Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

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Autumn 2003

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE
I he Australian \a\al Institute was formed and incorporated m the ACT in I97S. The main objectives of (he Institute arc:
•	to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the
maritime profession: and
•	to pro\ ide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navj and
the maritime profession.
Hie Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. Views and opinions expressed in the Journal of the lustration Naval Institute are those of the authors and not necessarily those o\' the Institute, the Royal Australian N;i\v or the Australian Defence Organisation. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, eomment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

Chief of \a\\

PATRON Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, AO RAN

President Vice President Secretary Treasurer Journal Editor Councillor
Councillor (buneillor
Councillor Councillor

COUNCIL MEMBERS
Rear Admiral Rowan \1olTitl. RAN Captain Richard Menhinick, CSC R \\ Commander Craig Pritchard, RAN
Ms Kym Williams
Mr Andrew forties
Commodore James (ioldriek. CSC RAN
( aptain Peter Jones. AM RAN
Captain Rav Griggs, CSC RAN
Dr David Stevens
Commander Kevin Corles. RNZN

Public Officer

I leuienant Patience Neal. RAN

AREA REPRESENTATIVES
I he follow ing Institute members have agreed to aet as points of contact on membership issues and for submitting articles, hook rev iews and eorrespondenee for the Journal.

\CSC, Canberra AD1A. Canberra
Darwin
DMAS Albatross DMAS Cairns HMAS Creswetl IIM\S Penguin DMAS Stirling New Zealand

CMDR Craig Pritchard
DrJohn Reeve I CDR JoBastian
(APT Steve Pearson I III Darryn Mullms CMDR Henry Pearee ( Ml )R John Shevlin (APT Ray (iriggs CMDR Kevin Corles

eraig.priteharejf(/ defenee.gov.au l.rceveo adfa.edu.au jo.bastian't/ defcnee.gov ,au Stephen.pearsonia dcfence.gov.au darrv n. mu 11 insm defenee.gov.au henry, pearcem dcfenee.gov ,au joint.shcvlinu/ defenee.gov .au rav.uriggs't/ defenee.gov .au kevin.corles a nzdf.mil .nz

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
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CONTENTS
ANl Friends and Supporters/ANI Library	2
From the Editorial Board	3
Letters to the Editor	4
2002 Vernon Parker Oration	6
Dr Norman Friedman
The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan	16
John Jeremy
Australia's War Against People Smuggling	17
Commander Ken Burleigh, RAN
Australian Naval Medicine and the Boxer Uprising 1900-01	23
Commander Neil Westphalen, RAN
The Inaugural Frank Broeze Memorial Lecture	30
The Hon Kim C Beazley. MP
SHIPHANDLING CORNER: Some Developments down aft - A Brief Look at	--
the Schilling Rudder
Captain Ray Griggs, CSC RAN
BOOK REVIEWS:
•	Sober Men and True: Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy 1900-1945
Re viewed by Dr John Reeve	41
•	Recent Defence Policy Documents
Reviewed by Amanda Coghlan

ABN 45 988 480 239

ISSN 0312-5807

Front Cover: HMAS Manoora encountering heavy seas during transit to the Gulf. (RAN) Back Cover: HMAS Anzac flying the Battle Ensign while providing NGS to allied troops in the southern Al Faw peninsular. (RAN)
The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute is printed by: New Millennium Print 1/38 Kembla Street. Fyshwick. ACT 2609
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BECOME A FRIEND OR SUPPORTER OF THE ANI
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ANI LIBRARY
The ANI Library has been repatriated from the Defence Library system and is now housed in the KAN Sea Power Centre. The Institute will gladly accept book donations on nasal and maritime mailers |where they will cither be added to the library or traded for difficult to obtain books). Could prospective donors please contact Dr Da\ id Stevens on (02) 62002423.
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FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD
The Annual (leneral Meeting (A(iM) was held on 18 March 2003. and members agreed to amend (he Institute's membership categories to those of members and honorary members, dispensing with the previous distinction between uniformed and civilian members; Council membership was also amended to reflect these changes. A Special (leneral Meeting vvill be held later in the year to consider updates to the administrative sections of the Constitution. Ihe dale will be advised in the Winter Edition of the Journal.
During the AGM. Rear Admiral David Campbell, RAN (Rel'd) issued a challenge to all members to increase the Institute's membership by recruiting at least one new member a year.
The third King-Hall Navy History Conference on The Nervy and the Nation will be held in Canberra on 24-23 July 2003. The annual ANI dinner will be held in conjunction with the conference on 24 July and Professor Geoffrey Till will deliver the Vernon Parker Oration. The insert to this Edition provides administrative and registration details.
The Editorial Hoard seeks articles on naval or maritime issues for publication in the Journal. Articles may range in si/e from a few pages to 10- pages - anything larger should be submitted to the Sea Power Centre for possible publication as a Working Paper. Articles concerning operations or administration policy are of particular interest but we will consider papers on any relevant topic. As much of the RAN's operational and administrative history is poorly recorded, the recollections of members (and others) on these topics are keenly sought.
The Journal will publish articles and letters under a pen name if prospective authors so desire; the Editor will manage the list and identities of such authors.
Hack copies of the Journal (where held) cost S3 for members and SI 3 for non-members. The Institute will take back old copies of the Journal if members no longer wish to hold them.
EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor	Mr Andrew Forbes	andrevv.forhes 1 ui defence.gov .au
History articles	Dr David Stevens	dav id.slevensl ui defence.gov.au
New Zealand articles	CMDR Kevin Codes	kcvin.corlesft/ nzdf.mil.n/
Shiphandling Corner	("APT Ray Griggs	ray.griggsft/. dcfcncc.gov an
Book Reviews	Dr John Reeve	j'.recvcu/ adfa.edu.au
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Letters to the Editor

Historic dun Restoration
(Set I ('DR G Swindon, p. 20, Spring 2002)
< omntander Anthony Vine, RAN (Navy Safety ( ertijication & Acceptance Agency) - The efforts ot the members of MM AS Kanimbia's ship's company in restoring the Christmas Island nun are to be commended, however the photograph of the sailors undertaking the work raise serious concerns about how safely the restoration was earned out.
1 he photograph, while being excellent front
a photographic perspective, COUld also be used as a pood example of where Personal Protective I uuiipmcnt (PPT) is not used correctly. The following is of particular concern:
 •	I he sailoi in the background is operating the needle gun while wearing sun glasses and not goggles.
 •	The female sailor in the foreground right, has her coveralls unrolled to her waist, exposing her skin to the dust and grit removed b) her grinder The sailor to the left of the photograph appears to he wearing a tee shut also whilst operating a grinder.
 •	The Christinas Island tiun haxing been on the island smee 1940 would have been painted with a plethora of different paints before and since Us installation. The photograph does not indicate that any precautions were taken during the paint removal to prevent the members involved being exposed to dust panicles (ie dust masks etc). I he accompanying article does not confirm thai the paint was analysed to
ensure that it did not contain heavy metals such as Zinc Chrumatc or I ead prior to ihe restoration I tie RAN has a duty of care to ensure that its personnel use sale work practices both al sea and ashore 1 lie photograph as published does little 10 enhance our reputation as a safe employer.
Reforming \ oral Planning I9"7-7S
(Si i < DRl   I Robertson, pp 14-17, Summer 2003)
Idmiral Wife Hudson,  K RAN (Ret d) - I have
gist finished reading the Summer 2003 Edition Of the Journal and. as always, am most impressed with the quality of input; particularly from   Saw's current  generation of younger

officers, with their very well informed understanding of broader strategic issues and the people factor.
I write now in response to Commodore 'Rocker' Robertson's article Reforming \nval Planning 1977-78, not least because of ins implied criticism of my performance as the Director of Naval Plans, in being laggardly in developing on his behalf a "proper strategic long-range plan'. As our offices were wry close-to each other I am a little surprised that he infers that for six months after receiving a direction from him in January 1978 there was no communication between the two of us.
For the record. I was posted as the Director ofNaval Plans(DNP)on 17"'June 1977 and for the first six months largely engaged in a joint planning review, tasked by the Chiefs of Stall Committee. Throughout 1978 I was busy with a myriad of aetiv Hies attendant upon the position of the then DNP and I recall a constant shuffling of priorities, < ommodore Robertson's strategic plan was one of those and while he may now see n was unduly delayed I can assure lum that Plan Blue had not been forgotten.
On IS'" December 197K I was promoted to Commodore and relieved Rocker as Director General Of Naval Plans and Policy I IK. NPPi I remained m that position foi two years
In August 1979. the Chief of Naval Operational Requirements and Plans, on my recommendation, approved the formulation of a
dedicated team to expedite development and completion Of a review of the RAN'S Force Structure. The end result was called NAVY 2001. That team, responsible to DCiNPP. Consisted of the then Commander Sam Bateman (Staff Officer Plans). Lieutenant Commander I rank Allien (a PWO and DONOR rep). Roger ( leaser (Directorate of Operational Analysis Navy ) and R Stewart ( Research ( Hficcr).
In the covering memo I May 1980) promulgating NAVY 2001 I stated:
\ (I y :<HU had its origin in DI(N) Idmin 37-1, dated 22 July 1977, which established the production <>l a Vow;/ Long Range Plan as a Management Objective The aim was to provide broad guidance for long term naval development, and responsibility was vested in the Director "/ Naval Plans under the oversight ot the Director Oenenil Naval Plans and Policy

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For n number of reasons, principally shortage of staff effort, progress was spasmodic and generally unsatisfactory up in the mid 1979,
Furthermore, it came to be realised that the data hose for the production of a long ranee plan WaSgrossly inadequate if it was to be anything more than a simple extension to the Naval Medium Ranee Flan, embracing a projection oj the existing force structure.
Nevertheless it was obvious that some form of review was urgently needed. Major naval force structure decisions were to he made during the period 1980-81 and looking ahead to
the late 1980s■■■early 1990s, it WOS elear that the time had come to examine whether the RAN should continue in its present form or whether its force structure should follow some other
direction.
In progressing NA t ) 20(11. the review team sought input from a wide range of sources, within and outside the Defence Department
As NAVY2001 developed, its aim was modified from a simple review of the force structure to an identification of force structure options which would, ultimately, he presented to the Chic/ of Naval Staff through his Advisory Committee. Thus. VII ) 2&0I is not in itself the Naval Long Range Plan. It is, however, a step in the right direction.
1 sincerely congratulate Commodore Robertson lor his vision in developing Navy's leehnieolour range of plans. NAVY 2001. part of that process, was invaluable to me when I

later became Chief of Naval Staff in 1985. Although it had been overtaken by other plans it was part of the basis on which the RAN made the difficult transition from the carrier era lo the versatile force the Navy has become today. With appropriate funding it will gel even better   I remain very grateful to Sam liatcman and his team.
For Rocker to now call the present RAN a sort of glori/ied Coast Guard does hint no credit. It certainly docs not reflect the multitude of demands that are being put upon it today, the professionalism of its men and women, nor the esteem in which it is held bs our allied and other na\ ies.
./// Slraezek (Senior Naval Historical Officer) - I read with interest the article by CDRE Robertson and had the opportunity to sec the response from ADVIL Hudson on the development of long range strategic planning in the RAN. To my mind both o\' these items are important contributions to the historiographs of the RAN. The reason for this is that so little has been written on the administrative and organisational history of the Na\y.
I would hope Other officers would follow suit bs putting pen to paper and discuss how Navy as an organisation evolved and functioned since the 1960s.
Bs way of information the Nasal History Directorate holds a set of Plan (ireens as well as copies of Plan Blue.

Crew members from HMAS Darwin investigate a submerged dhow - 26 Mar 03 (RAN)
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Sea Power as Strategy
By Dr Norman Friedman1

Wh.il l ward to talk to you about is a view ol
national strategy, which has to be something
more than simply saying that sea power is very Useful. It you're on an island, very obviously you start talking about what effeel the sea has on whatever you do. A sea power view starts with the fact that it's very easy to move things by sea. easier than any other way. let me give you an example. I was at a discussion of fishery protection and there was apparently a recently celebrated ease in which a poacher operating oil your Southern coast was intercepted, not near your Southern coast, but eventually all the way across the Southern Indian Ocean off South Africa. 'Well you say. that's a pretty remarkable tlrino'. but that's an illustration of the fact that in effect at sea distances shrink very dramatically. They don't shrink in the sense that you just snap your lingers and you're live thousand miles away instantaneously, hut there's a sense in which things gel a whole lot closer. It's an odd sort of sense. I'm not sure how to express it properly, but another way o( saying that is that what floats can be remarkably mobile.
I torn the point of view of defending yourself, that means that anyone else using the sea as a highway can show up anew here around your island. Talking ahout protecting a limited area of your coast becomes self-defeating. People find other places that ate easier to approach or attack. That seems to mean that the defence has a terrible peripheral problem. By the way. that is not unique lo Australia I he United Stales faced much the same problem Is coastal defence the right way to protect the country? A lew years ago we did a study. The argument was that movement by SCa was really quite easy The conclusion was thai it might be a lot less expensive for us to discourage attack by threatening to move our own concentrated force into an enemy's waters, to threaten his coast and present him with the intractable coastal defence problem we faced. That seemed much better than wailing   loi   enemies to come to  us.  That  is

certainly pan of a sea power approach to national defence, an approach which takes into account the full defensive (and offensive) effect of seaborne mobility.
Another part of a sea power approach (and I'll give you some historical examples) is always lo ask what the point of any particular war actually is. Sea power offers alternatives which land powers generally lack: the sea power decides when and where lo attack. Matters are very different from a land power's point o\ view, because if it borders a country bent on invasion, the war is fought simply to slop the invader from overrunning his victim. France in 1914 is a ease in point. If it is not so easy to be overrun, then a government can ask how to get to the desired outcome. It can take a wider view. The wider view may very well be thai attacking some particular place will offer valuable leverage. Your troops participated m exactly that kind of war. Look at (iallipoli, ami forget for a moment that it was badly earned out and horribly tragic. In a strategic sense, it was an attempt to face the central issue in WW I. I rem the point of view of the British I inpire. including! Australia, it was not simply to defend Trance. Rather. H was to defeat Germany, Once Germany lost n would have to disgorge whatever it seized in Turopc. including whatever part of I ranee it got. Hut simply ejecting the Germans from France would not have defeated them, and they would always have been able to strike again (by the way that is one way to see the outcome of W'W'I and the ultimate second round of WWII), The British Tmpire was seaborne. It could not be defeated as long as the Germans could not gain control of the sea. It could, at least in theory, decide when and where to strike at the Germans. Had Gallipoli succeeded, then in theory the British might have knocked the Turks and then the Auslriaiis out of the war. Probably more importantly, they would have strengthened a Russian army, which would have subjected the Germans to a far more desperate two-front war. It was that maritime component that gave the British  Empire the

Edited transcript from the Vernon Parkei Oration delivered on 7 Nov 02 at 11 \f\s Harmon.

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freedom to entertain such possibilities. That they did not work out in practice was tragic, but it does not change the fact that sea power offered alternatives that land power could never have offered. So part of the sea power view is that force should be applied when and where the payoff is greatest. Sea power in effect magnifies the effect of relatively small but extremely mobile land forces.
This point is illustrated by the way the war was actually fought. The Australian Army proved extremely effective in Prance. But that was only part of a larger story. The reason the Army could go to France as opposed to standing in the Northern Territories trying to defend this island was it could be projected by sea - and the Germans had no way what so ever of projecting their own army the same way. We often forget (hat because it's so easy, transport by sea seems almost automatic. It isn't. It was terribly important that the Royal Navy and the other Empire navies, including the RAN. dominated the seas, at least in a positive sense (they could not always keep the Germans from sinking some ships, but they anil not the Germans could move masses of men relatively freely).
Sea power is not just about navies. It is about the way all of a country's military power is used. Sea power affects the way a government views a war. The government may well want to limit its participation. The war may turn out badly: going somewhere may turn out to have been something other titan a really good idea. I realise that although my crystal hall doesn't work, government's do much better, but you know, occasionally they gel it wrong. The fact that the force was moved there by sea and that there is a lot of capacity means it can leave by sea. If the force shows up in ships, projecting air power from moving platforms, then it can leave quietly. If troops are ashore like say. the Marines, then it's a little less quiet, but they can still move away somewhere else when it pays to do so. Otherwise they need permission, both to come and go. and that presents both far more problems and far more loss of prestige on withdrawal. Tear of that loss of prestige can lock a government into disaster.
Sea based forces don't have to have permission to go places. Most of the time your government isn't interested in burning down someone else's country. However, it may be very interested in giving them the idea that

they could get burnt down m future. After all. most of our business isn't the actual violence: it's letting them get that idea. If you have to have permission to be there, ihey can really throw you out and they don't suffer any unpleasant consequences. The ability to go in by yourself is extremely valuable.
Now in a lot of eases it may be that you do much better with coalition partners. However, the ability to go it alone lends to make coalition partners decide their national interest and go along with you. If they have a veto, then there are always a lot of good reasons to veto whatever you want. 'Sou hear a lot about the United States being very unilateral (and here I'm speaking for myself. I'm not a US Government spokesman): we can go burn down Iraq by ourselves, we don't care. Clearly part ol' that is * You can 7 Stop us'. Another part of that is. however, that many governments know they may want to join in but also know that local critics will say: "Well, bad things will happen it van hurl this poor Saddam, a nice man you know, don't hurl him'. Our ability to go it alone gives those governments freedom of choice, because they can tell their local critics that nothing they do will stop us: they might as well follow their interests. During the Gulf War I thmk the Saudi's were extremely nervous about allowing Americans m lo protect Saudi Arabia, and you know that the Iraqis tried very hard to make them a lot more nervous. We showed up with three aircraft carriers, which provided the air defence of Saudi Arabia for a while. Once we could i\o it whether they wanted us lo or not. suddenly they realised they rather wanted us to. Thai made a big difference to us.
Is it always a good thing lo be able lo do it alone.' Well. I must admit that every once in a while a government may try lo do something by itself that isn't very clever. I know that many of our critics feel that we're about to do that. What can I tell you'.' We work lor our governments, and while we do we have lo assume they know what they're doing.
So the first thing about the sea as a venue for moving is that it's possible to move heavy masses and concentrated weight. Another example: When we were in Kosovo the question came up of whether we could deploy attack helicopters. It may be that the real story is the Army didn't want to use them, so they showed how difficult it was to deploy. But I would point out that the Marines hail  large

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amphibious ships, which were in effect moveable bases, and the) could have deployed
attack helicopters or any other sort of helicopters essentially instantly. Now whether that's desirable or not is a Government issue, but the ability to go somewhere without preparation seems to me worth the effort. By the way. the other side of that is the talk thai you're getting now about the danger of Al Qaedfl putting things in containers and God knows how many shipping containers there are. Most of what travels around the world goes by sea and if someone subverts that traffic of course there are problems.
But the important thing ts that there isn't a lot of geography at sea. and that makes a big difference. It also means that ships cannot easily be detected m the open ocean and they can't by the way. if you're not stupid. That means that anyone lacing a descent from the sea has to deal w ith a much larger number of different alternatives and ihtit's a virtual reduction in Ins forces, that's leverage. If you have a numerically small but extremely competent land force, that is terribly valuable. I he I S Marine Corps is a good case in point.
i on may, nave others that you would think of. In any case, seaborne mobility gives such an organisation a lot of advantages, which it doesn't nave if it has to land with permission, it n hits to deploy in a more conventional manner. I hose advantages come with a price. Nun nice tiavitl package or sea based package is quite finite. The unit can't carry as much with it its a large army. On the other hand if it is a lot more effective than whatever they're up against, that's perfectly enough
Now. these arguments are not new. If you go back to the beginning of the 2(>"' Century, Mahan.  who  was  a  US  Navy  Captain,  was
extremely popular because what he said was that navies eliminate distance. Most trade is maritime, so if you can cut maritime trade you starve people, lie was a product of the American civil war. The Union Navy in the civil w;ii imposed a very tough blockade on the South.    Naval    officers    of   his    generation
believed the blockade was decisive, therefore m navies they had the ultimate strategic weapon Much the same as what funis l.c May would later Say about strategic bombers with II bombs. Now it turns out that no. it's not quite as decisive as all that. People faced with embargoes usually find a way to work around   them,   but   when   that   is   done   in

conjunction with something else it is terrifying, for example, the South did manage to break through the blockade, hut at a horrible cost. The    cost    shredded    their    society,    which
probably had effects on whether they would keep lighting. When they were lighting a hot war on land and they were denied a lot of stuff by sea. that made life a lot rougher. If you look at WW I with the Germans, it is clear that blockade alone could not stop them from operating, hut if you look al the way they were say in CM 7-IS the combination of the drain of lighting a war and being blockaded was a very interesting one. What does that say about sea power'.' It says it is very effective, but if you are going for ultimate objectives, by itself it is unlikely to be decisive. 11'the objectives arc not ultimate, the threats you can make from the sea arc likely to be very effective ones. The business about being more independent of distance than land power I think is well worth thinking about. Mahan hoped for decisive action. As I say. il did not quite work as he had hoped.
These are the arguments against him. The mam argument was that one of the elements of a sea power strategy is the descent of land forces on someone else's coast. That is what I have been saying. I am not pushing your navy at the expense of everything else. I am talking about a way of using national forces. In Mahan's day land armies were growing very rapidly and there were a lot of railroads. There was a fair chance that wherever you descended from the sea an army could build up very last to face you down. That is certainly a pail of the story of (iallipoh. 1 would add however, that Gallipoli was a much closer run thing than people realise, that despite an unbelievable catalogue of mistakes, winch I am sine \ou blame on the British, most would not guess at that. Il very nearly worked. The payoff for working would have been that the Germans would have had a much tougher time in the I ast. If the French had held out at all. which they probably would have, the effect would have been absolutely devastating. That is the strategic view that I am advancing. Otherwise you say 'well why Gallipoli?' I mean, it is a strange, remote place. Well, because you get something out of that place.
Well what happens to mass armies'.1 In WWII we learned that we can move enough mechanised materiel b) sea that whatever force comes out of the sea can be fairly, powerful.

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What has happened since is the cost of armies has goes up quite sharply. You find that the cost per man goes way up. therefore the number of people goes down. The number of organised units goes down. The best piece of news of all is that a lot of the people who probably would oppose you (and us also) are not very wealthy. They are unlikely to be able to pay to replace or repair what they have It used to be that they could get it tree from the Russians or the Chinese. The Chinese seem much less interested iit giveaways and the Russians have gone out of that business altogether. That suggests that the Future of mass armies is no! good, that most armies will get smaller if the) want to remain mechanised. But if they do not mechanise they will probably be easier to destroy, from the point of view of a mobile high lech organisation, that is excellent news. Also you know that international trade is increasing, that people tend to specialise for economic reasons. That may mean that if access to the sea is broken, it is actually more important now than it would have been in Mahan's time. That may be one of the messages of globalisation. Again from the point of view of imposing national will by the sea. that is interesting.
Now I must tell you that if I had been giving this talk say five years ago, I would have mentioned an American analysis that really there was very little in the world that was more than a couple of hundred miles inland Therefore, we could live with shorter-range naval aircraft. We could get rid of the tankers that allow us to project inland, because after all when would we ever really care about anything more than 100-150 miles from the sea. Then we discovered that there's a country without a coastline that we were recently involved in and there are two ironies. One. we got it wrong. Two. a lot of what we did in Afghanistan was maritime, which was interesting.
Australia has a relatively small population, which is extremely well educated. You arc-very good at high technology: those are your strengths. As an outsider I apologise for talking about what you should do. but it would seem to me that you should get very interested in technological leverage, because if you can take a consolidated force and hit someone with it effectively, that's probably the best pressurc you can make. If you need numbers, then even if you  get  a  population  of 50  million   (as

recently proposed, hut apparently not terribly popular) that's still mil a billion and a half right'.' Too. if you look at the new forms of commercial surveillance what you find is that photo satellites are really not very good at finding moving objects. They're very good at finding large concentrated objects. A client can certainly ask to look at his border and see if anyone is getting ready to attack. That almost means thai large land armies setting up in advance where it lakes them weeks or months to bulk up large concentrations are going to be detected - which by the way says that what the coalition army did in the Gulf Wat will not work. To do that massive Hankmg attack we had to build up a large force. It would seem to me that your chances of effectiveness get better compared to larger more or less fixed forces. Land forces can't move that fast, because although the vehicles are quite last they do not carry much with them, so that they have to slop to fuel every so often. They also need lots o\' spares and maintenance. I ven if the vehicles make 50 miles an hour on a road they cannot keep that up for long. Ships are not as fast. 30 knots is not 50 miles an hour and certainly not 500. but because we carry a lot with us at sea. we go a lot further.
A very good British naval historian once said it this way. If you look at a convoy battle in WWII and the distance say from London to Warsaw, which in land terms is an unimaginable distance, the whole thing lakes a couple of weeks. To cover the same distance on land you're talking about months or years But the force is very thin. The number of troops would maybe be a battalion, maybe a couple ol' squadrons of aircraft. So when you're looking at what happens at sea. you're looking at things that are spread out. Things like reconnaissance and deception tend to count more at sea than they do on land. A phrase I once saw in a novel about land warfare was 'an land, geography is destiny*. If you are smart and you look at a map you can figure out what will happen. Helicopters make-life more interesting, but if mass lias to go by road, there are only so many roads. It is not like that offshore. If I am projecting land power from offshore, at least when I start, I can start from an unpredictable place. I can also reduce what has to go ashore by putting more of the firepower if you like, offshore. If it is all unified of course. I can then call on that firepower from offshore. (If course, you have

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to buy the right Stuff to do that. In addition I tnaj be able to keep more of the logistics base offshore, for longer. That means I land less and I land a greater proportion of teeth. That can make it easier to nunc around. There are obviously limits to what I can land and Obviously it most of the support is from aircraft, or missiles or guns offshore, there will be times when things go wrong so that whoever goes ashore wants some organic backing. Right now for us is a major issue as to how much organic materiel the Marines have to carry ashore.
If you bus yourself a finite Navy, or finite sea based force, it has to do a very wide variety of things. Because sou can hang around UJlliked and you can gather intelligence. Very often >our government wants that more than anything else. There is some crisis brewing. you would like to know w hat is happening and you would prefer people not to ligure out that you arc finding that out Even with satellites, which will eliminate your national treasury very rapidly, people know when they are around. You cannot move them around very easily, YOU can to some extent, but that raises the price. With aircraft, most people who like aeroplanes can buy books showing all the specialised aircraft in the world and they can easily guess exactly what they do. Submarines are different Most people in this region cannot find submarines to save their lives. So they are a way of gathering things covertly. The covert part includes not effecting an ongoing crisis until you decide to do it. That is valuable because it maximises your government's range of choices.
Once a decision has been made the same navy shows up for coercion. In that eases it is definitely worth while fur people to see it. The tact that the) cannot throw it out In denying it a base ol some kind makes a big difference. That says that larger more survivable surface ships buy a great deal. Since I work for a Navy that really likes big ones you might have guessed thai I would say that - but that does not make it any less true. Then there is this. A lot ol governments like tO impose embargoes as a way of imposing pressure and your Navy has been very prominent in the embargo in the Northern Arabian Sea against Iraq. Well as I said before, embargoes do not often cripple. but they are a way of applying pressure. Flexible ships offer the widest possible choice, which means that the government, which pays

for  them,  gets  the  most   for  its  money.   I apologise if what I say is obvious.
Then there is strike. I would distinguish strike from a protracted campaign because very often you want to show someone that you can come back and hurt them later if they stay out e>\' line. For example, in 1986 we thought that the Libyans had ordered the bombing e>\' that disco in Berlin, which killed some Americans. We decided to give them a hard lime. We went in with a mixture of carrier and land based very long-range air. I think the land base was to force the British to agree that they were in with us (the aircraft Hew from British bases). We were very hig on making our allies be shown to he part of what we were doing. Again my guess, this is not official. The main point of this to me was not that we achieved enormous destructive effect in Libya, we did not. everyone knew that. Later there was some talk that a couple of Tomahawks would have done the same job. What we did in Libya was we basically waltzed through their air defence system and did not get hurt. We showed we could come back later and do what we like. Well that seems to have impressed them, they did not come back and do a lot more terrorism. We were pretty happy about that.
Then there were protracted ground campaigns and you may be about to see one soon. There I would say the pay off on projecting by sea is that we pick where we go. That means that it is much harder for someone else to mount a serious defence. Number two: if things do not do that well, we can leave. Now. if you were a maritime power that thinks like that and you have more land oriented coalition partners, they generally do not appreciate this point of view at all. Their objective is to make sure that you stay with them and preferably that a lot of you stay with them more or less permanently. Your government's objective is to gain some kind of end - which is not to he nice to whoever you're partnered with. Before WWI there was a discussion in Britain o\ whether they would basically go for maritime or a coalition land oriented view. It seemed to me reading the discussion at the time, that the proponents of total coordination with the French on land were saying 'well this naval fluff which is a sea power view, is sort <>t cold blooded, even reptilian'. Well they lost a lot of people including a lot of your people showing how warm hearted they were towards their coalition

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Number 108

partner. The last I looked you signed up to be Australians rather than citizens of some wider assembly oi' countries like, say, ASEAN. Alliances are not the same as nationhood. Coalitions are often a \ery nice thing to have, but at some point your national interests may differ. The ability to choose I think is worth a lot. These are questions that Come up. If you buy a sea power range of strategy, it costs. So how much leverage do you get out of sea power alone?
The answer is a lot. but not everything. This one is important. It matters what your objectives are. If you are a satisfied country (you qualify, we qualify) there is not much territory that you really want all that badly, for example, we went in and overran Afghanistan. To Afghans presumably Afghanistan is a very valuable place. I do not think that very many Americans would regard it as a lerrilic place to run. They may claim it is a strategic place between central Asia and Pakistan, but from my point of view we would prefer not to be in a strategic place at all. it is a miserable place, you know that. Our interest was in destroying a safe rear area for Al Qaeda. That is a transitory interest. You go in and do something very unpleasant and then you find something else to do. Because we have forces that are very easy to redeploy, that is possible. Once you land somewhere and you garrison it. it suddenly becomes terribly important. That is a very distorting thing. You have had a little experience of that and we have had a whole lot more. How much did you really care about the merits of Vietnam? Well it was pail of a larger war. How important was Vietnam itself.' Once we'd invested enough bodies, we couldn't figure that one out. If you look at different places that people describe as strategic, usually they arc strategic as part o\' some bigger war. When the bigger war goes away, our national strategy is going to change, or at least the details will change. The less that you are forced to buy permanent presence in places the happier you're going to be. So you want the benefits of being there without the bad part about having to he there permanently.
If I get a lot out of the fact that my enemies cannot figure out where 1 am. then how long docs that last? All I can tell you is that I spent a lot of time studying how we tracked the Sovnet fleet. It's hard to track moving ships at sea especially if they do not cooperate. The methods we used, passive satellites, some radar

satellites, do not really correspond to commercial satellite applications. That says to me. that probably the future of the sea sanctuary is better than the future of a lot of others. When you buy ships, and now I w ill get to specific naval things, there is a tendency to specify exactly what you are supposed to do. The trouble is they last a long tune and your crystal ball tends not to be all that hot. So actually being a bit bigger pays o\Y. flic reason a bit bigger does not really cost that much is that what supports a ship at sea is buoyancy, yiui do not have to pay a lot just to sit there. II you buy yourself a much bigger aeroplane you have to spend a lot more on propulsion. If you buy yourself ten million more tanks, you have bought yourself ten million tanks. So for me as an American it has to be easier to modify, and by the way. also a lot harder to sink if you design it right. All o\' these things do not automatically work, if you are a dummy you do it wrong and bad things happen to you. you have been in this business long enough to know that.
There is a lot of interest in netting and remote sensing. Navies probably do more of that right now than other services, because ambiguity and reconnaissance play a larger role in naval warfare, because they are more spread out. One thing you will see I think, is that if the Army is going more tow aids vv hat we call the digitised hattlelield. where netting allows a small army unit to attack beyond its own hori/on. you will see them split into smaller units and their thinking will he more like what we associate with naval thinking The great problem is they will have to solve logistics problems, which do not occur at sea. By the way. also if you gel a lot more lethality out of a numerically small but very Sophisticated army unit, that becomes a very natural thing to project by sea and if it's very lethal, it is really a nasty thing to project. Sou know there is a lot of interest in stealth. This is not the right talk for it. hut I think stealth probably will not last that long, that is because computers get better all the time. That says 'do mil worry so much about stealth, be sitrvivtiblc*. The weapons do not get much better. It is not that easy to sink something if you make it a bit bigger, right.
Let us look at some historical cases. The point I want to make is that there are really different ways of looking at wars. Look at the two World Wars. I was a defence analyst for

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years during the Cold War You know that we always talked about the central front. Now the central front was called central because it was the middle o\' the West (ierman border. But 0b\ iousK many people thought the central front was central to what would happen. So the question always was 'What if the Russian Army was Oily good? I question now whether it was. If they were good, they would overrun all of German} and Prance and they get to the Channel. Well would that win'wwill? Our answer in the Maritime Strategy was no. WW 111 would really be about whether Russians would dominate the world. We would not like it if they reached the Channel. I mean, we would prefer the Europeans still to be intact. On the other hand we also had this sneaky feeling thai some of them might decide to avoid having their countries completer) trashed by surrendering. Our answer was 'Guess what? The war does not eml when you give up, so you may as well fight*. Phis was nni always popular For some reason. I cannot imagine why, hui thai is really a difference in
outlook.
The other thing was this. If you look at the central front in the Gold War and you imagine a war actually occurring, ii becomes a horrible meal grinder like the Western front in W W'l. So if you are an analyst and you think that you are earning your pay. the question that comes up is 'inn there some way to fight WWI in which a whale generation of Westerners did not get killeil'' Well. I was involved in developing the US Maritime Strategy and in effect We were saying 'yes there is', because if you look at the seaward Hanks of any advance into Europe, those Hanks become terribly interesting II you present a real threat to those Hanks, then w hoes er is advancing has to lake account of it and probably has to pull back until he secures it. That means that if you are willing to take real risks at sea. because Hanking attacks are going lo be expensive and ineky. then there is a way of slowing down a Soviet advance. Now why would you care about that? Because a lot of NATO strength was through mobilisation - there were a lot of reservists. They could not maintain standing forces the si/e of the Russians, but if you could make sure that any war in central In rope was in slow motion, there was a fair chance that the odds would even up. Another example of the Maritime Strategy was in the far East We got
very friendly with the Chinese. The Russians

had a feeling that one day the Chinese would like to have Siberia back. The Chinese have maps that show that the Tsarists stole Siberia and that it was very unfair - ami it was only a mere three or four hundred years ago (as you know that is moments) and the Russians would never quite forget that possibility. So that would lie down fairly large Russian forces. They really could not redeploy them because o\' poor communications, but we were interested also in tying down mobile forces, lor example, anti-ship bombers, submarines, things like that. What we got out of having a strong Pacific fleet was they could not bet that we did not have a secret deal with the Chinese to overrun Siberia when the good times came. I would imagine the Chinese did not want any part of it. But you can do attacks that look ns though you are preparing for them to go in and then let them explain in Moscow later. That is the kind o\~ thing you get out of mobility. Would it have heen decisive'.' We think it would have heen kind of useful. We though) that having minor amphibious forces would make them worry a lot about places like Si Petersburg. That is a very sobering business. Just the idea that we could match them in places that were asymmetric for them probably sobered them up a lot, and we think we got a lot of mileage out of ft.
Now lets look at a WW I example. If you were British and you did not feel culturally close to the French, you might ask yourself what the biggest threat was. You might say something like 'Ok. ii the Hermans are mast sensitive about say East Prussia where the Herman military elite came from, pay the people who will give them the hardest time right? Go in the Baltic and threaten la land there'. 1 he Germans tried to laugh that off. but I do not think it would have heen very funny, I think it might have worked.
Another example shows how bad things can be. The Crimean War in its time was called the Russian War. It was really about getting the Russian Empire to stop threatening various places including Turkey. So the question was 'how da you deal with these Russians' They have a hip, land empire far away. SO what tla you do.'' The first idea the British had was no Will make a maritime raid There 's a place -the Crimea ■ in the Black Sea. and the Russians arc threatening the Turks in the Black Sea. Id' will grab the Crimea as a demonstration  oj our power ami our  will'

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Apparently their intelligence was terrible. They did not realise the Crimea was actually well defended and that they would get bogged down there. As soon as they were bogged down there, suddenly the war was about the Crimea. The British Cabinet developed the idea that if ever they won in the Crimea the war would end in their favour. This was absolute insanity. From the Tsar's point of view, the Crimea was a useless place in (he Black Sea far from w here everyone cares. He did not really care about his own troops. It was perfectly acceptable to use up a few more troops and lie down the enemy. There was no way that the loss of the Crimea would shatter the Russian Empire. The British hail to find something that mattered.
Well in the Baltic the British figured out there was something that mattered and that was St Petersburg. About 1X55 the British took a Russian Sea fortress called Sveaborg. That's usually treated by historians as a sort of a cute but irrelevant stunt. Well the Russians felt a little differently. Those defences were not very different from what was defending St Petersburg. Also because security was not brilliant, the Russians could watch the British building a specialised force that would have taken St Petersburg. That is. you could see the force being built and you had the demonstration it would have worked. The Crimea might not matter, but St Petersburg really did matter and probably that threat had a lot to do with the Russians deciding that this was not really a whole lot of Win. There were other things also. The point I am making is that a sea power way of thinking assumes you can go anywhere along someone else's periphery and that very often there is some place other than where you happen to be that gives you a bigger pay off. It is about leverage. Now if you have an army with ten million people, all of them feel like gelling killed for Allah, then presumably leverage and economy are not all that important. I doubt many - if any - such armies exist.
If I look at WWII, look at Churchill after June lv>4(). the thing that they were so desperate to prevent had just happened. By the way. they do not have an ally in the last giving the Germans a hard time. This is a pretty bad thing. People who do not like Churchill say well, he had this mystical vision that there was some way out. but of course he was crazy and we should hav e settled. Well no. he was a historian. If you look at their previous

wars like the Napoleonic War, what happens is that as long as the British stay in business, they can keep forming coalitions, and eventually they form one that busts the French. It takes a while. Things do not always work. You go in. you land troops, you try to do something, something goes wrong, you take them home and land them somewhere else. Now you can see that either as (as somebody at Newport once said) a Mrs Meawber type of strategy 'Something Will turn up'. Or you can see it as a very reasonable way of using sea power By the way. part of the sea power story was that they had access to world resources, including incidentally, yours. That made a tremendous difference. Now I would guess that at some point Churchill said to himself. It's 1X00 again. or I SO I or whatever. The other side runs the continent, hut (hey cannot jump the Channel, lets give them a hard time and eventually we will get friends. His guess was that he would get the US. The Russians were not as satisfactory, because they probably would have enjoyed also seizing all e>\ Furopc. winch would have meant another unpleasantness later, but you work with what you have got. That is a very different view. II you look at casualties in two World Wars, you will notice that your chance of survival as a British soldier went up rather dramatically in WWII, even though army people feel that they did not do that good a job in places like Normandy. They did not know how to combine arms properly. Still, the peripheral approach really was a very good one. In wars you do not get high grades for showing how lough you are. you get high grades for winning. If someone else wants to bleed as part of your war. that is his business.
II you look at ihe Pacific W ar. there's a real question of what the war aim is. For the US Navy, which I regard as correct, the war aim is simply to defeat the Japanese. Alter ihey lose they disgorge whatever they have grabbed, that is the end if it. The view taken by the US Army in a lot of its historical work is that war was about how evil it was for the Japanese to seize the Philippines, which we owned. I low important twos Hiking hoik the Philippines? Did it wilt the war.' No. Were we Mill fighting there on I'd Dor.' Yes. Did it eat up it lot of people.' Yes.
Ihe last thing I will tell you is if you look ai Afghanistan, the only reason we were able to go into Afghanistan was sea based power. Now sea based does not mean it is just sailors, do

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imi eet me wrong. It' I look at Afghanistan. problem one is if you are going to make an attack in Afghanistan where does u come from'.' Well no one in the region is all that hot about playing with us. In many eases they will not try and slop us Hying overhead, because we will bomb them, hut other than that they are not interested. Well, we could strike at Afghanistan from earners. The problem was that we had gone cheap on earner based tanking, so we absolutely had to have that amount of cooperation. That is. we absolutely needed to have bases available with tankers. In fact. Australia contributed some tankers. However, the strike at least did not have to be land based. That made a tremendous difference in how much we had to pay people to let us in. In the ideal world we would have kepi the A-61 s and we would have been able to do it off the earners by themselves. The world is not ideal: our crystal balls are not perfect. The second thing was do you need ground forces? Well you now hear about how these special forces people in Northern Afghanistan would aei as the artillery for the Northern alliance and people say 'wlnit do you need troops there for. look ill what you can do from the tin" first, il is what we can do from the air in support of a ground army. No ground army, no fun. Secondly, in Northern Afghanistan there were a loi o\ people who had good reason to really hate the Taliban, mi we said to them lit' Wilt help', and they said Great idea', once we demonstrated that we were serious. And by the way that took a little while, before they would play So Northern Afghanistan works pretty well without a lot of American troops.
Now lets ask about the other half. If you look at Southern Afghanistan, actually more South Eastern Afghanistan, which is mostly Pushtuns (the Taliban were Pushtuns) one of the mistakes was thai we thought ol it as an ideological split: it was more ethnic. You know, we may noi like the brand of Islam that they are pushing, but by god they are our creeps not yours, so we will back them up. That meant that there was not going to be any Southern alliance spontaneously forming to kill ihe laliban. What do you do? Well I would argue that moving those US Marines that took t amp Rhino near Kandahar was not just a cute stunt, but instead was absolutely decisive. It was decisive because once we had a serious lighting force on the ground in Taliban Country,  then  that  convinced a  lot  of other

Number I OS
Afghans that we were serious and that we were not backing down. Second, the Taliban had a choice. They could try to wipe out our Marines, or they could basically admit that they were powerless. They admitted powerlessness. Well lhat killed their prestige a lot. Now the Marines complained that there were not enough of them to go out and do offensive action, so they felt weak. No. they were decisive. Now. why did that work? It worked because their logistic and firepower base was at sea where we could move it around easily and as little as possible had to move inland and it was very effective. That is a sea power kind of application, You get a lot more for your money when you have real national mobility, when everyone can nunc freely at your government's dictate, when there is enough lire power offshore so that what lands really gels backed up against opposition, and fire power has to include aircraft.
I apologise if I have imposed on national decisions here, but it's a kind aY stralegv I think is well worth thinking about.
About the Author
Educated as a theoretical physicist, Dr \orinaii Friedman is a defence analyst Concerned primarily with the interaction between technology and tactical, strategic, and policy issues. He was a staff member and then Deputy Director <>/ National Security Studies Of the Hudson Institute from 1973 through 1984. Since that time he has served as a consultant to the Secretary of the Navy (in the Office <>/ Program Appraisal. 1984-94) and to various defence contractors. He has published 26 hooks, most recently Seapower as Strategy, an account oj modern naval strategy; a history
o) the CoUl War, The Fifty-Year War. Conflict and Strategy in the Cold Wari and Seapower
and Space, an account of the role that space and information assets now play in nanil war/are. He is a member of the L.S Naval Institute, the Royal t nited Services Institute.
the American Society of Naval Engineers, the
American Physical Society. the Naval Submarine League, anil the British Naval Review.

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The right solutions at the right time

for the Royal

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Navy

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Raytheon
A     I  I     C     T     □      A      I        I      A
AUSTRALIA
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ADELAIDE      •      BRISBANE      •      CANBERRA      •      MELBOURNE      •      NOWRA      •      PERTH      •      SYDNEY

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
www.navalinstitute.com.au

Number I OS

The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector
Strategic Plan
By John Jeremy

In late August 2002 the Minister for Defence released the Department of Defence Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, It is one of the most thorough examinations of the realities of this market sector that has been made publicly available, and main of the plan's observations and conclusions will come as no surprise to those with experience in this industry. I lie plan is particularly notable for its emphasis on the importance of retaining a njval shipbuilding capability as well as that for ship refit and repair. It is the clearest statement of industry capability requirements that Defence has made for main years.
The mam conclusion of the Strategic Plan is 'thai inline demand is sufficient to sustain only one shipbuilder, ami thai single shipbuilding entity model provides the only feasible structural arrangement t<> meet Saw's //in construction capability requirements.^ Clearly, this conclusion will he a most controversial aspect of (he plan.
loday, the naval shipbuilding and repair industry is m commercial hands (apart from ASC). and its ability to survive and prosper is largely dependent on Sufficient workload to justify the necessary investment in facilities and people. No commercial organisation can retain special facilities and capabilities on the off chance that they might be needed - and the necessary investment in facilities and skills development and retention is considerable.
Ideally, continuing competition for the supply of ships and scrv ices to the navy is a desirable outcome However, it the price of maintaining competition in a very small market (by international standards) is a loss of essential capability then that price is too high. The lead time for this essential capability is years - it cannot he turned on and off like a tap.
The Strategic Plan outlines a new way of managing business in a sole-source environment. The proposed strategic alliance will introduce interesting complexities to the relationship between Defence and the Alliance Entity   (as it  is called),   flic plan notes that

Defence will need 'visibility oj the Entity's operation and management without constraining day-to-day activities.' Ibis can surely be done, but it would be essential for the relationship that the Alliance Entity be allowed to manage its business, to hire. lire, train, invest and innovate without interference by bureaucracy.
Perhaps the greatest challenge for the Government if it decides to implement this plan will be making it work in Australia's political environment. Each State will lobby for a piece of the action, and politicians will he pressed by firms in their electorates who believe they can do it faster and cheaper, even if they have never done it before. At least, in this ease, there is only one customer, unlike the market for railway locomotives and rolling stock where political pressure has frequently resulted in work being spread amongst the States when a single source would have been more efficient
Acceptance of the recommendations in the Strategic Plan will not be easy for the Government, hut doing nothing is likely to produce a similar but more random and less satisfactory result.
Reprinted with permission from The \nstralum Naval [rehitei t. I dliime 6 Number V.

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Australia's War Against People Smuggling
By Commander Ken Burleigh, RAN

r ew tonus arouse passion among people quite as much as the word 'refugee*. Since August 2001. when the Norwegian Sagged \essel Tampa arrived off the coast of Christmas Island, there has been an unprecedented amount of interest in the Australian government's policy, toward the illegal entry of foreign nationals into the Australian migration /one.1 The unlawful entry of people into Australia is well documented and indeed, is not a new phenomenon. Since the early 1470s stories of 'Vietnamese hoatpeoplc' abounded and became ensconced in Australian eolloquial vernacular. Since 1400. however, the apprehension and treatment of 'illegal immigrants' has become extremely topical again within the community. During the 1 I year period leading up to the arrival of Tampa, about 14000 people' of predominantly Middle-eastern origin, arrived into Australia by boat, although from 1444. the frequency and number of arrivals increased significantly. The vast majority of these people arrived at the Australian offshore territory of Ashmore Islands by way of decrepit fishing vessels or inter-island ferries from Indonesia. After surviving untold perils both ashore and at sea on these vessels of questionable seaworthiness, people arriving into Australia would be transported to the mainland for questioning and processing by officials of the Australian government.
Since the Tampa incident. Australia has adopted a far more stringent approach to (he treatment of these arrivals. The so-called 'Pacific solution", the excising of offshore territories and installations from the migration /one and the prevention by naval and customs units, of illegal entry vessels entering the contiguous /one (CZ), have received a good deal of international and domestic condemnation. By implementing these tactics, the Australian government has ensured that no foreign national has arrived in Australia illegally by boat since the Tampa affair began. The question that needs to be asked however is whether Australia is within its rights to execute the legislation that it has. Many commentators criticise the policy, but there is generally a great deal of emotion and morality involved in their

arguments.' The aim of this article is to assess whether the I4S2 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC)andlhe 1451 Refugee Convention <IU) are impediments to current efforts by Australia to address the problem of people smuggling into
the country.
Australian Policy and the Law of the Sea Convention
The Tampa affair sparked a fundamental shift in Australia's position in terms of the reception of illegal immigrants. The incident was an unfortunate case m which the master of the Tampa exercised his obligation to assist personnel m distress in accordance with the LOSC Article 98, propelling him into the centre of a contentious international and domestic debate on illegal immigration. "Hie legality of the way Australia dealt with this incident is beyond the scope of this article, but suffice to say. it became a conduit for Australia to change it's policy on illegal immigration. This change in policy was principally designed to combat people smuggling syndicates based in Indonesia and elsewhere in Asia that had been operating with impunity throughout the 1440s.' People smuggling can be defined as '... to import or export (people) secretly, without /ego/ duty or in violation of law'.'' In essence, people smugglers organise the transport of asylum seekers to a destination where they can pursue refugee status, having lied their homelands. This transport can occur by a number of means but for the purpose of this essay, arrivals by sea will be concentrated on.
Since the Tampa incident, the Australian government has empowered naval and customs law enforcement officials, to apprehend Suspected Illegal Entry Vessels (SUA) before they reach the territorial sea (TS) of Australia. Naval boarding parties now intercept these vessels, which are invariably attempting to smuggle asylum seekers into Australia, in the CZ. In the first instance, the objective of the boarding parties is to ascertain the identity of the SIEV and its purpose for sailing towards Australia. When a vessel is identified as a vehicle for people smuggling, the vessel is either escorted to the nearest point of the TS of the country from whence it commenced its voyage,

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i>i alternatively, the personnel are detained for relocation to another destination. At no time are the passengers in the vessel allowed into the Australian migration zone, unless there are extenuating eireumstanees. such as critical illness or iipurv. The government*S required end-state, is that no person enter the migration /one illegally, and that processing of claims for refugee status occur at a place outside Australia. under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). To assisi iii this process, the government passed legislative amendments to the 1958 Migration Act thai excised the offshore territories of Christmas. COCOS and Ashmore Islands, in addition io offshore installations like oilrigs. from the migration /one. Provisions for the relocation to another country, o\' people apprehended while attempting to enter Australia illegally    vveie    also    incorporated    in    these
amendments.
\t     the    same    time    and    to
complement changes to the Migration \ci. legislative   amendments   to   the   1999   Border
Protection Act were also passed by parliament.
Under these changes 'vessels may be prevented
from arriving in at removal from Insiro/ian territorial waters using "reasonable /one" if necessary ij suspected oj carrying "unlawful" Immigrants'. The amendments also remove the opportunity;   for asylum seekers to apply for
protection visas, as well as introducing mandator} sentencing for those found guilts of people smuggling offences.'
The Inst, prescribes the rights of coastal states in offshore areas, lor the purpose of dealing with people smugglers, four /ones are applicable:
 •	internal Waters,
 •	the I s.
 •	the ( /. and
 •	the   high   seas  (including   the   Exclusive Economic Zone (I i/ti.'"
! he I (lS( slates lhai within internal waters and the I S. a coastal stole exercises lull sovereignty. In the ("'/. the coastal stale exercises sovereign rights, and on the high seas, including the Id /. the coastal stale has no sovereign power in relation to immigration or people smuggling. Noting that current operations against people smuggling only occur outside internal waters, this article will only deal with the IS. CZ and high seas
Subject to Article 17 of the Lost', 'ships oj
all suites, whether coastal or laiuhloeketl. enjoy
the right oj innocent passage through the TS' of

another coastal stale. Article IS goes on to slate that such passage shall he 'continuous ami expeditious'. Article 1° places a caveat on the right of innocent passage in so tar as. such passage should not 'prejudice the peace, good order or security ol a coastal wore". This article further articulates that a foreign vessel 'loading or unloading any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws ol a coastal state*, would he guilty of such prejudice and would not he comply ing w ith the tenets o\' innocent passage. The right of a coastal state to adopt rules and regulations 'to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws' is promulgated in Article 2). In such eases, these rules and regulations require 'due publicity' and foreign ships exercising innocent passage are required to 'comply With all such rules and regulations'. The rights of a coastal stale are amplified again m Article 25. which allows for the coastal state to "... take the necessary steps in its IS to prevent passage.
which    is    not    innocent*.       Clearly,    these
provisions within the LOSC, allow Australia to
execute the policy amendments that now exist in relation to people smuggling and asylum seekers. The key provisions relate to Australia being able to introduce rules and regulations thai prevent infringement of its immigration laws. Additionally. Australia as a coastal slate, is permitted to take necessary steps to prevent passage that is not innocent within its IS. I he actions of vessels attempting to perpetrate people smuggling offences in the Australian Is are obviously not consistent with innocent passage, giving Australian authorities due cause to intercept and linn these vessels around. Noting that powers of a coastal state are more robust within the IS than further out from the coast, the provisions relating to the CZ will now he examined.
Australian authorities currently plan to intercept SlEVs within the CZ and before they reach the TS. This plan is dependent upon the detection of a vessel of interest and the response tune available to the naval or customs vessel in the vicinity ol the SIEV. Since introduction of the new legislation, most SlEV's have been intercepted in the ('/. hut at least two vessels have penetrated the TS. In terms of a coastal state's rights within the CZ. Article 53 of the TOSC provides that "... a coastal './are may exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration

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or sanitary lows and regulations within its territory or TS'. The artiele also allows a coastal slate to 'punish infringement of the above laws
and regulations within its territory or TS'. Ii) defining the C'Z. the artiele states that 'the CZ may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its TS is measured'. Rigid interpretation of this provision shows that Australia, as a coastal state, has the right to exercise control over its 24 nautical mile C'Z. for the purpose of preventing infringement of its immigration laws by a foreign ship. By intercepting SIEV's within the CZ. Australian authorities are simply preventing these vessels reaching the TS or migration /one where they would be in contravention of the Migration Act. The actions of Australia m preventing access to the TS and migration /one prevent unnecessary difficulties when asylum seekers come in sight of or land on Australian soil. Having discussed Australia's rights with respect to the areas over which it has sovereignty and sovereign rights respectively. the rights of navigation on the high seas will

now he discussed.
The high seas is defined by Article SO of the LOSC as 'all parts oj the tea that are not included in the FEZ., in the TS or in the internal waters of a slate, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state*. Articles S7 through 90 go on to provide for freedom of navigation on the high seas, the requirement to use the high seas for peaceful purposes and the fact that no state can claim sovereignty over any part of the high seas. Within the convention, there is no provision for the boarding of vessels on the high seas for immigration purposes, however Article 95 does provide for the complete immunity of warships on the high seas from any other slate other than the Hag state.14 In the execution of the current policy against people smugglers, there is no contravention of these provisions by Australian authorities in the first instance. Vessels are not boarded for investigation until such a time as they come within the CZ. It is later m the policy execution that some contention arises between the actions of Australia and the LOSC Once a SUA' has been

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bounded and il has been determined that it is engaged in a people smuggling activity, the preferred option is to escort thai vessel back to the Indonesian TS. During these escort operations, a nav), security element remains in the SUA while the warship remains in close company. W hen the vessels reach a position just outside the Indonesian IS. the security element returns to the warship, while the SUA' is monitored, as it proceeds back lo Indonesia. When the warship is satisfied that the SUA' is complying with instructions to return lo an Indonesian port, the warship returns to Australian waters I he issue here is that Australian military personnel embark in a foreign vessel during a voyage across the high seas While these personnel do not assume command of the SI I \ at any time, they are there lo ensure that it complies with instructions to return to Indonesia, arguably interfering with the vessel's freedom of navigation in accordance wub Article S7 o! the LOSC. While this type of activity is not provided lor in the I < >SC. it is possible lo justify the presence of a security element by loosely interpreting Article MS of the LOSC pertaining lo a duty to render assistance,
In dealing with this issue of safely of life at sea. Article 98 provides that 'every sum- shall require the master of a ship Urine its flag, in so
far its he i an da so u ilhaiit seriaiis danger In the
ship, or the crew ... to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being last'. " W lule the link may he tenuous, it can be argued thai the security elemeni from the warship is rendering assistance lo the crew and passengers ol the SUA'. This line of argument can be annunciated in two ways. First, that the security element is rendering assistance to the crew, in that the lives of the crew could be in serious danger from the passengers, il' the security element was to leave the vessel. Second, rendering assistance to everyone onboard the SUA can be argued, noting the propensity for asylum seekers to infitd damage to both themselves and the SUA' itself. Indeed, in November 2001, two female asylum seekers drowned after the SUA they were travelling in was set on fire and sunk by fellow asylum seekers        Ibis   type   of  desperate   action   by
asylum   seekers   is  designed   to   circumvent
Australian policy  in the hope thai they  will be
allowed entry into the country. As already slated, ibis argument is tenuous at best, but represents lite only avenue to justify Australian actions in these instances. In short. Australian

Number 198
actions on the high seas in these circumstances are not provided for in the LOSC and this represents a possible legal impediment to current operations. To fully assess the Australian policy towards people smuggling however, it is necessary to address it in terms of the RC
Australian Policy and the Refugee Convention
The RC which was agreed in 1951 and entered into force in 1954, defines a refugee as a person w ho has
... a we/I founded tear of being persecuted /<>r reasons a/ race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular saeial group or palitieal opinion, is outside the eoltntry of his not tonality and is unable, or owing to such tear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country: or who. not haring a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence ... is
unable or. owing to sueh fear, is unwilling to
return to it. Recognising a person as a refugee affords that person certain rights within a country that is a signatory to the convention. Determining the refugee status of a person, requites an objective assessment of that person in accordance with guidelines and processes provided for in the RC. Until sueh an assessment has been made, a person is not deemed to he a refugee under the RC or the 1958 Migration Act. Rather, terms sueh as asylum seeker", 'illegal immigrant' and 'unlawful Don-citizen are used'.'" Australia's current policy entails the processing of asylum seekers in other countries, m cooperation with the governments of those countries and the UNHCR. By stopping asylum seekers entering the migration /one ol Australia, the government is not bound to provide social services required by the RC, by virtue of the fact that the asylum seekers have no yet been classified as refugees. By addressing the people smuggling issue in ibis way. Australia has not contravened the definition of the term refugee, simply because that term is not applied to a person inside Australia. 1 heir legal status is defined in a third country and appropriate action is taken from the lime the definition is applied or otherwise. Despite this fact, there are two additional articles within the RC that bear looking at in terms of Australia's current policy.
Article 3 I of the RC piW ides that
...   contracting   states   shall  not   impose
penalties, on account <>l their illegal entry or

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present c, on refugees who, cowing directly
from a territory where their life or freedom whs threatened ... enter or are present in their territory without authorisation} It can he argued that Australia is in contravention of this article, due to the fact that denying entry to Australia and detaining people for processing in a third country, can be perceived as imposing a penalty. ' Despite the fact that 00 determination is made on the status of asylum seekers until a later point in time, this argument does appear to he Hawed. By conducting itself in this way. Australia is merely relieving itself of the possibility of accepting refugees that arrive illegally or 'queue jump'. Additionally, detention of people in a camp where processing occurs, is a logical step in preserving the integrity anil security of the nation in which the processing is taking place. Before allowing asylum seekers the privileges afforded to refugees, their movement is controlled while their claims are processed In terms of removing asylum seekers to a third country, it is necessary to now look at the way the RC deals with returning refugees to another country.
The obligation of states not to return a refugee, in any manner whatsoever, to a country where his or her life or freedom would he threatened lies at the heart of Article 33 of the RC and is also known as refoulment/' While many commentators look on the Australian policy as breaching this article, in terms of closing holders to entry, mandatory detention for processing and escorting SIHV's hack to Indonesian waters,""1 strict interpretation of the article indicates that this is not the case. The vast majority of asylum seekers attempting to enter Australia, are from the strife-ridden Middle Hast and have no immediate neighbours in this region. The Australian government has adopted the position that there is no chance of their lives being in danger, either by being returned to Indonesia, or by being held in a third country as part of the Pacific solution. On the surface, this appears to be a valid assumption and there has certainly been no documented evidence, of an asylum seeker being placed in danger when turned away from Australia.
Conclusion
In the current strategic environment of uncertainty. Australia has made a decision to close its maritime borders to unauthorised persons arriving by sea. These people generally

arrive by way of Indonesian vessels organised by people smuggling syndicates. Australia's decision is consistent with concern over the growth of transnational crime, and is designed to defeat people smugglers who operated with impunity throughout the IWU'v Ibis strategy, against people smugglers entails the prevention of asylum seekers reaching Australian territorial waters, by way of naval and customs interception within the Australian CZ. Asylum seekers are then directed back to Indonesia, or relocated to a third country for processing of their application for refugee status. While there are arguments against this policy stance on (he grounds of morality, a studv ol 'the LOSC and the RC needs to be conducted to ascertain the legality of the Australian position.
The LOSC" allows Australia to exercise sovereignty over its internal waters and IS. Additionally, it allows Australia to exercise sovereign rights over its CZ in order to protect the infringement of immigration laws. Asylum seekers entering Australia by boat are clearly breaching immigration laws and circumventing the formal application process for entering the country, bj providing payment to people smugglers. The policy docs not breach the LOSC, as Australia is merely exercising its sovereign rights lor the purpose of stopping people smugglers. Although there is an issue with Australian military personnel maintaining security onboard SUV's on the high seas, while on transit back to Indonesia, this poini can be argued in terms of assisting with the preservation of life at sea. Furthermore, sinel interpretation of the RC shows that the Australian government does not breach this convention either. In order for refugee pi iv ileges to be granted to an asylum seeker, thai person musi first go through a process thai defines ihem as a refugee. Australia has adopted a position whereby that classification process is to occur outside Australia. Once a person has been classified as a refugee then Australia recognises that classification as a signatory to the convention. While the issue of asylum seekers is emotive within Australia and sound moral arguments can be made against the Australian policy, it is clear that the LOSC and the RC provide no significant impediment lo Australia's war on people smuggling.
About the Author
C 'ommander Burleigh joined the RAN its a seaman officer in 1984. I Principle Warfare

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11 iiu. tutvalitistinuc.ii mi. mi	Number 10H	
Officer and Navigation tub-specialist, he has		
tervedas the navigating Officer of HMA Ships Gawler, Stuart and Adelaide am/has i ontmanded Launceston. I/Is shore postings haw included navigation instructor. Fleet Navigation Officer and (>itii er in Charge of the RA v Navigation Faculty. He graduated from the K 'Si in December 2002 and is now serving as	14 ibid. pp. 53-56.
Standard escort procedures being used hi Australian warships in the operation to counter people Smuggling,
Hit t hited \aiians c 'onvenlion on the La* a/ the Sea, p. 56,
Personal experience has show n that as\ lum seekers become very angry and potentiall) violent with the	
iha Deputy ( ommander a/ the Australian Seyy	crew of a SUA', if they perceive that the) are not	
Patrol Boat Group.	getting what ihei want	
	C Sidoti, Refugee Policy: Is There a II in am qj	
1 South Asian Human Riehis Documentation ('enter.	this Mess?, Speech to Racial Respecl Seminar.	
Legislating for Ext fusion: lustralia 's Flight from the	Canberra, 2002. p. 3.	
/tr/iitiri- < 'aiiwntiaii. 1 "lie Daily Sun Internet Edition,	hup: www.hiea.org.au/refugees.htm.	
Issue Number 26, 2002, p. 1.	"Office of the lliuh Commissioner of Human	
hup   www.dailystamews.com law 200201 03	Rights, t hited Nations Convention Relating to the	
\1 I richer, Asylum Seekers m German) and	Slants of Refugees, Geneva, 1951, p. 2.	
\ustralia: Polit ies, Politics and Polemics. Speech to	hup: 'www.unhchr.ch/html menu3bo c ref.htm. 11	
die Goethe Institul Sidney 4 March 2002.	September 2002.	
hup: 'www.2oethe.de an swi enpurich.htm. 12	" fin ised Offshore Placet | Migration Zone	
Seplembei 2002	('hangesi, p. 2.	
l Brennan, Developing Just Refugee Palates in	United Nations ('anvention Relating to the 'siams	
i                       Australia Local, \ttiinnal and International	a/ Refugee, p 10.	
Cam mis. Speech ;ii the l Diversity of Sydney, 7	Human Rights Watch, Ba kground: Refugee	
August 2()(i2	Convention Violations, 2001, p, 1.	
URLthttp:  www.meilia.usvd.edu.au speeches 2002 b	http://www.hrw.org/press. 2001 12/refconbs 1211 .hun	
rennan print.html. 12 September 2002.	:4 ibid.	
' Personal opinion of author based on readings	ibid.	
containing significant attention on humanitarian	■' Ext ised Offshore Places (Migration Zone	
issues While these humanitarian \ tews are certainly	Changes), p. 1.	
relevant, the) should not be allowed to cloud the		
legal imperatives denied from the principal		
com enlions of l-( >SC and R(		
Department ol Immigration and Multicultural		
Affairs, Information Paper. / rt isedOffshore Plans		
i Migration Zone 1 hanges), 2002, p. 1.		
:                        hup: www.immi.gov.au/illegals/uad/03.htip		
Macquarie Dictionary, Sydney, I988»p.939,		
Based on government instructions in the planning		
ami conduct of ami- people smuggling operations in		
Northern Australia and Christmas Island.		
/ ii ised Offshore Plat es | Migration Zone		
( liaiinst. pp, |-2.		
'                         ' / egislating for Exclusion Australia's Flight tram		
the Refugee ( 'onvenlion, pp. 2- V		
Di ( hessuni. iia Impactoj International		
( aiiwniians an Efforts to tddress People Smuggling		
una lustralia, 2001. p. 2.		
http://wvAV.navv.mil.nz/mzn/article.cftn7tmicle id=°		
67&article ivpc discuss		
i titled Nations, The 1 nited Nations Convention on	
	
the Law <>////< SeaoJ 10 December 1982, New York.		
1997. pp 2<>-2°.		
()ne Sll Y actually ran aground on Ashinore Reel		
in October 2001 after implementation of the new		
legislation		
The i nited Vationsi onvenlion on the Law of the		
So.pp 31-32,		
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Australian Naval Medicine and the Boxer Uprising
1900-01
By Commander Neil Westphaien, RAN

YELLOW
s| \

Boxer Area ot Operations, 19*0-01 (Author )

1 be Boxer Uprising began ton the foreign legations (embassies) at Peking on 20 June looo, when tliey came under siege by a secret society with the covert support of the Chinese government. Allied reinforcements at Tsientin were also trapped until they were relieved by 20.000 men on 13 July. and. when it became known that the legations were still (just) holding out, they were relieved on 14 August. The siege received the Hollywood treatment in the film $7 Days at Peking.
The Australian colonial response to a British request lor assistance led to the departure of IIM Ships Mohawk. Lizard and Wallaroo from Sydney for China on 2 July. Midshipman A.I.. Fletcher left his impressions of the RN medical branch at the time
The surgeons were about 73 per eent ex-Trinity ('allege. Dublin, 20 per eent Scottish universities ami lite add 5 per eent English. Perfect dears hut very thirsty when young. Their medieine may have been crude hut they knew a lot about miliaria and ID

Mv chief memories of the Sick hay were No
9pills, almost atomic in action, for internal
disorders,    santonin   far    warms    -    very
prevalent in the Past  -  and \als  of zine
ointment for everything else.
The British also accepted 200 Victorian and
250 NSW sailors for ser\ iee ashore, plus the
South Australian gunboat Protector, However.
all   three  contingents   were  delayed   hv   pay
wrangles and this cost them any   chance of
seeing action. This article describes some ol
the medical aspects of these deployments.
Protector's Deployment
I ive days after requesting clothing allowances for Protector's crew, her commanding officer
Captain C.J. Clare added *.l dm tor may also require an allowance for uniform when appointed. Will the lion the Chief Secretary please approve this slight alteration it required." As a result. I)r Bedlingtou I low el Morris was the last member to be appointed to the  ship.   Born   in   Wales   in   1868,   he  had

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HMCS Protector. c!9M (BISI16. permission Mortlock Library ofSA)
C7 I As 2d from F.H. Fauldings before Protector  left   Adelaide  on  6  August    On
arrival at Sydney on 10 August. Morris expended another C74 17s Id on medical stores." (reswelI joined lour days later in Brisbane and Protet tor reached I lone Kong on 9 September, after a horrendous voyage at the height of the typhoon season. En route t icswell drilled his crew hard and 'Our Correspondent' for the Herald (not identified) wrote
...the port watch were given an hour's
lecture  on   'First  Aid' by  Doctor  Morris.
who is interesting, instructive and amusing
tit the same time. Imaginary limbs were hound Up, arteries and veins stopped from bleeding, until some advanced pupils began
to handle bandages and tourniquets as if they wished for a real subject on whom to show their efficiency.
Protector arrived at Wei-hai-wei on 30 September, where Creswell was interviewed by Vice Admiral Seymour. In 1024 Creswell
graduated from Durban! University in 1893 and   migrated   to  Adelaide   in   1896.    His
daughter-in-law recalled him us a charming, upright, straightforward num. who loved burlesques. Founder of the RAN Captain William ( reswel] later wrote '...Surgeon Morris, to whom the success of the expedition Owed much, quite the ideal man for the work muter \m h temporary conditions, and earned the confidence and regard oj all <m board Morris arrived in time to generate a bill lor

wrote: Sir
Edward    Seymour   plied    me    with
questions, asked and noted many details
and particulars oj the ship.
And how ■main tick do you have'
Sane sir, the hut is there's nowhere to put
them.
I told him of our gruelling trip to Hong Kong. Well if you have no sick. I'm hanged if I see why anybody else should have anv sick.
I learned later that ,/ battleship anxious h>r a run to Japan had submitted a big nick list in support of her request.
In the event, apart
from mine clearance
duties. Protector spent
most of her time in China
carrying	dispatches
Captain JR. Jellicoe (later
commander of the Grand
fleet	al	Jutland)
complimented Protector
that she was never sick or
sorry, and always ready for
a job oj work.'' Protector
was released on 2
: November and. after
stopping in Sydney lo
celebrate	the	new
Commonwealth of Australia, she returned home on 6 January 1001. I he-Adelaide Register recorded the following excerpt from an interview with Captain Clare on her return
[Qj: What has been the general impression
concerning the men.' /Clare/: Throughout I
may Say the opinion expressed has been
complementary.   It is  interesting to know
that ours was the most healthy ship on the
station. While nearly every man-of-war had
Id  to  20 percent sick,   our siik-lisl  was
practically nil. with the exception of a few
eases of influenza.
In 1000 the Victorian Navy had live part-time
surgeons,   including   Staff  Surgeon   Charles
Alfred   Stewart.   Horn   in   llobart   in   1X55.'
Stewart had qualified in   IS70"' and became
Principal   Medical   Officer   (PMO)   to   the
Victorian Navy  in  ISS5.1    He was paid E383
5s. Od. per annum plus imperial pay rates and
4s. 4d. per day   field allowance  in China. y
compared lo Ins usual rate of C4I   13s. 4d. per

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Stiliunis departing Weoloomaoloa wharf. 8 August I960 / lit t/ \05ttJ2
smallpox vaccinations, a NSWMLI member was landed ill and it was found Steel's name was omitted from the list of personnel receiving field allowance. One wonders how long it took Steel to receive his money.
The voyage north had the Ambulance Party performing vaccinations while exercising both bandaging and cutlasses (reflecting their somewhat ambivalent role prior to the 1007 Hague Convention). Second-in-command of the nsw contingent. Commander Edward Connor,   wrote   of  many   men   feeling   side
month.   He conducted all the medicals for die
Victorian   contingent,   aided   by   Sick   Berth
Steward"" (SBS)   William   Stanley   Patehelt.
Born   in    1870.   Patehelt   was   a   permanent
member of the Victorian Navy and had only
recently married. '
Most   NSW   officers   were  commissioned
reservists   with    little   seagoing   experience.
while   the   Victorians   had   mainly   ex-sailor
Warrant Officers, In  1900 the NSW naval
forces had seven part-time medical  officers,
led by Fleet Surgeon    Thomas Knaggs. who
had introduced St John  first aid training to
Australia in   I SSI. This pre-empted the first
official    Australian    St    John    organisation
(formed in 1883 in Melbourne)."'
Slow recruiting tor China led to numbers
being made up by 24 men who were originally
going to South Africa. These men became the
NSW Marine Light Infantry (NSWML1). the
only    Australian    Marine
force  in  its history.  The
contingent   also   included
an     IS-man     Ambulance
Parts led by Staff Surgeon
John James Steel,    which
had      been      raised      at
Newcastle in [896.    Born
in Scotland in 1835. Steel
was educated  in  Sydney,
Edinburgh      and      Paris
before      qualifying      in
%
1878.'"        lie '    "rapidly
accjuired     an     extensive
practice  in  Sydney'    and
was   appointed    into   the
NSW   Naval   Brigade   in
IX%.:s   A   widower   with
one    daughter,    he    was
proficient in languages and
a student o\' Shakespeare.
I le received £500 pa for his
China service.
The medicals were performed ... U7/// wonderful celerity and tact by SiaJJ Surgeon S.T. Knaggs. VD, Staff Surgeon .1.1. Steel and Surgeon G.L. O'Neill. The men were admitted to the offices by sgnads and then siihjeeted la several tests. At the
outset the volunteer had t<> pass the sight test - reading different sizeil capital letters backwards and vice versa with two eves and then with a single orbit at a distance of seven or eight paces, lie was then ordered la strip to the waist,  when he was  well

sounded and critically inspected and his
height   and   weight   were   taken.    Is   was
anticipated the percentage oj  'rejects " was
exceedingly small -  a   sine proqj a/ the
stamina af the men comprising the naval
forces,
It seems the pass rale was improved by only
examining the candidates  from  the waist up.
There was however
One poor fellow  who  was  desperately
anxious to get away, and who looked strong
and /it for anything, burst om crying so great was his disappointment at being refused. He pleaded with the two dot tors, hut whilst they were sympathetic. titer were
implacable.
The transport Salamis sailed on 8 August, after her civilian Chief Steward shot himself and a sailor fractured his ankle falling off a tram. Just prior to sailing lymph was obtained for

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effects3 and also referred to 'one poor chap with a nasty haemorrhage of the lungs.'' Despite the allegedly 'rigorous' examinations, tour men from the NSW Contingent were invalided home from Hong Kong.'"
Sahnnis arrived at Taku on 9 September" and on 15 September the Australians moved to Isientm. where 300 men began a forced march to attack a fort, lieutenant ILL. Lofts NSW All I wrote
The water was from a village moat ami very dirty. Fuel to Toil it was from thateh. even so tea was good, although we had been forbidden from bringing mess tins we had to find tins thrown away by some Russians
to boil it in None that I know oj exi ept the
Doctor |probably Stewart] yot dysenteiy^ As men fell out with exhaustion and sunstroke. Steel was at their side, bringing in four stragglers overnight before collapsing himself. 1 le was carried unconscious back to Tsientin and returned to camp three days later to an enthusiastic (nation. " As the remaining Australians camped near a swamp. 25% soon developed dysentery, influenza, 'lever' and 'ague' ' Most were evacuated to the British hospital at W ei-hai-wei. but on 6 October Pte T.J. Rogers NSWMLl died of influenza. He had almost been sent home from I long Kong with rheumatic fever 'but ... was given the benefit ol the doubt'.
Both contingents were assigned to attack
Pao-tmg fu city (population 200,000), before
taking up winter garrison duties at Peking.
However the NSW Contingent was ordered
directly to Peking and they left Tsientin on 10
October. I he move included 20 sick, while
another nine VILI personnel were left behind
due to illness, flic latter arrived 'scarcely able
to   Ctawt,	They   were  left  behind  without
anyone to attend to them and without food, but we soon fixed them up as well as our resources permit for we were not very flush with rations.'4''
The Victorians departed for Pao-ling fu two days later, leaving behind Hoy Albert (iibbs. who died of fever aboard the hospital ship ( iirthaye on 19 October and was buried at sea. On arrival they were spared laying siege when the city surrendered. Disaster was narrowly averted on the way back when an ammunition junk exploded with over x>0 casualties, although no Victorians were hurl. " Back at Tsientin they moved into a godown (storehouse) until they left China live months

later.
At Peking the NSW' contingent split into
three   groups    for   police   duties,   although
'mission creep' soon had them setting up other
municipal authorities. AH .1. Hamilton died on
6 November of dysentery.1   followed four days
later by Steel himself. He had been ill since his
collapse and Connor wrote on S November that
the PMO /Principal Medical Offii erj Came
round and  invalidctl   I inc.   Conwell  and
Oliver.   Has hoping Steel would go too '
Two days later he wrote 'Poor Steel died
this morning! Awful day Mowing a yule ami
oh! SO dusty. Rode over to IKJ to find out
about Police patrol then took Major Xawal
St  Dtila  there and lunched with  the   I"
Sikhs. Called on Roberts and came back
Had   a   yarn   with   Steel   before   dining.
Germans came over for whist and I went
over and read papers which degenerated
into a eliittway about Malta   Hack at ID -
Passing the Pr's cabin I looked in ami saw
the bed empty. Sot seeing him at the rear I
looked in again and saw him tying on his
side near the door with his great coat on. I
picket! him up and found his fate quite Cold
but his hands were warm so he could only
have just died. Sent over for Hazlelon and
the Civil Dr also tame up.  Took the body
over to the hospital.
Steel  was known  to be  taking  a   "sleeping
draught'   and   an   inquiry   assumed   he   had
accidentally overdosed on chloral hydrate. He
was buried at the British Legation1' and was
re-interred in a British eemetery  located near
the current Beijing Hotel. His burial records
were     lost     during     the      l%S     Cultural
Revolution.'1
Lofts    wrote    of    the    revised    medical arrangements for the NSW Contingent
A small party of ambulance men. mostly
enthusiastic young fellows from St John's
Association consorted and marched with
the   Marines   After  the death  of Sliryeon
Steele (sic) Captain  Moore Indian  Mctlical
Service   ami  later   Dr   Cope   a   civilian
suryeon look over the medietil duties  but
did not leave ( hina with US on our return to
Australia.,
The medical inspection o\'X November did not
prevent the death of AB Eli Rose from pleurisy
on 6 January. On 31 December 14 men were in
hospital, including one with smallpox." while
two men  sent  to W'ei-hai-wei ended  up  in
Japan.     Meanwhile the Victorians sustained

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several wounded in scrapes with foreign troops,   including   AB   .1.    Harding,   who
sustained sabre wounds from some Germans.
A report in mid-1 ehruary stated dial the health of the contingents was excellent alter
the smallpox case had been discharged." However, the prospect of relief proved too much for AB Arthur James Bennett, who shot himself on 14 March. A \eteran from the 1885 Sudan contingent, his apparent suicide possibly resulted from being demoted, after assaulting (TO J.G. Sparkes while drunk."
The Australians were relieved on 23 March and left China aboard the transport ChittgtU on 5 April. On the wax home Stewart diagnosed Cpl Thomas Symonds NSWMLI with chickenpox, but the ship was quarantined on arrival in Sydney on 25 April when the quarantine MO confirmed he aetually had smallpox. Although Symonds recovered Pte Charles Smart NSW Ml I died of smallpox instead The Victorians boarded a train for Melbourne on 3 May. where those whose vaccination status was in doubt had another enforced holiday at the Portsea quarantine station.
Aftermaths
Stew art was promoted to Fleet Surgeon in 1901 and retired in 1405."' Patched transferred to the Commonwealth Naval Forces and was court martialled in 1406. after being dismissed from the nax y for prejudicial conduct, lie appealed, requesting either an impartial rcxiew or a court martial and received two letters: one refused both requests and the other granting the court martial. The court martial found him guilty and he was sentenced to be discharged anyway!" lie died in 1444 and xxas buried in the Cheltenham New Cemetery."
LS Connor served in the Boer War and in WW I. AB Field also served in France, and his (lima Medal is at the Australian War Memorial. AB C.A. McDonald served during WWI with the Army in Australia. AB Paseoe served in France, and AB Whitelaw served with the RAN Bridging Irani." AB Hidden served with the Australian Naval and Military I xpeilitionary force to New Guinea, and later also went to France."
Morris was promoted to fleet Surgeon in the Roy til Australian Naval Brigade (later the RAN Reserve) in 1410.'" retired from the RANR in 1424 and died in 1436.""

Conclusion
Although no medical journal appears to have survived, his favourably reported fust aid training and lack of illness on board suggests that Morris did well. The fad that the requirement for medical support came late in deployment planning remains a consistent theme today. Other medical themes with the shore contingents include performing pre-deployment medicals en mass at short notice and sustaining the obligatory casually-on-departure (not to mention MO pay bhindeisi. One can only hope these recurring problems will improve during the next 100 years'
With seven deaths out of 460 men in six months (30 deaths 1000 men per annum), the Australian shore mortality rate greatly exceeded the 5.4 deaths 1000 men experienced by the RN in 1899, or even the 7.2 deaths 1000 RN personnel in 1400. associated with the Boer War" By comparison, Australia lost only 11.7 deaths from illness 1000 men per annum m South Africa.'"' Of the seven deaths, one may have been prevented if he had been sent home, while another may have been prevented by an effective smallpox vaccine. Steel's death appears to con linn the axiom that the doctor who treats himself has a fool for a patient.
Despite their Ambulance Party, the NSW contingent had six of the seven deaths, as well as 17 invalided home compared to six Victorians, It seems likely that individual Sailors, kicking collective training ami led by amateurs, did not perform as well as a homogenous group lead by ex-sailor officers. It also seems likely that the Ambulance Party's fust aid training was of little use lor managing infectious disease, although conditions in (lima may have created a daunting task lor medical personnel whatever their level ot expertise.
About the Author
Commander Wcslphalen qualified at Adelaide I niversity in 1985 ami joined /he RAX m a Medical Officer in 1987. His shore postings hare    included   Cerehrns.    Raimoral    \aval
Hospital and Kuttabul, as well as two amis as S\l<> Albatross. Sea Postings have included Swan, Stalwart and Success, participation in Op Damask in Sydney in 1993 and RIMI'M 46 m Perth He is currently SMO Stirling,

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In addition to the RN ships of die Australia Squadron, the ISSN Naval Agreement gave the colonies partial control of five small cruisers and two gunboats manned and operated by the RN, in exchange lor a small colonial subsidy Resides acting as a reserve, the Auxiliary Squadron was intended to nam Australians lor naval service. Although tins arrangement was never satisfactory lor either the Admiralty or the colonies it lasted until the Royal Australian Na\y was established in 191 1. See Rob Nichols. Statesmen and Sailors:
iustralian Naval Defiatee 1878-1920, Standard Publishing Mouse. Balmain, 1995,
Quoted in John Wells. The Royal Navy: I" Illustrated Social History 1870-/982, Hath Press.
\\on I K. 1994,p. 57.
HM< SProteetot and Boxer Rebellion 1900-01'. south Australian State Archive file ORG 74/64
South Australian Government Gazette, 19 November I X'R,
" Interview Mrs Pulcie Morris I daughter-in-law ) 9 Feb 01.
'' 'Our Kirst Australian Wairship - Story of the Protector - Interesting Reminiscences by Admiral Sir William Creswell.' The Register, Adelaide. 2 I June 1924. p. 9; quoted in Rob Nichols. Bluejackets and Boxen Australia's Naval Expedition to the Boxer I 'prising, Allen and Cnwin. Sydney. 1986
A century later, Fuuldings is the current contractor lot supplying pharmaceuticals to AD! health facilities throughout Australia. ■   I IMC S Protector and Roxcr Rebellion 1900-0r,
1 ibid.
'" Quoted in Nichols. Bluejackets and Boxers,
" 'Our First Australian Warship' p. 10,
* Australian War Memorial 3DRL 2246 'Copy of
Diary of George Frederick .le fiery on the expedition
ol 'the 11 Ml S Protector to the Roxer Rebellion.
China'.
Quoted in Colin Jones. Australian Colonial \ii\ies. Australian War Memorial. Canberra. 1986, n. 127,
' The Register, Adelaide. 7 January 1901. p. <k quoted in Nichols, Bluejackets and Boxers.
( Corfleld. The lustration Illustrated History oj
the Boxer I 'prising, Slouch I Lit Publications, Rosebud 2001. p. 224.
if Atkinson, Australian ('onthtgents to the < hina Field Fan e 1900-1901, NSW Military Historical Society. Clarendon Press. Sydney. August 197d. p. 48.
L Bruek. The Australasian Medical Directory andUandhookXS* edition I. Balliere. Tindal. I oiulon. August 1000
'"NSW Colonial Secretary In-Letter 5/6559 16083 dated JO July 1900.
' Australian Wat Memorial I Item 2 3 - Finance Records. Victorian Naval Contingent. 1900-01

" The rale of Sick Berth Steward was changed lo Sick Bay Attendant (SUAi in 1920. The RAN changed from SB A to MFD (Medical) in the early |970's.
1 A.M. Smith. Carving I pike Melon: Australians In the Boxer Rebellion. I hma 1900-1901, Mostly
I	nsung Military History Research and
Publications. Melbourne. 2000. p. 65.
The rank of Fleet Surgeon was changed to Surgeon Commander in 1920.
Ian Howie-Willis. .1 Century for tustratia: Si John Ambulance in Australia 1883-1983, Brown Prior Anderson. Canberra. 19X3. p. 170. -'' NSW Colonial Secretary In-Letter 5 6559 16083 dated 30 July 1900.
° NSW Colonial Secretary In-I etter 5 6549 11223 dated 29 May 1900.
:" 'The Late Staff-Surgeon Steel of the New South Wales Naval Forces' The Australasian Medical Gazette. 20 November 1900. p. 4XX.
Brack, The Australasian Medical Directory and Handbook.
-" W (iratnger ted). V.SII   \nn\ and Navy List, Corrected to 15 Oct 1900, Government Primer. Sydney 1900. p. 159.
:" NSW Colonial Secretary In-I etter 5 <^z'> inns; dated 30 July 1900. 10Sydney Morning Herald 30.ltd) 1900 p. 7.
" ib,tl Nieholls. Bluejat kets and Boxers, pp. 46-4S.
'C.F. Mumin. Diary of Midshipman C£ Mumin
NSW Naval Brigade on Service in China, from ~th
tngusl 1900 to 2nd May l"<>l. Typewritten
photocopy held by Naval Historical Society,
Sydney, p. I
4 Sydney Morning Herald 7 August I not), p. 5.
u NSW Colonial Secretary In-Letter 5 6559 16363
dated X August 1900. Mumin, Diary of Midshipman C.E. Mumin, p. I E.R Connor. Photocopy of handwritten diary held
by Naval Historical Society. Sydney, entry dated IX
August 1000
" ibid, entry dated 19 August 1900.
'" Sydney Mommy Herald2 October 1900, p. 5.
a Sydney Morning tfera/d 18 October 1900, p. 5.
41 Australian War Memorial file DRL 21X0
4'The Late Staff-Surgeon Steel of the New South
Wales Naval forces' p. 4XX.
" Connor, entry dated 5 ( Ntober 1900.
" Sydney Mommy Herald2 I November 1900, p. 7.
4" Quoted in Nieholls. Bluejackets and Boxers, p.
X5, (Able Seaman Bertotto'sdiary - private
collection).
"' See W PI vans. Perth Xol Hards. Hawthorn
Press. Melbourne. 1971. pp. 9|-94. Sydney Morning Herald! December 1900, p. 3.
II	Connor, entry dated X November 1900,
4" ibid, entry dated 10 November 1000

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" Sydney Morning Herald 26 December 1900, p. 5.
Nicholls. Bluejackets ami Boxers, p. 97. a Australian War Memorial file DRL 2 I SO.
Sydney Morning Herald 15 February I WO. p. 5.
si
M Sydney Morning Herald 16 February 1900, p. 5.
^ Nicholls. Bluejackets and Boxers, p. 145.
W Quoted in ibid. p. 122.
^7 C'orlield. The Australian Illustrated History of the
Boxer Uprising, p. 23.
,s Nicholls. Bluejackets and Boxers, p. 147.
* Sydney Morning Herald 20 April 1901, p. 7.
Smith. Carving Up the Melon: Australians in the Boxer Rebellion. China 1900-1901, p. 30.
Atkinson. Australian Contingents to the China Field Force 1900-1901, p 48. ''"' See Evans, Deet/v Sot Words, pp. 135-144.
Corfield. The Australian Illustrated History of the Boxer I 'prising, p. 210.
Smith. Carving Up the Melon, pp. 46-72.
Atkinson. Australian Contingents to the China Field Force 1900-1901. ""RN Van a List, Sep 1912, p. 590. "7 J.E. I lughes. History oj the Royal Adelaide Hospital. Adelaide. 1067 (19X2 supplement). On tracing Morris's descendants, the author discovered in January 2001 that he had babysat three of Morris's great-grandchildren when they were living next door to the author's parents in the 1970s! 61 C Lloyd & J.L.S. Coulter, Medicine and the \avv ,200-1900, Vol 4. E&S Livingstone. London 1063. p. 271.
The Australians lost 267 men from illness out of 16.1 75 sent to South Africa between December 1000 and May 1002: see P Dennis (el al), The ( )xford ( bmpanion to Australian \filitary History. OUP. Melbourne. 1005. pp. 104-100. " Atkinson. Australian Contingents to the ( hina Field Force 1900-1901, pp. 12-18.

HMAS Anzac providing MLS to allied forces on the southern Al law peninsular 21 Mar (13 (RAN)

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Inaugural Frank Broeze Memorial Lecture
by the Hon Kim C Beazley, MP1

J\i the heart of statecraft lies geopolitical understanding and geostrategy. This is not
geographic determinism. Such philosophies, now rightly discredited, la] behind much of the thinking, particularly Axis thinking, which dominated international polities in the first half of lust century. Unfortunatclv those experiences have contributed to an inability among policy-makers and analysts, from many countries including Australia to think through the real meaning of their geographic situation in all its complexities, human, economic, developmental and strategic.
fhese were problems thai ne\er afflicted Frank Breeze's thought: his European background probably helped. Though deep!) involved in national, particularly Western Australian lite, he retained to the end a detachment that made Ins perspective on our country unique. He could situate us hjstoricall) on a broad canvas. He eould eomhine the cold!) analytical approach required m geopolitieal assessments whilst at the same lime bringing B passionate, abundant heart to the foihles. activities and possibilities. prejudices and strengths of the people of his nation of adoption historically and in the here and now.
lie wrote massively There is not a person m tins room with a faseinalion for any branch of history who would not have his or her insights expanded by reference to some part of it. lor me. however, it was his capacity as what one Canadian commentator described 'as arguably 0/ the time the world's most substantial maritime historian' that is the mining spirit for my remarks tonight. His hook Island Nation has its opening part entitled 'Controlling Sea Space: Geopolitics. \\ .11 and \a\al Policy.'
No other history of Australia commences in such definite terms. No other signals that its writer intends to offer his her view of the dynamic interaction of geography, power and general human experience as the basis of his

interpretation of national history. I intend later to look at one distinct area of national policy -our maritime defence and how it interacts with our general national security, our possibilities for self-reliance and its interaction with others. particular!) allies.
Chapter two of 1 rank's book, though I disagree with some of its conclusions, is for me the best starting point. You eould not get a better 30-page introduction to the terms and conditions of our survival and how we have handled them than that. I am humbled by I rank's writing. Years ago with a co-author I struggled through a book on the dynamics of Soviet and American naval competition in the Indian Ocean. I was taken aback during the last election campaign when having a cup of cot tee in Sydney's Glebe Point Road to have a bloke bolt across the street from a tenth hand hook store with a copy for me to sign. I was never more taken aback when reading for this lecture to come across a short article on Indian Ocean geopolitics written by frank live years ago that contained more clarity and insight in a slum piece than I had managed to labour at length to produce. It will remain one o]' the abiding tragedies of Frank's death that the history of the Pacific on which he was working will noi be produced by his hand and his mind. Stuart Vlaelntyre described Island \ation m a delightful phrase as our fust 'fully amphibious account' of Australia. The Pacific story deserved at least as much.
Frank's charge against Australian historical writing and national policy alike was that it was •eontmentahsl" and therefore incomplete.
Images and perceptions <>/ national identity
have revolved largely aroinul inward looking and often racist concepts of continental' Australia in which the sea was seen as a lone shutting out unwanted institutions. ' lie goes on 'This exclusive focus on land not only runs diametrically against ius/raliii v physical existence as an island ... surrounded by a vast ring 0/ tea space,   hut also 1 ontradiets  the profound

fins is an edited version Of the leeiure presented ai the I inversus of \\ cslern Australia on 13 September 2002
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experi&tce of the country's involvement with the sen in history, heritage ami social life.' This eontinentalist outlook did not deprive our decision-makers of any interest in the sea. far from it. The defensive and incomplete character of that focus however diminished the rigour with which we analysed our own diplomatic. defence and economic requirements and rendered us naive and I would add, lazy, in assessing both our own obligations and the actions and directions of our allies, essentially over the last century British and Americans.
Frank perceived us as having made a decisive break with this in the 1980s. Though he quarrelled with some aspects of the then government's policy he praised it for
adopting it new strategic concept. somewhere halfway, between forward deployment and 'fortress Australia' and based on eontrol of Australia S maritime approaches towards the north and west. The protection o/ Australia's overseas trade ami the development of the mineral resources of the Pilhara and Timor Sea contributed considerably to that reorientation. Later he wrote
With the gradual decline in the political and economic significance of both Britain and \merica. it is within the confines of that essentially maritime region that Australia has had to redefine it international position, identity and security. Defenee policy has increasingly been ficussed on maritime capability ... In the process finally but inevitably, defence strategy has also been geographically reoriented towards the continent's western ami northern coasts ami away from the penguins oj Antarctica ami the comforts of the boomerang coast. Lovely expression that - boomerang coast - the coastal zone between Brisbane and Adelaide.
It should be clearly understood that maritime defence is not a navy preserve. Subsurface, surface and air threats for a country like Australia are a direct air force interest. Likewise for both the Australian littoral and the littoral in our area of immediate strategic interest in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific army amphibious capabilities are clearly important. The outcome in Last Timor is    clear    enough    demonstration    of    that.

Furthermore the revolution in military affairs of the last 15 years with its focus on the notion of battlespace is bringing the land and maritime environments closer together. This technological revolution is as much about platforms for enhanced command, control, communications, computers, and broad area surveillance as it is about precision-guided weapons. Nevertheless a naval platform endures. It is flexible in where it can he situated and with its submarine component it is capable of long distance, long-term placement in effectively any maritime and air-threat environment. It would require a Castro-like effort on my part to handle all force elements. Fortunately for you. I don't endure and therefore you don't have to.
I will concentrate on the navy. Until the I980*S I argue our geostrategic outlook distorted the development of a balanced naval force capable of dealing with Australia's needs and interests. Whilst no sensible analysis of our hundred year's history would suggest that discarding relationships with our British and American allies or not building relationships with like minded countries in our region would have advanced our security and better ensured our national survival (particularly in 1942) a naive approach to the allied comfort zone left us impaired. We are indeed a lucky country to have survived our mistakes.
Allied connections need not have imposed wrong priorities on our force structure or caused us to dangerously ignore essential elements of a balanced defence, but they did. Even when resources in absolute terms have been adequate for a reasonably planned defenee. the tug of ancient misperceptions drag us constantly away. Our allies are attractive, our legacy of human endeavour in war so rich that keeping us focused on a disciplined national strategy and associated military strategy is like bathing a eat.
As I look at Senator Hill's statement last week about furllier changes to our already highly questionable capacity to fund the enhanced ambitions of the last two Defence White Papers, based on our experiences in I nnorand Afghanistan. I feel like reaching for the nearest moggy. We have been able to do those deployments with difficulty but adequately from our existing force structure. We've kept our allies happy but I wonder if wc take   this   further   to   major   force   structure

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changes what  will  -.tart to  fall between the cracks.'
Well, probably the Navy again. We all play lip service to the maritime orientation of our defence structure and there reallv is something in it forever) Sen ice. However, if the Navy is al I he heart of it. it is not at the forefront of our minds. Years ago. when we did the l°S7 White Paper. Defence polled the public about their understanding of defence matters. ANOP asked which Sen ices came to the public mind: 53% said army. 27",, said air force. 16% said Navy. I've not seen a poll before or since that shifts those figures around more than a few percentage points. It seems that the value of the NaV) being able to operate out ol sight has the contra!) effect of also being out of mind.
In this regard I would like to look briefly at a current naval deployment which I was privileged to share a day or so with onboard ll\l \S Annua a couple of months ago. I want to look at it from the point of view of its achievements, hut also from the point of its value to the core tasks of the navy closer to home, any lessons on its impact on our principle alliance and illustrative points on its relationship lo the Navy's force structure. After that I want lo return to the differences between our historical experience up to the IdNOs and our capacity since to sustain a self-reliant Strategy with important allied relationships intact.
largely unnoticed by the Australian public the Royal Australian Navy this year has conducted a classic naval blockade al the head of (he Persian Gulf enforcing UN mandated sanctions on Iraq. Australian ships have been involved on and off for a decade, bin this year Australia has assumed command of this operation to relieve pressure on a IS military focused on Afghanistan, it is commanded by Captain Peter Sinclair who operates with his Staff mainly from an Arleigh BUrke class guided missile destroyer. The other direct Australian contribution at the moment tire I IMA Ships l> until and Melbourne. A porous operation for some years has tightened up
Large numbers of frustrated smugglers are locked up for weeks in Iraqi waterways unable to move their illicit cargoes, particularly oil, without being forced back or if they are on large ships seized and their oil confiscated. I his year several thousand ships have been interrogated: close to 41)0 boarded with about half of them found to be in breach of the IN

sanctions regime. A smuggling operation which has hitherto netted Saddam Hussein about SI billion a year has seen its Gulf leg dry up. The success this year has been based on the w illingness of the Australians and others under Australian command lo undertake what arc termed non-compliant boardings.
That much is known to diligent followers of the odd Hash about the Navy in the Australian media. What is not known is how complex this Operation is and how taxing it is on the crews. In the first instance this is a multilateral exercise vvilh Captain Sinclair obliged to coordinate a variety of ships and patrol boats from the US. UK. Kuwait. UAL, Argentina, the Netherlands and New Zealand. The capabilities tend to he specialised to particular areas. In addition, contact must be maintained with Iranian naval elements in the vicinity from both its regular Meet and the Revolutionary Guards element. Smugglers trying to escape Australian and other ships in international waters frequently slip into Iranian territorial waters.
The task group has access to American surveillance information and the product of the USS Hopper's aegis system for which to say the least. Captain Sinclair's command team have developed an affectionate regard. Literally thousands of ships ply the (lull front supertankers to a multitude of traditional dhows. Precision on potential smugglers is a difficult interpretive task. In mid-summer the temperatures even at sea are often 50 degrees centigrade. Crews work 5 and 7 hour shifts with equivalent breaks seven days a week throughout most of the deployment. Interception of non-compliant vessels is done by crews from ships boats, heavily tooled up and with the task oi' getting through barbed wire on the rails and bolted and welded iron hatches on bridges and holds. There is a cheerful excitement about the boats crews which is just as well because some breakouts have been attempted which require them to operate non-stop. 1 was luxuriously put up in the sick bay but could hear the boat above me being continuously launched and recovered all night.
There have been complaints but no resistance from the Iraqi government. Nevertheless the ships must be prepared for a hostile environment. The charts I looked at for the shallow draft Australian frigates operating close  to  the  mouth  of the  Iraqi  waterways

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contained warning that the waters were mined. Outdated said the Captain - the American's have cleared it. Nevertheless at the back of everyone's mind must be the tact that the only maritime success enjoyed by Iraq in the Kuwait war were the mining of a cruiser and a helicopter carrier. They were not sunk but were taken out of the line - a reasonable outcome for $30,000 worth of mines. The ships must also hear in mind the presence of Iraqi shore missile batteries. In addition crews have to be alert to September 11 type aircraft activity, if not air force activity and, with the thousands of dhows in the (iulf. a CSS Cole type boat assault. This is a constabulary operation but in an environment in which a full suite of war threats must be prepared for and the capabilities to delect such threats and respond to them exercised. It is a compliment to the RAN that the USN is prepared to see it assigned tactical command in such an environment and make its assets available.
For the purposes of this lecture, what can we discern from this.' firstly Australian warships incorporated in our order of battle when our force structure was planned around a capacity to control Australia's maritime approaches and play a role in our area of immediate strategic interest are fully capable of meeting a government decision that we should contribute to a UN task well outside it. Secondly the ships so designed with minimal adjustment are capable of titling into a US operational arrangement, further evidence that self-reliance need not contradict an alliance commitment. Thirdly in performing their constabulary tasks the naval personnel concerned do not see their warfighting skills unexercised or diminished. The same cannot be said for those obliged to operate border patrols to our north under Operation Relex where months are spent on simple and boring tasks that should be in the hands of a coast guard.
However, the presence of the American guided missile destroyer brought other things to mind more directly related to the capacity for things to start to fall between the cracks as strategic discipline is modified and other tasks are added If the Government decides to rebadge their operation in the event of an escalation of the conflict with Iraq, the current generation of Australian frigates will not be able to contribute at quite the same level as the frigates in the Kuwait War of 1990-91. Then

the centrepiece of the Australian contribution was the air defence optimised DDGs with 3D radar supporting their SMIs. They were used as picket boats at gaps in the /agios mountain wall through which Iraqi air assaults were anticipated. The FKGs have SMI. the Areata only close range missile defence. Neither has 3D radar. The environment is less threatening now so this may not matter, but it is worth reviewing how we got here.
The 1987 White Paper proposed a surface Meet of 17: 3 DIXis. 6 I ICis. S ITIls tfraacs), The first two classes were defined as tier one ships, the Annus as tier two. The role of the tier one ships was to be able to operate in a hostile environment in the archipelago, the tier two ships to support them in ASW activities at closer choke points. Particular reference was made to what was then seen to be substantial enhancement of submarine capabilities in the region. Not all were happy with the refoeused strategy. There was a view in the government of the day that the 1987 White Paper had underplayed operations in the immediate littoral as a strategic requirement that needed to be addressed in (he force structure. The 1994 White Paper saw amphibious capabilities added lor littoral operations in the archipelago.
The Labor Government acquired two Newport Class LSTs and the Navy did a line job upgrading their capabilities, whilst journalists and the then Opposition did a superb job of covering the upgrade by claiming the Government hail bought even rustier buckets than first thought and this caused a cost blow out. The new capability is considerable. Somewhere along the line however we lost three frigates. By the time of this Government's While Paper a new ait -defence frigate was not to be a replacement lor the DDG as originally intended but three might come in to replace the h II (is as they start to pay out ten years from now. 17 ships down to 14 down to II. This may all be acceptable and much greater capabilities are bemg built into the Anzacs, Lxcept of course the Annus are no longer to have the Seahawk helicopter for the ASW role they were originally designed for. They will embark the SeaSpnte. which is optimised for surface attack and surveillance.
The point is however a disciplined public strategic rationale was put in place for the 1987 structure for the surface fleet. It was not complete. It was arguable. It may have been wrong.  But we have not had the disciplined

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argument for subsequent changes. In tough budgetary times one feels the Navy will Struggle to gel the case for an air warfare frigate or destroy er accepted in the near future
I have already discussed the role of the Navy in the redefinition of maritime strategy that occurred in Australia during the 1980s. Its force structure implications were for a balanced navy with a three tiered surface fleet - DDGs, IK is in tier one, Anzaes in tier iwo patrol boats and mine countermeasures in tier three In addition the Navy's contribution to maritime strike and long distance surveillance came through submarines. Underway replenishment ships were to sustain two task groups. Amphibious capabilities were weakest though this was subsequently corrected.
Given that allied cooperation with both the I S and regional allies was not to be a force structure determinant, confidence was expressed that a force designed to control, or at least deny enemy access to an Australian maritime strategic /one that covers as it does more than 10% of the earth's surface, would have the Rexibilitj to contribute to allied operations were a Hag required. There was one qualification here. There would be constant pressure for the platforms to have the communications and information processing capacity to keep up with sophisticated allies, fo this point that has proved to be the case Massive though the I'SN is. there was a shortage of air defence platforms in the 1990-ul deployments in the Kuwait War which ihe RAN helped fill. The American enthusiasm for our ('ollira class submarines relates in part to their capacity to operate more effectively in some littoral waters than their nuclear powered submarines. With the striking power Of its weapons lit ihey also augment the SSGN component of the Pacific fleet by some 20%.
A force so structured was a long time coming, for most of Australian history the consideration of the unique aspects of our strategic environment have been subordinated to the requirement to fit in with an allied effort. first British, then British and American, In part this was based on the hope, often against experience and with an incredible naivclc about allied capacities and intentions - that titling in would keep them here, further, that it would keep them here in sufficient force to counter real threats. In pan. it was often based on economy. Our government sought a permanent peace div idend.

This did not mean that our unbalanced naval forces played no role in Australia's defence. They were hugely active in all Australian war efforts. In WWII our navy participated in almost all ocean /ones of combat. Close to home its effort in the supply and lodgement of troops was massive. We were engaged in main of the household-name naval bailies - t oral Sea, Savo, Leyte Gulf The last great naval battle in world history to dale was fought at Leyte Gulf between the Japanese and BO allied Beet - allied because despite the I'SNs massive preponderance, three Australian warships were part v>\' the Heel. The Australian heavy eniiser IIMAS Australia had the distinction of being the first warship struck by a kamika/e attack. However arguably the operation most damaging to Japanese sea power deployed from .Australian soil involved no Australian combat forces at all. That was the campaign engaged from Australian ports by allied submarines, which accounted for more than a third of Japanese shipping losses. Tremanlle was the biggest submarine base in the southern hemisphere.
Hut I will leave it up to frank Hroe/e to summarise the geostrategic contribution ai Australia to the allied success. He wrote
Free  Australia  allowed  contact  to   bo
maintained between the Indian anil Pat die
Oceans, which enabled the passage of troop transports and American convoys. On balance, Australia's nwst important junction was probably as an advance base fat naval warfare and the reconquesl of
South     lias!     Asia.      It    providcil     the
indispensable geopolitical defence-in-depth oj the Western colonial empires /or the
building up of the large invasion /ones
from South East Asia - a /unction played in
the European theatre hv Britain itself.
In  the   immediate  aftermath  at   the  war  an
economically	straightened	(hiflcy
Goveramenl confronted a region from which the colonial powers were retreating and the Americans moving to a northern Pacific fovus. A hybrid maritime strategy emerged with some attention to independent capabilities. But economy and the allied presence at least in ihe furthest part o\~ a very extensive region of strategic interest kept us heavily focussed on the allies with the hope of drawing them closer. The government's ll)47 decision to acquire two carriers was a response to ihe Navy's desire for an independent capability for

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naval operations within the region. They were the eentrepiece of what was hoped to he a force equipped with capable surface eombatants. minesweepers. logistic and amphibious ships - no submarines and in reality no money. The incoming Men/ies Government completely discarded any notion of an independent regional focus and virtually all of what might be seen as a balanced force, In the middle of the Korean War a massive Australian economic peace di\ idend was achieved. The carrier's role was changed to augment allied anti-Soviet submarine capabilities. The ships that would have left a balanced force were gradually paid out.
For the next thirty years a debate over the relevance of the fixed wing Heel air arm obscured a deeper and more interesting debate over Australian maritime strategy and the right balance of naval forces. Two Strategic Basis Papers of the 1950s present a fascinating contrast - one in 1956 which was approved, another in 1959 which wasn't, but which arguably reflected the true state of defence force thinking and which consequently influenced changes in the 1960s to the Navy's force structure.
The 1956 paper suggested force structure planning could
reasonably proceed on the basis that Australian forces engaged in operations in conjunction with United Kingdom and United States Forces, in accordance with common treaty affixations. will he supported hy nuclear action hy the United Kingdom and the United States when circumstances require such support. This is inherent in the SEATO strategic concepts developed to date for the defence of South East Asia in limited war and can he expected similarly to apply in other cases OS plans are developed to meet other situations (eg. global war and contingency plans for the defence of Malaya). The firm of support might well he making available for service with our forces elements armed with and capable of using nuclear weapons or by milking such weapons available It) our forces in the field under certain operational circumstances. Here a completely unreal picture of our actual geostralegic environment blinded us to forces at work in the real environment, which saw us unprepared for the actual counter-insurgency problems that emerged in Malaya. It did not

anticipate  the emergence  of Indonesia  as  a
destabilising     factor    in     regional     defence
calculations.  A  massive  Chinese  communist
assault did not and was never likely to emerge.
Those   that   did   emerge   caught   us   totally
unprepared in our force structure planning.
The 1959 paper maintained
The organisation of our defence must take
into consideration two main requirements,
vi: the retention of non-communist South
Fast Asia in friendly hands, and a future
situation were we may be called upon to
defend Sew Guinea or the north  western
approaches by our independent efforts. As
our forces could be reshaped only over a
long   period   of years,    tltey   should   be
designed /nimarily with the ability to act
independently of allies. Such forces could
act    conjointly    with    allies    in    regional
defence arrangements. On the other hand,
forces shaped solely to act in concert with
major   allies    would   not   necessarily   he
capable of an independent role.
The  Cabinet   set   back   the  development   o\~
Australia's   strategic   maturity   by   a   decade.
minuting   'Cabinet  directed attention   to   the
conclusions that the Australian forces should
be designed primarily with the ability to act
independently of allies.  It found difficulty in
accepting this conclusion and invited further
discussion on the matter. ' In the same year
1959,       the       government       accepted       a
recommendation to disband the licet air arm.
There was no change of strategy  implied m
this,  merely the thought  that  other cheaper
forces  such  as   submarines   might   make   an
equal   contribution   to   allied   anti-submarine
efforts. The carrier was eventually  reprieved
until the latter years of the Fraser Government.
Despite these twists and turns, the  1960s
did  see the emergence  of a  more  balanced
naval     structure.     Highly     capable    surface
combatants    made    a    comeback    with    the
acquisition of the DDGs. maritime as well as
land based strike with F-l 1 Is. patrol boats for
coastal   surveillance   and   interdiction,   mine
counter-measure vessels and submarines. Of
these the capability of which the Navy was
most wary was the submarine. Navy Minister
John Gorton forced through its acquisition. He
said in 1959
There is little doubt that the submarine is now the most effective anti-submarine unit. The clearest way to consider the effect that a submarine force by Australia would have

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an a potential enemy is to < onsider the very targe efforts lustralia had to make and still has ia nnikc. ia cannier ti comparatively
small number oj enemy submarines.
It was the British who were decisive in changing the Navy's mind however. They simply told the RAN that as the British submarine Beet nuclearised, they would not have conventional submarines available to exercise with the Australian Beet.
It was the British and Americans who finally forced the need for change in Australian Strategic thinking as well. The aborted lu5d Strategic Basis Paper linally beeame a reality when the British withdrew from Past of Sue/ and President Nixon announeed his Ciuam doelrine on allied sell-help. Building on changes in strategy put in place by the Wlutlam Government, Fraser in the 1976 w lute Paper announced national strategy would hitherto be based on self-reliance. That national strategy was finally converted into military strategy in the 1980s. The l%()s and 70s changes had produced a naval force structure that was relatively easily adapted to its requirements,
Our maritime geography   and the area of
greatest strategic relevance to us never change. Nothing however is static in the interaction
between global and regional polities and so we are obliged to review constantly these dynamics to discern whether or not strategy should alter with all the implications that may have for tlte structure of our armed forces.
There is no doubt that global and regional polities are very different now from those in the 1980s. It is easy to be caught up in the hreathlessiiess of the news cycle that brings before us distant problems as urgent crises in our living rooms in the nightly news programs.
I he fundamental questions are these:
 •	Do changing events require us to alter a national strategy based on self-reliance within a framework of alliances?
 •	Do they alter a military strategy that has as its focus defence in depth for our maritime approaches'.'
 •	Do they change a need for a force structure built for that task.'
I would argue nothing fundamental needs to change, but new technologies and economic constraints will always oblige constant review at the margins. Losing discipline in strategy for the exigencies of the moment means that in an environment where resources are limited, it is

possible to undermine fundamentals if we are not careful.
There are three Standout changes in this political strategic environment, firstly, the central dynamic of the global system has changed from a bipolar-contest to one where the IS enjoys massive hegemonic power. Secondly, the immediate region of the Asian. Southwest Pacific littoral is more unstable than il was in the lUSDs. Thirdly, the events of September 1 I have thrown into stark relief the vulnerability of stable nations to what is called asymmetric warfare and have exposed to greater public attention a decade old worldwide terrorist threat. Analysis of all this in detail is impossible here However, several points need to he noted.
firstly, the emergence of the United States as the world's first and exclusive - in the words of a French Minister hyperpower - as the core feature oi' the global system, is not to the disadvantage of its allies. Our planning would be very different if the Cold War had had the opposite outcome. The IS now accounts lor more than 4(l"„ o\ total global defence spending. Its expenditure is greater than the next six powers combined This does not suggest that if ever the IS needed our military assistance, it needs it more now.
There is however one substantial change in US defence policy which requires dueel consideration in a lecture on Australian maritime strategy In ihe 1980s we planned our self-reliant strategy in an environment where our ally's attention was elsewhere. The areas of global competition were in Europe, the Middle fast and North Asia. Our contribution through the joint facilities to US capabilities in those areas was a very real one. though they were a long way from Australia's direct strategic interest. In the end. though, the US was quizzical of aspects of our approach: for them we were m a strategic backwater. Given our contribution and our willingness to deploy further afield if alliance requirements indicated it. the US let well alone.
The requirement for the IS to discipline its force structure with half an eye to its Soviet competitor in those areas has now disappeared. For the last ten years the US has struggled to get to grips with a new basis for force planning. In the immediate aftermath of September II. largely unnoticed the US released the product of its rethink in its quadrennial defence review. Il is this review

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rather nun its moves to deal with terrorist
based threats that drives long term defence policy. Its assumptions are important for us lo understand in the context of our maritime strategy. The US is making dramatic changes in its intelligence capabilities and internal security arrangements. It is bracing friends and allies around the globe on policing and intelligence cooperation. It has conducted a forceful diplomacy around its actions in Afghanistan and more broadly, which has seen noted diplomatic success in its relations with Russia. China and on the South Asian subcontinent.
It has taken the US some time to appreciate how successful it has been, flic appreciation however has come in lime for it now to start moving multilaterally as it sorts out how it wonts to deal with Iraq. Though the costs of these operations look massive to those of us who sit in I illipul. they have required only minor adjustment lo American force Structure. September I I produced no seismic shift in American force planning and how those forces are lo be deployed, though the threat from non-stale actors has been lagged on lo possible threats from stale actors when potential enemies are considered. The quadrennial defence review is another matter. The essence of new doctrine has shifted away from a capacity to light wars in the focal points of cold war competition to being based on capabilities that WOUld defeat local hostile forces at any point of the globe. Rather lhan address the capabilities of an equivalent power the US seeks out strategies of weaker actors for asymmetrical warfare that would deny US access to an area of interest. The US Defense Department seeks to structure forces in a way that renders them capable of defeating such strategies. The blue water, open ocean characteristics of US naval strategy and tactics has shifted to the green water littoral task.
The political task is to have allies embrace closer American attention to their immediate vicinity, offering bases and developing the capacity of their forces for interoperability with the US. A new geographic definition of the Asian littoral is provided in the document. One of the areas cited under US main objectives in which hostile domination is to be precluded is the Easl Asian littoral. This is defined as the region stretching from the south of Japan through Australia to the Bay of Bengal.    Its    scoops    up    Taiwan    and    the

Southeast Asian littoral, and interestingly.
Papua New Guinea, on the way through. The
global military posture is lo be reoriented to
developing a basing system that provides
greater flexibility for US forces: temporary
access to facilities to enable US forces lo
conduct training and exercises: redistribution
of forces and equipment based on regional
deterrence requirements: provide sufficient
mobility.	including	airlift.	scalift.
propositioning	basing	infrastructure.
alternative points of debarkation, and new logistical concepts of operations, to conduct expeditionary operations in distant theatres against adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction and other means to deny access lo US forces. Nowhere in this report is China mentioned, but it is the ghost at this (cast The description of asymmetrical and sea denial tactics and strategies which are to be countered appear a minor image of what LIS planners know of developing Chinese military doctrine.
Two years ago the RAN's Scapower Centre produced in public the product of years of hard work in defining the RAN's strategy and tactics for an Australian environment for Australian forces. It is entitled Australian Maritime Hot trine. David Stephens, who is head of the Naval historical section of the Scapower Centre was one of franks PhD students. It includes the Navy's perception of the Australian Government's identified Australian enduring strategic interests. The fust of these is lAvoidance of destabilising strategic competition developing between the IS.    China   and   Japan   as   the   /tower
relationships between these three evolve and change* Clearly sustaining this is going to be an interesting feature of allied relationships for some time to come.
Australia already contributes to die alliance many of the attributes the US seeks from its friends in its new strategy. What i^ different is that we move from a strategic backwater lo greater focus. The new American Strategy will mean more pressure in the relationship on issues of interoperability. We gam enormously technically from access lo American capabilities. The technologies that go to managing battlcspace are in large measure of American origin and arc available lo us. Surveillance of our approaches ami our broader strategic environment is enhanced by our agreements  with  the  Americans.   Timor

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demonstrated when there is substantial direct Australian concern in the region where \usirahan capabilities require enhancement the) are prepared to be supportive.
There are often subtle differences of approach between us however and management of them will be much more difficult in the new environment than in the I980's. Insuring that (he management of these issues do mil impinge on a force structure well suited to our strategic needs is now critical. Ihe Government's defence program outlined in its capabilities paper posited as it was on 3% real growth m defence spending is now hea\ily threatened. This is a product of several factors. Firstly blow out in existing programs. This includes the Navy's heavy weight submarine tuqvedo. Secondly, the addition of capabilities not included as essential in the original program but which now have been added on. A haphazard addressing of the new environment. $300 million plus for the army's additional helicopters is one example, finally there is the decision to enter the Joint Strike lighter program which pushes out the I A-IN and f-III replacement for 15 years. This is a development with consequences for the existing flee! of aircraft, which is central to our maritime strike capabilities. The air force has no costed solution for the upgrade ol" the existing aircraft within the budget laid down. Ihe blowout is potentially billions. Part of the solution may he to shift land strike capabilities to a land strike missile with a combination of submarines, C-130s, P-3Cs and 737s as platforms. At least the platforms are within the existing program. All this will enforce severe discipline on the Navy and provide a major tactical challenge as its surface licet shrinks below that cm isaged fifteen years ago.
What I have tried to do in this lecture is to pick up some themes that influenced frank Breeze's writing. To portray the complexities of the monumental struggle for maturity in what he called "free Australia' as it got to grips with its maritime geopolitical situation he saw as one of his tasks. The light for a relevant maritime strategy has in part been a light about our national identity. It has been a challenge to narrow, naive and prejudiced thinking. There is probably much in my analysis that he would find narrow. This is because while he understood military geography his view of history, culture and humanity would never he constrained  bj   it.   It  will  be  up  to  other

lecturers in this series to relied Ins broader interests, lbs memory deserves that.
Dutchmen were wrecked on this coast for hundreds of years and they disappeared without trace, frank and llli made successful landfall and their contribution to the life of the Australian mind and particularly the Western Australian mind has been great
About the Author
The Hon Kim C Beazley, MP was the Minister
for Defence from 1984 to 1990.
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4

Some Developments down aft - A Brief Look at the Schilling Rudder.

tiWk
By Captain Ray Griggs, CSC, RAN
This
edition  is
devoted	to
developments down all. We often get focused on the more glitzy aspects of technology and some quiet revolutions can pass us by. I lie rudder continues to remain the preserve of the Engineer and one ol' those things the ship handler generally takes for granted that he or she will always have.
Developments in rudders or alternative directional control methods, such as trainable water jets and thrustcrs have generally been slow in introduction to warships. In some areas however developments have been vcrv impressive, for example, many of us have witnessed significant developments in tug technology over the last 25 years with the advent of hlort nozzles and Z-pellers. The development of these technologies has been such that they have become available in smaller and increasingly more capable lugs.
Warship design down all has not been anywhere near as revolutionary, with the possible exception of the controllable pitch propeller and developments in Mine Counter Measure Vessels (MC'MVs). One rudder that is now in service in over 1000 vessels around the world is the Schilling rudder. It has SOItte excellent properties that as a shiphandlcr it is worth being aw arc of.
The Schilling rudder is not in itself new and has been around in various forms for over 30 years Its original design intent was to overcome the sluggishness of conventional rudder designs ;u slow speeds on barges and similar types of vessels in the constrained inland waterways of Europe.
The design of the Schilling rudder is fairly simple, fhe rudder is a fishtail shape with a fairly blunt leading edge and thin tail. The leading edge, is rounded and this causes acceleration in the water How passing over it. This accelerated flow delays airy, stall and maintains    'lift'    (which    in    rudder    terms

translates into sideways force) at lower speeds through the water than a conventional rudder.
fhe thin 'fishtail' of the rudder is the key from the shiphandlers perspective to being able to use it effectively at rudder angles of up to 70c. The aft area of How acceleration provides nunc enhanced vectoring of the water How at these very large rudder angles.
The Schilling concept
^a.iaw-A
The Schilling rudder is baM*l upon thr fishtail design concopl ihown below
Source:      Schilling      Uiuldcr Hamworlliv KSI  Ltd

Predictably, given the rudder's heritage, it is extremely effective when the vessel is operating at very low speeds. At 70 the Schilling rudder covers about 30% more of the propeller disc area than a conventional rudder at 35°. By trapping more of the propeller wash at lower speeds, the shiphandlcr is able to obtain significant lateral movement even in a single screw configuration.
With a properl) optimised rudder operating at between 60-70 of rudder angle, sideways thrust o\ up to 50% of the equivalent bollard pull of the ships propellers can be achieved, effectively acting as a very powerful stern thruster. This is a significant capability and makes a single screw bow thruster configuration far more flexible and reduces the need for tugs in a wide variety of conditions
While the development of the Schilling was initially focusscd on improving the slow speed

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shiphandling problem, its design has now developed both hydrody luunically and in its construction methodology to cater for higher speed use. This opens up opportunities for possible applications in certain warship designs, particular!) in amphibious and alloat Support ships where top speeds in the low to mid 21) knot range are generally the norm.
At higher speeds the Schilling rudder will generate less rudder force than more conventional rudders. This is an advantage as the smaller the control force that is applied when trying to steer a steady course the belter. In the merchant service this translates to reduced fuel, higher service speeds and reduced wear and tear.
Because the rudder is capable of much higher rudder angles, the shiphandler needs to lie cognisant of how much wheel should be applied in certain circumstances. The maximum turning effect or sideways force while Irving to maintain significant headway is achieved with about 40 of rudder applied. In the shiphandhng sense the temptation to put the wheel hard over must be overcome as u may actual!) make the situation worse if a significant speed reduction is not what is needed.

	35° P	35° S	65c P	65° S	
AdvLBP	2.71	2.02	2.03	1.90	
Tac DiaLBP	: os	i.<)4	1.90	1.90	
Turns with 35   of wheel at 10 kts. 05  at X kts.
(A typical naval A() has Adv and Tac Dia of
4.2 and 4.0 respectively at 35' 1
(Source: Schilling MARINER, llamworthv KSK
ltd)
The Schilling rudder needs to be very carefully tailored for the specific ship it is going to be luted on. The actual rudder st/e and siting will depend on the role of the vessel, manoeuvrability requirements, under water hull section design and the like. It is certainly worth looking into for some of the upcoming new construction projects.
This overview has drawn heavily on the wealth of detailed information and documentation about the Schilling rudder at llamworthv Marine's excellent web site at vvvvw.hamvvorlhvkse.com. It is without doubt the most impressive resource on the Schilling rudder available and well worth a visit.

A  twin  screw,  twin  Schilling  arrangement Source: ll-amworthv KSK Ltd
Manoeuvrability when underway is significantly enhanced by the Schilling rudder. The IMO set criteria for a ship's turning circles: these are normally expressed in units Of the length Between Perpendiculars (l.BP) of a ships si/e. lor a 3r>0 turn a ship's advance should not he more than 4.5 times the LBP and the tactical diameter should be less than 5 times the LBP. Ilamworthy Marine report the results of turning trials of a 151.000 DWT Sue/max crude oil tanker (LBP of 2o4m) as follows:

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BOOK REVIEWS

Sober Men and True. Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy 1900-1945
by Christopher MeKee
Harvard University Press. 2002
hardcover, 285 pp. illustrations, index. RRP I ISS29.95.
litis is a book to delight all inquiring naval people, especially those seeking
to belter understand modern naval culture and traditions, as well as the
human world of one of the great naval forces of history : a world in which
RAN life was born. Christopher MeKee is a respected American naval
historian whose work on the early US Naval officer corps is well known. In
this hook he continues his enlightened interest in the human aspects and
vviiler social context Of navies, turning to Britain and this time to the lower
deck. The result is an eminently readable and intellectually fruitful portrait of
the British sailors who effectively made the Royal Navy during its last two generations as the sword pi
a great imperial power. MeKee is scrupulous in letting the sailors speak for themselves - rather ihau
seeing them through the eyes and records of authority - m the actual words of their letters, diaries,
memoirs and oral testimony. The immediacy of their accounts is combined with his careful and
imaginative writing in a vivid and moving book. Three do/en well chosen photographs inelude images
conveying the misery and exhaustion of coaling a ship and the only known photograph of RN sailors
partying in a brothel.
MeKee explores the world of the lower deck in all its negative and positive aspects, with a sharp eye lor the moral grey areas in between. He deals with sailors' backgrounds and reasons for enlistment, w ith naval discipline, officer-rating relations, and aspects of comradeship. There are also the terrors ol battle. A signalman aboard the destroyer leader IIMS Kelly, torpedoed in 1940, fell the universal fear of the warrior: he was afraid of being afraid. He took comfort, interestingly, in the fact that aboard a ship there was nowhere to run. There was also the deadly dangerous nature of routine life aboard ship as well as of illnesses. We hear of shore leave and binges, of sex and relations with women ('nice girls' as well as prostitutes), ol sailors' marriages, and of homosexuality aboard ship (a serious naval offence but for obvious reasons hard to detect). We hear about life alter the Navy and the reasonably good prospects sailors enjoyed, even in the midst of economic depression   I he skills anil values they had learned, together with the prestige of the Navy in society, generally served them well m en vie street.
Some of the most interesting aspects of the book deal with the apolitical nature of lower deck life, its necessarily consensual discipline, its unofficial hierarchies, and its lack of respect for formal religion. It was difficult for sailors to reconcile the official Christian ideal with the random and irrational horrors of war in whieh many suffered, good men died, and bad ones prospered. I he serious rituals surrounding the distribution of the daily grog ration (which lasted until lv>7(i) weie almost B substitute sacrament. Rum (whether neat or diluted) still played a very central role in making sailors' lives bearable in the early twentieth century, as it had done in Nelson's day.
If a sailor learned his trade, re-enlisteil for a further ten years on top of his initial twelve, kept his nose clean, and surv ived a hard existence, he was rewarded with a pension for life I luman beings stay sane by expunging - as far as is possible - had memories in favour oI good But what is remarkable in these stories is the positive memories and the legacies which many sailors attribute to the Navy. They remember the spirit of adventure and the foreign travel which was. at that lime, a privilege rarelv enjoyed by the working classes. They remember the comradeship and miss it in later life, as they do the llnaneial security of naval serviee  There is also the romanee of the sea which when eomhined with military life has imprinted itself OH the minds of many. Sailors remember 'I xrcat respect h" the sea.

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I in loveliness <>l dawn, a/ sunrise and sunset. The clear bugle call of the Royal Marines at the ceremony of sunset echoing across the harbour'.
But even more than this, the British sailors of this era were proud of heme the men the Navv had made them and of doing the job they did. As one of them said 'There is no one like a naval man. I Mix u ith no one oilier than that even today. And I know them he/ore they speak.' The Nav y became part ol these men in a special way One could take them out of the service, but not the sen ice out of them. The Royal Navy became their spiritual home. In pan this was the heritage which all excellent organisations pass on to their members. In part it was the rigour, effectiveness, and pride of one of the elite military forces ofhistorv. I knew just a lew of these men as college staff in England twenty years ago and always enjoyed talking to them  Highly efficient anil on duty always well turned out. they were gentle and quietly spoken, just occasionally sharp and combative, and very shrewd about others. One gave the best short historical judgement on Winston Churchill one could ever hear or read (7 was brought up to believe that no one is indispensable, but he was as dose as von couldget). They were Worldly and knew peoples and places from the Americas to the Middle fast and the ports of Asia. Unlike many ill England they knew Australia and appreciated Australians. By that time they were ageing men and part of a vanishing world. But they had a powerful pride in ha\ mg been part of the Royal Navv and having policed and defended the Empire, Ours is a better world for what they and their allies did
Much of the physical harshness of the old naval life is gone, and so is its all-male world. But its history still resonates and is relevant to today's naval issues, especially training, personnel management, and the conduct of operations. In this light this book can be read with profit. It is also something of a milestone in naval history, to be read in conjunction with such hooks as Nicholas Rodger's The Wooden ll'ar/J unci Ronald Speetor's At War At Sea. I he volume on The Face Of \av,il Battle, shortly to be published by Allen and L 'nvvin in conjunction with the RAN. is a further attempt to promote the naval face of battle genre. We need to know more about the human factor in naval history and its social context if the history of navies is to he fully and properlv integrated into academic historical study. Strategy, policy, and operations arc not the whole story. Above all. Saber Men and True is a book to he savoured for its humanity and its getting behind the stereotypes.
Reviewed hv DrJohn Reeve. I '.Y.S'M'-,//>/ I.
Recent Defence Policy Documents
The Australian Approach to \\ arl'are
Published in 2002 as the first m a three part scries this booklet provides a clear and concise outline of the historical, legal and cultural underpinnings o\' the Australian Defence force (ADf). logically structuring each chapter operates as a building block which, when considered collectively, constitute the fundamental foundations of Australia's warfare philosophy. The areas examined are the relationship between the ADf" and the community, its constitutional and legal basis for existence, the influences of Australia's geo-strategie position, national culture and defence posture. These sections are supported by photographs illustrating ADf operations, past and present. All prionlv task areas are covered, defence of Australia, promotion of regional security, support of Australia's wider interests and peacetime national tasks.
1 he Australian approach to warfare, specificallv addressed by the last two chapters, draws together .ill the previous themes covered in the booklet. It outlines seven core qualifies of the Australian warfare philosophy. These include legitimacy, communitv relations, focus on manoeuvre warfare and the personal qualities and values instilled in our commanders and troops, amongst others. The booklet concludes by suggesting that the ADf needs to remain anchored by its sense of history and place in society whilst embracing adaptability and flexibility in order to meet the challenges of the future. Although primarily targeted at those who have a limited knowledge of the services it is an engaging read and would make an excellent training tool for new ADf members.
Force 2020
Developed in consultation with several working groups, including ADf personnel and civilian members of the Department ol Defence. Force 2021) released in 2002 forms the second part of the
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three part series. Designed to guide the progress of the ADF towards the future world of 2020 it forms a foundational component of Defence's future vision. The subject matter is clearly articulated and insightful. Unfortunate!) the production style is at times confusing and distracting. The aims of the publication are significant. It intends to foster a common understanding of Defence's future direction and the necessary mechanisms required to arrive at that point. It is also designed to shape complimentary long range planning documents and to guide experimentation whether joint or single Service led in nature. Significantly Force 2020 is positioned as an adaptable product that will he subject to review as new information emerges from both concept driven long range planning and experimentation.
The booklet is divided into three main sections. The first examines the importance of building on the past: highlighting the foundations that ground the ADF as it moves into the future. The second looks at present capability and warfighting concepts. It points to issues that need to be addressed now to ensure the success of the future vision. The final section consists of two chapters. The first outlines the future vision of Defence in theoretical terms whilst the second attempts to explain what measures are necessary to translate the vision into reality. Four 2020 is essentia) reading lor any individual interested in the future direction oflhe ADF.
Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003
Launched by Defence Minister Robert Hill in February 2003 this 25 page, easy to read publication provides an update to the most reeent White Paper, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, fwo years on it provides a revaluation of the challenges that Australia as a nation and the defence force in particular will face in the immediate future. It attempts to address significant changes in the international strategic environment and the emergence of new threats. Paying particular attention to the terrorist attacks of I I September 2001 in the United States and October 2002 in Bali the document acknowledges the increased importance of the global strategic ami security environment for Australia's national defence and security. At the same time it illustrates that the likelihood of a direct conventional attack on Australian territory has diminished, at least for the short term. Although the Update positions terrorism as the dominant force shaping the strategic environment for 2002. the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also examined in detail. This changed global strategic environment means Australian national interests could be altered by outside events. One envisaged outcome of this shil't is the possibility of increased coalition involvement by the ADF in conflicts further afield. However this projection is tempered by the suggestion that such contributions are likely to be limited to the provision of integral niche capabilities.
The document also provides an update on Australia's strategic regional environment, specifically Southeast Asia and the Pacific. It outlines the significant challenges our regional neighbours' face, including deteriorating law and order and economic instability, (his decline in governance could make regional states more vulnerable to transnational crime making it extremely difficult for them to address the effects of terrorism. The factors driving increasing instability and the efforts of the Australian Government and the defence force to arrest this decline are detailed for Indonesia. Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands. Vanuatu and Fiji. One conclusion draw from this discussion is that although Australia will continue to provide considerable assistance to these nations and acknowledges the likelihood of increased calls for operational assistance if the situation continues to worsen h cannot solve the problems of regional neighbours. These must be addressed internally.
The final component of the document outlines the measures the government will institute io address these new security concerns. It argues that the principles set out by Defence 2000 remain sound. Rather a degree of realigning capabilities and priorities is required. Ibis will ensure that the ADF can maintain the level of flexibility, mobility, readiness and capability required to meet these new and emerging threats. In conclusion the need for the document itself to remain flexible and to he updated as the strategic environment changes is noted. The document provides a timely and concise update of evolving government defence policy in response to significant world events.
Australia's Navy for the 2l" Century: 2002 - 2031
This unclassified version of the Royal Australian Navy's long-range strategic plan was released in laic 2002. Drawing on Defence 2000, Force 2020 and the Defence Capability Plan it provides a vision of the transition oflhe current Navy Fleet through to the future level of desired capability over a thirty
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
www.navalinstitute.cam.au	Number I OS
wear time (fame. The first half of the plan examines strategic and technological issues shaping ADF and Naw planning in the present and the future. It outlines Australia's maritime strategy with a focus on the integral role of the Navy. It also addresses the nature of warfare in the 2U' Century drawing hea\ Uy from Fnix e 2020. However the discussion successfully moves away from the strategic to focus on the specific implications of technological advances on future Navy warfighting capability, addressing such issues as warship technology, communications and unmanned vessels.
The second half of the document focuses more specifically on fleet transition. The long-range plan is divided into three rolling stages. The first. Fleet-in-Being, examines the eurrent eapability level of the Navy. The second, the Enhanced Fleet, is the transition phase from the present to the future. It looks at necessary upgrades to existing platforms and the acquisition of new platforms in the medium term such as the Air Warfare Destroyer. The Navy Innovation Strategy directs the final phase, the development of the Future Fleet. It draws on regional trend analysis, technology projections, interoperability issues and projected government funding levels to suggest new capabilities that will be required to meet the demands of future missions. The role of the concept experimentation process. Headmark. is also discussed. The document provides a clear and informative outline of the importance of experimentation in the long-range planning process and the joint nature of the exercise. A table is included that provides an estimated time frame for each fleet stage. It clearly demonstrates the demarcations of each Fleet by listing the capabilities of each stage against all eight Force Element Groups. Australia's Saw for the 21" Century is well presented and clearly structured making it essential reading for those interested in the future direction of the RAN.
Reviewed by Amanda Coghlan - Savy Headquarters
Editor's Note: contact Andrew Forbes on 62655062 or andrcw.forbes I (a defence.gov.au for copies of these publications.

H.MAS Kanlmbla Sea King crew - LS Jeff Weber, LELT Paul Klmlln and LCDR Paul Moggach (RAN)
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