits.

Attention to detail is part of this quality. Captain D. Michael Abrashoff commanded USS Benfold for a little under two years in the late 1990s. He brought the ship to a high peak of efficiency, and later analysed the reasons behind why the ship became a byword for the right way to get things done. One interesting aspect of this is that Abrashoff stepped aside from the top role in some ways: he let the people he commanded know that it was not “his” ship, but “their” ship. His book is significantly titled It’s Your Ship.

At the Naval Academy we studied legendary military leaders, from Alexander the Great to Dwight D. Eisenhower, but I sensed that something was missing from those portraits. Biographers described their victories and heroic gestures, but my years in the Navy taught me that the art of leadership lies in simple things – commonsense actions that ensure high morale and increase the odds of winning….I found that the more control I gave up, the more command I got. In the beginning, people kept asking my permission to do things. Eventually I told the crew, “It’s your ship. You’re responsible for it. Make a decision and see what happens”.

The great WWII General Sir William Slim said: “The best way to get known to your men is to let them see you and hear you by going among them and talking to them.” In his talks to his troops Slim always reminded his men of what “you” have done; not “my troops” or even what “we” have done, but of what “you” have done. Slim was later a Governor-General of Australia from 1953 to 1960, and he certainly was then a “man of the people”. Thousands of years earlier the Greek warrior Xenophon said something very similar: “A good leader gives direction, sets an example, shares danger or hardship on an equal footing and wins the willing support of others.” It has been said of another mighty Greek leader – Alexander – certainly amongst the greatest generals in military history, that:

He shared in the men’s dangers, as the scars of his wounds testified…he ate the same food as they did. He was highly visible….he fought hard himself but he was ever on the watch for any acts of conspicuous courage in the face of danger amongst his men.

Sergeant Major Miller, who we have met before, had a second criteria for the good leader. You needed to demonstrate for your people:

A genuine concern for his safety and well-being. The concern must be real, because a young soldier can spot a faker a mile away. If your concern for him is genuine – and he knows it – then you can rest assured that he will follow you into the jaws of death.

Nelson by the standards of his time had the gift of being able to imagine the hardships of his men, and was just and considerate in his actions. Although Nelson served in a time when naval discipline was stern, he was never one to flog a fleet into shape. In this respect, he stood in strong contrast with many other senior naval officers: even an Admiral as outstanding as Jervis, later Earl St. Vincent, had a reputation for being fair but also harsh. While the naval mutinies of Spithead and the Nore raged, Nelson’s ships remained aloof from the dispute, although the stories had leaked through to his ships’ companies. It is significant that when the Theseus, a ship implicated in the mutinies, was sent to join Nelson’s ships, a scrap of paper was casually dropped on her quarterdeck a fortnight later. It read:

Success attend Admiral Nelson!

3 We might pause here for a byword on Nelson and the officers of his time. Nelson, by comparison with many of his fellow captains, was often merely logical: he did not have the eccentricities of many of his peers, some of whom dressed their gig crews somewhat strangely according to their personal taste; were hopeless drunkards, or simply dull. Although promotion was not unusual, some having risen to their rank through patronage or semi-political plotting. Earl St. Vincent, Admiral John Jervis, the great reformer of the British Navy at this time, never tired of reminding officers that “…the present indiscipline of the Navy originated with the licentious conduct of the officers”. He was straightforward in his criticism. Sir Charles Knowles of Goliath, for example, was described by Jervis as “…an imbecile, totally incompetent, the Goliath no use whatever under his command”.

On one occasion, three mutineers were convicted on a Saturday, to be executed at 8.00am the following morning. Vice Admiral Thompson protested at the execution on a Sunday and was immediately overruled by Jervis, who had him removed from the fleet.

The Battle of Waterloo by Robert Hillingford shows the General giving encouragement to one of the British squares during the battle.
Qualities of Leadership

God bless Captain Miller! We thank them for the officers they have placed over us. We are happy and comfortable, and will shed every drop of blood in our veins to support them, and the name of the Thesam shall be immortalized as high as the Captain’s – Ship’s Company.

This was the commander who even before his fame grew to its eventual immense proportions had men petition to serve under him, and who often took a personal interest in their welfare. Although we might think of such interest as being perfectly normal, the period of the Napoleonic Wars was a hard and savage era of history, with the "mob" below and leaders such as Nelson far above. Nelson, unusually for the age, while not rubbing shoulders on all occasions with his men, saw them as being humans and worth his time. On one of the many occasions he was wounded, Nelson refused to allow attention to be paid to him before the others of the ship’s company awaiting the surgeon’s ministrations. On another occasion, after the Battle of Copenhagen, he visited the hospital in which his men lay wounded even before visiting his mistress Emma Hamilton. Unusually for the age, he took especial interest in his men, giving their nurses a guinea each as a mark of especial encouragement in their duties.5

In other words part of empathy consists in knowing what is required by one’s own leaders, as well as one’s own people. The British historian John Keegan opines that General Ulysses S. Grant, unlike other Generals of the Civil War, was well aware that the American people “required humility to the authority of government”. Grant put himself forward with just that, and – importantly – even given the highest military office, he chose not to surround himself with the trappings of office. Keegan’s thoughtful words are worth quoting in full:

Generalship is bad for people. As anyone intimate with military authority knows only too well, the most reasonable of men suffuse with pomposity when stars touch their shoulders. Because “General” is a word which literature uses to include in the same stable Alexander the Great and the dimmest Pentagon paper-pusher, perfectly well-balanced colonels begin to demand the deference due to the Diadochi when promotion carries them to the next step in rank. And military society, that last surviving model of the courts of heroic war leaders, regularly does them the favour of indulging their fantasies.19

Even a somewhat distant leader – Wellington, the victor at Waterloo in 1815 – knew what was necessary in this area. Keegan, once more, noted of The Duke:

…hearing after the siege…that many [troops] had been left without shelter, he rode thirty miles after dinner to expel some uncaring officers from their lodgings and install the wounded in their place. He ever seen, so the expectation was somewhat deserved. It may be, by actions such as these and well aware of the fickle crowds who could quite often influence the government, that Nelson was simply insuring himself against political disaster.

made the same journey the following night to ensure that his orders had been obeyed, since they had been received ‘in a sulky manner’, and when he found that they had not, he put the officers under arrest, marched them to headquarters and had them tried and cashiered.20

There are many other such leaders who exhibit a special empathy that mark them out for a place in history. Some are only found in misty historical accounts: Arthur of the Britons, for example, while others are more firmly known: Alfred of the Saxons who fought the invading Danish to a standstill in Britain around 871 and beyond.21 But a common mark of all such leaders were that they knew their people, and they placed themselves amongst them, and therefore knew of their problems; shared their hopes, despair and triumphs – and all were loved as a result.

Communication

A great communicator can make all the difference in a precarious situation. It was the opening moves of Waterloo when a tactical commander was told by General Wellington what was needed: Captain Moyle Sherer, who was serving in Hill’s division, had recognised in the three columns of ‘black enormous masses’ in the glittering steel and clouds of dust, his first sight of a French army… thoughts of Boney’s invasion camp at Boulogne, of Italy overrun, of Austerlitz, of Jena flooded his mind. Suddenly he heard a loud, deep voice issuing orders:

“If they attempt this point again,

Admiral Nelson in 1800, five years before the Battle of Trafalgar (Public domain).
Hill, you will give them a volley, and charge with bayonets; but don’t let them follow them too far down the hill.”

The style of this order – ‘so decided, so manly’ – was just what Sherer needed. It filled him with confidence, leaving him in ‘no doubt’ that he and his comrades would repulse any attack. Yet at the same time Lord Wellington’s manner was simplicity itself, without a touch of bludgeoning or bombast: He has nothing of the truncheon about him; nothing foul-mouthed, important, or fussy: his orders on the field are all short, quick, clear, and to the purpose.22

However, rank does not always signify that its holder is an effective communicator. One needs to be understood at all times. It was once said of Admiral Howe of the RN, a First Lord of the Admiralty… “He was also an apostle of new signalling tactics – an unusual interest for a man whose verbal instructions baffled subordinates by their obscurity.”23

Like Wellington, his naval peer Nelson employed in his leadership style something quite unusual for its day: the art of effective communication. One characteristic was to invite others to contribute their ideas for a campaign, or a battle, or a change of some sort; to educate his men and get them – and him – to know each others’ minds. Nelson embarked upon the Battle of the Nile in 1798 by letting his captains engage in individual fashion. The French fleet, anchored by the bows in a line in shallow coastal water, engaged in ship to ship fashion by five British vessels sailing inside the line and anchoring, and the rest engaging from outside. Thus the French were caught between two forces. At the end of hours of fighting, the French had lost 1,700 men to the British loss of 200; their fleet was largely pounded to pieces, and Napoleon and his army were stranded in Egypt. Nelson had hoisted just two signals through the entire battle.24

For the autocratic manager this would have been disastrous – an authoritarian leader would not trust his subordinates to make momentous decisions and fight on their own. Nelson, however, trusted his individual captains. So too, in the long pursuit of the French, years later in 1805, he had regular meetings with his “Band of Brothers” – the name first applied to those who fought under him at the Nile.25 During the long chase the officers would pool their ideas for forthcoming battles; the best use of tactics; what a following ship would do when its fellow was sighted engaged and so on. Consequently even the necessity for signals within the ensuing battle was dispensed with; the captains knew each others’ minds.

To a certain extent Communication means to be able to use words effectively to persuade others. Winston Churchill was a great exponent of this. Eisenhower, then a US General and later President of the United States, experienced the British Prime Minister in action:

Churchill was a persuader. Indeed, his skill in the use of words and logic was so great that on several occasions when he and I disagreed on some important matter – even when I was convinced of my own view and when the responsibility was clearly mine – I had a very hard time withstanding his arguments.26

We began with a suggestion that a capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator. We have seen many great leaders who exhibited those traits. This series will examine how many of Australia’s naval leaders performed in these fields.

(Endnotes)
3 Horsfield (12-13)
5 Description of Admiral Lord Nelson and his career are drawn from Kenneth Fenwick’s HMS Victory; Christopher Lloyd’s Nelson and Sea Power; Peter Padfield’s The Nile, and Robert Southey’s The Life of Horatio Lord Nelson.
7 Wood (59)
10 Connelly. (16)
12 Adler (116)
13 Adler (204)
15 Adler. (219)
17 Adler (232)
20 Keegan. (160)
23 Horsfield. (37)
26 Adler (76)
Studies in Trait Leadership – A Dedicated Achiever

Vice Admiral Sir William Creswell, KCMG, KBE, RAN

By Lieutenant Commander Tom Lewis

In Vice Admiral Creswell the Royal Australian Navy has its father. A Royal Navy officer of extensive and wide experience, he eventually left that service at a time when the Navy was going through radical change, in particular with its propulsion systems – from wind to power – and in gunnery and armour concepts. He was called back to the Colours to serve in first the South Australian Navy, and then the Queensland service. Leading the first Australian naval expedition abroad to China, he returned in 1901 determined that the new nation should have its own navy, instead of a reliance on the British Squadron. Once seeing this take place, he then worked tirelessly to consolidate the force he had largely established, and although well due for retirement, stayed at the helm to guide the fledgling force through WWI. Given Creswell’s consistent and unwavering belief in the need for an Australian navy, it is not surprising that he made political enemies, some of whom were to harass him even into his retirement. But Creswell’s policies have since been vindicated by the historical events of the last century, and he is now rightly and generally recognised as the founder and father of the RAN.

Born in Gibraltar on 20 July 1852, William Rooke Creswell saw extensive service at sea around the world. At the age of 13 he joined the Royal Navy, first of all in the training ship HMS Britannia.1 At the end of his time there, he ‘...was awarded a First-class Pass coming out second in a class of 46.’2 He otherwise distinguished himself – in a negative sense – as midshipman in charge of the ship’s cutter. Not understanding the convention that forbade crossing the bows of a senior officer’s boat, Creswell commanded his crew to row harder so as to race and cross in front of a captain’s vessel. The near-collision that ensued also saw Creswell taken away from command of the cutter. During his ship time he was also to suffer from seasickness. A later biographer – Stephen Webster – notes attaching oneself to a senior officer for promotion prospects was a recognised method of advancement, but Creswell was not successful in this endeavour.3 He was posted to the frigate HMS Phoebe, a sailing ship which had been converted to engines. In this vessel, and in company with five other RN ships, Creswell travelled halfway around the world. The cruise of the ‘Flying Squadron’ was under the direction of Rear Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phips Hornby, and directly concerned with the education of young officers.4 A visit to the ‘Spanish Main’ saw Creswell’s second language of Spanish brought to the fore as his Captain’s Aide-de-Camp. Then the ship travelled on to the West Indies, Central America and then to Australia. His leave in Melbourne was undistinguished, mainly because a shipmate failed to return to take ship duties for the second week of the ship’s stay. Japan and Honolulu followed, and returning to Britain in 1871 Creswell was appointed Sub-Lieutenant.5 He was posted to HMS Minotaur in the Channel Fleet.

In 1873 Creswell joined HMS Thalia in Singapore. Thalia was somewhat of a curiosity – Creswell described her and her sister ship Juto as a combination ‘corvette and troopship’. He was soon temporarily transferred to Midge, a small sloop, barque-rigged but with twin screws. A series of missions followed, often in ships’ boats and a schooner – the 40-foot Badger – against pirates. These were small, often desperate events, fought with small guns and rockets backed up with smallarms.
One action saw a fierce fight against two large boats and about 120 pirates, with the British contingent heavily outnumbered and, to make matters worse, Badger aground on a mud flat. The ensuing action saw repeated attempts to refloat her while taking defensive action against the pirates, and Creswell and Sub-Lieutenant Abraham Lindesay both wounded. Creswell’s injury was from what he described as a ‘heavy Schneider bullet’ in the thigh. However he continued to fight, and the pirate attack was beaten off and the schooner refloated. The bullet was never found, and Creswell later surmised it was still inside him ‘for the rest of his days.’

Both officers were promoted as a result of the action. According to Webster, this early promotion was significant in Creswell’s career – he saw ‘the lesson learned from that jump was not quickly forgotten’.

An appointment to HMS Topage as a watch-officer followed, with a voyage to India as escort for the Prince of Wales. He was posted to Undaunted in February 1876, and then on exchange with another lieutenant of the London while at Zanzibar off the African coast. London was employed as the depot ship to a number of ‘patrol boats’ – vessels somewhat unlike that fitting the modern description – open vessels deployed away from the ship for lengthy periods, and for which, as Foster notes, an ‘iron constitution’ was needed.

In these, the RN chased the small handy boats used by the slave traders, then operating offshore where they off-loaded their human cargo into bigger ships.

The anti-slavery work was dangerous and a constant, almost background task of the Royal Navy, and moreover fraught with possible disaster if diplomatic restraints were incurred – not all nations were against the practice, and many resented their shipping being inspected. One such transgression almost brought Creswell undone, when he removed seven slaves from a plantation without sufficient evidence to ensure they were indeed recently bought human cargo. He was found to have used an ‘excess of zeal’ but escaped with a reprimand. To make up for this, a little later he was able to command a small steam cutter and capture a ‘splendid great dhow cram full of slaves’ – the biggest capture ever made by HMS London.

Although the intricacies of political manoeuvres did not lay our Victorian adventurer low, malaria contracted in the region certainly did. Contracting this debilitating illness, and with London not equipped with the facilities to treat it properly, Creswell was ordered home. He had nearly achieved his goal of promotion – he and a Lieutenant O’Neill had received the special thanks of Lord Salisbury, Foreign Minister of the time, for their work. But without patronage, and with what Creswell described as a ‘lukewarm interest’ in his future prospects from his own Captain, the coveted step to Commander would not be forthcoming.

At the end of the 1870s, and once home in Britain, the death of Creswell’s father had to be dealt with. Creswell is somewhat reticent about the reasons for his retirement from the Royal Navy at the same time. In his later autobiography he describes his father’s passing ‘and certain other considerations which need not be entered into here’ that made him decide to leave the Service. His biographer notes he did enter into a torpedo course at HMS Vernon, but

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1 An excellent account of this horrible traffic is given in the novel Flash for Freedom, by George McDonald Fraser. Although a fictional account, the author’s meticulous research locates the story well in the politics and practices of the time.

2 The rank of Lieutenant Commander within the Royal Navy was not yet in use.
other accounts say he was ‘invalided out’ from the Royal Navy in 1879. Australia was an attractive prospect, and it was later that year, with his younger brother in company, that he landed back in Australia. The ‘Australian interlude’ within the civilian world is quickly dealt with by Creswell himself. He notes “…exploratory expeditions to the Northern Territory; cattle droving from NSW to far north Queensland, and in one period of 18 months sleeping only once under a roof.” Much of this time was spent in the saddle, but as riding was a skill acquired at an early age, Creswell noted no discomfort from this considerable transformation of his way of life.

Creswell was in the Northern Territory in 1885 when it was suggested he return to Naval Service. Commander Jim Walcot, an ‘old friend and shipmate’ mentioned in a letter to Creswell that he might consider joining the South Australian Navy. This force had been recently formed to give naval protection to the State, with similar bodies being formed by some of the other colonies. Creswell refused for a number of reasons, including that his prospects were beginning to look good. However, a little later, he visited his brother in Mackay, and found him ill. A move to a colder climate, the doctors suggested, was essential for better health. While Creswell was considering his future, another letter from Walcot arrived, urging reconsideration of the offer. This time Creswell accepted, and was appointed as ‘first lieutenant’ or second-in-command, under Walcot, of the South Australian naval service’s Protector.

At this point it is worthwhile to pause and note the curious state of affairs regarding Australia’s defence in those days. In her isolation, Australia was often seen by its inhabitants as being vulnerable. The arrival in 1882 of three Russian warships off Glenelg in South Australia is but one example of how a hostile power might suddenly appear and perhaps begin hostilities. The effective modern communications that now we take for granted was not even a dream in the 19th century, and news was often carried by hand. The possibility that Britain, and by implication her colonies, might unexpectedly be plunged into a state of war – which would be announced by the fire of enemy ships – was a real fear.

The presence of the Royal Navy did something to stem these feelings, but the British squadron was stationed in Port Jackson, the harbour for Sydney, far away from many capitals, on the east coast of the continent. Further, the Squadron was often depleted when ships were away on other duties. South Australia eventually purchased Protector, a vessel of 920 tons displacement and 188 feet in length, armed with one eight-inch and five six-inch guns. Other Colonies also took this course, with Victoria and Queensland both purchasing vessels – Cerberus and Gayundah respectively – and organising navies.

The fears of attack or invasion were ongoing and pervasive through much of Creswell’s career. Alfred Deakin’s speech to the Australia Natives Association in March 1898 was typical:

Let us recognise that we live in an unstable era, and that if we fail in the hour of crisis we may never be able to recall our lost national opportunities. At no period during the first hundred years has the situation of the great Empire to which we belong been more serious. From the far east and far west alike we behold menaces and contagion... Happily your voice is for immediate and absolute union.

This was the background to much of Creswell’s future agitations. The return to naval routine was easier than expected, and eventually, as a bachelor with more evenings free than if he had a family, he had a fair amount of time on his hands. He subsequently had some leisure to think on the future of navies and Australia, and began writing some of his thoughts down. Three articles were published in the South Australian Register, and Creswell’s ideas were appearing in public as a commentator on naval affairs.

His thoughts centred on three main themes. The first was that the Australian Colonies needed local naval defence if the Squadron were absent. The second was that military forts were insufficient to provide defence against...
long-range gunnery from the seas. The third theme was that the primary threat might come from foreign raiders pursuing what the French describe as ‘Guerre de course’ or war on commerce.

There was often bitter debate over naval defence, with many colonists of the opinion that defence was a matter to be handled – and paid for – by the British Government. Creswell was of the opposite opinion, and he must have seen much frustration over defence funding and the pace of change. He occasionally refers to his feelings in his autobiography:

It was not until the year 1887, at the Colonial Conference of that year, that the colonial premiers…agreed to supplement the existing British squadron by an ‘auxiliary squadron’ of five fast third-class cruisers and two torpedo-gunboats…But apart from this resolution…the indifference of the Australian public, the coldness of the governments, continued, and were a source of worry and bewilderment to me. As a zealous naval lieutenant, thoroughly convinced of the necessity of cherishing to the utmost the naval services of his country – the country of his adoption – I chafed and fretted at the scant attention paid to its crying needs, and bitterly envied the care and affection lavished upon the military forces. While the Navy is almost starved, was my angry reflection, the Army is feasted.  

For the rest of his naval career Creswell would continue to advance his cause by many and varied means. His actions often meant he was involved in debate, much of it heated, which reached further than the borders of South Australia: occasionally into the pages of *The Times* in Britain, and also into Australian political machinations as a whole.

In 1888 he married the daughter of Justice Randolph Stow. The Creswells moved into a house in Largs Bay, and set about raising a family. Three sons and two daughters eventually took up much of Creswell’s time ashore. He and his wife were popular figures in their society, and Creswell later became an Honourary Aide de Camp to the Governor.

In 1890 Creswell took command of the South Australian naval forces while Walcot took a year of leave, with Creswell as acting Commandant. During the year Creswell journeyed to Melbourne and attended a series of public lectures on naval matters from the Secretary of the Victorian Department of Defence – Commander Robert Muirhead Collins.

The work on board *Protector* was often mundane, and the ship was utilised by the South Australian government in a variety of non-naval tasks. Webster records Creswell as being involved in ‘…training reformatory boys,rigging displays at the Jubilee Exhibition, ferrying important passengers, and providing hands for Marine Board work.’ He was able to devise a practical and interesting programme of training which took advantage of visiting ships, the local army troops and various voyages on board the ship. He was also rigorous in his expectations of his subordinates’ behaviour: when three Petty Officers deserted their duty for a nearby public house Creswell had them dismissed from the Service.

A few years later a crisis beset the small navy. In 1890 the *Star of Greece*, a new iron-hulled sailing ship driven ashore off Willunga in south Australia in a storm of July 1888. A large loss of life resulted, and the Colony’s rescue facilities were found in a subsequent inquiry to be inadequate. It was suggested that Creswell become the head of a revised ‘lifesaving service’. He not only took up the cause with enthusiasm – arguing for new safety standards and a set of national laws – but also succeeding in obtaining funding for the restoration of equipment. Subsequently a state-of-the-art lifeboat was acquired by the South Australian government, and launched by Creswell’s wife in 1896. Twelve coastal rescue stations were also established.

As commander of the South Australian Navy, Creswell was in a good position to make his thoughts public on maritime defence matters, and he took this crusade with relish. He gave lectures in a number of locations and to a number of audiences. The naval enthusiast may have found a ready reception, for Germany had embarked on a naval programme that even today would be impressive: 69 ships to be built over seven years, including 19 battleships.

Later Creswell was left in command, albeit of a force now largely reservist in nature. Soon he was promoted to Commander. He took it upon himself to remedy manning shortfalls, and did this with three initiatives: dropping the requirement for previous nautical experience; introducing weekend training as opposed to a month-long cruise, and approaching the local Yacht Club (of which he was Commodore) for recruits. In all of these measures he was successful.

Another initiative was brought about by a tragic event of some five years earlier. This was the destruction of the *Star of Greece*, an iron-hulled sailing ship driven ashore off Willunga in south Australia in a storm of July 1888. A large loss of life resulted, and the Colony’s rescue facilities were found in a subsequent inquiry to be inadequate. It was suggested that Creswell become the head of a revised ‘lifesaving service’. He not only took up the cause with enthusiasm – arguing for new safety standards and a set of national laws – but also succeeding in obtaining funding for the restoration of equipment. Subsequently a state-of-the-art lifeboat was acquired by the South Australian government, and launched by Creswell’s wife in 1896. Twelve coastal rescue stations were also established.

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Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George. In August 1899 he attended the Melbourne conference of naval commandants, as instructed by the premiers of the colonies, who were becoming increasingly enthusiastic about the idea of a federal naval force as Federation became a matter for discussion. The conference, as Creswell later noted, was tedious, but in the end a small sub-committee took responsibility for producing a report, with Creswell writing it himself. This urged the formation of a 3000-man naval force, a resolution met later with some disdain by the Royal Navy – for not being strong enough, as well as other reasons. The sub-committee's report went largely unnoticed by Australia's politicians, who were largely taken up with the problems of Federation.

With the outbreak of the Boer War in October 1899, armed forces came once more to public and political attention. In April 1900 Creswell took up the post of Commandant of Naval Forces in Queensland, largely because, as Bob Nicholls in Statesmen and Sailors tells us, the salary was almost double that he was receiving in South Australia. Webster suggests that the possibilities for career improvement were probably seen as more attractive than that of the South Australian Navy.

The China Boxer rising of May 1900 thrust matters of hostilities further into the limelight. The more powerful Colonies of Australia pledged to answer a call made by beleaguered forces in China, and ships and men were volunteered from a number of sources, as Nicholls outlines:

Victoria proposed raising a force of 200 sailors with field guns, while Queensland and South Australia cabled that they could make available ships from their respective naval forces. New South Wales offered to provide a crew for one of the ships of the Auxiliary Squadron in reserve in Sydney. The offer fell somewhat flat, with only Protector from South Australia being judged as not too old and slow for the task. Subsequently Creswell commanded the force. His account of the expedition has fortunately survived, although it was not included in his autobiography, completed some years later.

Creswell noted he was offered command of his old ship primarily because he had just left it, and his stewardship had impressed those now in charge of the South Australian Navy. Upon joining, he commented that: ‘Every soul on board I knew.’ Although the ship's company was largely drawn from Reserve forces – and therefore might be expected not to be as handy in their abilities – he was pleased to find out she had been prepared and stored for war in around a week from receiving notice to deploy.

On the voyage north the ship's company were hard at work practising for every eventuality. Creswell noted the high morale, which survived problems such as tricky navigation through the Barrier Reef; storing water at Thursday Island; inefficient loading of coal, and a four-day typhoon near the Philippines, where ‘…hatches, ports, every opening on the deck had to be closed. Red hot below and hardly a dry spot on deck was the order of things.’

Upon reaching Hong Kong, which Creswell had last visited as a Sub-Lieutenant 28 years previously, he found himself in the curious possession of no fewer than four commissions. The first was in the RN as a Lieutenant (retired), for naval officers hold their commissions until they die, resign it, or have it taken from them. The second was as a Captain from South Australia, the third as a Queensland officer, and the fourth a new RN version proposed for all Australian officers joining the force. This would rate Creswell as a Commander, a reduction in rank upon which subject he immediately wrote to the Admiralty in protest.

Protector had survived the trip without damage or ‘defects,’ which seemed to surprise the local RN force, as did the lack of any ‘sick’ members on board. Creswell was told by Admiral Sir Edward Seymour: ‘I wish you would teach the battleships to do without ‘sick’. Soon the combined force was deployed to bombard the fortifications at Shan-hai-Kwan, the city at the sea end of the Great Wall of China. However, on the day the fleet came within range, the fort capitulated.

Such bluff, threat and avoidance of conflict marked the next few months. As winter set in, with Creswell gloomily contemplating the frozen water on the decks of the ship in the mornings, a signal was received recalling Protector to Hong Kong. Creswell confessed later to wanting to take home ‘a trophy,’ with ‘a great bell derelict near the shore’ receiving some covetous glances, but it was deemed too heavy to recover. However, someone amongst the Australian force saw fit to commandeer a bronze cannon, which eventually ended up at the Royal Australian Naval College in Jervis Bay, where it may be seen today.

To the sounds of a Highland band and the cheers of the 700 men of HMS Goliath, the little Australian ship began the journey to Hong Kong, her 120 men having done their best to cheer a return salute. Creswell navigated the ship through another typhoon on his way back to the British base, later learning that a colleague’s ship had been pooped twice, that is, having the stern of the ship flooded by an overtaking and overwhelming wave. Creswell put his survival down to ‘…
steaming slowly. The screw did not pin the steep stern down as happens when steaming fast.29

Upon the voyage back to Australia Creswell had time to reflect. He later described the expedition ‘…in its main purpose…disappointing’ due to the circumstances dictating the ship’s inability to use her main armament. However, he valued the ‘…warm-hearted, kindly reception by the old Service, which rang genuine and true.’ And indeed, the Admiral's report commented that ‘The Protector was most useful, being an efficient and well-kept man-of-war, reflecting credit on Captain, Officers and Men’ Captain Jellicoe, then the Admiral’s Chief of Staff, and later the famous RN Admiral, also commented on Protector as ‘…never having been sick or sorry when wanted for a job of work.’30

The matter of Federation had been pressing when the expeditionary force left Australian waters, and on his return Creswell found defence had been thrust into a turmoil by this change to Australian government. The future of naval and army forces was a hot topic. Creswell had seen foreign powers’ navies – those of Germany and Russia – in waters near China.31 Japan too was emerging as a strong competitor for territory, and all of this meant for Creswell that now more than ever a combined federal naval defence of Australia was of paramount importance.

That this defence should be federal in nature was the natural opinion of Creswell and many others. But this was a short-lived dream. Financial stringency was the new order in federal circles. Furthermore, the Admiralty was not in a hurry to hand over defence of this part of the Empire to anything hastily conceived.32

This new campaign – beginning in early 1901 – saw Creswell return to the media as a platform to advocate his views. He wrote a number of articles for the Brisbane Courier, once again in a thin disguise. Advocating a federal defence, Creswell argued that one of the primary purposes of the British Auxiliary Squadron – to train Australian seamen – had been neglected. He proposed a programme to promote Australian involvement with federal defence, specifically utilising a ‘special service cruiser’. This would not only be capable of coastal defence, but would also be capable – like Protector – of being deployed elsewhere in the service of the Empire.

Creswell’s articles were warmly received by the newspapers. The Age enthused ‘…a wise policy too. Captain Creswell has rendered a service in trying to bring it out of the clouds and place it on the basis of a practical service.’ The Sydney Morning Herald and the Adelaide Register also praised the pieces.33

Despite this campaign, Federal defence matters moved slowly when they advanced at all, and they were dominated by Army concerns. A Federal Committee had been formed to formulate a federal defence policy out of the colonies’ former activities, but it consisted solely of army officers. When Creswell was sent by Sir John Forrest, the new Minister for Defence, a draft of the military committee’s first deliberations he thought it ‘one to suit Switzerland or any country with no sea frontier.’34 Furthermore, there was also emerging a possibility of the abolition of the State naval forces.

The first Federal Defence Bill was introduced to the new Parliament in July 1901. Much debate ensued, and the Bill was strongly criticised. It contained nothing in the way of naval defence proposals, and concentrated instead on ‘citizen soldiery’.35 Public argument followed, and a paper from Creswell arrived in important quarters, outlining a proposal for an Australian naval force. The somewhat unwieldy title was ‘Australian Marine Defence: The Best Method of Employing Australian Seamen in the Defence of Commerce and Ports.’ Written in blunt terms, the present arrangement was described as ‘one of stagnation and continued military impotence.’ Creswell proceeded in facts and figures to lay out his proposal: one circulating federal ship, naval districts; overhaul of gunboats; a training ship, and another three warships at intervals, together with an Appropriation Act. The paper also laid out organisational plans for permanent forces, reserves, and training schools. Creswell also was capable of some useful imagery:

…the spectacle of 5, 000, 000 Anglo-Australians, with an army splendidly equipped, unable to prevent the burning of a cargo of wool in sight of Sydney Heads, is only the ordinary consequence of a policy of naval impotence.36

The Colonial Conference of 1902, held in London, proposed a different outline. This suggested Australians would be trained in the ships of an Imperial Australian Squadron. The chief Australian architects were the Prime Minister, Edmund Barton and Sir John Forrest, the Minister for Defence. The proposal met with hostility back in Australia, and Creswell began to assume more prominence in the public eye with his outspoken criticism. Rear Admiral Beaumont noted in a private letter that ‘The popular cry lately has been in favour of Creswell’s Australian Navy – though it is more in the papers than amongst the people…’37 Prime Minister Barton introduced a compromise with the second reading of the Bill in the new Parliament: the local naval forces would not be disbanded. The eventual passing of the Bill therefore left a solid nucleus.
of opinion that would eventually combine into an Australian force.38

The next Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, sought re-organisation of the local naval brigades under federal control. A conference of naval commandants was organised. Creswell was soon appointed by the government as the (Acting) Naval Officer Commanding. Under the Australian Naval Agreement of 1903 the federal government would contribute 200,000 pounds per annum to the Royal Navy, which would agree to maintain a certain number of vessels on the Australian Station, one of these to be manned by Australian seamen.39

The end of 1903 saw a title change for Creswell. From 24 December 1904 he was no longer the Naval Officer Commanding but rather the Director of Naval Forces. He had also been appointed to the position of Naval Commandant of Victoria, a post he held concurrently.40 Nevertheless, he was still, in some sense, an impotent figure. Alun Evans has pointed out quite aptly: ‘...it was almost a lone figure. Alun Evans has pointed out quite aptly: ‘...it was almost a lone figure. Alun Evans has pointed out quite aptly: ‘...it was almost a lone figure. Alun Evans has pointed out quite aptly: ‘...it was almost a lone figure. Alun Evans has pointed out quite aptly: ‘...it was almost a lone figure. Alun Evans has pointed out quite aptly: ‘...it was almost a lone figure. Alun Evans has pointed out quite aptly: ‘...it was almost a lone figure. Alun Evans has pointed out quite aptly: ‘...it was almost a lone figure. Alun Evans has pointed out quite aptly: ‘...it was almost a lone figure. 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Creswell apparently placed the trophy in the care of the Naval Commandant, in Port Melbourne. From there it was transferred to the Williamstown Naval Depot, and then Flinders Naval Depot where it remained until 1969. The badge is now in Russell Offices, Canberra. On 1 March 1904 the Commonwealth Defence Act of 1903 came into force, with Creswell as Naval Officer Commanding (Acting).44 Although based in Brisbane, eventually Creswell took over the ships of the State Navies, which included the Victorian Cerberus, together with the torpedo boats Countess of Hopetoun, Childers, Lonsdale and Nepean. From Queensland came gunboats Gayundah and Paluma, and torpedo boats Midge and Mosquito. South Australia’s Protector was still in service and a number of smaller vessels were available.

In 1905 Creswell also produced ‘Rising Sun’ badge.42 A metal sculpture – a collection of bayonets and sword bayonets radiating from a crown – was used as a basis for sketches for an Army badge. The actual sculpture had been apparently made on board Protector. Later it was in the safe-keeping of Hutton, who presented it at a dinner, presided over by Creswell, before the Major General returned to England. At the dinner, he said that the badge had: ‘...resulted from a coordinated effort by the army and navy in South Australia...to me it represents not only the coordination of military forces, it also represents the coordination of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth, and this is happily suggested by the circumstances of its construction...it was constructed aboard the first major sea-going ship of the Commonwealth Naval Forces. Creswell described as most useful for scouting for the enemy. Submarines he dismissed as being unproven and also of such slow speed as to be outrun by ships.

The war of 1905 between Japan and Russia was at this time attracting much attention, and Creswell was offered a position by The Times to comment upon matters.45 He reluctantly declined, but the efficient use of “torpedo boat destroyers” by the Japanese must have weighed heavily on his mind during the conflict.

Although Creswell was advocating change, and there was indeed opposition, there was certainly a groundswell of support for Australia having input into how Defence matters were run. The chief reason for this was cost: Australia by the end of 1905 was contributing 5/12ths of the cost of the British naval force on the station. As Deakin pointed out to the Governor-General at that time, the sphere of operations for that force included Chinese and Indian waters.46 Australia was contributing substantially towards the upkeep of a squadron which Britain would have kept there in any case yet the new country had virtually no control over the ships. Deakin waxed eloquent: ‘...we have no identification with the squadron...there is nothing naval that can be termed Australian...we merely supply funds that disappear in the general expenditure of the Admiralty’. It may well be that this was the moment when Deakin made up his mind for a uniquely Australian force,
though as Nicholls points out, we may never know with certainty.\textsuperscript{47} Certainly the state of the Australian naval forces were at make-or-break: Creswell noted he had ‘…only two Lieutenants on the active permanent list really fit for hard duty.’\textsuperscript{48}

1906 saw Creswell visit Britain for an examination of torpedo craft in all their facets; and to endeavour to visit training establishments of various kinds. In all, he toured around 20 establishments. The subsequent ‘Report of the Director of Naval Forces’\textsuperscript{49} was aimed mainly at showing that building torpedo boats within Australia was indeed possible, with models of the vessel firstly provided. The change to oil-fired engines was noted. Also suggested were the differences that vessels designed in Britain but operating in Australia would require, and special reference was made to the rough nature of Australian seas outside the enclosed waters of the Barrier Reef. This report would have confirmed Creswell in the minds of many readers as an expert in his field: it is authoritatively written; logical, explanatory, and recognises arguments for and against various ship types. The Brisbane Courier was probably echoing the sentiments of many in September of that year when it commented on the wisdom of Creswell being able to devote all of his time to Commonwealth naval matters:

This is a recognition of services whose value can only be estimated by those who have had an opportunity in following the work he has done both as State and Federal Commandant in combating the prejudices of the Admiralty and in pleading for the recognition of Australian nationality…It is largely due to his representations that men like Admiral Fitzgerald now favour an Australian navy…\textsuperscript{50}

Meanwhile, in Australia, the argument settled down into two camps: the British squadron, or an Australian navy. One officer investigating the situation for the Admiralty, Captain Charles Ottley, RN, was of the opinion in a memorandum to the Navy that it was best to let the argument ‘run out of steam’. Indeed the Admiralty had not replied at the time of the Captain’s writing – May 1906 – to Fisher’s points raised some time before. Ottley further noted that the ‘…Australian Naval Agreement still has 7 years to run. During those 7 years the present agitation in favour of a local Australian Navy will very possibly disappear’. He was blunt in further criticism: the desire for a local force was labelled ‘sentimental considerations’. Ottley further was of the opinion that much of the support came from ‘the Irish element’, ‘a section of the Labour Party’ (sic) and of course the people already employed in navy work within Australia. Creswell, incidentally, was misspelt throughout with a double ‘s’.

September 1906 saw Creswell involved in the dismissal of a Sick Berth Attendant, William S. Patchett, in what eventually became a controversial matter that made the papers.\textsuperscript{51} Patchett brought a defamation case against a Warrant Officer, and the matter dragged on through Patchett’s discharge and an eventual court-martial. Creswell’s role was negligible, but the publicity could not have been welcome.

The 1903 Naval Agreement was reviewed at the Colonial Conference of 1907. It was apparent that there was now a softening of ‘One Navy, One Empire’ policy, and suggestions were made about an Australian force. However, questions were left unanswered, including those relating to the overall command of the ships, their type and number, and the legal status of the ships operating outside Australia’s three-mile limit.\textsuperscript{52} Deakin emerged from the whole process exhausted, but convinced of the worthiness of destroyers and submersibles for any new Navy. At the end of the year he introduced into Parliament a proposal for defensive measures. Coastal forts would be strengthened, a national guard introduced; ships and submarines purchased, and the whole arrangement closely controlled by the British. The outcome was a rejection of some of Creswell’s ideas, especially in connection with British control and with the adoption of submarines. It is worth while noting, however, that on one point the Admiralty would not budge: in times of war any Australian force would come under their control.

The Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty, W. Graham Greene, was of the opinion in February 1908:

Under international law there is only one executive authority in the British Empire capable of being recognised by foreign states, Colonial ships cannot operate independently of the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{53}

In 1908, Colonel H Foster, Director of Military Studies at Sydney University, produced, ‘with Remarks thereon by Captain WR Creswell’ the report ‘The Defence of Australia’.\textsuperscript{54} This pointed out that an attack on Australia would mean that any enemy would automatically be at war with Britain, but it did not discount small attacks on Australia. It saw the need for small garrisons to protect ‘the capitals and Newcastle’; and organised mobile forces to deal with attacks elsewhere. Naval forces would interdict any large movements against the land, and also provide protection for troops being moved as necessary.

The report seems to represent a small backdown for Creswell, but given that he was in a supplementary role,
this is not surprising. There was no mention of numerical strengths, either in army troops or naval platforms. In essence, this seems what might in later years have been called a ‘position paper’.

The arguments over the nature of a naval force went back and forth through the final months of the Deakin government. How should it be composed; who should have control; where should its men be trained, and more besides. One of the clinching arguments for the building of an Australian force was the growing recognition of German ambitions. The Two-Power Standard, by which the RN was kept at the strength of any two other Great Powers, was being eroded, and the cries of the British public reflected a desire for more great ships: ‘we want eight, and we won’t wait’, was a popular proclamation, and saw a similar feeling across the Empire.55

With the building, after 1906, of a Dreadnought fleet for the Royal Navy – a programme that made all other battleships obsolete overnight – the presence of an Australian naval force, which could be added to the RN in time of need, was a catalyst. If the Australians were determined to have their own force then it might be best for the Admiralty to at least influence the nature of that force so they could use it in time of need. With the second Labor government (of Prime Minister Andrew Fisher) in power and advocating an Australian force the old arguments were ended. On 5 February 1909 the Australian government cabled its representative in London to open tenders for five destroyers.

Although there was much pressure from various parties to build a dreadnought to add to the RN’s might, or even to buy one outright for Britain, the Australian proposal stood firm. But the nature of the new force was now the main subject. Some argued for a ‘fleet unit’, a battlecruiser, around which a fleet could be built.57 The need for the Australian force to fit into the RN force, and that of other Empire colonies such as New Zealand, was important. An Imperial Conference of 28 July 1909 led to the formation by Canada and Australia of independent navies; but those navies would operate as an integral part of the RN in time of war.58 While the final composition was not immediately decided, it was agreed that the new Australian navy would need destroyers.

What of Creswell? He was now 57, but still in good health, despite the Schneider bullet somewhere inside him.59 He inspected the building of the first two destroyers, Parramatta and Yarra, in Britain. A third ship – Warrego – after being built there was to be re-assembled at the Cockatoo Dockyard in Sydney to provide a beginning for Australian warship building. Although in principle a good idea, this project and others beyond it were to fall foul of a combination of poor management, union problems, and machinery inefficiency. However, Warrego was launched a year later. As well as this ship-building programme, Creswell was organising training, shore units and the structure of the new Navy – all overseen, of course, by the Royal Navy, mainly in the shape of Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, an old shipmate of Creswell’s from 40 years before.60 A grand vision of a two-ocean navy, established by 1933, was created, with a force of 15,000 members manning 18 cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 submarines and three support ships. A Naval Board was proposed, as well as a Naval College for education of officers.

On 11 March 1911 Creswell was promoted to Rear Admiral. He had been a captain since 1895. The year also saw Creswell honoured with the award of a knighthood, the second degree of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George,61 giving him the post-nominal of KCMG. He was now appointed to the new Naval Board, as the First Naval Member. But not all were favourably impressed. The newly arrived Commander in Chief, Vice Admiral Sir George King-Hall, observed that, in his opinion, Creswell ‘talks too freely to reporters’, and also – reflecting perhaps his own teetotaller habits – that Creswell drank to excess.
‘...too much whisky I think. Two glasses at lunch and a glass of port on top.' On 10 July 1911 King George V granted the title of ‘Royal Australian Navy’ to the Permanent Commonwealth Naval forces.

The RAN moved ahead with the implementation of its fleet and the organisation to support it. A Navy Office was established in Melbourne. Cockatoo Dockyard arose again as a problem, with the Third Naval Member, Engineer Captain William Clarkson, arguing against it. The timetable of building the new was to be implemented. And a site for the Naval College had to be chosen, which was primarily the duty of the Second Naval Member, Captain Chambers. Jervis Bay was eventually decided upon, although while the grounds and buildings were being prepared a first intake was chosen and settled at a temporary site of Osborne House in Geelong. The appointment and status of the officer who would command the ‘Fleet Unit’ – that is, the command of the fleet when at sea – had to be decided. Naval intelligence was organised, primarily under the auspices of Commander Walter Thring.

1912 saw the acquisition of Sobraon, an ex-clipper, given a new life as a training ship, and renamed HMAS Tingira. Moored in Sydney Harbour, she moved very little, but provided a salty experience for young teenagers, who scrubbed the decks and learnt about matters nautical under the guidance of experienced sailors. The training was hard: as one of the original sailors recalled, they received for breakfast ‘...a steaming bowl of hot cocoa, and a hard sea biscuit'. Every trainee had to be quick for meals, and it almost appeared as if the Navy made a practice of ensuring some missed out as a form of encouragement. As one recalled: ‘...the call was made “Come and get it” – and if you were last you didn’t get any’, and ‘If you were on watch it was gone by the time you came down and you didn’t get any until the next meal.’

Life was difficult, too, on the Naval Board. One matter of 1913 led to much bitter discussion – the discovery that the only Fleet unit in the Pacific area would be the Australian one. The collection of outdated vessels on the China Station was not considered a useful addition if indeed a conflict arose – perhaps with the newly trained and somewhat aggressive Japan. Another problem was the arrival of the new Second Naval Member, Captain Constantine Hughes-Onslow. Aggressive and of strong opinions, he looked set to become a difficult person. Indeed this was so, with Hughes-Onslow perceiving many challenges to his authority, and arguments arising, including with Creswell. This state of affairs eventually crystallized into a re-worked version of the plan for the defence of the Pacific area, with Thring combining with Clarkson and Hughes-Onslow to take on Creswell and others. This was presented to the Naval Board in June 1913. The new report proposed an abandonment of the Henderson ideas and concentration on a new forward defence policy. Much debate ensued, some of it in public, with Parliament involved, and a large amount of acrimony and accusation. The end result was that Hughes-Onslow was dismissed in late 1913. For a time it looked as if the dismissal of other members including Creswell would follow, on the basis of making a clean sweep and a fresh start. Indeed, Creswell may be seen as having been weak here: as Nicholls has pointed out, he might have acted sooner to hold the board together. An alternative view might be that Creswell was being strong by not contributing to a discussion in a way which would simply add fuel to the fire. However, eventually the issue died down and Creswell’s place was once more secure. On the horizon a bigger problem was building for the new Navy. In contrast with these bitter and tiresome debates about structure and
Based in the colony of Tsingtau on the coast of China, they were at large in the Pacific. Australia led a flotilla of ships to find them. The German Admiral, Von Spee was not to be found and the search was to be in vain. Paradoxically, the first action of Australian naval forces was on land: the taking of a German radio station in New Guinea. A short battle ensued, and an officer and a sailor were killed on the Australian side before the station was taken.

Later in the year a battle took place between the cruisers Sydney and Emden off Australia’s north-west coast. The raider Emden had sunk or captured 25 victims before being caught by Captain Glossop, who had been despatched from a convoy, ferrying troops to Egypt, to confront the raider. Although Captain Von Müller fought bravely and capably, his ship was no match for Sydney and was pounded into a wreck and eventually beached on the North Keeling islands. This is another triumph for Creswell’s Navy: although much of the crew were British, many were Australian, and the ship was fought well by all of them.

The war years saw their share of political trouble. Creswell sometimes disagreed with the usage of RN and Australian ships, for example, with the decision to use Australian and New Zealand ships in island operations in the Pacific rather than the hunt for German warships. This was vindicated somewhat by the sinking of two British warships by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the Falklands. Creswell knew that if Australia had not been tied to such local operations the outcome would have been different.

Other struggles included the ownership and responsibilities attached to various Pacific colonial claims. Creswell managed to establish regular patrolling along both the east and west coasts of Australia. He carefully balanced the demands made on the new Navy with the growing status of the new, and fortified, Australian nation. However, he had a major struggle with the first Minister for the Navy, Jens August Jensen. Jensen emerged as Minister after the division in mid–1915 of the massive and unwieldy Department of Defence into separate departments for each of the Services. Although the new Department of the Navy had acquired its own cabinet representative Jensen was to become a thorn in Creswell’s side.

Creswell was concerned with the future of the Navy and Australia after the war. Japan, although an ally was already, even in 1915, being seen as a potential threat. How should any future force be structured? A proposal was resurrected to bring back the concept of ‘one Imperial force’ but this was rejected largely through the condemnation of the Dominions. Creswell himself thought it lacked strategic vision, something he evidently had: according to his biographer Webster he was an enthusiastic supporter of both oil-fired boilers and of the new force component of aviation being brought to the service of both the military and of naval forces.

Creswell worked with Captain Arthur W Jose, who was employed in the Intelligence section of the Royal Australian Navy. Jose was in the 1920s to begin work on a Creswell initiative: the story of the RAN in WWI, which was to become the official history of the Navy in the War.

Further problems during Creswell’s war included arguments about the protocol of communication between the Admiralty (in Britain) and the Naval Board and difficulties in the arrangement of Naval Intelligence. One person who frustrated matters was the Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson. In those days the role of the

**Studies in Trait Leadership – A Dedicated Achiever**

**Vice Admiral Sir William Creswell, KCMG, KBE, RAM**

direction, there was one significant and glorious event of 1913: the entrance of the Fleet to Sydney Harbour. On 4 October the brand-new HMAS Australia, wearing the flag of Rear Admiral Sir George Patey, led a proud collection of ships: the cruisers Melbourne, Sydney and Encounter, with the destroyers Warrego, Parramatta and Yarra. The flag of Admiral Sir George King-Hall was struck, signifying the transfer of responsibility to Patey and the end of Admiralty responsibility for the station. Further ships were building, and the submarines AE1 and AE2 were readying for their passage to Australia. The future looked promising for the new Navy.

In July 1914 Creswell was on leave. Commander Thring received a warning message from the Admiralty and took steps to place the new Navy on a war footing. Around 9,000 men were ready to meet the call. 16 ships were in commission, with five building. Creswell’s many years of planning and preparation were not to be in vain.

Creswell called immediately for strict censorship of naval matters, and harsh penalties for transgression. Port protection and the despatch of troops were concerns, and of pressing immediacy was dealing with German possessions and ships in the Pacific area. The Navy office was reorganised in practical terms, with a 24-hour watch system presided over by Creswell, Captain Gordon Smith – who had replaced Hughes-Onslow – Clarkson and Thring. Although command of the Navy was transferred to the Admiralty much background responsibility remained within Australia.

The German presence near Australia was formidable. They possessed three light cruisers – including Emden – and two armoured cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
then Governor-General was much more concerned with the mechanics of government than the largely symbolic role it was to become in later years. Munro-Ferguson was at odds with Creswell in particular concerning the issue of communication between the Admiralty and the Australian Naval Board. Another fight was with the Governor-General’s secretary, who was involved in intelligence matters, but in a manner not approved of by Creswell.

Creswell clashed with the new Minister over a number of matters, including the arrangement to purchase the completely unsuitable ship Emerald, at first unknown to Creswell, and the acquisition of the Shaw Wireless Works, located in Randwick, NSW. The ship and the Works were both bad purchases for the Navy. In addition, Jensen neglected the Board: from his appointment to his departure in 1917 the Board met 14 times, with Jensen attending only once. 78

On a personal note, in 1917 Creswell lost two sons to the war. This must have been shattering, and made all the more so by the pressing weight of running the Navy in wartime. It must have been a terrible situation for a father and a naval officer: prosecuting the war with all the vigour he could muster, but knowing that war was killing his sons.

The interference with the role of the Naval Board continued under the next Minister, Joseph Cook, in the closing stages of the war. An example, which effectively amounted to an abrogation of the role of the Board, concerned the performance of the Commanding Officer of the Naval College at Jervis Bay, Commander Grant. This officer had expelled two trainees for misconduct, a punishment supported by the Board. The Minister overruled the decision. Commander Grant resigned in protest, and a valuable leader for the College was lost. 79

After the Great War the Board was overhauled, and Creswell’s age was a factor in reconstruction. He was past the RN mandatory level of retirement, and it was obviously a suitable time to withdraw gracefully from the scene, given the end of hostilities and the difficulties of the Board. However, the management problems had managed to become a media matter, and Creswell’s position was implied by the Argus newspaper as a cause, and the failures – real and imagined – of the Navy’s administration. 80 It must be admitted that the relationship with another member of the Board – Clarkson – had never been really repaired after the Hughes-Onslow affair, and the effectiveness of the Board had suffered as a result. It is hard to apportion blame, but there must be some attached to Creswell as well as his opponent.

Creswell’s last months within the Navy and in the early stages of his retirement were not marked by a happy relationship between the Service and himself. The first taste of petty-minded bureaucracy was when Creswell wrote to the Minister asking him for travel warrants to visit Queensland, New South Wales and South Australia – all States where he had commanded naval forces. Acting Minister Poynton refused to allow the authorisation.

Creswell retired in 1919 at the age of 67 to a 450 acre farm called ‘Ferndale’ north of Melbourne. A year later he wrote to Cook, the new Minister for the Navy. He pointed out that the ‘almost invariable custom’ of granting a member the next higher rank on his retirement had not been followed in his case. Creswell pointed out that his service had not lacked in any way, and asked for the shortcoming to be remedied. The granting of the rank was, as Nicholls notes, only an honourary one, for the Rear Admiral was not receiving any pension, as no superannuation scheme existed. 81

The request was refused, with the Naval Board citing Creswell’s supposed non-qualification by sea-service and command. The letter of refusal, Nicholls records, was even ‘scary, badly prepared and typed’. 82 But two years later feelings had changed and Creswell was promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral. This messy interlude may have given rise to some confusion about Creswell’s retirement date. The Naval Archives Branch’s Outline of Australian Naval History, for example, gives his retirement date as 1922.

Creswell enjoyed another decade and more of a busy retirement, combing rural pursuits with an active interest in many schemes for the development of Australia: horsebreeding; developing the Murray River, and more. From the Ferndale property Creswell also wrote the first part of his memoirs – Close to the Wind. In retirement he continued a deep interest in the Navy, and was not averse from writing letters both to people of influence and the Press. He took an active role in the management of Ferndale, and travelled overseas.

Creswell died on 22 April 1933 83 after a bout of pneumonia, at the age of 80. 84 He was survived by his family, including his wife. Although his later years had been marked by some ill-feeling, the respect in which the navy held Creswell was to grow in the decades that followed. From the early 1950s it became clear that Flinders Naval Depot, near Melbourne, where naval officer training had been transferred in 1930, was becoming overcrowded. The government decided in 1956 to return the RANC to its original site, and after many arguments and much hard work, the return to Jervis Bay was achieved on 20 January 1958. On this occasion the establishment was commissioned as
HMAS Creswell, a mark of significant tribute. The only known bust of Creswell is in pride of place in the Establishment’s Historical Collection. Creswell’s reputation has grown steadily over the years. Alun Evans noted in 1986 that:

…his persistent advocacy in support of Australian naval power in the face of powerful opposition during twenty or more difficult years, helped in a significant way to mould opinion, both in the Parliament and among the general public. 85

Robert Hyslop notes in Aye Aye Minister – Australian Naval Administration 1939-59:

Elsewhere in this book I have given examples of senior officers who were out of their depth in a political milieu. Before 1959 Vice Admiral Sir William Creswell was the only senior officer to exhibit the characteristics of the famous political admirals of the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century, and Vice Admiral Sir John Collins was the only senior officer serving in the RAN who was at ease in his relationships with political persons. 86

Vice Admiral Sir William Rooke Creswell might be best remembered for his three main achievements. These were the development of the Colonial and State Navies, where he took a managerial role; the development of an Australian Navy, rather than an offshoot of the RN, and the management of the RAN throughout WWI. And across the fleet of today there is a quiet acknowledgment of his achievements: Creswell is truly seen as being the ‘father of the Royal Australian Navy’.

How can we judge Creswell as a leader within the areas of ‘trait leadership’ under discussion? Creswell achieved in almost everything he set his hand to, and his contribution to the Royal Australian Navy is arguably the most significant of any member in that Service’s history. We might well ponder on how differently WWI might have turned out for Australia without the RAN in the form it was in 1914: how would forces have proceeded to Egypt, and what might have been Australia’s fate at the hands of the strong German forces in the Pacific.

As a junior officer, Creswell performed with ability and expertise. As a ship commander, Creswell’s command in the Boxer Rebellion was of singular excellence. As a planner, strategist and manager, he performed through the years prior to the establishment of the RAN, and beyond through WWI, at a level of great ability. Some political difficulties, however, might have been handled differently.

Not only in his time, but beyond his commands to the present, Creswell has been an inspiration in his perseverance, dedication and fortitude. Although not noted for his empathetic understanding of others, Creswell is distinguished as a writer for his cause, and as a tireless advocate through the use of speeches. In these ways and by his continual good example, Creswell reached out to Australia in his crusade for the RAN in a way few other naval members have. Who better than Creswell exemplifies using initiative in going forward for one’s cause? In his early days within the Colonial navies he continually put forward new and perceptive ideas. With his campaign for the establishment of the RAN, he achieved much: the creation of a balanced fleet; the successful training establishments brought into being for a new Navy; the effective force which went off to fight successfully in WWI - all of this and more can be accredited to Creswell.

In summary; one of the leaders within the RAN’s history who had true strategic vision. Creswell envisaged a Navy far into the future, both before the formation of the RAN and beyond its 1911 inception. He worked tirelessly and with perception towards his vision, and it is testimony to Creswell that the Navy acquitted itself so well in its first fight and beyond. Truly may Creswell be called the ‘father of the Royal Australian Navy’.

Lieutenant Commander Tom Lewis
PhD, OAM, RAN has served in a variety of PNF and reserve roles within the Navy. He led US forces on deployment in Baghdad in 2006.
(Endnotes)

3 Webster. (9)
4 Webster. (9)
5 Close to the Wind. (118)
6 Webster. (17)
7 Webster. (18)
8 Foster, Hubert. 'The defence of Australia together with remarks thereon'. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, V.2/35, 1908. (Copy in Defence Library Services)
9 Close to the Wind. (192)
10 Close to the Wind. (193)
12 Vigne. (424-433)
13 Close to the Wind. (193)
14 Close to the Wind. (194)
15 Webster (26)
16 Webster (28)
18 Close to the Wind. (196) Webster notes (pp. 39-43) that despite Creswell's claim in Close to the Wind, there do not appear any such articles in 1886 editions of the Register. There are some letters by a 'Johnny Haultaut' – presumably a pen name, but these letters lack Creswell's style or badge. There are some letters by Foster, Hubert. 'The defence of Australia together with remarks thereon'. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, V.2/35, 1908. (Copy in Defence Library Services)
19 Close to the Wind. (198-199)
20 Webster (95)
21 Webster (81)
22 Webster (90-90)
23 Webster (90-95)
24 Webster (59-63)
28 Vigne, Randolph. 'A Colonial Gunboat in the Boxer War.' The Mariner's Mirror. Volume 86, No. 4. November 2000. (424-433) This article contains a lengthy account of some 5000 words which according to Vigne, was typed up later by GL Macandie, secretary to the Australian Naval Board 1941-46, with the original now in the possession of the Creswell family. It forms the basis for the account here of the China expedition.
29 Vigne. (432)
30 Vigne. (433)
31 Webster (110)
32 See footnote in Webster, p.114.
33 Evans, Alun. 'Creswell's Crusade.'
34 Webster (120)
35 Webster (124)
41 Evans, Alun. 'Creswell's Crusade.' Webster (147)
42 Webster (147)
44 Webster (142-148)
45 Webster (156)
47 Nicholls. (112)
48 Evans, Alun. 'Creswell's Crusade.' Webster (110)
49 Report of the Director of the Naval Forces (Capt. WR Creswell, C.M.G.) on his visit to England in 1906 to inquire into the latest naval developments. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Papers V.2/82. 1906.
52 Nicholls (116-12)
54 Foster, Hubert. 'The defence of Australia together with remarks thereon'. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, V.2/35, 1908.
55 Nicholls (144)
56 Webster (187)
57 Webster (189-191)
58 Department of Defence (Navy). 'Foundations of the Royal Australian Navy'.
59 Webster (194)
60 Webster (202)
61 Department of Defence (Navy).
62 Nicholls (182)
64 75 Years.
65 Webster (229-232)
66 Nicholls (221)
68 Webster (238) suggests this number; the 1928 official historian's account suggests 3,800 Permanent Personnel (see Jose: Appendix 5). Presumably Jose is not including Reservists.
70 Nicholls (221)
73 Webster (243)
74 Webster (250)
75 Webster (254-256)
76 Webster (259-261)
77 Webster's monograph has two mentions of Jose (pp. 258 and 269), with the first stating 'By 1917 Thring had broken down the work of the intelligence gathering section of the War Staff as follows; and then he lists four names, of which 'Captain Jose' in the fourth. However, he lists two Lieutenant Commanders and then a Lieutenant and then Jose - other biographical details on him do not state whether he was a Navy or an Army captain – a considerable rank difference. The latter seems more likely: given Jose's comparative lack of experience in military matters an appointment as a very senior officer is doubtful.
78 Webster (278-9)
79 Webster (281)
80 Webster (283)
81 Nicholls (276)
82 Nicholls (276)
83 Plaque erected by his 'family and brother officers' in 1937, within the Naval Chapel, Garden Island, Sydney.
85 Evans, Alun. 'Creswell's Crusade.' A Navy for Australia. Sydney: ABC Enterprises. 1986. (83) (Copy in file B.088047. RAN College Historical Collection)
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Band Deployment Group, attached to HMAS Kanimbla, play at Wet ‘n’ Wild, Hawaii, as part of the United States Independence Day Celebrations.

Lead vocalist of the Royal Australian Navy Band deployment group, Able Seaman Musician (ABMuSN) Stephanie Hutchinson sings during a performance held at the Hale Koa Hotel, in Waikiki, Hawaii, during United States Independence Day festivities. She’s joined here by ABMuSN Melissa Ballantyne (left) and Leading Seaman Musician David Coit.
Able Seaman Musician (ABMUSN) Melissa Ballantyne (left), Leading Seaman Musician David Coit, ABMUSN Ellen Zyla and ABMUSN Adam Arnold of the Royal Australian Navy Band, play during a performance held at the Hale Koa Hotel, in Waikiki, Hawaii, during United States Independence Day festivities.
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**Book Reviews**

**Sydney Cipher and Search**
by Peter Hore

On 19 November 1941 the Australian light cruiser *HMAS Sydney*, commanded by Captain Joseph Burnett, encountered the German raider *Kormoran* (under the command of Captain Theodore Detmers) off the coast of Western Australia. In the ensuing battle both ships were mortally damaged and later sank; *Sydney* with the loss of her entire crew of 645 men.

*Sydney* was the glamour ship of the Royal Australian Navy following her exploits in the Mediterranean in 1940, during which she saw extensive action, that included her destruction of the Italian cruiser *Bartolomeo Colleoni*. Her loss was a severe blow to Australia and one which is still felt by many to this very day. Many theories regarding her final action have been put forward including German treachery, Japanese involvement prior to Pearl Harbor and an Australian Government cover up. Any book written on this subject is bound to receive in-depth scrutiny, and skepticism, from a wide range of academics, historians and ordinary readers. This latest book on the loss of *Sydney* is no exception.

Captain Peter Hore, RN (Retired) has done an excellent job piecing together new information and previously overlooked evidence. His well written and very interesting book is based on Captain Detmer’s version of the battle; with several new details from an encrypted account of the battle which remained hidden, for many years, in a dictionary owned by Detmers. Captain Hore has been involved in researching the loss of *Sydney* for several years and this has included a painstaking search of archival material held in Britain and Australia, on behalf of the Australian Government, as well as conducting interviews with surviving *Kormoran* officers. The story unfolds in an easy to read detective novel style which is substantiated by extensive use of first hand reports from German and Allied sources.

Much of the book deals with the controversy of *Sydney’s* loss and the location of the action (and thus the location of the wrecks of both vessels). Hore has used his extensive knowledge of the German official accounts, Detmer’s own coded account, interviews with German survivors and several Allied documents on the action to try and piece together what really happened in the desperate fight between the two ships. Much of this documentation has been available to researchers for many years; but a re-analysis of the decryption and cross comparison of each item had previously not been done and shows the value of dedicated and thorough research.

Captain Hore also does not pull any of his punches when calling to account some researchers and historians who have made a number of poor assumptions based on their failure to adequately review the available primary resources.

The book also examines two very important aspects concerning *Sydney’s* loss. The first of these is British Admiralty directions and policy when warships were confronted with potential enemy raiders. Hore’s analysis of this indicates that a number of British warships, engaged in hunting raiders, made the almost fatal error of approaching too close before adequate identification was made. This includes one British cruiser that came within one mile of a disguised British merchant cruiser whose captain was able to convince his compatriot that he was a harmless merchant ship! The second aspect is British cruiser construction and the flaws in design and construction which could have led to *Sydney’s* loss. Hore concludes that British warships were generally well built and could give and take a punch. This is supported by the first hand evidence of the action and, once the wreck of *Sydney* was found, this was corroborated by an analysis of the damage sustained by the cruiser. The extensive damage sustained to *Sydney’s* bow by a torpedo strike appears to be the fatal blow that ultimately caused the loss of the ship.

Finally Hore’s research was also important as it assisted those searching for the wrecks of both vessels. His analysis of German and Allied records as well as the first hand account of the action by Reinhold Malapert (*Kormoran’s* communications officer) supported the ‘northern’ location of the action. Peter Hore readily shared this information with ‘Wreck Hunter’ David Mearns and the research was instrumental in setting the datum for the 2008 search. Hore’s research was vindicated when the wrecks were finally located in the northern search area some 2,500 metres deep on the floor of the Indian Ocean in March 2008.

The book’s subtitle “Solving the last great mystery of the Second World War” is, however, somewhat misleading. While Hore’s research helped to locate the site of the *Sydney/Kormoran* action, and subsequently the wrecks of both vessels, there is no firm evidence put forward as to why Burnett took his heavily armed cruiser to within one mile of *Kormoran*. Captain Hore supports the claim made by Detmers that *Sydney* did not suspect *Kormoran* was a raider - yet why did *Sydney* continually repeat her signal challenges right up to the point that Detmers made his fateful decision to open fire? Did Burnett simply make a fatal tactical error or is it possible that the German Navy was reading Allied naval codes and lured *Sydney* into a deadly (and potentially illegal) trap? This possibility is mentioned in vague terms but never really fully investigated.

Despite this Captain Hore has produced a very enjoyable and exceptionally well researched book; it is highly recommended for the armchair historian and non-naval reader alike. While this book is an excellent addition to the ongoing study of the *Sydney/Kormoran* action it does leave some questions unanswered.

The book outlining the full reason for *Sydney’s* loss has yet to be written; and probably never will.
Book Reviews

Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently

By Roger W. Barnett

Publisher: Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, Maryland
PP: 212 pages plus index

Reviewed by Captain Gordon A. Andrew, RAN

For an Australian reader the title of this book needs clarification so as not to be misleading. When the author uses the word “Navy” he does not do so generically – this book is unapologetically and specifically about the United States Navy and the United States’ strategic policy. Further, it is about the strategic culture that led to the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. This was, in the author’s view, “…a unique focusing of the various elements of Navy Strategic Culture” (p. 86) and “…a coherent, persuasive and powerful strategy document” (p. 100). Since the publication of the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, the Navy has been ‘…cast back…’ (p. 100) and its strategies of the last 20 years ‘…have not qualified as operational, or even planning, strategies’ (p. 123). This view of the Reagan-era Maritime Strategy as the pinnacle of US Naval strategic thinking is perhaps unsurprising given that the author’s last job in active naval service was in 1983 as the Head of Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and therefore responsible for the production of the 1984 Maritime Strategy.

Navy Strategic Culture builds its case through a straightforward and logical structure. It starts with a broad explanation of strategic culture before focussing on the maritime context that the Navy operates in and why this leads its thinkers to be different. How naval forces are used to achieve strategic goals is then discussed and, at this point, the author is at his most interesting. He never establishes whether a navy trains and develops its officers to be different or just attracts different people. Neither does he look closely at differences in planning and strategy compared to other military officers. Far more interesting is Barnett’s description of what he terms ‘Navy Strategic Culture’. He never establishes whether a navy trains and develops its officers to be different or just attracts different people.

Chapter 7 is the climax and logical end of the book – it explains ‘how the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s pulled all the loose ends together into a coherent, truly strategic, approach to conflict with the Soviet Union’ (p. 7).

However, the book doesn’t end there. There is one final chapter prior to the Conclusion entitled ‘Retrospective’. The author expands its role is to ‘…address countercultural issues – ones with the potential to thwart the full realization of the culture…’ (p. 7). It deals with the perceived evils of a changing global security environment, increased ‘jointness’, those that would charge the USN with a disinterest in mine and riverine warfare, those that believe that a modern surface navy is vulnerable, and those that would impose civilian social constructs onto a military. While not adding much to the main argument of the book, it is an interesting account of the author’s view on what has gone wrong since he left the service - more on this later.

Arguably, the USN is also the only navy in the world that could unilaterally publish a document called ‘The Maritime Strategy’. In Australia, a maritime strategy is, of necessity, a way of describing the Defence strategy. But the US Department of the Navy is “…the most strategically independent of the services – it has its own army, navy and air force’ (p 174).

Given the unique nature and size of the USN as a service and strategic entity, what then can an Australian reader draw from Navy Strategic Culture? Is it worth reading and why?

Firstly, our alliance with the US is, in the words of the White Paper, ‘our most important defence relationship’. Navy Strategic Culture gives the reader a detailed and coherent explanation of ‘The Maritime Strategy’ of the 1980s. It does not attempt to discuss the contemporary US maritime strategy (Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower) which is more relevant to our current circumstances but if one views strategic development as evolutionary then this book is invaluable in providing insight into its antecedents.

Secondly, it is an interesting reflection on why naval officers are different from their land equivalents. The book opens with a list of senior joint command appointments in the US that in 2007 were filled by USN Admirals; ADM Fallon at CENTCOM, ADM Stavridis at SOUTHCOM, ADM Mullen as CJCS, and ADM Olson at SOCOM. Navy would appear to be over-represented and Barnett asserts that “…the ability of Navy officers to think strategically, to rise above the minutiae of the tactical battlefield, and to discern "where the big picture fits in" rendered them uniquely valuable as combat commanders in that particular global security environment’ (p 1).

One wonders what Napoleon would make of Australia, where the concepts of jointness and joint command are well-developed and entrenched, and the RAN is proportionally less well-represented in joint commands and senior appointments than in the US.

Unfortunately, this is one of the least well-developed of Barnett’s arguments. He never establishes whether a navy trains and develops its officers to be different or just attracts different people. Neither does he look closely at differences in availability and curricula of schooling and education in comparison to other military officers. Far more interesting treatments of the development or lack thereof, of a naval officer’s character can be found elsewhere – notably At War At Sea by Ronald Spector.

Thirdly, despite the difference in scale, the discussion of expeditionary warfare, the employment of naval forces, and the role of technology are applicable to all maritime forces. As the ADF develops its expeditionary capability with
the introduction into service of the Canberra class LHDs the discussion of the USN view of what it means to be expeditionary – forward, mobile, offensive, self-reliant and adaptable – is relevant and worthy of more discussion as it relates to our circumstances.

Fourth, his litany of contemporary ills in Chapter 9 is a valuable “compare and contrast” exercise for the RAN. The USA is, on the whole, more socially conservative than Australia, and this is reflected in the respective militaries. Where Australia now unexceptionally have our surface combatants commanded by females, send women to sea on the Collins class, and do not discriminate based on sexual orientation, the USN is still grappling with its “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and whether or not to allow women at sea on submarines. Reading Barnett’s reflections on this issue I was struck at how anachronistic the arguments sounded – and was reminded very strongly of the debate Australia had in the mid 1980s. We have moved on – I expect the USN will also, given time.

Finally, the Appendix alone is a ‘must-have’ for any staff college student or general writer on naval and maritime affairs. I started this review by saying the title for the book was misleading. The title of the Appendix – Treasure Chest of Quotations – is, in contrast, absolutely accurate. Fifty-six pages of short quotations assembled from a wide variety of sources covering all the subjects covered in the book and then some. It is a treasure that rewards regular revisiting.

Navy Strategic Culture is an idiosyncratic look at the USN and maritime strategy in the 1980s by an author who retired from active service 25 years ago and has viewed the subsequent development of USN strategy from an academic’s stand-point. The author’s closeness to the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s is both a boon for the rich detail he can bring, and a distraction as his personal views sometime cloud his logic. Although the book does not completely satisfy its sub-title’s claim to answer “Why the navy thinks differently” it is, overall, a valuable commentary on navies, on maritime thought and on the USN’s view of the world. It is a valuable touchstone for how our navy, and our defence force, conducts ourselves as maritime forces operating in a maritime environment under a maritime strategy and it should encourage us to think more about our own Navy strategic culture.
extraordinary success.

Operational competence, daring, and willingness to do whatever missions the nation required also contribute to the Marines’ enduring renown, which is another major theme in *Leathernecks*. From Lieutenant Presley O’Bannon leading Marines 600 miles across the desert to confront the pasha of Tripoli at Derna in 1805, to Captain Samuel Miller’s brave resistance to the British in the battle of Bladensburg in the War of 1812, to countless displays of extraordinary toughness and heroism in the Battle of Fallujah in 2004, Marines continued to distinguish themselves in battle, and prove the organization to be unique, flexible and (to use a modern term) highly deployable. Archibald Henderson, the longest serving (1820-1859) and one of the most influential Commandants ‘...never forgot that, in the final analysis, the Corps’ reputation rested on Marines’ performance in battle’ (p. 61).

*Leathernecks* contains many morsels of insight into the Marines’ rich traditions. Those not immersed in Corps history may enjoy discovering the origins of the Marine Hymn (its author is unknown, but it was made a mainstay of the Marine Band partly by John Philip Sousa, who led the Band from 1880-1892), the source of the monikers “Leathernecks” and “Devil Dogs”; why the Marines have the rank of gunnery sergeant, and whence the motto “Semper Fidelis.”

The final theme readers will note is how much the Corps should at war for nine years, and questions about their purpose and future, along with a more general uncertainty about the future of warfare and American strategy. Defense budget hawks are known to wonder aloud why the United States effectively has a second Army, Air Force, and Navy inside the Marine Corps. At over 202,000, the Marines are the smallest of the US military Services, but larger than the British Army and the entire Australian Defence Forces. Some are also beginning to question the ongoing utility of amphibious assault, one of the Corps’ key missions; and after two protracted land wars in recent years, analysts have suggested that the Marines have become little more than another Army.

By Congress, the newly-nominated Commandant James F. Amos (who would be the first aviator to serve the post in Corps history) will confront, among other challenges, the inevitable consequences of a force that has been at war for nine years, and questions about how much the Corps should prepare for its conventional missions versus the kinds of wars fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. But *Leathernecks* does not tackle these questions in the final chapter, “The War on Terror,” and neither does it reference some of the more controversial incidents involving Marines in recent years. In November 2005 a group of Marines allegedly killed 24 Iraqis, including women, children, and elderly people in a rampage in the city of Haditha, Iraq. The trials of the accused are not yet complete, but as a rather notorious event that occurred during the Marines’ tenure in Anbar province, it would seem to merit at least a mention. The chapter also describes an incident during the battle for Fallujah in November 2004, in which a wounded Marine Sgt. Rafael Peralta pushed a grenade underneath his body, apparently to save his fellow Marines. But the authors do not go on to note that Peralta’s likely act of heroism remains controversial; the U.S. Defense Department did not award him a posthumous Medal of Honor, as recommended by the Marine Corps, because an investigation into the matter concluded that the nature of his wounds would have prevented Peralta from making a conscious decision to smother the grenade. His family has refused to accept the next lower award – the Navy Cross – and the matter reportedly remains in dispute.

While it may be unnecessary to mention every controversy in the long history of the Marines, the lack of discussion on such recent events may suggest an inclination in the book more generally. Moreover, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq receive a fairly superficial treatment in Chapter 15, which also contains factual inaccuracies, such as that the US Army’s First Armored Division helped to put down the Baghdad uprising of Moqtada al-Sadr and his followers in April 2004 (p. 433-434). In fact it was the First Cavalry Division, which took over responsibility of the area from First Armored during the worst day of the uprising, April 4th, and continued an intense battle through the end of that month. But this may be understandable given that these events occur at the end of 235 busy years.

Despite these deficiencies, the book makes for both a visual and an intellectual treat, and will deservedly adorn the coffee tables and bookshelves of anyone interested in the Marine Corps, maritime history, and US military history. Indeed, readers will readily relate to the aphorism recounted in the Preface that “there are only two types of people in the world, Marines and those who wish they could have been Marines.”

Reviewer Celeste Ward Gventer, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, was political adviser to the operational commander of US forces in Iraq in 2006 and deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations capabilities in the U.S. Department of Defense in 2007-08.
HMAS Sydney (II) returns to Alexandria on 20 July 1940 after her victory in the engagement with the Italian cruiser Bartolomeo Colleoni. Shortly before she entered harbour, the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, made a general signal to the Fleet, giving arrival details and adding ‘Give her a rousing cheer.’ As later described, ‘Her own destroyers started it off by hauling out of line in the channel and cheering her as she passed them. Her berth lay at the far end of the harbour, a distance of about two miles from the boom. Every ship in the harbour had cleared lower deck, and as she passed down harbour they cheered in turn. To one of Sydney’s company it was a “continuous roar for about fifteen minutes... something I will never forget.” The Australian destroyers - each flying seven Australian flags for the occasion - gave her a tremendous welcome and Waller [Captain Hec Waller, RAN], leading the cheering in [HMAS] Stuart, gave an Australian flavour to his greeting with the signal, “Whacko Sydney.” It was a great Australian day in Alexandria.
ANI On-line: A guide to the website.

Our website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the previous site, the site also features a library of past journals, a discussion forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help you take full advantage of all its features.

Obtaining an account

In order to access the features of the site you must have a user account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, navigate to the website www.naval institute.com.au using your web browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member ID and password.

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Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website (figure 1) and click the “Members Login” item (figure 2). Enter your member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click the “Login” button. The case of the member ID and password are important: i.e. “CaSe” and “case” are considered entirely different words by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as a single “*” to prevent others from seeing your password as you type.

If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.

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In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the “Logout” link in the grey status bar (figure 4).

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The personal information that you provide will be visible to other members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off-line records.

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In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login and click the “Forum” menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that you would like to view by clicking its “View Topics” button (figure 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its “View this topic” link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, you may add your own by clicking the “Add New Topic” button (figure 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by clicking “Add New Post”. Fill in the heading and body of your reply and click the “Submit” button to add your reply to the topic. If you change your mind while writing your reply, you may click the “Cancel” button and your reply will not be added to the topic.

Further questions

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Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Separate paragraphs by one line. Single spacing only. Use one space only after stops and colons.

**Conventions:**
Use numbers for 10 and above, words below. Ship names use italics in title case; prefixes such as *HMAS* in capitals and italics. Book and Journal titles use italics.

Use single quotation marks for quotations. Do not use hyphens for any rank except Sub-Lieutenant.

**Citations:**
Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use footnotes to explain any points you want the reader to notice immediately. Book titles follow Author surname, first name, title if any. Title. Place of publication: publisher, year of that edition.

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Please send to the Editor on <talewis@bigpond.com.au>

**Editorial considerations:**
The Editor reserves the right to amend articles where necessary for the purposes of grammar correction, and to delete tables or figures for space considerations.

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Naval personnel from the present-day *HMAS Sydney* prepare for the 2010 ANZAC day march in their home city

*(Photo courtesy of Evan Williams)*

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HMA Ships Pirie and Balikpapan stands by to conduct a tow exercise off the coast of Darwin during the Minor War Vessels Concentration Period, 1 June 2010.