Registered by Australian Post Publication No. NBP0282
ISSN 0312-5807

VOLUME 17 AUGUST 1991 NUMBER 3

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE
■

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL  INSTITUTE  INC
The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objects of the Institute are:
a.	To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy
and the maritime profession.
b.	to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the
Navy and the maritime profession, and
c.	to publish a journal.
The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publications of the Institute will stress that the authors express their own views and opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.
The membership of the Institute is open to:
a.	Regular Members. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN or
RANR and persons who having qualified for regular membership, subsequently
leave the service.
b.	Associate Members. Associate membership is open to all other persons not
qualified to be Regular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the
Institute.
c.	Honorary Members. Honorary membership is open to persons who have made a
distinguished contribution to the Navy or the maritime profession, or by past
service to the institute.
DISCLAIMER
Views expressed in this journal arc those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Australian Naval Institute is grateful for the assistance provided by the corporations listed below. They are demonstrating their support for the aim of the Institute by being members of the "Friends of the Australian Naval Institute" coterie.
Australian Defence Industries	Rockwell Ship Systems
Blohm and Voss	Stanilite Electronics
Computer Sciences of Australia	Thomson Sintra Pacific
GEC Marconi	Scientific Management Associates
Jeumont Schneider Division	Westinghouse Electric
Pacific Dunlop Batteries	Jxxupp Atlas Electronik (Australia)
Nobeltech	Ansett Australia

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
August  1991
CONTENTS

Page 2
3 4 5 1 1 13 17 1 8
31
41
47
57 58 60
61 62 63

From the President
From the Editor
Guide for Authors
Book Reviews
Letters to the Editor
Washington Notes _ Tom A Friedman
Sea Power and the Gulf War — Eric Grove
Implications arising from the Force
Structure  Review — Sen. Jocelyn  Newman
The South West Pacific — Strategic
Backwater or... — Wayne Gobert
The Effects of Technology on Defence Manpower Needs.— CPO QMG  J Cleary
John Curtin and a Maritime Strategy circa 1941
Of Ships and the Sea — Robin Pennock
News   Updates
Membership  Information
ANI Insignia — Order form
ANI Council Members and contacts
Advertising  Information

I runt cover: Submariners til work
Rack covtr: Twilight time.      Another summer's day draws 10 a dose as work op the MMAS STIRLING      homrponed submarine MMAS OX LEY ends for the day  The 2100 tonne (>\l I t was undergoing a SlJm refit nn Australian Shipbuilding Industries shlplt/i facility located at Smith Ctitiftee in Cockburn Sound. Western Australia. Photo: I.SI'll Scott (tinntilh RAN.

Jnurruil of the AuMralhin Ntiml Institute

From the President

Hie 1991 Vernon Parker Oration will be delivered by Commodore Teo Chea 1 lean. Chief of Navy. Republic of Singapore, at the Joint Services Staff College. Westtm on Tuesday 17 September 1991 commencing at 2000. Commodore Teo was promoted only recently to the position of Chief of Navy
The Republic of Singapore Maritime forces have acquired many new capabilities over the past decade. The Navy recently has commissioned six Victory class corvettes equipped with Harpoon anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine torpedoes and the Air force has E2C Hawkeye early warning and F16 tighter aircraft in service which arc capable of supporting the Fleet in a power projection role well into the South China Sea. With this demonstrated ability to integrate the capabilities of its maritime power assets, Singapore arguably is assuming leadership of regional miuitime defence matters. Accordingly I have asked Commodore Teo to talk to the subject of maritime power in South East Asia to the year 2000. He will enhance the reputation of the Vernon Parker Oration. I hope you can join us.
On Friday 1 November the Institute will dine the Friends of the Institute and their ladies Sir John Gorton, the longest serving Minister for the navy and recently an octogenarian, has agreed to attend as Guest of Honour. The dinner will be in the wardroom, HMAS flarman, at 1930 for 2000. Members of the Institute are invited to join with the council for this event. Space is limited and those wishing to attend should ring the Secretary, Lieutenant Annette Nelson on (06) 265 1156 as early as possible.
Sincerely Ian Callaway.
Page :     Auxuxi 1991

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
From the Editor
This issue of the Journal contains some of the May 1991 AN! Seminar presentations, and together with the text of an address by Senator Jocelyn Newman make goixl reading.
Letters to the Editor and anicles submitted for publication should be laser printed where possible - otherwise scanning can be difficult - so please read the Guide To Authors at page 4.
This issue has been prepared with a larger typeface, but identical style, compared to the previous journal - in response to some informed consumer comment. Some of you will have noted that the previous journal was labelled Volume 18, .., Number 2. This is incorrect - it should have read Volume 17 ....(Librarians please note). You will find a self-adhesive label enclosed in this journal with which you can amend the May journal.
Note the date for the ANI Dinner at DMAS HARMAN on 1 NOVEMBER
Regards, Don Agar
August \99l - Past ■'

Journal of the AuM'tihan Ktivat Institute
Guide for Authors
General
All readers, whether members or not, are invited to submit articles for publication
Articles should deal with interesting recent developments in maritime matters which
have a direct or indirect bearing on naval matters.
Contributions from overseas arc welcome.
Articles specially written for the AN1. and accompanied by a statement to dial effect.
may be eligible for prizes from time to time.
The Editor reserves the right to reject or amend articles for publication.
Articles from 2500 to WKK) words are welcomed and the Institute will pay for original
articles at $10 for each 1(X)0 words published.
laing articles should be subdivided appropriately and accompanied by an abstract of up
to 75 words describing the scope of the article.
'1 Tie Journal's established style is for impersonal, semi-formal, prose. Where a
published work, whether serial or book, is directly quoted, due acknowledgement
should be given. Specific numbered references should he used where appropriate and a
suitable bibliography appended to the article.
Illustrations, photographs, graphics etc.
While glossy black-and-white prints arc preferred, colour prints with good contrast arc often acceptable. Attach caption and other information to the back of the print with a small piece of tape. A width/height ratio of about 5:4 is ideal. Trie Editor likes to include a mix of vertically (portrait) and horizontally (landscape) oriented photographs. Tables, diagrams and graphs should, if complex, he carefully drawn in black on white paper and Heated as photographs. Simple tables can be reproduced in the typesetting process, but it is the author's responsibility to ensure the clarity of the information presented.
The typescript
As much of the journal as possible is entered from computer disk or via an optical scanner. 'Hie preferred disk format is Macintosh but popular MS-DOS packages arc welcome. If in doubt, submit ASCII text format. The preferred typescript format for scanning is laser or daisy-wheel printer output, single-spaced on A4 paper. High-quality dot-matrix (24-pin) output may be acceptable. Lesser quality (9-pin) which might need to he entered by hand, should be double-spaced. Three hard copies of the article are required whether submitted on disk or otherwise.
Copyright and clearance to publish
In submitting material to the Journal, authors arc granting the AN1 a non-exclusive licence to publish. It is the responsibility of authors to obtain from the appropriate source permission to publish material that may be regarded as sensitive in any way. It an author ventures a personal opinion, the context should make it impossible for any reasonable person to infer official sanction for that opinion.
The cover sheet
The author's name, address, telephone number, present position and hrief biographical particulars should appear on a cover sheet. If an article has been previously published, a publication history should be included Any outside assistance accorded the author in research or preparation should be acknowledged
ani's postal address is po box 80, campbell, act, 2601. Telephone enquiries to the Editor, ph (06) 280 3761
(BUSINESS   HOURS)  FAX  (06)  239   1167
Pcgi -i     August 1991

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

-rm

Book Reviews

ACTION   STATIONS   CORAL SEA: The Australian Commander's Story, by Chris Coulthard-Clark,  is  published by Allen & Unwin Australia, PO Box 764, North Sydney NSW   2059   RRP  $29.95.
Reviewed by Alan Zamrnit
1992 is the 50th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea, fought off Australia's north-east coast on 7-8 May 1942. This action was the largest naval battle ever fought in close proximity to Australia's shores and the first action fought at sea in which the opposing surface forces did not actually see and directly engage each other, fit was fought out solely by aircraft — some land-based but mostly launched from carriers which formed the principal units on both sides).
The action itself is still often described as "the battle that saved Australia", but this hook goes to some lengths to describe the precise limits to the Japanese operation which brought about the clash, and shows that a direct invasion of the Australian mainland was not actually under contemplation, rather the Japanese were aiming to isolate Australia and prevent its utilisation by the United States as a base for the build-up of allied forces against the southern perimeter of the area conquered by Japan by February 1942.
Mad the Japanese succeeded in capturing the real object of their operation (Port Moresby) at little cost -as well they might had their intended blow been delivered — the question of planning an invasion of Australia may have been revived, but this prospect was frustrated by the even more decisive naval action fought off Midway in the month after Coral Sea. The damage suffered by the two fast fleet carriers deployed by the Japanese at die Coral Sea ensured that these important units were absent at Midway on 4 June, and may have helped

swing the naval balance in the Pacific in America's favour.
Apart from providing a full general narrative of the whole action, the special focus of tiris book is on the part played by the support force comprising Australian and American cruisers (HMAS Australia and Hobart, and USS Chicago) with escorting destroyers, under the command of the Rear Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron (RACAS), J.G. Crace.
Although detached during the main carrier clash on 8 May, Grace's squadron had a significant role to play. On 7 May it was sent without air cover to intercept the Japanese troop transports escorted by Japanese warships as they made their expected passage around the eastern tip of Papua en route to Port Moresby.
The ANZAC squadron presence as a blocking force resulted in it coming under very heavy torpedo and bombing attack on the afternoon of 7 May, during which the flagship (JJMAS Australia] narrowly escaped being hit by a salvo of bombs which landed all around her (dramatic photographs of which are reproduced in the book).
At 3.06 p.m. when about 70 miles south of De Doyne Island about 12 twin-engined torpedo bombers attacked Rear Admiral Crace's ANZAC squadron
It is recorded in "Action Stations Coral Sea" HMAS Australia found itself in the path of two torpedoes. Crace wrote:
"They can only have missed by a mattei of feet. Captain Farncomh handled the ship extremely well and it was entirely due to him and a great deal of luck that Australia was not hit."
The ANZAC squadron hail so far sustained no direct hits and escaped any serious damage. Not that the ships were totally unscathed. After releasing their torpedoes, the bombers had continued to

August 1991     Page 5

Journal af tin- Australian Naval Institute
fly straight On at the ships, strafing with machine gun and cannon fire as they came.
Five torpedo bombers were destroyed. No sooner had the torpedo bombers left, than m Rear Admiral Crace's words from the book:
"We were all congratulating ourselves on a marvellous escape from the T.Bs when all of a sudden up above in perfect formation against the blue sky were nineteen silvery H.L.B.'s (high level bombers) Almost as I saw them 1 saw the bombs drop antl again Captain lomcomb did the right thing and put the wheel hard a starboard. The ship had just started to swing and list when down whistled the bombs all around us and all on the Compacs Platform crouched down. I think most fell on the port bow and starboard quarter so that we would have bought it good and hearty if the wheel hadn't come over when it did."
The Officer of the Watch on the Australia remembered that:
"The weight of that water, as it came down over us on the Bridge, and we were 52 feet above the waterline, was sufficient to force us to our knees.' Crace himself was remembered, standing on the bridge, his face and immaculate white uniform now drenched with water, blackened by smoke and stained by the explosive content of the hombs.
The Hobart had seen a lot of high level bombing in the Java Sea and the attack on HMAS Australia seemed no big deal.
At 3.19 three B17 American bombers above the Japanese aircraft dropped their bombs aimed at the ANZAC squadron thinking the ships were Japanese,
An American B 17 aviator. Captain Speih, reported:
"We thought they were otu Navy bombers attacking Japanese warships and we were preparing to lend them a hand when we found they were Japanese bombers, and the warships were ours, so we kept fairly high and cruised around watching the light. One Australian cruiser was taking everything the Nips had, weaving in and out among the bomb bursts so neatly that you would think she knew where they were going to fall. One salvo fell right around

er, and it looked like the end, but she rode out of a smother of foam just the same as ever. It was a grand bit of seamanship. The Japs just could not hit any of them "
The above is a small sample of the Standard of "Action Stations Coral Sea" lite btxik also covers the aircraft carrier action and the loss of L'SS Lexington on May 8.
As its subtitle indicates, the book is not just a description of the battle but also gives a biographical account of Crace himself. Although he was a Royal Navy officer, it will surprise many readers to learn that his origins lay in Australia and he still considered himself an Australian. Born at Gungahlin, in what is now within the Australian Capital Territory, he was raised near the site of the future national capital and educated at the King's School at Parrumatia before going to England to become a naval cadet. In 1908-10 he served on board HMS Powerful, the flagship of the British squadron on the Australian Station. In 1913 he was loaned to the infant Royal Australian Navy, and returned to Sydney as torpedo lieutenant on the flagship HMAS Australia, on which he served for most of the First World War, until 1917. In 1924 he again visited Australia — this time with the British Special Service Squadron led by HMS Hood.
Although this story is narrated as background, the emphasis of the book is on the period beginning on 1 November 1939 when Crace took up the appointment as RACAS. From there it follows him through the next two and a half years brforc he leaves (shortly after the Coral Sea) to return to England where he eventually retired as Admiral Sir John Crace.
Among the revelations contained in the
luxik are:
Grace's bitter feuds with the Naval board over what he considered to be improper interference with his duties as RACAS, which resulted in his attempts to resign in October 1941 and to press for his relief right up to the Coral Sea action.
Grace's involvement in the aftermath of the loss of HMAS Sydney to the German raider Kormoran off Western Australia in November 1941.

Page 6 - August 1991

	Journal of the Alt.
A description of the events which followed after Crace was informed that US land bombers had joined Japanese aircraft in attacking his squadron during the first day of the Coral Sea action.
The book is the work of a retired Army officer better known for his books on Australian Army history, though in recent years he has also branched out into studying the history of the Royal Australian Air Force - Chris Coulthard-Clark is both objective and controversial.
What makes this book so important is because much material and many photographs in the book have never been published before. They have come from Admiral Sir John Crace's private papers. Much assistance was given by Vice Admiral Sir Richard Peek, the Gunnery officer of HM AS Hobart, together with other Coral Sea Battle participants from the cruisers Australia, Hoban and Chicago who not only provided material but read draft sections of the manuscript.
The Reviewer:
Alan Zammit is an amateur Naval historian with a special knowledge of UMAS Australia, having spent from 1945 until 1948 in the cruiser. His father was in HMAS Australia during the Battle of the Coral Sea.
"THE   DISCOVERY  OF  THE BISMARCK -Germany's greatest  battleship surrenders her secrets" by Dr Robert D. Ballard  (232  pages, recommended retail price $49.95)   Distributed  in Australia by Hodder & Stoughton  Australia,  10-16 South  Street,  Rydalmere, NSW   2116
Reviewed by Vic Jeffery
Bismarck's final resting place is some 4785 metres below the surface of the Atlantic Ocean on the side of an underwater mountain which rises sharply on the Porcupine Abyssal Plain off the

trillion Navul Institute	
coast of France. The exact location of the wreck remains Mr Ballard's secret.
She sits majestically upright, giving the appearance that she is ready to enter the fitting out yards to have its upper superstructure and main armament fitted.
Dr Ballard describes how along with the main armament, almost all the ship's superstructure was missing. "Nonetheless if you put the turrets back on. the ship would have looked amazingly like she did in her heyday. Bismarck was indeed a wreck, but a dangerous looking one — still sleek, still armed and lethal |still carrying her secondary armament), still confident of her power".
It took two years, two separate expeditions in 1988 and again in 1989 in different ships, Starella and Star Hercules, with the same equipment and a painstaking survey of 300 kilometres of the seabed before the princely German battleship was finally located.
Ballard's guiding light was the steel framed Argo attached to the end of a five kilometre cable which carried side-scan sonar, control mechanisms, lights and television cameras.
Despite having the positions given by the British battleships HM Ships King George V and Rodney, along with the heavy cruiser HMS Dorsetshire, finding the Bismarck was described Dr Ballard as "comparable to looking for a needle in a haystack, at night, in a blizzard, with only a torch".
How die Bismarck sank is fascinating in itself. As die battle waned she slowly sank by the stem. Rolling over, her weakened stem broke away. The four 15-inch gun turrets and much other debris fell away and with the ship. Now fully flooded, it righted itself and picked up speed as the final plunge continued. Some 10-20 minutes after leaving the surface the hull hit midway up die side of a submarine mountain, setting tiff a massive landslide, with the ship and other heavy pieces of wreckage being carried down the slope coming to rest about two thirds of the way down the slide area.
The clever way in which Bismarck's history has been interwoven with the

August 1991 —Page 7

fOUrnal Oflhe Au\trnliun Naval Institute
present is excllent. These is a tremendous insight into life onboard the ship and a tx-gnidging regret that such a magnificent fighting ship should be lost on her first deployment.
Some 2d years before, the RMS Titanic was also lost on her maiden voyage w hen she struck an iceberg in the North Atlantic. Both these vessels have now been located by Dr Ballard oflhe Woods 1 lole (Jceanographie Institute and their locations remain a secret There is now talk of finding the Japanese banleship. ) iiinati).
Although she only made the one voyage into the Atlantic. Bismarck, the pride of the German Kriegsmarine, commissioned only the year before, is one of the best known warships ol World War Two. Still, when one considers her successes in sinking the battle cruiser HMS Hood and damaging the battleship HMS Prince of Wales with her magnificent gunnery and her efforts in isang up a large percentage of the British fleet, it was in die proudest German naval traditions. She fought magnificently against superior odds and went down fighting
I a\ ishly illustrated, this book contains some 400 colour and black & white photos, along with paintings, some specially commissioned, maps and diagrams with many shots showing sections aboard Bismarck prior to its loss and the same locations today. Many of the underwater shots of the Bismarck can only be described as "hauntingly eerie".
I his is unquestionably one of the lines! books 1 have ever sighted. Apart from being a darn good read, it is a superb book to just peruse. The quality of the layouts design and contents are of the highest standard. Clearly a great deal of thought, time and consultation have gone in to this publication.
I">r Ballard's previous book, "The 1 Hscovery of the Titanic", I believe was an international bestseller. There is absolutely no reason why "The Discovery of the Bismarck" will not equal or even surpass the sales of his previous work.
If you only buy one nautical book this year. I reccommend this be the one.

The Reviewer:
Vic Jeffery is a keen amateur naval historian and a frequent contributor of reviews to this journal. 11c works at I (MAS Stirling as Naval Public Relations Officer.
"LES   BALEINEURS   FRANQAIS DE  LOUIS  XVI   A   NAPOLEON: J Thierry  Du  Pasquier,  1990, Henry Veyrat, Paris; 228 pages; price Fr140; ISBN 2-85199-521-9
Reviewed by AGE ./ones
The history of the French whaling trade to Greenland. Davis Straits and the South Seas in the ISth and P>th centimes is, in a small way. a lesson in the influence of sea power. When tha American War of Independence began, the whaling trade Of Nantucket was sixty years old. When the war started some of the American masters sailed to London and Dartmouth, Nava Scotia and later to Milford in Wales. During that war, British whaling ships suffered little from American and French attacks.
In 17S4, soon after the peace. New England masters sailed for Dunkirk and other French ports, establishing the trade there. All went well till the war between Britain and revolutionary France, then the whaling ships were swept from the seas, some being taken by the Royal Navy and privateers. The British whaling fleet suffered few losses by comparison. There was a short revival after the Peace of Amiens, but when the war started again the French ships did not leave port. Alter the peace of IS 14 the French whaling fleet was employed again as was told by M. du Pasquier in his book of I'IS2. "lx-s Baleinicr.s Francais au XIX Siecle".
The present b<x>k deals with the French whaling trade iu Greenland, Davis Strait and the South Seas, including New Holland, up to 1803, with a short chapter on the last hundred years. The great merit of this book is that it was written very largely from original documents, with

Pagt 8 - August 1991

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
some use of published books, so it has the mark of authority. It has been written with great care and full references are given.
There are two dozen apposite illustrations. Much of the story is summarised in tables of ships, masters and catches, season by season. This book fills a gap in French maritime history and does it well.
INNOVATIONS    TECHNIQUES DANS  LA  MARINE,   1641-1817, by Philippe Henrat; 1990,  Archives  Nationales, Paris; 396 pages, no price stated.
Reviewed by A G E Junes

This is a reference work by ,the amservateur en chef, who also has charge of old naval recordsat the Archives Nationales, an indication of the vast amount of material held there. It is a calendar of 67(X) documents dealing with a wide range of subjects: Hydrography, navigation, the methods, tables and instruments, compasses, chronometers, barometers, astronomy, medecine at sea and more mundane matters like lighthouses, signals, capstans, levers and steam propulsion.
Names such as Bougainville, La Perouse and Cook, Cuvier, the Forsters and Benjamin Franklin indicate the range of subjects.
It has a full index which gives brief biographical details.
It is well presented.

JbUHK

A Standard anti-aircraft missile hems; fired from a RAN FFG during RIMPAC 90
Aueusl 1991 — Pane 9

Page 10 —August 199]

Journal of the Australian Saval Institute
IIMAS Brisbane- after Phalanx fit

Journal nf the Australian S'uvul Institute
Letters to the Editor
The Editor
Journal of The Australian Naval Institute
Dear Sir,
1 was delighted to see the cover of the Febru&iy 1991 Issue of our Journal, where the Phalanx Close-in-Weapons System of HMAS Brisbane was displayed. The fact that die planning of many people over the past decade has resulted in the RAN DDG's still having a weapons outfit which is consistent with the age and the environment in which they operate is testimony to their efforts.
I was not directly involved with the DDG Modernisation Programme, and perhaps was regarded as a hindrance by being a member of the Fleet Technical Suiff by those who were, but this enables me nevertheless to congratulate the past members of the RAN DDG MOD Project Team — well done.
On a different subject, I read with interest in the same journal reference to there being a need for some variety in your articles, and your desire for "a pleasant change from the normal maritime strategy articles received". As one who at one time enthusiastically contributed with technically based articles, and by subsequent Presidential editorial implication was made to feel that they were inappropriate for the higher planes sought by this journal, I find your comments somewhat ironic. Perhaps with the wheel having turned somewhat your technical members could now come in from the cold and be allowed to contribute? Technical people have often been regarded as a bit of a joke by many within the RAN and 1 would have thought that at the very least their attempts at journalistic splendour would at least enable a few more jokes to propagate?
D.L.Stevens
LCDR RNZN Auckland, New Zealand

The Editor,
Journal of die Australian Naval Institute.
Dear sir.
I read with interest Tom Frame's recent article "The Ships History    Recording or Distorting the Navy's Past?" in ANI's February Journal, and cannot help but agree with his conclusions.
The ship history is an essential part of the overall history of the RAN. however it needs to be well researched using both official records and information gained from personnel who served in the vessel Ship histories are- difficult to do well and easy to do poorly
Frank Walker's "HMAS Annidale - The Ship That Had To Die" is one of the latter varieties of Ship Histories and joins the company of such books as "Who Sank The Sydney" by Michael Montgomery a near work of fantasy on the loss of HMAS Sydney in November 1941 and Iris Ncsdale's rambling account of the Tribal Class Destroyers "ACTION STATIONS"
The last decade has seen a spate of ship histories, some good, some very average and some such as Walker's particularly poor. These ship histories lend to be written by those who served in the ship, those who are ex-naval personnel, or have some association with the service (eg, Michael Montgomery's father was Navigator in the Sydney). Unfortunately many of these tend to be a "Why let the truth spoil a good story" version. Rumours become fact memories are dulled over time and factual events arc over embellished      perhaps the authors are thinking more with their heart than with their head.
Walker makes several wild allegations and fails to adequately support any of them. This is especially evident in his speculation as to what happened to the missing raft of Annidale survivors. Walker slates that the men were spotted by a RAAF Catalina aircraft hut "It was text rough for the plane to land and next dav there was no trace of the men, the

Auyu.it IWl -   I'uye II

	Journal of tlu- Australian Naval Inslilulc
rait or even wreckage from the raft. The
only logical assumption is that they were taken onboard a Japanese ship and executed".
Really, if it was too rough for the ("atalina to land perhaps the rait was swamped by a wave and sunk and its occupants succumbed to exposure ami died. The Timor Sea is a particularly large area and the chances of spotting a small raft are remote, maybe just maybe, they were not spotted on the next day by searching aircraft. To say that the only logical conclusion is that they were executed by the Japanese is to step into the realms of fantasy.
\s Mated previously the ship history is essential to the overall history of the RAN and thus it must be well written. It must contain the facts as gleaned from official records as to what the ship did, and it must contain anecdotes from those who served in the ship (both officers and •uilorsl to give the reader the human side of the ship.
If the author wishes to put forward an opinion on why an action occurred or what may have possibly happened then they need to back it up with facts or a logical argument, not as in Walker's case with sarcastic ramblings. half baked speculations, and throw-away one line quips.
Walkers "HMAS Armidak - The Ship that had to die", however does provide one useful purpose. That is being an excellent example of how not to write a ship history.

The Editor,
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute,
Dear sir,
1 read with interest and appreciation Larry Noyc's short biography of Admiral Sir Victor Smith
In the interest of historical accuracy 1 must point out that, although Sir Victor was the first graduate of the RANT to reach the rank of full Admiral on the active list of the PNE, he was not the first officer to reach the rank of full Admiral.
Thai distinction belongs to the late Admiral Sir George Francis Hvde K.CB. CVO, CBH. The Navy List shows that he was promoted to the rank of full Admiral on the active list of the Australian Permanent Naval Force on 12 July 1936. At that time he was serving as First Naval Member. Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, in which post he continued to serve until his death on 2S July 1937. Hyde originally joined the Royal Naval Reserve, transferred to the Royal Navy and to the Royal Australian Navy shortly after its formation.
Several Royal Navy officers were loaned to the RAN in the rank of full Admiral. However, Hyde was not on loan. He was a permanent RAN officer.
These facts do not detract from Sir Victor's achievement, the magnitude of which Larrv Nove describes vers well.

G.J. SW1NDFN Lieutenant, RAN
HMAS Creswetl,
lei \ is Bay. NSW.

A W Grazebrook. CMDR RANR
Mansfield, Vic.

Pagt 12— Auvusi I9'J1

Journal of I he Australian Naval Institute

Washington Notes

&

From Tom A Friedmann in the United States

Practitioners in the art of war, like all other artists, require extensive practice 10 perfect their art. Unlike other disciplines, however, no contrived combat can replace the real thing. Because of the effect of the "fog of war", it can be helpful for the military to periodically engage in minor combat operations to test people, equipment and tactics.
Operation Desert Storm provided the United States opportunity galore to prove many new weapons systems and tactics at a mercifully low loss of American lives (the ratio of accidental to combat deaths incurred by American forces was about 2:1). Analysis of the campaign has begun and, while some of what we've learned is new. some, unfortunately, is not.
Stand-off and "smart" weapons and stealth technology worked remarkably well. Navy Tomahawks are estimated to have hit 85% of their targets, while "smart" bombs once again showed their worth. Although the latter is considerably more expensive than gravity bombs, their ability to "cleanly" hit targets in populated areas as well as enhancing the proficiency to destroy specific targets on one mission justifies the additional expenditure.
F-l 17 stealth lighters and B-2 stealth bombers were instrumental in the destruction of the Iraqi air defence system. But despite the B-2's operational success, value for the dollar must be considered when acquiring a weapons system and I for one still find it hard to justify spending some SX(K) million per aircraft, according to current estimates. Idcntification-friend-or-foe problems OCCUI in every conflict but were

highlighted in Desert Storm because ol the high number of deaths caused by "friendly fire". The effective application Qf modern technology should bring about their reduction if not their extinction Our electronic warfare capabilities were remarkable. The ability of AW ACS to control the skies not only checked the enemy but managed air traffic so brilliantly that there was not one mid-air collision out of the thousands of sorties flown round-the-clock by at least a dozen air forces. Navigation satellites allowed land forces to outflank the enemy by moving through pans of the Iraqi desert so desolate and remote that the Iraqis themselves never venture into them for fear of getting lost.
One of the great revelations of the campaign was the accuracy and effect ol the 16-inch guns of the Iowa class battleships. This of course was the fourth such "revelation". The first was during World War II, the second was Korea and the third was in Vietnam. Despite proving their value once again the Department of Defense has ordered that the last two active battleships be decommissioned at the end of the current fiscal year.
FLASH! Mines pose a significant threat to sea communications! You did not read it here first! By doing precisely what they were supposed to, mines hindered navigation throughout the Gulf. One $3(KX) mine put the new $1 billion Aegis cruiser Princeton out of action, while another severely holed the helicopter carrier Tripoli.
To circumvent mines, mine countermeasurc ships and aircraft were

August 1991 —Page 13

Journal ofllw Austr
required. WGW! Is this news or what?! The entire November 19K4 issue of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute was devoted to the problems and the potential of mine warfare. Apparently the Journal was not circulated to the powers thai be in the USN, who thereby missed a sage dissertation on the deplorable state of mine warfare in the United States Navy, along with several suggestions on how to remedy the situation.
In the seven years since, billions of dollars have been spent duplicating strategic weapons systems like the B-1 bomber, an aircraft so riddled with defects that it could not participate in Desert Shield. And still mine warfare continued to languish. A high price was paid for our persistent failure to make a major investment in mine warfare. This time no-one was killed. Next time, we may not be so lucky
The fact that the Air Force still cannot transmit bombing target lists to Navy carriers because of incompatible communications links is not surprising. Outrageous but not surprising. However, published reports of the Navy and its accompanying problems to communicate with other navies and with our own ships arc amazing.
Thfi USN had exercised with ships of all nations it worked with in the Gulf so communications problems should have been minimal. More troubling was the fact that die unusually large size of the naval force deployed caused the Navy to scramble to organise command and control lines among its own commanders and ships. The Navy projected it would need half a dozen carriers to combat the Soviet fleet in the North Atlantic. Why didn't naval planners establish command and control lines that could have been activated for use in the Persian Gulf?
The Navy and Air Force needed more trexips and cargo-carrying capability and aerial tankers. Again, no news here. Additional transport and tanker capability are like mine warfare: They lack sex appeal. 'Hiere's always something more exiling in the budget for constituencies in the Pentagon and Congress to support. But this is an easy excuse that absolves Joint Chiefs of Staff from their responsibility to support "orphan" programs without which the deployment of expeditionary forces is impossible
Pag* 14  - aukusi I99J

ilian Naval Institute
"Orphan" programs are as critical to the nation as those with high profiles and the Chiefs should be their guardians.
And what would a war be without complaints about mail and food? The Army's mail system dates from World War 1 and virtually collapsed under the strain of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Parcels that I sent to HMAS Darwin via Australia arrived in less than half the time it took to send simikrr packages from the United States to the Gulf.
The army's new way to feed people in the field, MREs (meals ready to eat) proved at least as unpopular as the infamous K ration. Marines and soldiers were forced to rely heavily on them despite the fact that the operation was static for six months and tluid for only six days.
Servicemen and women make many sacrifices for their country. Good mail service and decent food arc the foundation of good morale in any lighting force. Those who serve our country deserve, at the very least, regular, prompt mail delivery and good, hot food.
Concededly the public usually doesn't hear of the success of intelligence services, failures, however, do have a way of becoming public and the Persian Gulf conflict was disconcertingly riddled with them.
The Central Intelligence Agency (.1) tailed to predict the invasion of Kuwait, (2) underestimated the number of Scud missiles in the Iraqi arsenal, (3) predicted that the Iraqi army would overthrow Saddam Hussein, (4) underestimated the amount of enriched uranium that Iraq had available to make nuclear bombs and (5) underestimated the amount of armour left to Saddam to reconstitute his army. (Much was in storage in unmarked and thus not bombed warehouses.)
Intelligence reports provided to General Norman Schwarzkopf and battlefield commanders was so couched in qualifying terms that they could not obtain timely information they needed to prepare for war.
The enemy is relied upon to disclose
arms caches, disarm and stay disarmed.
If it violates the provisions of the	

Journal of I lie Australian Naval Institute
armistice, resumption of the conflict will he all but impossible because of the precipitous withdrawal of military forces before we have verified compliance with the temis of the cease-fire agreement. Sound familiar? Iraq in 1991? Post World War 1 Germany?
One can only wonder who is advising President Bush on his handling of Saddam Hussein and why the President is taking his advice. How could a man supposedly SO well versed in world affairs pass up the opportunity to eradicate "another Hitler"? If the countries we called our allies did not want to eradicate "another Hitler", why did the President align us with them in the first place?

How could the President believe that "another Hitler", a man who broke his word to numerous world leaders and slaughtered his own people, be trusted to adhere to a cease-fire agreement once the threat of total destruction had been removed? Why did the President put so much faith in the belief diat the Iraqi army would overthrow Saddam Hussein when the German Army could never put its act together to overthrow Hitler'1
The result of these diplomatic and intelligence failures may cause the armed forces to repeat the most painful lesson of all: If you don't properly secure the peace, you will have to re-fight the war.

Oberon class submarine "on lop"—Jervis Bay, NSW

August 1991      rave 1^

Journal of lite Australian Naval Institute

SII70B-2 in bat,

Nowra NSW

Page lt> — August 1991

Jour mil nftlic Australian Naval Insttluw
Sea Power and the Gulf War
by Eric Grove, Naval Research Director, Foundation for International  Security,   UK.
Based mi a presentation to the Australian Naval Institute at HMAS Watson on 16 Mas
199!

All wars arc unique and it is always dangerous to draw general conclusions from them. The Gulf War was perhaps the least maritime of conceivahle conflicts outside Europe. However therein lies the point. For, if such a non-maritime war depended so much on a capacity to use the sea and strike from it how much more might future conflicts in a less favourable environment for ground and air forces be affected by the sea''
Without sealift the war could never have taken place at all. The deployment bv February 3 1991 (ISOdays after the President's deployment order) of three million tons of dry' cargo and 4.2 million tons of petroleum products by sea in 397 voyages by ships owned or chartered by the Military Sealift Command [MSC] provided the wherewithal for American forces to fight and win. Ninety four per cent of the total cargo brought in for American forces by February 3 had come by sea. Other countries also relied on sealift. Ships used by the United Kingdom had brought in 260,000 tons of general cargo. I()2,(KX) tons of ammunition, and 11,700 vehicles by January 15. In order for these cargoes to arrive ports in Saudi Arabia had to be made secure. The rapid deployment of two carrier battle groups and the Marine Expeditionary Force flown in to marry up with equipment held in prepositioning ships helped prevent Iraqi attack at a crucial time.
Although sealift worked remarkably well there were problems. Several of the American Ready Reserve Force [RRF] ships broke down alter their years in mothhalls and took mom time than expected to get out of reserve. F.vcn the impressive fast sealift ships (FSS) were not entirely reliable, although USNS Capella's activation within 4S hours as

against the required 96 and her beginning offloading less than three weeks after starting activation were both significant achievements. When she arrived with 27th Mechanised Division's equipment she brought more cargo than the entire airlift up to that date.
It was hard to obtain crews for the RRF ships as their obsolete steam engines do not reflect current shipping practice. One reactivated officer was over eighty! By February 3 almost forty per cent of the dry cargo delivered had come in non-US flag ships and the USA had run out of available Roll on /Roll off vessels. On February 3 there were in total 84 foreign flag dry cargo ships on charter at that time. Given the nature of the crisis there were few problems in resorting to foreign tonnage but the Americans regard this level of dependence as undesirable Vice Admiral Donovan, the commander of the MSC told The House Armed Services Committee on 19 February of "the absolute surge requirement for more RO/ROs in the early months of a contingency involving sealift of forces." Whether anything can be done to improve US national surge sealift capacity given the continued decline of the American mercantile marine and its personnel is another matter. It must be said, however, that the national assets available to MSC were not fully stretched, not all RRF ships were activated and neither were the US Navy's seasheds and flatracks employed to allow container ships to carry military cargo, h was easier to use Allied tonnage, and this could well be the pattern for the future
Indeed, British logistics authorities arc much more relaxed about their almost complete reliance on foreign shipping. Apart from five ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (four landing ships logistic and

August 1991 — Page I '

Journal Oftht Australian Naval Institute
a replenishment ship) British equipment and supplies were earned in 142 chartered merchantmen of which only eight flew the red ensign. For the first time much of the material was containerised which made shipping in mobtal merchantmen easier and meant that goods arrived in a better and more organised state. Toe British were also less impressed by the performance of prepositioning. The Americans consider the performance of their prepositioning ships at Diego Garcia and Guam to have been one of the great successes of Desert Shield. Mobilised on 7 August they were unloading within ten days and their equipment was rapidly married up with the Marine Expeditionary Force flown in from the USA. The condition of that equipment, however left something to tie desired. Lessons were learned which imply levels of expenditure on care and maintenance of stocks held in PREPO shipping which are unrealistic for other countries. The Americans, however, consider the advantages of prepositioning to be worth the cost.
One little known aspect of the war was the effort put into safeguarding the Coalition sea lines of communication. There were consistent worries about Libyan unpredictability during the crisis and a significant naval presence was maintained in the Mediterranean to guard against any trouble. Italian, Spanish, British and German vessels, carriers, escorts and mine countermeasures vessels, were deployed to guard the Mediterranean SLOCs as were two NATO integrated forces the Standing Naval Force Channel of mine countermeasures vessels and the Naval On Call Force Mediterranean of escorts. Blockading ships in the Red Sea kept a watch on Yemen anil there was also anxietv over the security of the Suez Canal'
It was not just a question of the Coalition using the sea. It denied the use Of the sea to the Iraqis. The sanctions Campaign depended on a remarkable international blockade carried out by the ships of thirteen NATO navies plus Argentina. Australia and Poland. Almost 7.<XKI ships had been challenged by 15 January and over 800 boardings had taken place; fifty ships had their voyages diverted. The blockade may not have been able to force Iraq out of Kuwait on its own but it weakened Iraq's capacity to fight. The*
l\ixe 18—August /9v/

efficiency of the blockade reflected the power of modem navies to exploit mtxlern integrated ocean surveillance systems; the helicopter also made boarding easier. The major European contribution to the blockade was coordinated by the Western European Union which built on the procedures established to concert European action in the previous Gulf War. WEU coordination ensured a highly effective coverage of the Straits of Bab El Mandeb and Tiran as well as of the Middle Gulf and by January 15 WEU ships had been responsible for about two thirds of the interceptions. In January as war seemed likely. Admiral Bonnoi the local French naval commander was appointed WEU Co-ordinator for activities outside the immediate war zone. Here, as Desert Storm loomed, from January 12 onwards, began, ships were placed under American operational control to from the battle force. Although die USN provided the core of die combat forces in ihe Gulf the US carriers and battleships were supported by ships of the British. Dutch, Italian. French. Australian, Canadian. Danish and Argentine Navies as well as by their own cruisers and destroyers.
If sea power made 1 lescn Storm possible it also played a far from insignificant pan in it. Contrary to pre war prognostications US carriers operated in the Gulf.. Midway began to make initial shon probes before the end of 1990 and finally took up station on January 11; Ranger joined her in the Gulf on the 15th and Theodore Roosevelt on the l')th. Saratoga, John F Kennedy and America operated from the Red Sea but the last named entered the Gulf on February 13th bringing the Gulf carrier group to four ships. By this time the carriers were operating closer to Kuwait with positive effects on both sortie rate and tanking requirements; on the 14th the carriers moved fifty miles further north still. All six carriers flew a wide range of missions, strike and strike escort (F- 14s escorted RAF Tornados), batdefield preparation and interdiction, close air support (the priority during the ground war), combat air patrol (CAP), surface combat air patrols (SUCAP), electronic warfare, tanker, airborne early warning, reconnaissance, and on board delivery. Naval aircraft proved especially useful in being able to fly air defence suppression missions at short notice and flew the

Journal. <{ ilir Australian Nuvnl Institute
majority ol such missions. Eor the defence suppression task the new TALD glider decoys adopted by the US Navy proved useful. The new SLAM stand off land attack missile was also combat proven but more important was the contribution made by F-14 earner based fighters equipped withe TAR PS recce pods 10 adding to the inadequate air reconnaissance capability available to the air command for battle damage assessment. The only real problem was a shortage ol laser guided bombs in the carriers which meant that naval aircraft were sometimes deemed unsuitable tor certain missions.
B) 6 March the USN and US Mamie ('orps had flown together some 28,929 sorties of which 36% were strike and 30% fleet air defence and CAP. They had dropped 4.4 million tons of bombs and other ordnance. Some of the Marine sorties were Harriers from the assault ship (1.! I A) Nassau used as a light carrier, a concept in which the USN is showing greater interest as its numbers of large decks reduces.
A major contribution to the air campaign was made by Tomahawk conventional land attack missiles both in the TLAM/C and TLAM/D (cluster warhead) variant. The letter reportedly proved especially valuable in taking out air defence radars. In all 291 TLAM were fired (196 in the initial strikes) and estimates of effectiveness vary' from about 60 to 85 per cent. The missiles only proved significantly vulnerable when misused tactically by being fired in a stream sequentially on the same course rather than to approach the target from a number of different directions. Most came from surface ships - the first was launched by the cruiser Bunker Hill but from January 19 onwards, a few Tomahawks were fired from submarines in the Red Sea and Mediterranean: the USS Louisville was the SSN thus to go into action. One Aegis cruiser, the USS San Jacinto was reportedly sent to the Red Sea as part of the Kennedy group in the strike role with her vertical launch system filled with 122 Tomahawks. In addition to the two battleships Tomahawk was carried by six Aegis cruisers, two "Virginia" class nuclear powered cruisers and six "Spntance" class destroyers (five with vertical launch systems one with armoured box launchers). Three cruise missile equipped

1 S surface ships, Philippine Sea, Virginia and Spruance operated as part of the British carrier group with I IMS Ark Royal in the Eastern Mediterranean
Naval forces cleared the Iraqis off the off-shore oilfields and the small islands in the Gull and dented the Iraqis any use of the sea. The Iraqis may have tried one or more small amphibious landings as part of the Khalji offensive, A force of small Iraqi assault boats was certainly found near Umm al Maradim island on 29 January. The boats were spotted by American helicopters and the ntd.ir of the British frigate Brazen and attacked h\ Lynx helicopters from Brazen and GlotlCestet with Sea Skua missiles, British Sea King armed helicopters and US Navy LAMPS III helicopters using machine guns and hand grenades Carriei based A 6 Intruders also joined in and the convoy was completely destroyed, 14 being sunk and 3 driven ashore. The following day a group of larger ships was spotted leaving Iraqi ports, This may have been a reinforcing convoy but it is more likely that the Iraqi Navy, assailed by air attack in its bases was trying to ficc to Iran. Among the ships identified was a Soviet built T-43 minesweeper/layer, three captured Kuwaiti German huilt TNC-45 missile armed fast attack craft and the three Polnocny class tank landing ships. US LAMPS III helicopters directed Lynxes onto the targets and Sea Skua hits were scored after which RAF Jaguars followed up with rockets and US Navy A-6s and F-18s with cluster bombs Almost all the Iraqi vessels were sunk but a damaged Osa class fast attack craft managed to reach Bandar Khoment.
The campaign to seek out and destroy Iraq's Navy continued. Attacks were carried out both against bases and against targets found at sea. A surface combat air patrol (SUCAP) was kept in the air using both carrier and shore based aircraft to deal with targets of opportunity. A particular worry to Coalition naval forces were the half dozen German built Exocel fitted fast attack craft (FAC) captured from Kuwait; five TNC-45s and one FPB-57. The Lynx/ Sea Skua combination was especially successful against this threat and five FAC were hit by Sea Skua missiles. The missiles disabled the craft even if they did not actually sink them at the lime. 'Die fate of these excellent FAC must cast doubt on

August 1W1 — Page I'J

Jourmil r'fllw Aiistrnlnin Xnvtit Institute
die whole concept Of the small missile boat. Apparently vibration is so bad on these vessels that they have difficulty in engaging airborne attackers with their defensive armament. They arc thus silling ducks to aircraft of all type. The bluff of the FAC, the great naval "equaliser" of the 1970s and 80s has ken finally called. The main threat to Lynxes came from missiles fired from the shore which caused at least one pilot 10 lake violent evasive action and deploy Hares and chaff.
In all the Lynx/Sea Skua combination claimed fifteen vessels sunk or disabled during the war, two Polnochny LSTs, the salvage ship Aka, both T-43 minesweeper/layers, live former Kuwaiti FAC. three patrol boats and two small assault craft. Both Cardiff and Gloucester flights claimed seven hits each. 'Hie American LAMPS III helicopters with their longer range radar were better for targeting near the coast hut the British escorts and their embarked surface strike helicopters were useful "niche fillers" in the coalition naval force Gloucester also carried out on 25 February a successful close range Sea Dan missile interception of a Silkworm coast defence missile tired at the American batdeship Wisconsin it was escorting. The British and other Coaliiion ships with the right link equipment were fully integrated into die wider air picture provided by AWACS. Aegis cruisers and 1   2Cs.
Britain also deployed two conventional submarines to the Gulf which may have been used for special forces insertion. On 27 January the Observer newspaper of London carried a plausible report based on unauthorised interviews with "a marine source" referring to an operation code-named "Sea Turtle" that had run into trouble. First two Iraqi tankers had been attacked by US naval aircraft, a raid "which damaged a British submarine hiding underneath" one of them. The report said the oil slicks had created problems for the maritime special forces operations indeed the unidentified source was quoted as saying the pollution had "ruined near shore reconnaissance".
Whatever the truth of this unconfirmed report lite slicks must have made minehunting more awkward. It was also difficult for minehunters to operate close to the Kuwaiti shoa- until the threat from
Piatt 20    August iwi

Iraqi guns and mobile shore based Silkworm missiles had been dealt with and the Iraqi Navy neutralised completely. The missiles were a difficult problem. They were mobile and hard to locate and were indeed never entirely neutralised. The UK-US mine countermeasures force did not begin to move into the operational area until mid February and began operations on the loih to clear a fire support area south ol Faylakah island. Originally it had been planned to make an amphibious landing on the Kuwaiti coast in early or mid February but the concept was rejected partly out of fear of severe casualties being caused in Kuwait by the supporting bombardment Options against Iraq itself were also considered and rejected. About the time MCM operations began the decision was taken to try nothing more than a raid on Faylakah Island and to use the amphibious forces mainly as a diversion. Two Marine Hxpeditionary Brigades (about 18,(XX) men) were embarked and no less than 31 amphibious ships were available, two LHAs, five LI'Ils, seven I.PDs, seven LSDs, eight LSTs. and two LKA assault cargo ships. Amphibious rehearsals and other acts to publicise the presence of the task force to the Iraqis made the point and six or seven Iracp divisions were tied down guarding the coast.
It was yet another coalition success but the Iraqi mining campaign must he ascribed some success also in contributing to the decision not to assault from the sea and in preventing even the I-aylakah assault taking place. The Iraqis laid at least 12(H) mines in ten fields around Kuwait, deliberately set free floating mines and just threw others over the side in several types both contact mines and magnetic/acoustic influence mines of various sizes. Some were locally made and some imported. Two ship casualties were caused by Iraqi mines. One was the Lf'i 1 Tripoli which struck a KX1-140 kg contact mine that caused ptxrr welding in the vicinity to fail. A hole 20-30 ft wide has blown in the ship. The LPH was acting as mother ship for Atneric&n MH-53 mine countermeasures (MCM) helicopters which it continued to operate for a time before retiring for repairs. More serious u u damage inflicted on the Aegis cruiser Princeton that ran over a large 4(X) kg influence mine in shallow water ol

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
optimal deptli for such a weapon to be effective; the damage was made worse by the effects of a second mine exploding 300 yards away. The lighdy built cruiser suffered bad "whiplash" effect and almost broke her back. One propeller shaft was also seriously damaged and the repairs were estimated at 5100 million.
'lhe five British MCM vessels of the "Hunt" class played the key role in mine clearance both during and after the war. They were supported by three old American "Agressive" class MSOs and the brand new American minehunter Avenger that suffered teething problems and had to be withdrawn from the postwar clear-up for repairs. Other European MCM assets co-ordinated by the WEU arrived for this latter operation. Before their arrival the combined US-UK MCM force assisted by Australian divers located 270 mines and had the Kuwaiti port of Al Shaiba open by 12 March. Moored mines close to the surface were detected by a new helicopter home minehunting video system and remotely controlled equipment was used by the British vessels to deal with floating mines. Some escorts were fitted with mine avoidance sonar that allowed them to lead other units such as battleships into |xrsiiion for bombardments; alternatively British MCM vessels prepared safe channels for the big ships.
flic battleships Missouri and Wisconsin came into action on 3 February and 6 February respectively using their massive guns to destroy prefabricated Iraqi bunkers and to destroy Iraqi artillery. 'Die heavily protected battleships could be put in areas where more lightly protected vessels might have been at greater risk. The battleships were in action in the cleared area south of Faylakah from February 23. Ground observers were used for spotting as were the battleships' drones. The latter proved good general reconnaissance assets for the advancing Marines once the ground was began. Something of a naval first was established when a group of Iraqis tried to surrender to one of the drones! The drones were also used to call in air strikes on Iraqi small craft. During Desert Storm the two battleships fired over a thousand rounds of 16-inch ammunition, both conventional and cluster shells -over a million pounds of ordnance - and they were of great assistance in helping the Marines ashore advance on their

frontal axis up the coast through prepared Iraqi positions.
The lessons of the Gulf War as they
affect sea power can be summed up as
follows:-
a   the need to be sure that there is enough sealift readily available to deploy heavy forces globally and rapidly;
b   the utility of maritime preposilioning to gel relatively heavily equipped forces into place quickly - if one is willing to pay the price of giving this equipment the proper care and maintenance;
c   the continued power of naval blockade;
d   the ability of naval forces from many countries to operate together effectively,
e   lhe continued progress made in building a co-ordinated European navy capable of operating "out of area" on close co-operation with the United States;
f   the continued importance of earner an power to give rapid response and complementary strike and ami air warfare capabilities independent of host nation support:
g   the utility of the conventional land attack sea launched cruise missile;
h   the utility of amphibious forces to exert leverage without actually being used:
i   the limitations of the missile armed fast attack craft and the utility of the missile armed helicopter (all suitable ship - borne helicopters should be given anti-ship missiles if they do not have them already);
j    the effectiveness of heavy naval gunfire support; and
k   the key importance of mines and mine countcrmeasures
As was stressed at the outset, the trouble with drawing lessons from historical experience is that all such scenarios are unique. Nothing quite like Desert Storm may recur again. Next time there may well not be a "red carpet" of a friendly host notion with a developed infrastructure of ports and airfields. Next time the emphasis might be on more or less immediate action without the opportunity for a rapid build-up. Next time die enemy might deploy submarines which would demand a major antisubmarine warfare (ASW) effort - if there had been a submarine threat in
August Wl — Page 2)

Journal of lite Australian Naval Institute
Desert Storm then the Coalition navies would have had to operate in a very different way Desert Storm was a campaign that did not require much of the operational flexibility that sea power can provide. That, despite this, it relied such

a great deal on sea power to succeed is testimony to the continuing fundamental importance of a capacity to use the sea for military purposes. Countries neglect their capabilities to do so at their peril.

Van) Happy Returns — reunion on homecoming of IIMAS Success
Page .J -   August I't'Jl

Journal of tiu- Australian Naval Instituu:
IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON THE DEFENCE FORCE STRUCTURE  REVIEW
An address by Senator Jocelyn Newman, Opposition spokesperson on Defence Science and Personnel to HMAS Harman on 8 August 1991

There is a clear perception in the Defence Force and in the community generally that this Government's defence policy has lost its direction.
Since the Vietnam War, debate on Defence has tended to be "unfashionable", but our commitment to the Gulf war staned to focus public attention back on to Defence - in particular, on some of the real limitations of our defence capabilities.
Manv of the strategic assumptions in the 1987 Defence White Paper, the Government's blueprint for Defence, have been overtaken by events, although the Defence Minister, Senator Ray, refuses to admit it. Even more significantly, the White Paper has locked the Government into a $25 billion (in 1987 dollars) capital equipment purchasing program, despite the fact that the Government has failed to live up to the Budget allocations which the While Paper identified.
The consequence is that oilier areas of defence spending, namely, manpower and operating costs, have to be squeezed to pay for the equipment That is the real reason why the Government has brought down the Force Structure Review.
The defence review which the Coalition is currently undertaking will base any changes or additions to our Defence Force structure on the reassessment we are making of Australia's strategic circumstances and outlook. We will not Ix* party to the same half hearted review the Government has undertaken and nor will we be endorsing or amending any aspects of the uncosted equipment list the Government has produced. When our defence review is completed we will detail our force structure proposals in a

comprehensive way and one that is directly related to our strategic requirements.
A ministerial statement such as the Force Structure Review which proposes a radical restructuring of Australia's Defence Force, should be carefully based on a strategic assessment of Australia's national interests. The Force Structure Review is not. It lacks any sort of clear assessment of the strategic realities facing Australia. It lacks an analysis of the implications of these realities for Australia's national security situation. It lacks an outline of the restructuring of the Defence Force that flows from that changing strategic and security outlook It lacks credibility because it refuses to make any kind of strategic reassessment
The Minister for Defence says that a strategic reassessment is not necessary because the 1987 White Paper continues 10 provide the strategic basis for the structure of the Defence Force. I le sanctioned this in a speech to the National Press Club on February 6th this year when he said:
"1 believe the careful approach to our security based on a ngourous analysis of our enduring strategic circumstances, detailed in the White Paper ... and endorsed in the classified Government paper ... remains fundamentally appropriate as we tackle our role in a changing world." (can it be correct that the strategic situation really was endorsed in a classified Government paper    which the Opposition has not seen.)
This attitude not only ignores the reality of the dramatic changes that have taken place in regional and international security over recent years; it is also clearlv contrary to the views of the Prime

Augusi wi     r,i.; 2

/   U": it ,>!  ;,■.,     '■..,   :    ..;:i';  ',  ;,.;, [<:■ ;  ■'. <
Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator (iareth Fvans.The Prime Minister told the Asia-Australia Institute on the 24th of May this year that:
"the last five years have seen the most profound changes in global strategic i iii umstances in nearly halt a century". He said that this would require Australia to   reassess OUT strategic relationship with Asia."
Senator Evans expressed a similar altitude on the 24th of February this year when he said:
'■There can he absolutely no doubt that the easing of superpower competition has had great effect in our own Asia-Pacific region; nor can there be doubt that new approaches to security now opening up have direct application in the region
I lie changes to which the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade refer, the rising defence expenditure of countries in the Asia Pacific region; the changing role of the I tmed Stales in that region; the rapidly growing spread of defence technologies and the end of the Cold War.
The force Structure Review is at ixlds with the line taken by the Prime Minister and the foreign Minister. In essence, the (lovemment is asking its to accept massive changes to the structure of the Australian Defence force without any reference to developments in Australia's strategic environment.
I. and others in the Opposition called on the Minister to issue a green paper to promote public debate on strategic changes affecting Australia, but he has quite deliberately refused.
Hie reason why is simple, but it is a
\ Rally important one Dr I lewson
pointed it out in his response to the
Ministerial statement on the force
Structure Review. II Australia's
requirement for defence equipment and
Force structure have changed as a result
of changed strategic circumstances -  as
the Prime Minister and the foreign
Minister have emphasised — why has
the Government refused to release a new-
public strategic assessment? If, on the
other hand, as the Minister claims, the
Defence White Paper provides a	
Page :■>    Auxuu \99\

sufficiently accurate assessment of Australia's strategic circumstances, why-is there a need to depart from the force structure which the White Paper outlines? The simple answer is that the force Structure Review is driven by budgetary considerations and not by strategic changes.
It is a review of defence policy that has been driven by the need to make cost savings because the funding projections made in the 1987 White Paper have not been met. Since the 1987 White Paper, the Government has consistently failed to deliver the funds for defence that it has promised. The White Paper stated:
If we are to achieve the levels of defence capability and the priorities reflected in this Paper, there is a need over the life ol the program, for an allocation of resources generally within the order of 2.69710 ?%ofGDP."
This level has never been achieved. For the last four years, defence spending has been kept to the historic low of 2.7 per cent of gross domestic product. In fact, since 1987, real growth in the defence budget has been kept at or close to zero, and in 19S7/8S it actually shrank by 1.8 per cent.
'Iticre is little flexibility in the Defence Budget. Defence's forward commitment to capital expenditure is currently at its highest level ever at approxirnately 80 per cent of the capita! expenditure component of the budget. This, when taken together with the salaries component of the budget, means that 80 per cent of the entire defence budget is already allocated well into the futurc-and thereby the problems with flexibility.
Not since the White Paper was produced in 1987 has the latbor Government provided the funds on which it was predicated and which were necessary to meet the tasks set out in the White Paper. Yet the capital procurement which was set in motion proceeded without apparent concent for the dislocation of the other priorities in that While Paper. What we see with the introduction of the force Structure Review is, in essence, an admission of the failure of the Labor Government to achieve its White Paper's objectives and. even worse, signals an inability to do so in the future

Jaurruil of the Australian Niivul Institute
One of the major priorities to be achieved for Australia, according to the White Paper, was a mine countermeasure capability. Yet after 15 years of the Mine Hunter Inshore having been accorded a high priority, we still today have little or no mine countemieasures capability. This is only one of the capabilities set out in the White Paper which we still lack. Others include, of course, the ability to maintain surveillance of our maritime and air approaches: the ability to rapidly deploy our forces by land, sea and air: and an amphibious capability for the Army.
Yet two years ago the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade made a number of recommendations about our mine countermeasure inadequacies, and only now is the Government finally acknowledging the failure of the program. Not only is this serious for the defence of Australia but it is also a matter of great concern that nearly SKX) million has been spent and we still don't have a mine couniermeasure capability.
I mcniion this because, to me, it is one of the more sizeable examples of poor management in the Department of Defence. The other examples are many and varied, and they have gone on for a very long time, ranging from the sublime to the ridiculous.
When debating the Appropriation Bill in the Senate a few months ago, several more examples of poor management by the Department were raised. These included spending $350,(XX) recruiting engineers overseas before the necessary clearance had been given in Australia to allow die entry of those engineers into the country, and the mismanagement of a trust fund of $100,000 which was given to the Department of Defence in 1983 and remained for four years without being invested, losing value each year, hardly good management of a trust fund bequeathed by a Polish Australian to be used in the interests of the defence of Australia
Senator Kay and I debated the need for Defence to have good information systems so as to know how it is spending its money. Late last year, in a very important report, the Auditor-General revealed that it was almost impossible to gel information on the cost

of a soldier. He was not alone in having difficulty in getting financial information from the Department. liver since 1 arrived in Parliament 1 have had that difficulty. as have my predecessors. 1 recognise that the devolution of financial authority to commanders will go some way to improving the management of resources, and I welcome those moves, hut there is still a need for senior management to know how that authority is being exercised.
Currently that seems to be too hard lot Defence to manage, even though there arc 24,000 civilians in the Department ol I >e fence. The Defence Act pros ides that the Secretary to the Department of Defence is responsible to the Minister lot financial planning and programs of all elements of Defence outlay and lot financial administration and control ot expenses, including the correct and proper use of public funds. One wonders what those 24,(XX) people are doing if this information is not available and cannot he made available cost effectively to the Parliament. Also, what has been their role in the mismanagement of the projects that we have seen over the years? We could almost run an army if we put the 24,(XX) of them all into uniform. We do not have a great deal more in the regular army at the moment
approximately 27.IKK?      ami that figure will shrink by 5,220 over the next decade.
The Government is proposing to reduce the size of the Public Service elements ot the Defence Department by 3.8(X) people This immediately raises questions. If financial control is actually being devolved to Defence force personnel down the line, why are we still retaining 20,2(K.) civilians many of whom will no longer have their previous financial responsibilities?
In addition, what confidence can we have that these 3,800 reductions are real* We have seen number shuffling with this Department in the past. I understand that 2(X) people in the Defence Science and Technology Organisation in Adelaide are pan of the 3.800, yet the phased restructuring of DSTO was announced by Minister Kelly on 18 November 1987. I believe that these people have been counted once already. I low many of the remaining 3,600 arc in the same boat?

August 1991     Page 25

Journal of the Australian S'aval hisutule	_^_______^_
equipment items are being pushed further
I have put questions on notice about these cuts, and 1 note that there has been no similar civilian structure review as there has been with the force structure review. liven if the 3,800 positions are not being recycled, it would appear that the civilian reduction is 16 per cent when the people we actually recruit to defend us are being cut back by 15.4 per cent. almost the same amount. One would have expected the civilian cuts to be proportionately greater. Especially since the military are the people who are actually supposed to do the fighting for us. Perhaps this is really what is meant by eiviliaiusation!
The two elements which give me most concern in this whole exercise are the impact on our readiness and, therefore, our ability to defend Australia, and the financial footing on which the exercise is based. I believe that the savings which are discussed in the l-'orce Structure Review are questionable on many scores, which I will speak ahout later.
The Opposition has made it very clear that it opposes any force structure cuts which impact on combat capability but, despite the Government's rhetoric to the tune of "our cuts will not affect combat capability". this is precisely what it is doing It is clear, despite the Minister's claims, that combat capability will suffer and the sharp end will he considerably blunted.
Although Navy has come out better than i lie other two services at face value in the force Structure Review, 1 believe any thinking person would realise that in the totality of die statement there is a certain vagueness about when many of the naval projects will in fact lx achieved      and 1 think that is something that needs to he kept in mind.
The electronic media when reporting the
Minister's statement made much of the
fact dtat there was going to be a great
burst of capital equipment procurement.
What a sad commentary that was on the
professionalism of the media. In fact, the
equipment procurement items that were
referred to by the Minister are ones
which were set out in the White Paper
back in 1987. So four years down the
track we are no closer to achieving them
and in fact the Minister's statement
referred to them as being achieved by the
year 2fXK). That means those capital	
I'atie 2f> — August 1991

down the track with no announcement as to achieving them soon.
There have been cuts in the logistics areas, some of which can probably Inquire justified, and the Minister has spent a great deal of time in the weeks leading up to the statement to tell us that our teeth to tail ratio is completely out of kilter. Perhaps it is, hut some of the arguments he has been using don't hold water.
I draw your attention to the tact that when we went to Vietnam and when we went to previous wars, we relied on great and powerful friends for a great deal of our logistics suppon. Self-reliance which has been the bi-partisan policy from at least P>76 means inevitably that you \sill have a greater tail. Therefore it will also he more costly in terms of money and in terms of manpower. So some of the logistics changes may not allow us in the long term to achieve self-reliance, There are however some decisions which are valuable. 1 think the plan to reinstate the Chinook capability, even though it is a reduced one, is welcome. It is also welcome that there is a commitment to give more attention to mobilisation planning and dtere are a great number of areas where contracting out or civilianisation of base tasks could probably be achieved for less cost and hopefully without a reduction in our combat capability.
There have been cuts in flying lime cuts to the flying time of the fills and to the Sea King helicopters. There is a reduction in our Caribou fleet, there is a reduction in the operating costs for 25 Squadron at Pearcc. These cuts come alter steady reductions in RAAP Hying hours over recent years — with an increasing problem for Army and Navy to achieve air support when needed. There is a reduction in our capability as far as tanks tux- concerned. One squadron is to go to the Territory, another squadron is to stay at Puckapunyal in the Reserves. The third squadron is not mentioned and 1 am concerned for that squadron.
If 1 can turn now to the Ready Reserve. 1 have some serious concerns about that, first of all, with its name. 1 think it is offensive to the existing Reserve and certainly it is a misnomer because they will not be ready. Secondly, I have

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
doubts about our ability, accept in the initial stage, to recruit. I say in the initial stage because there has been a block in the processing of recruits through Kapooka for the last few months and so there is now a back log of people tested and ready to go to recruit training. They may be persuaded to go in as the initial batch of Ready Reservists, (quite a smart move if you think about it), but after thai I have some concerns about whether we will be able to get the recruits.
I certainly have some concerns about employers. It has always been difficult to get employer support, and I cannot see any changes in that. But it will he even greater during the recession, especially when you consider that the Ready Reserve project is to require one year full-time away from the civilian job followed by 50 days per year for the next four years away from the civilian job. Can you imagine how many employers are going to want their employees to have 50 days away, plus four weeks annual leave? I can't see too many myself.
The financial inducements to employers will be costly to die taxpayer, and the absence of the employee for two, two week periods of Ready Reserve training plus four weeks annual leave will have a significant effect on businesses, which should not be underrated.
Most importantly, what legislation does the Government propose to enforce these requirements? The Minister has made no mention of it and it is my understanding that there is none. How can we possibly be reducing our regular personnel component without any guarantees that those we are replacing them with will do the job if required?
As a layman, I have always believed that the Navy, but more especially the Air Force could make mom use of reservists and 1 am keen to hear from you what impact you believe the Ready Reserve proposal will have on those services.
How available will Ready Reservists lx-if there was an emergency? '["here seems to be no commitment to providing die sort of legislation that is going to be needed to make sure that these people arc available, and some of you will remember what happened in the Second World War when people were in reserved occupations. The question of

incentives is a serious one which we should consider. There will be incentives to both the recruits and to their employers, and they will be very costly if we look at the American example from which Mr. Wriglcy and the Government took their information.
This is not a cheap option and is likely to he very costly in the sense that employers arc ui be encouraged through financial means to release their employees, and employees to sign on for this long commitment. Fducation allowances and things like that are some of the measures that die government is mentioning. Yet universities arc now pressed for places and increasingly are refusing students the right to defer their studies,
I think that one of the serious outcomes of the Ready Reserve proposal will he the effect it will have on the existing Reserves and their morale and the ability to both recruit and retain. They are clearly going to sec dicmselvcs as second class citizens which they do already, as you know.
I have a dribble of letters all throughout the year from Army Reserve Units pointing out that they want to train, they have run out of man-days, that the training days are ran sufficient for their unit. They are very keen people and they are being asked to undertake certain parts of their training for free. So not only are they committed people who are working in a civilian workforce all year and giving up their spare time away from their families, many of them are doing it for free.
The promotional and career advancement opportunities lor the Ready Reserve are likely to lx- greater than those for the existing Reserve and so we will sec-people streaking ahead in the promotion stakes leaving the existing Reservists behind. That will add 10 the retention problems in the existing reserve
Many reserve units do not have sufficient equipment now. If the son of money that is to be put Into the Ready Reserve had been put into the existing Reserve, u could have had a marked impact on morale and retention.
Turning now to the Regulars, some of you will remember what happened to the 52/300 total Regular force during the

August 1991 — Page 27

Ji'urnul of the Att.\f<tluin NavallnstitUU
early 1950'S when we had the National Service Training Scheme. This was a time when our Regular Force was reduced substantially and they spent a ureal deal of their time simply taking people through and through and through the training cycle. There were few people left to do the Other jobs that were required of the Defence Force
It had a serious impact on Army morale at that time and I fear that that's what were likely to get again
In early 1942 Lieutenant. General Sir Ivan Mackay, GOC Home Forces, advised the Government that it might become necessary to concentrate Australia's defence in southeast Australia. Similarly General Douglas Macarthur's plans for the defence of Australia included abandoning the north and the west. It was this advice which led to the fierce political controversy of what came to be known as the Brisbane Line. The basis of this advice was that the Army in Australia then consisted of about fifty infantry battalions, and it was assessed that this number was msufficient to do little else than centre the defence of Australia around the eastern seaboard.
Although this advice was rejected by the then Labor Government, now it is generally appreciated thai it is difficult to see what else could have been done, given the state of Australia's army at that time.

are under strength and in the case of the reserve battalions, badly equipped and insufficiently trained. As you know, the six regular battalions are to be reduced to four by convening two battalions to reserve units manned by the new Ready Reserve.
14ns means that since W72/73 our first line of defence, the highly trained and effective regul.it battalions have been slashed from nine to four. Since 1942 northern Australia's population has grown to almost 1.2 million people, with many major cities and key resource developments located throughout.
As well, in defence terms most ol our major bases are. or are about to be sited in northern Australia. But our ability to deploy sufficient ground forces in the defence of Australia is now less than we w ere capable of in 1942.
The paucity of ground defence resources which bedevilled our defences in P>42 still applies today. However, instead of 50 battalions we now have 2 1, of which onlv 4 can be said to he combat reads
Similarly, we remain unable to detect illegal entry into our country, we remain unable to protect our shipping from mines, and vve remain unable to effectively go to the rescue of our nationals in neighbouring countries because we lack the adequate surveillance, a mine counter measure capability, and an appropriate helicopter

It was reported recently, that information obtained under the 30 year rule revealed that the Australian Government had intelligence information during the War detailing a Japanese attack on Australia and of India. The information showed that the plans were very advanced and indicated how the main Japanese force would set out from Christmas Island to Perth, take over the railways and the infrastructure and proceed east. Very simply, it demonstrates how important it is not to put all our defence eggs in the one basket, we should lie more flexible with the locating of our forces — we cannot guarantee an enemy will come from where we tell them to come.
I'p until the Force Structure Review our Army could muster six regular infantry battalions and fifteen reserve infantry battalions. However most of these units
Pagt 28     August 1991

I turn now to the financial integrity of the Force Structure Review which is in doubt. I have very serious reservations about the costing of die Ready Reserve. 'Hie Auditor-General experienced difficulties in getting reliable figures for his audit of the Army Reserve last year. But his report claimed that the cost per day of today's reserve soldier is more than 50 per cent higher than that of a regular soldier. Imagine my astonishment when 1 find that the Government has costed a ready reservist at only 42 per cent of a regular soldier and thai the Army itself costs a ready reservist at 60 per cent of the cost of a regular soldier. They obviously cannot all be right.
I understand that the Auditor-General
stands by his costs of last year for the
existing Reserve and 1 understand dtat
thg Army figua's were not wildly	

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
different from the Auditor-General's figures It can only mean that the figures of 42 per cent and 60 per cent of a regular soldier do not include all the crisis which should be included to arrive at the true cost of a ready reservist.
We have been waiting for the last couple of years to see the results of the previously announced assets sales. The continuing depression in the real estate market has meant that Defence has not received the benefit that these sales were predicted to bring to the Defence budget. I would not place too much reliance on any prediction of buckets of money from the sales of bases announced for closure.
For example, the long term closure of I I.MAS Platypus may well result in a pretty small return for the Defence budget it. as appears likely, it ends up as a waterfront park rather than a valuable subdivision.
I understand that the planned staged sale of Zetland, much of which will take place prior to the building of the new Navy stores at Moorehank, will also be very difficult to achieve, due to problems with essential services if the site is subdivided.
There are several internal uncertainties in the statement in the financial area. What is not spelt out by the Minister is the context in which these decisions have been taken, which I spoke about at the beginning of my speech.
The force Structure Review announcement is predicated upon no real growth in the Defence budget. However, the Fence structure review also looked at options based on an increase of one per cent and a decrease of one per cent in the Defence budget. It recognised thai, even with one percent real growth, the Government's White Paper was not atlordable. h also recognised that only 70 per cent of the White Paper initiatives could he funded without any growth, and thai if there was a reduction of even one percent in the budget, less than half of ihe White Paper program could be funded
I am most fearful that, taking together the suspect figures for the Army Reserve, the uncertain returns from the facilities sales and the bulge which will shortly hit
ns iii the capital procurement inheritance

front Mr Beazley in a year or so, lite budget will once again be up for radical cuts. There was a clue to this in the fine print relating to the Ready Reserve in the Defence statement, which had a clear implication that more regular forces could well become Ready Reserve forces within the next three years.
1 low much more ca.1 Australia's Defence Force be cut before we decide to lay-down our arms and have no force at all ' We are doing nothing short of surrendering Australia. How long must we wait before we see substantial and meaningful cuts to the dinosaur of the Defence bureaucracy'.' When will our combat capability truly take priority over the brown-suited bureaucracy'
In conclusion, you would need no reminder that the lack of readiness in Malaya led to the fall of Singapore and to the capture of thousands of Australians and Rrits, and their incarceration by the Japanese. That is the lesson we need to get across to the public about the lack of readiness.
We had the Fiji deployment in 19K7, in a hurry. We had the Gulf deployment in 1990, in a hurry. We have instability continuing in our region and that in Papua New Guinea concerns us very much. Only recently a book titled 77ic Coming War with Japan by Friedman and IxBard has been released which tells the fascinating and very credible story of the coming war between the LISA and Japan, with Australia caught up in the wash, and having to choose who to ally with. *I"he scenario is not an overcoloured one and its reasoning is spelled out as follows: "If there is one thing that the 20th century ought to have taught us, is that the common sense approach to history is almost invariably doomed to be wrong and that the most preposterous expectations are usually closer to the mark."
We have a commitment to the United Nations Peace Keeping role and we have a commitment to defence co-operation in our region. We need to retain highly-specialised dedicated forces with a high level of training and an ability to react quickly to the contingencies spelled out in the Defence White Paper.
The Defence Statement will seriously jeopardise our readiness to defend our
August IW] — Page ■"'

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
homeland. But our media were preoccupied with who would win the leadership stakes on the day the statement was made. It received singularly little

attention. Yet in the long term it may well prove to be the most important decision of the Hawke Government.

CNS, Admiral M W Hudson RAN (Ret) being rowed ashore at the Fleet Base
Page M> — August 1991

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
The South West Pacific — Strategic Backwater or...?
by LCDR Wayne Gobert

This article won second prize in the Officers contest,
'...wc should approach the region within a framework of regional partnership, not dominance. We do not regard the South Pacific as our sphere of influence...Such influence that we do exercise wc want to Ire in the context of close, confident and broadly based bilateral relationships, in which we promote regional stability through economic development and the encouragement of shared perceptions of common strategic and security interests". Senator Gareih Evans '
INTRODUCTION
The region known as "The Pacific" has meant different areas to the policy makers of different countries at different times; however the region has long been an area of vital concern for Australia. The depth of Australian interest in the Pacific has been demonstrated on several occasions since white settlement, by various examples of Australian colonialism at Norfolk Is, and in the New Hebrides, Fiji and New Guinea. Indeed, although Australia refused to accept any independent externa! policy making capacity at Federation in 1901. the Constitution specified that Australia did accept powet over "Pacific affairs".2
In 1919 the extension of Japanese authority into the former German

section of the 1990 Peter Mitchell Essa.)
Pacific territories Aind the predominance of Japanese naval powei in the Pacific, led Prime Minister W.M. Hughes to create the Pacific branch under li.H. Picsse, to "keep Australia informed of developments in, and international incidents pertaining to. the Pacific."'' Although this branch was abolished in 1922, its establishment supports the thesis that the Australian Government kept its eyes firmly fixed upon Japan and the Pacific, despite publicly arguing that external affairs were a British responsibility.
This essay will examine Australia's geo-political interests in the Southwest Pacific in the light of the region's strategic significance. The dissertation will briefly define regional parameters, the strategic significance of the South West Pacific, geo-strategic developments in the region and Australian policy responses
AUSTRALIA'S   STRATEGIC POLICIES   AND   THE SOUTHWEST    PACIFIC
Regional   Boundaries.
When the northern hemisphere nations ulk of the Pacific they are usually concerned with the northern Pacific anil the area within the Japan-USSR-Korea China axis. When their concents spread south they are usually confined to the

tivans. Senator G. Australian  Foreign A/fairs and Trade No.4. Vol.60. April 1989, p 142
'huither details can  be obtained from closer
examination nf The Constitution	

JThc major possessions were The Marshal!?, and Caroline*. Samoa. German New Guinea stid Tsinglao.
4R Thoimon. 'Invaluable Ally ot Imminent Aggressor'.'*. Journal Of Auslrtdian Studtrs, Nn 12. June 1983, p 6
August tWI — T'agr 11

Jouttuit otitic Australian Naval Institute

Pacific ritn and South East Asia \ For the purpose of this ess iv the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) will be defined as widely keeping to lite island states encapsulated by the ethnically deliniated sub regions of Melanesia. Micronesia and Polynesia.-1
At its largest extent the SWPA covers 35 million square kilometres of ocean but only about 552,000 square kilometres of land. Micronesia lies at the north western boundary of the area and includes those island nations north of the equator and to the WCSI of the International Dateline (the Marianas, federated Stales of Micronesia [FSM|, Riribati and the Carolines). Melanesia extends from New Guinea through the Solomons and New Caledonia, to Vanuatu and Fiji. Polynesia completes the region's southern and eastern boundaries and incorporates the nations of Niue, the Cook Is., Western Samoa, American Samoa and the French Polynesian territory. Ethnically, Meianesians are of negroid descent, and the MicTonesians of Indo-Malay lineage, while the origins of the lighter skinned Polynesians remain a mystery ™. These ethnic boundaries are not rigidly defined, and a fourth ethnic group, the Fijian Indians, constitute a large proportion of the South West Pacific's population
Early Strategic Interest in the SWPA
Throughout the 19th century the various Australian colonies maintained a Steady interest in the South West Pacific. New South Wales interests were predominantly motivated by free trader activities and the gaining of markets. while Victorian activities in the SWPA were largely driven by Presybterian

missionary zeal4 At various times the colonies fell threatened by a range of stimuli in the SWPA including: French convicts (reccdivists) in New Caledonia percolating onto Australia, French "Papism" gaining the upper hand in the New Hebrides \ (lerman naval bases in New Guinea and Samoa, and Russian designs upon Australian gold. The Australian colonial press of the 19th century were also concerned with strategic issues in the South West Pacific ■. Indeed Australia's first military foray overseas was into the Pacific 7. while die federation movement itself, sprang from the Annexation Society K. This preoccupation with the Strategic significance of the Pacific stemmed from simple geography; the Pacific is contiguous to Australia, and any aggressor had to possess a relative]) proximate operational base.
" Forward Defence" Up until the 187f)'s the Australian colonies relied predominantly upon direct British protection, however as the twentieth century approached and British interests became increasingly Euro-centric, the colonies were called upon to make a contribution to Imperial defence. In return for British diplomatic services and the ultimate application of British power, particularly sea power, the Empire became a reservoir of manpower ready to light upon the side of the mother country. As John McCarthy observes, "The sending of colonial forces to South Africa and the Middle East saw the beginning of that long enduring axiom of Australian Defence policy later known as forward defence'"'.

Pen jn example sot-: ll.S Deparrmem of Defense
J»lfl  Military   P,,»e,    1VX7 HX.  US   Delerne
Intelligence Agency. Washington.  U'xs, pp tM 1to
*-J.<iiu Committee on foreign Affairs, Detent-.?
and Trade, Australia s   Relations   With   The SOUIH Pacific, ACt'S. Canberra. IW>, p I
-i Some anthropologists have advanced ihe iheory
thal    the    Polynesian-,   originated    from    Itn-
Marpnesas Islantls
PggC J2      August 1991

K   Thompson, Australian Imperialism in   l he
Pactjtt ,    Melbourne    University    l'-Mclboumc. 1980. pp   222   22')
aloc   cii 6loc. cit
7Thc Maori Wars of Ihe 1850s.
^Thomson, op ett. p. 223
"McCarthy. J  Dependency'. University College
AUFA. Canberra, 118°. p 3	

loc.cil.
Journal of ihi- Australian Naval Institute	
Focus on The SWPA. The Pacific War and the beginings of a British withdrawal from East of Suez changed the "big brother", but policy remained essentially the same '. Australia's deep concern towards Pacific matters was Clearly expressed in the declaration of the long forgotten (and still current I) ANZAC Pact of 1944 ' Regardless ol opposition from the great powers Australia declared its willingness to have its own "Monroe Doctrine" in the Pacific ' As the Cold War deepened Australia's interests became more firmly aligned to the support of allies and the need to commit them directly to the Pacific region.
The Dibb Report, The Defence of Australia #7 and Australia's Regional Security (1989) are now the basis ot our foreign and Defence Policies and emphasise self reliance, global stability and regional defence 4. They have geographically refined and clarified Australia's strategic neighbourhood by identifying two sections; the area of direct military interest and the area of broader strategic interest. Nonetheless, the basic tenet that a major ally be encouraged to remain in the Pacific is as valid in 1990. as it was in 1870. History, modified and supported by modem thinking, reinforces the axiom that the SWPA must loom very large in defence strategy, li is certainly no backwater, as the region is neither remote, inconsequential or unchanging.
Strategic Significance of the SWPA
Before proceeding with an analysis of policy responses, it is worth considering why the SWPA is worthy of strategic attention. Indeed it could be could argued that due to its small population, the SWPA is an irrelevant distraction. Yet Australia has a deep
historical connection to the SWPA, and the SWPA has long been the only part of the globe in which Australia has been consistently involved. 'I"he SWPA is contiguous to Australia and in particular to the vital eastern seaboard. Approximately 25-3.1 % of Australia's trade passes through the region ', and approximately 20% of Australia's exports are intended for Pacific markets °. The overwhelming majority of the SWPA's nations maintain want] relations with Australia, and none could he considered to be genuinely hostile Australia provides leadership to the region in cultural, educational, medical, scientific, and almost all other social fields (this influence is reduced in the remaining Pacific colonial territories), finally, the security forces of the SWPA are almost exclusively aligned with Australia or New Zealand.
It is an inescalable conclusion that Australia is a dominant power in the SWPA. and that the present status quo. is very favourable to Australia's economic, cultural, political, and military interests 7. In the face of declining US interests, and increasing third nation and non-government pressure group activity 8 in the SWPA. Australia cannot afford to ignore the region. A favourable status quo, in a contiguous area, boasting considerable national investment in a variety ot forms, must be maintained.
^Shipping arul Air Caryo tianmmliiy Stations Australia 1989', Ausiralian Bureau ol Statistics. AGPS. Canberra. 1989, p.16.
15
hbid..
'Strategic Survey I98(> 87. International Institute of Siraiegic Studies. Brasscys. London. 1987. pp. 174 179
"Examples of glowing cxiemal inleicsls include
a. The opening of a Soviet Embassy in f'on Moresby.
2T. B. Millai. Australia m Peace and War, ANl1 Press. Canberra. 1978. p. 50.
2loe. cit
^Department of Defence, Defend. Report 1968 89, AGPS. Canberra, in 'Defence Program Overview'.
b USSR - PNG tithing agreements.
e. Greenpeace activities over drift net lislung.
d. Taiwanese overture! to Tonga and PRC" links
wiUi Fiji. and. World Council Ol Churches call
for social pisiicc in Ihe PacjQr,	
Augu.tr 1991 —Page J J

Journal of'the Au
Regional   Vulnerabilities The Emergence of South West
Pacific Nations The SWPA was the last section of the globe to see independence extended to a large number of former colonial possessions. The period 1962 (Western Samoa) to 1U78 (Tuvalu) saw the emergence of ten new nations and several "semi-independent and freely-associated" states (eg:FSM and The Cook Islands) 1   I his expansion of nationalism was also accompanied by the establishment of a host of regional bodies including: the South Pacific Forum (SPF), the South Pacific Bureau for Economic 1 icvelopment (SPBFD), the South Pacific Commission (SPC), the Pacific Islands Development Programme (I'll )l'i and the Committee for South Pacific Mineral Resources ( CCOP-SOPAC)2. However, the creation of a large number of comparatively inexperienced and economically fragile nations has led to a rise in strategic uncertainty.
Military Vulnerability. In recent years it litis become fashionable for the more hysterical defence analysts to advance the notion that the SWPA faces threats from external military forces 3. These writers claim that Gorbachev's 'Vladivosiock Speech' 4 and the acquisition of some Soviet naval forces. particularly naval aviation, arc clear indications that the USSR is posing a greater threat to Australian interests in the SWPA. However as Coral Bell
1 Several Pacific nations cxisi in a stoic of semi independence     described     as     "free
i  --,ii t.iii.m" Generally    this    involves    local autonomy   v.uh   the   'ormcr   colonial   pQwgl
I'-iunins  citizenship,  defence  and external
power'.
^Sce J,ant t'ommiitee on Foreign Affairs. Defence and Trade. iJCFADT) open. Appendix
V
•Tor an example sec. Soviet Influence in the South Paiifie. A McAdam (cd). Caplivc Nation) i ouneil. Melbourne. 1S>S8.
4III luSn President Gorbachev's "Vladivostok Speech", declared dial Ihe USSR was a Pacific nation and would lake greater interest In the
u-rion lie. the cnlii'- I'kiIuI	
Page M - August 1991

\iruiian Naval ln\iuu;c	
Observes -\ the SWPA is remote from areas of superpower competition and die present "Communist threat" is little more than an attempt by several nations (certainly not all Communist) to recognise, often for the first time, thai the SWPA exists at all. The notion that die Soviets could SOrnehovs maintain a Pacific "fortress" in the SWPA during a period of genuine superpower conflict is ludicrous. However, the one inescapable military strategic development in the SWPA, is thai the US presence will decrease, while other third parties will attempt to increase their regional presence h.
Kconomic Vulnerability. However while the SWPA is unlikely to he faced with any direct external military threats. security is a muln-faceted issue, and instability in any shape must Ire of concern to Australia. The region is extremely vulnerable to a host of non-military influences that could lead to threats even more serious than the military "threats" imagined by those predicting a Soviet military base in Vanuatu. The Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (A1DAB), believes that the major problems facing the Pacific "mini-states" are: small land size, high population density combined with low total population, limited revenue base and geographical remoteness 7 The economies of the micro states are small, ranging from Tuvalu with a < 11 )P of S3.9 million, to PNG's S3.S billion *. Furthermore, only the Melanesia!! states have any significant non-marine resources and almost none have a positive balance of payments account''.
'Bell, C The Strategic Interests of Ihe Major Powers In The Paeific. ANU Press. I'.lllborta. 1987, pp S7 b7
See: Congress of The United Slates. Mouse Foreign Affairs Sub Committee on A-.ni ud the Pacific. Problems in Paradise f A Interests in the South Paeifte. S. Solat/. (Chair)
7AIDAIj. Australia's Overseas Aid 1983-8* AGPS. Canberra. 1988, pp 28 77
'South   Panto   Commission,   South   Panto
I < onomtes Slatislteal Summary No   til.  [988 Tic.  oil

Journal of the Australian Nasal Institute	
litis places significant strain on the	and the plan to resettle Vietnamese
micro-state economies and fosters unavoidable economic dependency.
Other Vulnerabilities. As well as inherent economic and resource base vulnerabilities other factors are exacerbating the potential for destabilisation in the SWPA. These other problems include urban drift, erosion of the "home village subsistence safety net", rising youth expectations due to exposure to the wider world, and external threats to fragile marine resources from distant water fishing nations (DWFN's) '. Other developments that may influence regional stability are external powei rivalry spilling into the SWPA2, ethnic confrontation between native groups and later migrants (eg: Kaiiak/Caldochc, Melanesian/ Indian-Fijian), tribal/clan rivalries (eg: PNG Highlands), potential schisms between traditional rulers and the younger generations (eg: Tonga ' and Porgera ''), criminal activities and environmental issues. Given the smallscale and unsophisticated nature of the governments of the SWPA, these destabilizes could lead to external involvement in regional matters ""over even comparatively minor mattes. Recent examples of relatively minor incidents that could have led to major upheavals include, the expulsion of "Christian evangelists" from Tonga '',
1 Australian Centre lor Maritime Studies (ACMS). '•.'..• it o ■:■ Studies f.y ACMS, Canberra. July/Augusi ts>«7, b 21
2Riddick, T. V Diplomatic Rivalry In The South Pacific'. Asian Survey Vol XXIX, No.8, University of California, Berkeley. 1989. pp gOQ s i J
^Sharnia. D The Peoples Call'. Islands Bu.suus-.. May 1990. pp 12 14.
Vonncll. Dr J 'Mining The Rim !)[ lire , Pacifit hlantls MonlMs. March 1988, pp 20 23.
5N. Rolhwcll. "Gaddafii's Pacific Intrigues'. Pacifit Islands Manlhly, June 1988. p.18.
b.Sharnia, op, ell	

refugees in Vanuatu.
Regional   Trends Strategic Developments. Several trends that could impact upon the vulnerabilities of the SWPA have been identified. These can be broadly described as socio-cconomically based and coincide with objectives declared at the Oceania Security Seminar in Canberra in July 1989 s. and at the 1980 security seminar in Washington ''. Island leaders believe that unless atldressed. these trends will lead to regional destabih/ntion, and the fostering of external competition and influence in the SWPA.
One of the major problems presently emerging in the Pacific is urban drift. This is distorting the traditional subsistence village structure of the islands and its erosion may have dire consequences for societal order and "traditional welfare support" in the event of economic hardship. The seriousness of this problem was recognized at a regional seminar in Lac this yearl0. A further challenge to traditional structures is the increasing education level of Pacific citizens, media exposure and contact with the outside world. This must inevitably lead to greaier demands for material goods, racial equality, and universal suffrage and democratization. This trend has emerged in Fiji and is now arising in Tonga were challenges to the Monarchy, and more particularly the "nohtes". are arising ".
'D.North. 'Leadoin and the Vietnamese Affair", Pacific Islands Monthly. February 1990. p 1 5
"Conference Notes, Iht' Security of Oceania m The l°Ws, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra,  1989
9Ashton, C, Washinglon listens hut docs it hear'.''. Pacific Defence Reporter. September 1989, pp 50 51
'"'Population Pressure'. PNC Post (ounce. Mas 14 1990. p  5
'Sllanria. op en. pp 12 14

August 1WI - f'ttgc 35

Journal ofthe Australian Naval Institute
Economic strains are also growing with threats being posed to fragile economies by DWFN's, pollution and large scale foreign investment. The micro states are faced with an inevitable choice between heightened foreign aid and subsequent dependency, or reduced infrastructural growth and independence.
Another major category of potentially disruptive influences are the tribal, anti-colonial, ethnic, criminal and politically based triggers for violence identified by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs 1 Jefence and Trade's report of March 1989 '. II allowed to develop, these triggers may eventually involve external power involvement and support to aggrieved parties. Examples are: Libyan involvement in Vanuatu J; Chinese/French support for the Fijian junta, external activities by government and non-government bodies against nuclear testing; the declaration of the South Pacific Nuclear Free /one i SI'NIsZ); the emergence of the Bougainville Republican Army (BRA) and the Republic of Meckamui; demands for legislative representation in the I'S Pacific Trust Territories; heightened awareness by islanders of pollution related issues (this is typified by the JACADS debate over Johnston Atoll); and the simmering conflict between the forces of colonialism and nationalism.
Pacific  Island Perceptions Of Regional  Trends
Islander attitudes towards regional destahilization are difficult to gauge, as there are few major regional journals '. they have very few diplomatic representatives, and the micro slates have relatively unsophisticated tertiary institutions (which devote their lew resources to vocational training, rather than philosophical pursuits). In July

1°SV the clearest view of Pacific islander attitudes was demenstrated at a workshop at the Australian National 1 Iniversity entitled "The Securitv of Oceania i'n The WW's".
This cross section of Pacific island society, both government and private, indicated that their definition of "security" was broader than traditional western interpretations, and was related directly to economic security, from this economic security, it was argued, would flow cultural and societal stability. Security was seen us being directly linked to economic matters and il was stressed thai a country cannot be politically independent if it is not economically independent. Internal threats am seen as having their roots in the distribution of economic wealth and the consequent well being of the population. John Dormice cogently summarized the attitudes of the Pacific Islanders as follows: " ...foreign invasion is seen as extremely remote...aside from region-wide economic problems, such threats as do exist are largely internal and mostly non-ideological" *.
'file goals or objectives of die regional states were summarized by the conference as follows:
a.	economic independence,
b.	social welfare enhancement,
c.	national cohesion,
d.	efficient administration,
e.	territorial integrity,
f.	harmony in society, and
g.	maintenance of economic and
welfare interests 5.
Australian  Responses.
This paper has argued lhal ihe predominant aspirations of the peoples of the South West Pacific revoke around socio-economic issues. If these aims are realised, die Pacific nations

V.'FADT. opcit, P5.
^Rnlhwcll. op. cit.
JOnlv Fiji and Papua New Uuinea have targe <l.uh
newspapers and there are only three regional
news magazines, Pacific Islands Mnnihlv. I Ac
South Seas Digest and Islands Business. The
firs! two arc published in Australia.	
Page 3f>- Augusl I'WI

Dorrance, J C 'Otcania and the United States An Analysis of US Interests and Polities in the Snuih Pacific'. National War Colie&t, June 1986, p IV
"Conference NolCS, The Security of Oceania in Ihr IWi, Strategic and Defence Studies r'cmrc, Canberra.   I''SO

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
argue that internal stability will follow which will in turn foster regional security.
Policy  Responses. Australia's challenge is to adopt a policy direction tailored to the SWPA that also accounts lor our own limited resources base. Australian defence and foreign policies programmes should be closely coordinated and centred upon internal economic growth and those issues perceived to be important by the SWPA's people. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the policies adopted should be discreetly applied so that the small and unsophisticated structures of the micro-slates are not upset hy overbearing aid programmes.
In June 1989 The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs. Defence and Trade delivered its report upon future directions in the region. This report drew upon submissions from bodies ranging from the Council of Churches to The Australian Maritime Studies Centre '. 'Die conclusions of the committee support the contention that Australian policy in the Pacific must develop along the following lines: ft, small scale increases in economic self-sufficiency,
b.	bolstering local capacity for
surveillance and sovereignty
enforcement,
c.	disaster relief,
d.	education and training in Australia
and development of local facilities,
e.	infrastnicturul and transport
development.
f.	support in international fora,
g.	fostering a positive balance of trade,
h. providing specialist advisers as
required, i. increase the number of ADF visits,
and j. ensure that Australia has a significant
regional diplomatic profile.
CONCLUSION
Australia's historic interest in the SWPA is no mistake or quirk of fate, k
ACMS. lix. cil.

is the result of geography and extensive economic, cultural, and security ties. The SWPA is neither remote, unchanging or inconsequential. Presently the status quo is highly favourable towards Australia's vital interests, but that balance has a real potential for change. In Tonga Bishop I-inau, the kingdom's Roman Catholic Primate, has warned KingTaufa'ah.ui Tupou IV that, "...there will be a coup d'etat if there is no change...the people want power sharing, and I think thai they must have it" -1. In Port Moresby. Melancsian Solidarity (MFLSOD.a radical student body devoted to "an independent and nuclear-free Pacific" ', has staged PNG's largest and most violent demonstration. Australian foreign policy makers must heed these regional developments.
The situation in the South West Pacific is one of dependence; dependence 00 foreign aid, dependence on a small range of either non-renewable resources or traditional produce with little scope for either expanding production or expanding markets, dependence on imports for fundamental products and dependence on overseas capital. The problem for Australia in the Pacific, a fonnulaiing strategics appropriate to ihc islanders' aspirations for economic independence and internal stability Australian policies must engender maximum panicipation by local populations and raise their levels of self-sufficiency, while simultaneously heightening an awareness of Australia's role in the Pacific. If this fine balance can be struck and domestic stability maintained in the region, challenges to Australia's position in the Souih West Pacific will he minimized.
Bibliography
Australian International Development and Assistance Bureau (AIDAB),
'Tonga heading for revolution   Hishop', /'.VG Post Courier. March 6 1990. p.8.
n	,
•^G.   Korei,  'Stolen  goods   found   in   smdtflll
office, PNG Po.it Courier. May In 1990. aS
August IWI       l\r.;- i '

Journal of I lie Ausir,iliiin Nuv,il Insmutr
Australia's Overseas Aid I9H3-RS. AGPS, Canberra, 1988.
Australian Trade Statistics, AGPS, Canberra, 1989.
Hell, G The Strategic Interests Oj The Major Towers in The Pacific, ANU Press, Canberra, 1987.
Brnwn, Ii.U. Asia and the Pacific in the 1970s. A.ll. and AAV. Reed, Maryland, 1971.
Depanmeni of Defence, Defence Report 1972, Australian Government Publishing Service (AGPS), Canberra, 1972.
Department of Defence, Defence of Australia. AGPS. Canberra, 1987.
Department Of Defence, Defence Report 1988-89, AGPS, Canberra, 1989.

Mc Carthy, J. Dependency .'■', I 'inversus College, ADPA, Canberra. 1989.
Meanev, N. The Search For Security in the Pacific 1901-14. Vol. 1, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1976.
South Pacific Commission, South Pacific Economies Statistical Summary No. 10, 1986.
Thompson, R. Australian Imperiatsim in the Pacific. Melbourne 1.1 niversitv Pressj 1980.
US Department Of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1987-88, Defense Intelligence Agenev, Washington, 1988.
Ashton, C. 'Washington listens but does it hear?'. Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol. XVI, No. 3, September 1989.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Regional Security,
AGPS, Canbema, 1989.
Dibb, P, RevU » oj Australia's Defence Capabilities. AGPS, Canberra, 1986.
Dorrancc, J.C., Oceania and The United States: An Analysis of US Interests and Policy in The South West Pacific. National War College, June 1986

Australian Centre for Maritime Studies. 'Australia and the South Pacific-Common Maritime Interests', Maritime Studies 35. July/August 1987.
Biddick.T. V. Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific', Asian Survey, Vol. XXIX. No. 8, 1989.
Connell, Dr J. 'Mining The Rim of Fire', Pacific Islands Monthly. March 1988.

Edwards, P. Prime Ministers and Diplomats The Making of Australian Foreign Folic) 1901-1949, Oxford
Universits Press. Sydney. 1976.
1 larries. 0 . Strategy and the Southwest Pacific. Pacific Security Research Institute, Melbourne, 1989.
International Institute for Strategic Affairs, Strategic Survey 1986 87, IISS. London. 1987.
Joint Committee On Foreign Affairs I tefence and Trade, Australia's Relations With I he South Pacific, AGPS. Canberra. 1989.

Ivans. Senator G. 'Foreign Policy Priorities', Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade. No. 4, Vol. 60. April 1989.
Fraser, H. 'Vanuatu settles down'. Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol. XV, No. 9. March 1989.
Knapman, B. 'Aid and Dependent Development of
Pacific Island States', Journal of Pacific
History, Vol. 21, No.3, 1986.
Korci, G.  Stolen goods found in students' office', PNG Post Courier. May 16 1990.

Mc Adam (edi. Soviet Influence in the I'm tlie. Captive Nations' Council. Melbourne, 1988,

Mediansky, F, The Security Outlook in the South West Pacific', The Australian Quarterly. Vol. 59, No. 3/4, 1987.

Pace 38 - August |v>»|

Journal ofthe AustniHan Naval Institute
on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, 1
North, D. 'Lcodoro and the Vietnamese	990 .
Affair', Pacific Islands Monthly, June
1990.	Tarte, S. 'Regionalism and Globalism
in the South Pacific', Development and
Rothwell, N„ Gadaffi's Pacific	Change, No. 20, No. 2, 19K9.
Intrigues', Pacific Islands Monthlv,
Vol. 59, No. 6, June 1988.	Tonga heading for revolution;
Bishop', PNG Post Courier, March 6
Sharnia. D. 'The Peoples Call', Islands	1990.
Business, March 1990.

Solar/., S (chair). Problems in Paradise: US Interests in the Pacific'. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee

AUgUSt   l'")l  -     fur.     >■/

Journal of the Australian Naval Insliiule

Giving the Army a lift — The S!/70b-2 Seahawk shows lis paces
face 411   - AugUSt l'7'7l

Journal oi tin An \ti align Naval Institute
The Effects of Technology on Defence Manpower Needs
by CPOQMG J Cleary, Fremantle Port Division, RANR.
I his essay won first prize in the sailor se, lion Of the Peter Mitt .hell Essay Competition in I'M'i

The effects of technology on Defence
manpower needs depend to a large extent on the time frame one ehooses to examine. Most informed observers in specialist fields eari fairly accurately assess conditions likely to exist 4-5 years ahead, and ought to he able to plan their equipment, maintenance and training needs accordingly. Beyond such a lime frame the future is less certain. It Likes a brave man or woman prepared to make budget estimates for equipment procurement more than a couple of years ahead.
In many respects, the Armed Forces operate at the leading edge of technology. and the planning associated with technological change is generally dealt with fairly effectively in the short term I lowever, the rate of change is accelerating, and if one lakes a long term view, technology is going to create, and indeed has already created revolutionary changes in Defence manpower It is Inns a traditionally conservative defence structure copes with this revolution that is the subject of this essay
Consider the major equipment items to the year 2(KX). It is a matter of public knowledge that for the Navy, the submarine project and Anzac frigates will form lite backbone of the fleet to the year 2(XX) and beyond. The Air Force will have its F/A18, F 111 and Orion aircraft, and die Army the Blackhawk helicopters. The over-thc-horizonradar will be a major drain on funds, as will a large amount of Defence esutblishment infrastructure such as Naval facilities in Jervis Bay. But although millions of dollars will be spent on relatively minor equipment, these will remain the big ticket items. Defence manpower planners can therefore accurately project R'cruitment, training and logistical support based on these items for the next decade and beyond. One assumes during

the lifetimes of these projects there will be no catastrophic social or military crisis such as a depression of the magnitude of die 193G'S, or World War III
1 he former, would certainly sec technological change come to a dead slop, and the latter probably producing die same effect, with the emphasis on dv.ill In either case events would develop their own momentum and revolutionary change would occur, but not as a result of orderly planning.
I haw stated that, in my opinion, new technologies will cause a revolution in Defence manpower, but by whai measure am I able to make such an assertion? The answer is fairly simple. By looking back at the changes which technology has created, and the effects it has had in Society in general, and the military in particular, ii should be possible to predict some trends which will occur in the future.
To achieve this. I intend chronicling the social, technological and military changes which have occurred during the unbroken service lifetimes of just three Senior Army Officers, one of whom is still serving. Then attempt to project the changes which will occur during the service lifetime of an unknown junior officer.
General Peter Gration is the Chief of the Australian Defence Force. He began his Army career in 1952, giving service to dale [ 1989] of 37 years. At the time he joined the Army the then Senior Army Officer was Lieutenant General Sir SI Rowel I, who joined the Army in 1914. a
careei of 38 years In 1914 the most
senior Army officer in Australia was Brigadier (ieneral J.M. Gordon, who joined the British Army in 1877.

August 1991 - fane SI

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
We now have a period of 112 years unbroken service representing the careers of just three men, during which time truly revolutionary changes occurred, brought about mainly by technology. Of course the great political upheavals which have occurred during tins period have really shaped the world, but I suspect the technological changes, particularly in transport and commurication has really been the trigger. 112 years might seem an eternity, but in histoncal terms it barely represents the blink of an eye. so let us start by looking at the time of Lt Gen Gordon, and when he began his
1877-1914 lt was the year after Victoria had been proclaimed Empress of India (without any reference to the Indian people). It may well have been one of the years when, according to legend, Victoria took one of the three baths she had during her reign. Victoria ruled over the greatest empire the world had ever seen, protected and projected by the 'Wooden Walls of England' as the Royal Navy was affectionately known. Young Gordon, a loyal soldier of the Queen, would live to sec those walls crumble.
During his Army career he would see the introduction of Breech loading, quick tiring artillery, an all khaki Army, an all steel, all steam propelled Navy, submarines, aircraft and the birth of the Royal Air Force, radio, machine guns, torpedo's, mines, motor cars. X-rays, electric light, gramophone records, refrigeration, film, vaccination... He would see the creation of scores of new nations, the decline of the rigid British class system and the practice of the upper class purchasing commissions abolished.
fired by the industrial revolution, this period was one of truly momentous change in which development piled upon development For the British Army, developments in artillery, small amis and tactics were painfully slow to be introduced, resistance to change being led by the Commander in Chief of the Amiy, HRH the Duke of Cambridge, who held this position from 1816 to IK')?,. A series of actions against the Zulus and the Egyptians proceeded the Boer war. It was this war which forced the greatest changes in the British Army. At the stan of hostilities die British infantry were still practising close order drill, standing shoulder to shoulder in
Pag* 42 — August /w/

full view of die enemy and tiring massed volleys. By the end of the war nearly half a million troops had taken pan, including thousands of sailors who took the guns from their ships and transported them thousands of miles across Africa with great success. The standard of musketry can be gauged by the fact diat in 1902 'the 12 best shots (in the British Army 1 fired 1210 rounds at targets from 210 yards to 2600 yards distant, and had scored a total of ten hits! Nevertheless for all the experience of the Boer war. and the lessons of the subsequent enquiries, all of the European Armies were unable to adapt to the modern, mechanised conditions that obtained in 1914. We now know that the slaughter of the 1914-18 war was due to a great extent to brave, but poorly trained soldiers, being led by officers a.s poorly trained and ignorant as themselves.
During this period the Royal Navy was also slow to change. As late as 18.10, following gunnery trials against an iron hulled vessel, the Simoon, the Admiralty concluded that 'Iron is not a material calculated for ships of war.' The Admiralty's reluctance to convert to iron ships is perhaps understandable given the experience of HMS Megaera. She was forced to beach on St Paul's island while-en route from England to Australia in 1871, the result of unchecked rust in her hull. Nonetheless by 18(>1 the first all iron warship. HMS Warrior, was launched and although fitted with an engine and screw, she was fully rigged for sail. Once out of harbour and in favourable winds, the propeller was unshipped and hoisied on deck by 6(X) men.
The development of the Bessemer converter allowed the production of steel. a much more suitable material for ship construction than iron, and in the very year the young Gordon joined the Army, the Royal Navy's first steel vessel, a small packet boat, was launched.
In gunnery, poor results with early breech loading guns led to the reversion of muzzle loading for all British guns until 1881, although they were using the I'AIXIIAM shell, an explosive shell designed to he fired from smooth bore guns. British ships were still only able to fire their main batteries in broadsides (at 9()': to the ship's head) and muzzle loaders had to be run in for reloading.

	tout/kit of ilw Amj
Early attempts at turret guns were not a success and one of the first ships, HMS C 'aptain, turned turtle in the Bay of Biscay in 1870. Her loss, due in part to the tallest and heaviest masts of any ship in the Navy, hastened die passing of rigging and steam became the only means of production. The standard of gunnery also left a lot to be desired. During a trial in 1871 a carefully laid gun on HMS Hotspur missed a target battleship at 200 yjffds range in flat calm with both ships stationary.
Il could be said tliat the development ol the warship reached a new plane with the launching of HMS Dreadnought. Built in a seat and a day at a cost of £1.75 million, she represented a revolution in ship design and set the pattern for all future batdeships. At the turn of the century the major nations began building submarines, so that by 1914 over 200 were in commission. The problem was that the speed of their development outpaced the means of detection and the best method for their employment, and nations were unwilling to accept they might be used against merehant shipping.
However il was on the sands of Kittyhawk, North Carolina, that the most significant technological breakthrough occurred in Gordon's military career. In 190? the Wright brothers achieved powered flight and the speed of development was such that only seven years passed before the first military application (aerial photography) of aircraft occurred.
Two years later, in 1911, the first bombing from an aircraft occurred.
When Gordon enlisted in 1877 what possible preparation could he have had tor tins new form of warfare. Like everyone else he hardly had time to marvel at the achievement of flight before he was faced with its incorporation as an instrument of war. How did the military establishment cope with the need for thousands of engineers to maintain these new ships, submarines, motor vehicles and aircraft. That so many were able to he pressed into service to basically leant on the job was more a function of a traditionally subservient working class, and a genuine desire to defend Britain, than any orderly planning on the part of the military hierarchy.

ir,iluw Haval Institute
And in 1877, what of the rest of the
world? In the United Slates, the Southern States were finally rc-integrated into the Union, thus officially ending the agony of the Civil War. For some of the Western Slates, it would he another 30 years or more before they would be admitted to the Union. The Army went to war against the Nonh-West Indians following Custer's defeat at the battle of the Little Big Horn the previous year.
In Australia the colonies had responsible self government and fears of invasion and immigration were the spurs to commence moves for a Constitution convention. Hie first test match was played between Australia and England at the MCG. Australia won by 45 runs Ned Kelly was beginning his career as a bushranger. Thomas Mon raised £2000/ / to fit out a refrigerated ship, the Ntirtham, to transport frozen meat to Britain (she broke down). A rush of Chinese wanting work in the goldtields caused fear that Australia would be overrun and Queensland passed legislation imposing a heavy licence fee on 'African and Asian aliens'. Attempts to employ Chinese at half the pay of Australian seamen caused the first maritime strike and Emest Giles had just returned from his successful expedition to the interior of Australia.
And so in 1914, Brigadier General Gordon, now the Senior Army officer in Australia returned to Britain. World Wai
I	had been declared and Australian
Forces had been placed under the
command of Britain. Hie most senior
Australian officer was a Colonel and as ,i
young man S.F. Rowell begins a career
in the Army which will last 40 years and
see him retire in 1954 us Lieutenant
General Sir S.F. Rowell. Chief of the
General Staff of the Australian Army.
1914-1952 This was a period of great change, but not as dramatic as had occurred during the previous 37 years. The main reason for the slower rate of change was the stockmarkct crash of 1929. and the great depression of the 1930s, a time when funds for research and innovation were not available. As a consequence, in military terms, the US, Britain and Australia entered World War
II	with hardware not gready advanced on
those in use at the end of World War 1

Aurum 1991 - /:■

Jourmil ofihe Australian Naval Institute
What had changed was that the Armed Forces had become much more professional and technological change had produced a much more skilled work force. Mass communication, through film and radio, meant a much better informed population, and events were reported almost immediately. In Britain particularly. World War I brought about massive social change. The traditional master/servant relationship broke down in the carnage of the trenches, and returning servicemen and women were no longer content to work as servants to the upper classes. There was a great shortage of help' and it is no accident that appliances such as automatic washing machines, spin dryers and electric kettles gained wider acceptance. Besides many of these men now had newly acquired skills badly needed by post-war industry. Surplus aircraft, and personnel, help create passenger flving, pioneered by QANTAS in 1920.
The technology of World War 1 also began the start of a change in relationships between officers and men. Generally the enlisted man was unskilled, came from the poorer sections of society and learned the simplest tasks by role. However, the introduction of complex machinery, communications equipment and a much more involved logistical support system meant that the enlisted man now had the power of knowledge and this was the beginning of the end of autocratic rule and blind obedience. The end of World War I also saw the beginning of the democratic revolution, as people fought for political equality. Oddly enough, Britain, the Mother of Parliaments did not achieve absolute political equality until 1949, as Certain businessmen and university graduates were entitled to a second vote.
In spue of the great depression the period 11> 14-52 saw many dramatic social and technological changes. These included the vote for women, the Russian revolution, pneumatic tyres, television, colour film, nuclear power, penicillin, plastics, the jet engine, tanks, radar, sonar, the electron microscope, rocketry, aircraft carriers, transistors, microwave cooking, hall point pens, kidney dialysis, open heart surgery, farm mechanisation, supersonic Bight, skyscrapers, and the
discovery of the UNA double helix Because of die lessons of World War 1, and the pause in progress brought about

by the Depression, there was much less trauma in mobilising the thousands of skilled workers necessary to fight the relatively high tech World War II. Much is made of the mechanisation of the German Army at the start of the war, but what is forgotten is that the majority of transport was still carried out by horse-drawn vehicles. It was the ability of Britain and America, adapting the mass production techniques of Henry ford, to exploit the vast raw material resources ol the allies which finally defeated Germain and Japan.
Bui, in 1914, who could have foreseen the need for the thousands of aircrati navigators, radio operators, radai and sonar technicians, minesweeping specialists, divers and parachutists;' Did Cadet Rowcll receive any instruction in what the strategic and tactical implications of these new professions would be. The fact is, in many cases they were in operational use before most people were even aware of their existence. In the years following World War 11, all of this was common knowledge. Bombarded by a flood of films, magazine articles, radio broadcasts and memoirs, the young Peter Gration would have known all about this shining new technology when he entered the Army in 1952.
1952-1989 For Cadet Gration 1952 must have been an exciting time. Australia had a modern, well equipped Army, Navy and Air Force with highly skilled servicemen and women. It was the year George Jorgenson became Christine alter the world's first sex change operation. 3D movies were being released, with the bizarre sight of the audience wearing cardboard glasses with one eye red and the other green. It was a time when post war migration was at its peak, and thousands of new arrivals from the devastation of europe would be housed in huge camps as cheerless as a Stalag. Milk was still delivered fresh in a billy left ai the front door and children would rush to see who could get the cream first. Most homes had an ice chest, the ice delivered twice weekly by burly individuals with hessian bags to protect their shoulders, and entertainment revolved around the radio, live theatre and dances. Jack Davey, Bob Dyer and Roy Rene were the undisputed kings ol Australian entertainment, and Allan McGillivray would broadcast cricket

Page -u     Ahcu.u I'i'ii

Journal of lite Australian Naval Institute
matches, tapping a pencil on a coconut to simulate the sound of bat hitting ball. To develop Australia, forests are torn down with the same passion they arc defended today and giant engineering projects, typified by the Snowy River Scheme, are commenced. Australian troops arc in action in Korea.
Technological change really begins to accelerate and General Gration has seen organ transplants, computers, fibre optics, space travel, man on the moon, and a man made object passing out of our own solar system, satellite technology, mass transportation, colour television, nuclear propulsion, intelligent weapons, contraception, lasers, genetic engineering, solar and wind power.
And what of the social changes. The Soviet Union, which in 1952 was regarded with almost paranoia, today gets more sympathy than the United States. There has been the trauma of the cultural revolution in China, the emergence of true democracy in the Warsaw pact. Some African nations have gained independence in bloodbaths that would have made Caligula blush, and if Cadet Gration had been told he would see action in Vietnam, he could not have found it on a map. The motor car has become as common as the bicycle 50 years ago and pollution threatens life itself. Science has eradicated some diseases entirely, but nature, not to be outdone, has introduced new ones.
The effects of technology on Defence
manpower today are dramatic. Our ships
and aircraft arc so sophisticated thai
manning is a real problem. The I-TG
frigates have a miniscule crew for so
large a vessel and senior specialist
technicians quite rightly resent having to
carry out basic ship husbandry tasks. In
a world desperate for skilled engineers,
trained personnel have the certain
knowledge that much higher paid jobs
are available outside the Service. For this
reason they simply will riot put up with
the meaningless ceremony of the last
century. They expect, demand and get
respect for their skills. They also demand
a high standard of conditions and pay
levels similar to their civilian colleagues.
In most service units today officers and
men work as part of a highly
professional, highly trained team, each
dependant on the other. Social interaction
is present to a level absolutely not  	

possible when Gordon joined the British Army in 1877. If he could sit down and talk with General Gration today what would he make of it all? I suspect he would find it all as unlikely as the notion Cadet Gration would have had that Japan would he the dominant economic power in die world of 1989.
Soon to the fourth, and unknown member of this chronology. It is possible that a young man or woman studying at the Defence Force Academy ttxlav will he the Chief of the Australian forces in 37 years' time. What technological changes will occur, and what social changes will shape his |or her| attitudes.
1989-2026 By this time the only F/AlXs will be found in museums and the Anzac frigates long since recycled. Will the world of 2026 be that of a shining future where science and technology has combined to cure all the ills of society? Or will it be a world of desperate hunger and rampant pollution where the resource rich nations like Australia are forced to grimly defend the food producing areas with weapons beyond our comprehension. Consider this, in 1877 the total world population was estimated at something over one billion. In 2(126 it will be over 8 billion, the vast majority in Africa and Asia. Indonesia's population will exceed 180 million, with 30 million in Jakarta alone, about the same as the total population of Australia. In India, the urban centres alone will total some 660 million, while in Africa, it is estimated the birth rate will be over 42 million a year.
What will lx- the technological changes over the next 37 years and how will they affect Defence manpower needs? The answers are as unknown today as they were 37 years ago, hut it is certain the rate of change will continue to accelerate 1 suspect that fossil fuel pollution and future energy crises will see a re-cmcrgence of nuclear power. Probably all transport of the future will be nuclear or solar driven. For many countries the age of the private car has already a-ached its peak. Huge increases in fuel and road rental taxes will see them the preserve of the very rich and influential. Future generations of computers will be so powerful that they will be sell programming. languages such as CoboJ and Fortran will be as ancient as Etruscan. An excellent time essav some

August 1991 — Page 43

Inurntit of the Australian ts'tivtil Institute
years ago proposed that todays computers arc the beginnings of a new lift form on earth. The high cost and sophistication of weapons systems will certainly see the Armed Forces becoming a vers small elite unit maintaining stocks of equipment capable of being brought into service during times of national emergency. They will he supported by a more active and more integrated Reserve Force, Most servicemen will have degrees and civilians will he employed for the more menial tasks. At the same time civilian consultants will play an increasing role, the military having given up the effort co train its own instructors, we will need instructional designers, genetic engineers, electronic warfare specialists and possibly people trained in morals and ethics 10 approve entirely computer initiated responses.
Environmental pressure will increasingly restrict the areas available for exercise purposes and Australia could possibly finance its Armed Forces by renting out exercise space to countries like Singapore and Malaysia where such space will be totally unavailable. In such a case environmental specialists and possibly botanists will become military occupations. My gut feeling is Australia will he a Republic by 2026 with all past loyalties forgotten. I also suspect we will form a United Nation comprising Australia and New Zealand.
Whatever the social and technological changes over the next 37 years, only one

thing is certain, the world is going to he as different from today as it was in 1877. 1 can't help but wonder what the cadet of 2026 will face.
Bibliography
Annies of the World 18S4 19I..X) Woodward
The Story and Scandal a] I his
Mcpacra.R. Hnywanl
future Shook. A Toller
National Geographic, August 198 I
I he Collins Atlas oj World History, I d Pierre Vidal-Naquel
The Timetable of technology, M Joseph
Illustrated World History, Ed Esmond
Wright
A History of Flight, C t'anhv
A Short History oj Technology, Deri)
and Williams
The Technological Society,}. EIlul Australia's Heritage, Gordon iN Gotch

l\iy,r -it, — Aunust 1991

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
John Curtin and a Maritime Strategy circa 1941
by Commander J Sherwood, RAN

"... there was no greater figure in Australian public life in my lifetime than Curtin. I admired him both as a man ami as a statesman.... As Prime Minister he worked unceasingly for Australia and suffered much personally over the wartime decisions lie was obliged to make..."
INTRODUCTION
Did the above accolade penned by Sir Arthur Fadden go far enough in describing John Cunin? Was John Cunin not only a much respected political leader, who guided his country through perhaps it's most threatened years, but perhaps also a shrewd strategist, who at a time of a changing international strategic power base, ensured Australia's sovereignty and voice on the world stage? As one historian, E.M. Andrews has suggested; Australians have tended to look for a strong and powerful protector to oversee their security interests in the broader international strategic arena. This because of a combination of: the vastness of the island continent it comprises, it's seemingly remoteness from the main strategic centres of the world and it's desire to allocate a primacy of resources towards economic development and social welfare.
Prior to the Japanese entry into World War II, the reliance was primarily on the United Kingdom and post 1941 on the United States. Although these have been fairly broad trends, they cannot be seen as being an immutable base on which the nation's foreign and defence policies have been formulated. Alfred Deakin as early as 1907 muted the idea of greater American involvement in the Pacific, no doubt as a means of ensuring a broader protective umbrella to Australia's interests. From time to time between the wars, it was again raised, as various political and military figures expressed

doubts over the strength of the United Kingdom's conviction to fully protect Australia's interests or if not conviction then at least that nation's ability to do so. Since 1941, questions have also been raised about the strength of the relationship with the United Suites of America. As Andrews so rightly points out, the policy of relying on alliances with great powers leads to serious external weaknesses, especially if that great power's interests are not fully strategically aligned with those of Australia. History now suggests that this existed in 1941, when Great Britain's strategic priorities were at odds with Australia's and placed Australia in a position of having to go it alone in the world strategic arena. This coupled with events that were beyond the nation's control, raised the real possibility of Australia's sovereignty being imperiled.
In more recent times another historian has suggested that this danger didn't exist because the United Kingdom and the United Suites virtually negotiated between themselves Australia's transfer to an American security sphere. This however may be an oversimplification of what was an important milestone in Australia's history, and especially that of her foreign and defence policies. Perhaps for the first time Australia was able to play a more mature role in making sure her interests were noted by her great and powerful friends.   'Hie question is; how important was the part played by Australia's politicians, diplomats and defence representatives, and more importantly the role of John Curtin as the guiding strategist.
WAR
AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGY
At the outbreak of war in 1939, Australia's traditional ties with Great Britain through her cultural, social,

August 1991 — Page 97

Journal t>( the Australian \avat Institute
political: economic and more importantly defence links were still extremely strong. It is only understandable then, that Australia's considerable commitment (although criticised as insufficient in some quarters) was aimed jowards supporting the defence of the Empire as it did in 1914. Nevertheless, the government of the day did recognise that the strategic problems facing Australia were quite different from those of 1914 because of doubts over Japan's intentions.
As the fighting in Europe and the Middle East increased in tempo so did Australia's commitment in support of Great Britain. This was a commitment generally decided on by the Advisors' War Council (AWC) of which by October 1940, Curtin was a member, and with the general support of all political parties. Commitment to Europe - or specifically in this instance to the Middle East - was Australia's historic commitment, stemming from it's membership of the Commonwealth and it's close ties with the United Kingdom. As time passed and war in the Pacific became an imminent possibility, Australian's found themselves so heavily committed in the Middle East that very little of their armed strength in being was available for use in the Pacific, or for defence of the home country. This had been a natural policy to follow and was in pan due to a belief in the ability of the British Fleet, based on Singapore, to halt any Japanese expansion in the island chain to the north.
This perception, was. towards the end of 1940, beginning to change. Australia was represented at a Ear Eastern Defence Conference held in Singapore from 22 -31 October 1940 and although the general outcome was one supporting earlier British appreciations that Singapore was the key to the British Commonwealth's defensive position in the event of war with Japan, it had highlighted to Mcnzies and through him the AWC "the alarming position in regard to the defence of Singapore", and of a need for closer consultation with British authorities. This was to take Mcnzies out of the country in early 1941 and leave Arthur Fadden as the Acting Prime Minister.

John Curtin and Maritime Strategy
Remarkably, in what appears to be have been a policy independent of this assessment, John Cunin was embracing a new strategy based on the need for greater Australian naval strength, not only to the north but also in Australian waters. Thus at the AWC meeting of S February 1941, Cunin expressed the view:
"that the danger to Australia would come in the first place from the sea and secondly from the air, while the army would only be brought into full action if both the navy and the air force failed"
flasluck has dismissed this as Curtin's private brooding over the war rather titan the receipt of new information. Perhaps it may have been a greater willingness on Curtin's part to note the advice of senior Australian military officers, rather than be mesmerised by that coming from London, that gave him a keener appreciation of the true situation. It is til significance that although Lieutenant General Standee was the only Australian among the Chiefs of .Staff, all three deputy/assistants were Australian officers, and who had been the Australian delegates at the October Singapore Conference.
More importantly Curtin was able to win the support of Fadden. and on 12 February 1941 a cable was despatched to the Dominions Office requesting a clarification of the naval defence situation in die Indian and Pacific Oceans and recommending the return of all Australian and New Zealand "naval" forces now serving overseas. Tliese concerns expressed by Curtin and accepted by the AWC were further exasperated by concent over where America stood in relation to a southward thrust hy lapan as reinforced hy a cable from the Dominions Office of 7 February 1941, and read to the AWC hy Fadden Oil 12 February. As Fadden has subsequently pointed out in writing about the Council's deliberations:
"Wc were most concerned and very disturbed about what wc could expect America to do in the event of a southward thrust by an increasingly aggressive and pro-axis Japan. America had not committeditself to a

rage 4i — August I9VI

	Journal of I he Australian Naval InitltuH
t inn course of action and
showedcxtreme reluctance to do so."
Additionally, at the 12 February meeting, Curtin stated that he thought that if the war was going against the Allies, tire United States might concentrate in the first instance on strengthening Great Britain in the Atlantic and leave until later "to get back the outposts of the Empire." Once again Hasluck expresses doubt about Curtin's knowledge of conversations along those lines, being pursued in Washington at the time, between President Roosevelt and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax. Contemporary documentation shows that this possibility was raised by the Australian representative (Commander 1 lenry Burrell) in Washington, in a cable to the Chief of Naval Staff on 7 February and shown to Faddcn on 13 February 1941. Fadden further postulates that the message referred to earlier from the Dominions Office:
"advised that President Roosevelt left serious doubt as to whether die United States would enter the war if Japan attacked only British or Dutch possessions and that the President had also indicated that even if America were involved in a war with Japan, he felt that to fight an active war in the Pacific would be a dangerous diversion of forces from the main theatre of operations - Europe and the Atlantic."
1 "his again raises the question of whether the AWC and or Curtin had access to information either not kept as a public record or not yet found. Of further significance is that in his statement to the AWC on 12 February, Curtin also raised concerns over the possible transfer of American Naval Forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. This is noteworthy in that it was an American proposal not formally made known to Australia until 3 May by the Dominions Office although the new Australian Naval Attache to Washington (Commander D.H. Harries) had cabled an outline of such a proposal to the Chief of Naval Staff on 1 May. It was a proposal that had been in the planning stage within the United States for some time.

American  Strategic Planning
Whilst during die period from 1921 to 1939 American national policy had been profoundly influenced by an ideology that the United States should not enter into military alliances or maintain an offensive capability, the exchange of ideas between military staff of the US and the UK had commenced in the earlv 1930s. In fact US and British Staff had been discussing in quite definitive terms the possibility of war with Germany, Italy and Japan and the US Navy's role in such an eventuality since 1934. The outcome of these discussions was a staff presentation to the Joint Board (the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations), of die Rainbow series of Plans on 30 June 1939, which were based on the assumption of the United States not supporting a war in Europe but carrying out allied democratic power tasks in the Pacific.
It would appear that this strategic plan did not have the full support of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Leahy, who was reluctant to commit the US Pacific Fleet west of Pearl Harbor. As 1940 progressed, US military planners certainly became concerned with what they saw as two underlying assumptions in British strategy; that Great Britain was a country relying on rapidly increasing material aid from the US and that British naval planners were hoping to rely on a token commitment of American Naval forces to the South West Pacific. In September 1940 the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, remarked:
"that it was very much in the British interest, that die United Slates Fleet should stay in the Pacific".
At about the same time use of the Singapore base was offered to the US Navy.
However, the US had other interests, or at least saw the strategic situation slightly differently. In October 1940 the new CNO, Admiral Harold R. Stark, working on the premise that die defeat of Great Britain and consequent disruption to the British Empire would greatly weaken the military position of the United States not only directly, by exposing the Western Hemisphere to attack, but also indirectly, by its constricting effect on the American

August 1991 —Paw-4"

Journal of I he Australian Naval Institute	
of his First tasks was at the end of
economy, proposed a new strategic plan. Known as "Plan Dog" it in essence called for a limited war with Japan (in the eventuality of one occurring) and was essentially the precursor to the Atlantic first strategy. All this occurring at a time, when those already at war, were attempting to get the US involved in military talks not only in Singapore but also in either London or Washington. Casey, as Australia's representative in Washington, was aware of this and arranged for a naval officer. Commander Burrell to be sent to Washington. Unfortunately domestic political considerations in Washington had prevented or at least put on hold talks in that city and US Naval Officers attended the Singapore conference as observers only.
A Naval Attache In Washington
The arrival of Commander Burrell at least gave Australia first hand contact with US Naval authorities, most notably the Director of Plans USN, who gave him some hint as to US Naval plans to reinforce forces in the Far F.ast in the event of hostilities. Barclay argues that neither Burrell nor Casey were shown "Plan Dog" and were thus unaware of the proposed Adantic first strategy. It is of note that the official US war historian, notes that this plan had not been endorsed by Roosevelt at this stage, the President having only authorised the conduct of bilateral military discussions with the United Kingdom which were to take place in January 1941. Vice-Admiral Burrell in his autobiography highlights that he also had discussions with the head of naval intelligence and accompanied Casey for talks with the Secretary of the Navy (Knox) and the Chief of Naval Operations.
As both the official cable from Casey highlights and Vice Admiral Burrell alludes to, his final day of this visit to Washington was spent at the United States Navy Department being briefed on American strategic proposals in the Pacific area, In December, Burrcll, on the recommendation of Casey was appointed as the Naval Attache in Washington to whence he returned, to take up this post, in January 1941. One
Fagt SO — Auguu 1991

January, along with the Canadian Naval Attache, to be present at discussions held between senior United States and United Kingdom military staff. Burrcll reported by cable to Australia and New Zealand in nine progress reports the general thrust of these discussions. As he points out, his first cable of 7 February noted that some portion of the United Stales Pacific Fleet, based on Pearl Harbor would he transferred for operations in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. The latter pan strongly suggesting that there would be agreement over the "beat Hitler first" strategy.
This period highlights that Australia was not completely left in die dark as to the higher strategic planning being undertaken by her great and powerful friends, in all probability due to the foresight of Casey. Most importantly, the consequences on America resulting from her participation in these conferences, noting that she wasn't at war, were both practical and moral:
'To give effect to the jointly approved strategic conception, warships were moved over the seven seas, planes were shifted between combat points. Scare fighting units and weapons of other countries were distributed in accordance with its term. Mad the American government refused to play its part in their execution, loss and trouble would have followed. The British and the Dutch would have felt themselves wronged. The problem is not peculiar to this instance. If a nation (or individual) enters deeply, as adviser or sharer, into the troubles or dangers of odiers, it must accept the duties of partner or the name of shirker. Public figures in their public statements and memoirs do not usually enter into subtleties such as this. But the President and Secretary of State were perceptive men and I think it safe to conclude that they appreciated this point."
By early 1941, Australia if still dealing through her traditional links with laindon, at least now had both diplomatic and military representation in Washington. Both Burrcll and Harries dealt through diplomatic communications channels and there is enough evidence to suggest that at least the acting Prime Minister Fadden was seeing some of the information being passed back on future

Journal ofllw Australian Naval Institute
allied strategic directions and appropriate military staff appreciations. As could be expected it was mostly highly classified, undoubtedly limited in distribution and probably much of it destroyed after dissemination. P.G. Edwards has aptly highlighted the problems faced by historians attempting to collect the records of die period, and authors who have looked at the period, in time since, can be excused for having made some assumptions based on either incomplete records or through inadequate access to records.
Internal   Influences
If political considerations were a feature of how public statements and professed policy were not perhaps a true reflection of reality in America, then in all probability the same was applicable in the Australian context. Menzies on his return from the United Kingdom in May 1941 found himself increasingly under attack from both the opposition and within the government parties for the way he had handled Australia's war involvement to that date. Cunin himself was under pressure from within his own party, with views ranging from those of Eddie Ward, who desired stronger action against the government, to those of Evatt, who was advocating acceptance of a Menzies proposal for a national government. Curtin's political shrewdness is shown in these circumstances by advocating a long term view that Labour would govern, and there would be no need to misjudge the dynamics of history by debate. Perhaps also from the knowledge he had gained as a member of the AWC, and perhaps elsewhere, (reflected in his statements of 12 February and 8 May) he was taking a long term strategic view of Australia's circumstances. It may well have been something more than Hasluck postulates; that Curtin, in the face of an actual threat, was coming round to accept the proposition which he and his party had been denying for twenty years
"British sea strength was still of vital
importance	and similarly sea
strength was the only force on which Japan could rely if she entered the war. From this aspect we should be in a position to counter at sea any action which Japan might take."

This was not just a greater understanding of the dynamics of global strategy, and the deterrent value of sea power, but a realisation that the only real avenue left for Australia was a hope that the United .Suites Pacific Fleet, elements of which visited Australia in early 1941 would assume the role of the Royal Navy in protecting Australia's approaches. Sworn to secrecy as to the proceedings of the AWC, Curtin would have been forced to play his cards close to his chest.
If one assumes that the government shared the same knowledge as Curtin, then the key difference is in the way they continued to pursue the country's diplomacy and defence policy. Notwithstanding the separate entity of Australia's diplomatic and military representatives in Washington, they continued lo essentially deal through London, seeking British government and military staff appreciations. In dealing with the problem of Japan, Australia did not seek to bring its influence to bear directly, but in concert with British diplomats in Washington. The British loi their pan, after Churchill came to power, left the diplomacy largely in the hands of the United States so that Australia suffered the disadvantage of acting with a party taking a more passive role. This in an area which was of vital strategic interest to Australia. Additionally, throughout 1941 the government continued to commit forces to the Middle East and Eiurope, despite their concerns over what appeared to be a non-commit£al approach from United Slates leaders to the defence of Australia's northern approaches and the lack of adequate British Naval and Air Forces to defend Singapore.
The dynamics of the domestic political situation was undoubtedly a constraint felt by some in power as to what could become public consumption. The Australian population through their government had from 1939 focused their attention on events occurring half way round the world. Their relatives and or neighbours were fighting alongside their forebears in the Middle East and Europe. As one commentator has put it, the foreign policy was MenzJes', and what the foreign policy of Australia addressed itself to was the image of the world in the mind of its maker. He had committed Australians to their British heritage and to faith in the Roval Navy to defend their

August 1991 — Pave $!

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
interests. Par reasons of his own, but perhaps driven by the economics of the time, he had failed to sufficiently alert them to the dangers faced in their 'own backyard' and from the outset had promoted a "business as usual" attitude to the war. He was ur willing to impose a heavy demand on the Australian population and saw the problem as one of time and patience, to educate the Australian public to die demands of war.
In this atmosphere it is not surprising dial both Curtin and Fadden were hounded from all sides when they made elements of their War Council deliberations open for public consumption early in February 1941. Curtin and Fadden were both no doubt perturbed by briefings given by the Chiefs of Staff and the developing industrial troubles in defence related industries. Although the statement released did no more than highlight correctly the gravity of the situation facing Australia and call for greater efforts in preparedness, it was perhaps the shock needed to lead off any apathy among the population in general with respect to possible situations facing the nation. Curtin was the author and instigator of the statement and once again, may have here taken the opportunity, to ease some of the burden M would have to deal with as Prime Minister and foresaw as facing Australia in the not to distance future. Menzies, on the other hand, continued an adherence to the British view, one that the threat of Japan could be neutralised by victory over the axis powers in Furope. A view, in light of Australia's interests, far loo narrow in strategic outlook and one that led him not to make the demands he should have made and did not help to luster his countrymen's confidence. As I lasluck has put it:
"Perhaps the one quality that was lacking was demand - a hard strong, unrelenting demand for .sacrifice - a demand that was itself the voice of mutual confidence - a confidence of a leader in his people and an expectation of their confidence in him."
It was to ultimately lead to his downfall and within a short period thereafter the ascension of John Ccrtin to the position of Prime Minister of Australia.

John Curtin as Wartime Leader
Tltc assumption of this mantle of leadership in early October 1941 was in all probability made easier for Curtin by his prior membership of the AWC and his awareness of the dangers lying ahead Yet he did not radically overturn the policies of the previous government, not only implementing the best of Menzies policies but enforcing them quickly, ntthlcssly and continuously Domestically, they were policies implemented by Menzies in July 1941 to increase Australia's war effort and required by now little if any fine tuning.
In the area of strategic policy Curtin continued to support the policy of reinforcing the Middle Fast and as late as November 1941, considered the movement of the 8th Division and the newly formed 1st Armoured Division to there as well. Perhaps the continued support of these policies may have been the result of more favourable strategic advice been received from both London and Washington. In early September, the Dominions Office had cabled Fadden thai the situation with regard to Japan was not only more favourable but as less tense. A view interestingly not shared by Australia's High Commissioner to London, S.M. Bruce, who regarded these views as somewhat over optimistic It was however supported in a cable from Casey reporting discussions with the Director of Naval Plans. United States Navy, who suggested that Japan was unlikely to be able to take aggressive action for 3 months and in all likelihood would focus her attention on Russia. This of course did not mean that he gave in to Churchill over the relief of the Australian garrison at Tobruk, which had been ongoing since July nor the provision of capital ships to the defence of Singapore. On both instances he received Churchill's assurances on the 27 October.
An  Independent  Stance
What Curtin did attempt to do was to take a more independent stance for Australia, with the view to greater cooperation with nations outside the Anglo Australian-American link. Not only diplomatic

Pagt 52 —AuKun 1991

Journal of the Australian Naval Inslilule
perhaps because of the comtnunication
representation to China set in place by his predecessors, but also an unsuccessful attempt in November to set up a series of quasi alliances involving the Netherlands, British Commonwealth, America, China and Russia as a means of deterring further Japanese aggression. His views on what he saw as Australia's right to have a say in all decisions affecting her own interests were reflected in a speech made to members of his party, in Melbourne, shortly after assuming the role of Australia's leader: "the real issue at stake in this war. What this country does must be done by its own consent. We shall not suffer from dictation from without. And to resist it we must have greater strength within. Only by standing together with those who are with us and for us can victory be won."
Through both Casey in Washington and
Bruce in London, Curtin attempted to
ensure that Australia played a role in
strategic developments and that she had
her say in the strategy being planned for
deterring Japanese aggression. In respect
to Casey it was an attempt by him in late
November, with the government's
approval, to try and play the role of
intemiediary between the Japanese and
the United Slates. At the same time
Curtin was giving the United Kingdom a
chance to provide some direction,
questioning Churchill with regard to
what policy was been pursued.
Churchill's response, that it was the
United Kingdom's policy "to march in
time with the United States", led Curtin
once again to propose an Australian
strategy for deterring Japanese
expansion. Although it involved close
collaboration with the United Slates, it
was not dependent on war between the
US and Japan, before the British Empire
should take action. Proposing the fullest
support for China, occupation of the Kra
Isthmus (strategically important for the
defence of Malaya) it included a policy of
providing assurances to the Russians,
Dutch and Portuguese that any attack by
Japan on their territories would
automatically bring the British Empire to
war with Japan or invoke armed
assistance. From the Australian
perspective it was making sure that
Churchill's mind remained focused on
not only the Empire's interests but most
importantly Australia's.
We now know of the rapid pace at which
global events were moving, a pace	

technology of the period, that was not readily apparent to all players. Yet Curtin showed a good appreciation of the deterrent policies required, and more importantly he was not afraid to be heard on issues vital to the defence of Australian interests.   While it can be argued that Churchill did not reply directly to Curtin's proposals, he did move towards a military understanding with the Dutch and on 5 December informed Australia of an assurance of United States armed support in the event of a Japanese southward thrust. The War Cabinet had on 4 December recognised that the primary requirement was to prevent an enemy from reaching Australia and had instigated a review as to whether the navy and the air force could be strengthened by the militia. Although they had access to some degree of intelligence, which was enough to keep Curtin in Melbourne during early December, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the swiftness of the Japanese advance southward, no doubt came as shock to Australia's leaders. What it had done was to gel the United States into the war, the only ally by 1941, with the necessary resources to defend Australia's maritime approaches.
At War with Japan
It provided the catalyst to bring Australians to action. Curtin's declaration of war, unlike that made by Menzies in 1939, was made independent of the United Kingdom and in a national address he made clear his government's strategy:
"We Australians have imperishable traditions. We shall maintain them. We shall vindicate them. We shall hold this country, and keep it as a citadel for lite British speaking race; and as a place where civilisation will persist."
The loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse on 10 December was not lost on Curtin, nor the fact that the allies had temporarily lost command of the sea in the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, or that the strategy of the United States was of vital importance to Australia. On 13 December he cabled Roosevelt with assurances that Australia, already playing
Au,t>u.a 199) — Pane 51

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
her pan in the defence of Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies as well as in Europe and the Middle East, warmly welcomed the opportunity of cooperating with United States forces in the provision of a naval base at Rabaul and aerodrome facilities in territories under the control of the Commonwealth and in New Caledonia.
It would appear that Curtin was showing shrewd judgement in his recognition of the importance of the north east approaches to Australia through the Coral Sea and the need to keep the minds of United States strategic planners focused on their importance. Earlier events no doubt had highlighted to him, the fact that in Washington, Australia only enjoyed at best a low visibility, and that she was now competing with the "mother country" for the resources of the "older cousin". Perhaps also known to Curtin, was that at this time American Army planners were beginning to recognise Australia's importance as a base from which to consolidate allied defences and ultimately launch the counter-offensive. On 12 December, the Pensacola convoy bound for Manilla, was re-routed to Brisbane and on 17 December, Marshall (Chief of Staff) approved Eisenhower's plan for the establishment of a base in Australia.
The Arcadia Conference
Of more importance was that Australia had learned through Casey of an indication from Roosevelt of high level staff discussions between the Americans and the British to formulate a generally acceptable strategic plan for the conduct of war in the Pacific and Ear East. This provoked immediate Australian concern over separate representation, recognising that British and Australian interests were not necessarily the same and that the Government was far from satisfied with the results of the policy of subordinating it's requirements to those of others. Australia was however denied representation at what was to be known as the Arcadia talks, and which commenced in Washington on 22 December. Curtin cabled his strategic concerns to both Chu-chill and Roosevelt on 23 December and again highlighted

Australia's commitment to global strategy and her fears about her own interests.
Certainly the Dominions Office cable of the same date, outlining future British naval strategy would have been of grave concern to Australia. It highlighted an Atlantic first strategy, with a second priority of holding the Indian Ocean. It is with these events in mind that one must look at Curtin's so called "plea to America" published in the Melbourne Herald on 27 December. Notwithstanding the key lines: "without any inhibitions of any kind 1 make it quite clear that Australia looks to America free of any pangs as to our traditional links of kinship with the United Kingdom", it went further and clearly enunciated Australia's position, and highlighted to both "mother and cousin" that Australia in playing her pan did not intend to be servile lo either and expected to have a voice in strategic decision making. It is of note that the official United States War historian points out that American army planners at Arcadia were surprised at the lack of Australian representation, among others, and it may only be coincidental that following the publishing of comments on the points explored in Curtin's article that the British and American staffs focused some of their attention onto the security of Australia and New Zealand. As since revealed by the drafter of the article it had been framed in light of efforts to secure additional US assistance and public apprehension in Australia that the UK Government believed that Australia might be lost and recovered later.
Conclusion
By the outbreak of war with Japan, John Curtin had only participated in the strategic decision making process for a little over twelve months. Yet during that time he had increasingly exhibited a breadth of vision, perhaps not seen and certainly not articulated by his predecessors. It is perhaps unfortunate that his early death has denied historians the chance to establish the full basis on which his strategic outlook was formulated. Perhaps it may have been just the private brooding of a brilliant man.

Pane 54 — August 1WI

Jimrnul nfihr Australian Naval Institute
Despite its comparatively small size, Australia did have a body of men, both civilian and military, in a position to provide strategic appreciations to their leaders, and Curtin's access to information may have been more then official records now show us. What he most certainly did do, was to develop a more uniquely Australian view, one with I sense of independence, which while not denying the need for strong and powerful friends, made it quite clear that in playing her pan Australia also expected to be heard. While history has already shown him to be a shrewd politician perhaps he should also be given more recognition as a shrewd strategist. Despite Australia's low visibility from a political point of view, the campaign waged from 1941 onwards for recognition and acceptance, led to that recognition as a leading small, or middle power, with a primary interest in Pacific affairs and a significant stake in global affairs.
It was a campaign orchestrated by John Curtin. In 1941 he had been quick to recognise the critical importance of defending Australia's maritime approaches by whatever means. A fact borne out in that the crucial operation in the Pacific War, in so far as the safety of Australia was concerned, was the Battle of the Coral Sea. He had also recognised that Japan's strength could only lie in her sea and air power and once again history has shown us that Japan's defeat was inevitable once she lost control of the sea and the air.

Esthus, Raymond. A From Enmity to Alliance. Melbourne Uni. Press. Melbourne. 1964.
F:addcn, Sir Arthur. They Called mc Artie: Memoirs of Sir Arthur Fadden. Jacaranda Press. Milton 1969.
Pies, Harold. The Road to Pearl Harbor. Princeton Uni. Press. Princeton. 1950.
Gratten, C. Hartley. The United States and the Southwest Pacific. Oxford University press. Melbourne 1981.
I lasluck, Paul. Tlie Government and the People 1939-1941. AWM. Canberra. 1952.
Hasluck, Paul. Diplomatic Witness. Melbourne Uni. Press. Melbourne 1980.
Hudson, W.J. and Stokes, J.W. Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49 Vol IV and V. ACPS. Canberra 1980.
Matloff, M. and Sncll, E.M. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-42. Office of Chief of Military History Dept. of Army. Washington. 1953.
McKernan, M and Browne, M. ed. Australia Two Centuries of Peace ami War. AWM. Canberra. 1988.
Ross, Lloyd. John Curtin: A Biography. MacMillan. Melbourne. 1977.
Thome, Christopher. Allies of a Kind. Hantish Hamilton London. 1978.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Watt, Allan. The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938 - 1965. Cambridge Uni. Press. London. 1968.

Books.
Bell, Coral. Dependent Ally. Oxford Uni. Press. Melbourne. 1984.
Booker, Malcolm. The Last Domino. Collins. Sydney. 1976.
Burrell, Vice Admiral Sir Henry. Mermaids do Exist: an Autobiography. MacMillan Melbourne. 1986.
Casey, Lord. Personal Experience: 1939-46. Constable. London. 1962.

Periodicals.
Andrews, E.M. "Patterns in Australian Foreign Policy" Australian Outlook Vol .26No.l April 1972.
Barclay, G.St.J. "Australia Looks to America: The Wartime Relationship 1939-41" Pacific Historical Review Vol.46 No.2 May 1977.
Buckley. J.P. "Prime Minister Curtin Appeals to the United Stales. Defence Force Journal. No.64 May/June 1987.

August 1991 — Page 55

Jouriuil of the Australian S'avtil Institute
Buckley J.P. "A Soldiers Tribute to John Curtin" Defence Force Journal No.53 July/August 1985.
D'Cruz, V. "Menzics Foreign Policy 1939-41: Preserving the
Good Life." Australian Quarterly Vol.3 1967. Dunn. Michael "Curtin Call to America." Journal of Politics. Vol .9 1977.
Edwards, P.G. "Australian Foreign Policy in the 1930S and 1940's:
Problems with Documentation." Australia Outlook Vol.29 December 1975.

Australian Outlook. Vol.28 No. 1 April 1974.
Fadden, Sir Arthur "Forty Days and Forty Nights: Memoir of a War Time Prime Minister." Australian Outlook. Vol.27 No. 1 April 1 1973.
Hudson, W.J. "Australia's External Relations: the Other Tradition". Australians on Peace awl War ed. 11 Smith. ADSC Canberra 1989.
McCarthy, J.M. "The ALP and the armed services: tlieory and practice 1919-1949." Labor History. No.25 Nov. 1973.

Edwards, P.G. "R.G. Menzies: Appeals to the United States: May-June 1940."

Robertson. John "Australian War Policy 1939 - 1945" Historical Studies. Vol.17 No. 19 1977.

Page 56 - Auxust 1991

Journal of the Australian Na.al Institute
Of Ships and the Sea

by Robin Pennock
It saddens me to report that the Sailing Vessel Carrick (ex City of Adelaide) sank at her moorings in Glasgow some three months ago The story of the City of Adelaide was published in Volume 10, Number 4 of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute.
From information obtained during a recent visit to Glasgow and that provided from the Glasgow Herald and Evening Times it would appear that Carrick was purchased by the Glasgow Ship Trust in March 1990 (for the princely sum of £1) with a view to her becoming the centrepiece of a proposed Maritime Heritage Museum. To relocate her was a massive feat of pilotage as four bridges had to be negotiated, none allowing much clearance.
The relocation took place on Tuesday 28 August 1990 and was well reported in the (local Glasgow) press. Masts and bowsprit were removed and a small amount of dredging took place in the Clyde. There were only three days of the year that the move could take place and the time frame was limited to about one hour, due in the main, to the tides.
In moving Carrick from her long time berth at Customs 1 louse Quay there

were three of the bridges that caused concern. These were: Suspension Bridge: 3 inches clearance above the deck of the vessel and 10 inches of water under the keel; Glasgow Bridge: 12 inches clearance on either side with f> inches of water under the keel; and KG V Bridge: 2 inches of water under the keel.
The move was carried out without a hitch and all appeared well after the move. However in February of this year, whilst lying at the Govan Docks awaiting restoration Carrick sank at her moorings. Moves have been made by the Glasgow city planners to have the vessel broken up and removed, but fortunately the Scottish Office have refused to remove her status as an 'A' Listed Vessel.
There are plans to have her re Boated and restored and for other sailing vessels to be acquired, the more important being County of Peebles (at Punta Arenas. Chile) and Galatea (Spain). The envisaged total cost for [Incomplete Maritime Heritage Centre will be in the vicinity of 20 million pounds.

Out of the past—On 19 April 1976 USS Olkahoma Cily became the first foreign warship to visit the West Coast naval facility that was to become IIMAS Stirling more than two years later
August 1991 —Page 57

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Amendments
NEWS  UPDATES
RUSI Seminar to brochure

defence systems, including extensive joint ventures with Norwegian companies.

Tlte Royal United Services Institute is holding its National Seminar at ADFA, Canberra, on 27 and 28 September 1991.
 •	The organisers have asked us to point out to attending readers of this Journal some amendments to the brochure: Registration is now between 083(1 and 0950, not 0800 and 0900 as advertised;
 •	General Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Forces, will be replaced by Admiral David E Jermiah, the Vice Chairman.
 •	His Excellency Mr Sabam P Siagian, Ambassador of Indonesia, will address the seminar;
 •	Mr Gerald Hensley, New Zealand Secretary of Defence designate, has been invited to speak; and
 •	there will be no speaker from China.
An Occasion To Celebrate
At a special ceremony held in Oslo on June 24 Swedish Ordnance (formed by the merger of Bofdrs and FFV Ordnance) handed over a 75 mm boat and landing gun to Admiral Torolf Rein, Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Defence Forces, commemorating 100 years of cooperation between them and Bofors.
The gun was one of eight made by Bofors in 1891: the time when the company was on its way to becoming one of the world's leading manufacturers of armaments.
Of the eight boat and landing guns produced seven were made under the contract, dated June 24 1891, to the Royal Norwegian Navy and the eighth was used by Bofors for testing ammuniton. This is the gun that will mark the great occasion.
The cooperation that began with the delivery of the first guns 100 years ago has involved many different projects, some of the most notable have been in the fields of coastal defence and air

Swedish  Ordnance Takes Home Ammunition Order
The Swedish Defence Forces have placed an order for small arms ammunition with Swedish Ordnance worth SEK 172 million. The order will secure production for the next five years at the company's ammunition plant at Karlsborg.
According to Mr Anders Olsson, Head of Swedish Ordnance's Small Arms Division, it is the biggest single order they have ever received. The order will also increase the division's prospects of continuing to be a stable supplier to the Swedish Defence Forces.
There are about 230 people employed at the ammunition plant at Karlsborg and almost as many at Eskilstuna manufacturing automatic rifles under licence.
A famous name passes into history
With the formation of Swedish Ordnance and now with the change of name of Bofors Electronics Pacific Pty Ltd to NobelTech, the century-old name of Bofors has disappeared from the commercial scene. No doubt it will continue to grace makers plates on various weaponry around the world for many years to come, however...
"Observation  Balloon" reaches10,000   hours
In the November 1990 issue of this journal we reported on a step forward into the past - tethered balloons being tested as airborne observation/surveillance devices.

i'aur SB - August 1991

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

SASS 1 (Small Aerostat Surveillance System) has now completed ten thousand hours of operational service, operating in all weather and surface conditions.

SASSl's manufacturers, TCOM, are promoting the tethered balloon as a more cost effective alternative to fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft for some surveillance tasks.

RIMPAC 90 — On the flight deck ofllMAS Success

August 1991 — Page 59

Jourru.il of the Australian Naval Institute
AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC
•APPLICATION   FOR   MEMBERSHIP/SUBSCRIPTION •NOMINATION   OF  CHANGE  OF   ADDRESS
{Block Leuers)
Rank/Title:	Surname:	
Other    Names:	
Service	
Street:	
City:	State:	
Postcode	
*I apply to join the Australian Naval Institute as a Regular/Associate member and enclose
my cheque/credit card authorisation for S	as	year(s)
subscription.
*The above library/organisation wishes to subscribe to the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute and encloses a cheque/credit card authorisation
for	as	years(s)   subscription.
If accepted for membership, I agree to abide by the Constitution and By-laws of the Institute.
(Date)	
(Signature)
Please debit my BANKCARD/MASTERCARD
Number	     	      	   	 Expiry Date.
Members or subscribers who join during the year will receive back copies of the current volume of the Journal. ""Delete as appropriate
Membership fees are kept to a minimum, commensurate with the need for the Institute to remain self-supporting. As of I January 1991 the subscription rates are:
Annual	2 years	J years
Members
Regular and Associate	25	48	65
Journal subscribers	27	52	75
A copy of the quarterly journal is sent free to all financial members. Fees fall due annually on 1 January

ttd
I

/'.jay HI — Aukusi 1991

	Journal of lite Australian Naval Institute	
INSIGNIA   ORDERS
Please forward:
	pairs of cufflinks @ $10.00	S	.journal binders @ SK.00	$,...
	mounted crests @ S25.00    S	lies @ S7.00	S	
I enclose my cheque for S	including S	postage (if delivery is to be made by Australia
Post (delete il alternative means of carriage are arranged
OR: Debit my Bankcard/Masicrcard/Visano.	  	  	   	
Expiry date	/	
Signature	
Name:	
Address	
All cheques/money orders should bo made payable lo The Australian Naval Institute Inc and should be in Australian currency
Inquiries and applications for membership should be directed to: The Secretary'. Australian Naval
Institute, PO Box 80. Campbell. ACT. 2600.

Crests are	'K^mwJrll wAwi     If*  Jf	*^s
meticulously hand-
_{	__   painted in full coluor
and are handsomely l'f   mounted on polished
New Zealand timber	Cult links
A AW   They measure 175mm	Thecufl-links are robustly made and ,m- attrai tivi-iv
■ '30mm (5" k 7")	finished in gold and black They are epoxv < .ipi":'
The price is $25 00	ensure long hie and are packaged in presentation
each plus$200	boxes The price is $10 00 a pair, plus 51 00
postage • packing ■	Postage i packing ■
Journal binders Journal binders are coloured blue vith gold lettering and ANI crest Each binder holds copies ol the icurnal by means ol a melal rod inserted simply through the middle page ol each journal and held hrmly at top and bottom ot the binder Plastic envelopes on the bottom ot the spine enable volume numbers or years to be loserted Price SB 00 each-plus $2 00 postage • packing "
Ties Ties are dark blue wilh a sinqle ANI badge in gold Puce $7 00 plus $1 00 postage ■ oacKing '

|" Can be deleted if allernalive means of carriage are arrangedj

August 1991 — Payr t>l

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE
COUNCIL MEMBERS

MEMBER
CORE I A Callaway CMDR F.J Coles CAPT I A Noble CMDR S F. Taplev CMDRTBloomrielc LCDR M Barnes
CMDR D R G Agar LEUT A J Nelson CMDR N Torrens LCDR P Jones LHUTT Frame CMDR J Parkes

POSITION
President
Snr Vice President
Jnr Vice President
Councillor Records
Public Relations
Treasurer-Insignia
& Records
Editor
Secretary
Councillor-Library
Councillor
Councillor
Councillor

ADDRESS
L-2-09
CP4-7-K)
CP2-5-1
APW1-429A
D-3-15
CP3-1-11
(Fax) CDSC Fyshwick D-3-10 DKN2A/07 A-4-15 ADFA CP4-7-26

PHONE
(06)2635254 (06) 2664906 (06) 2664906 (06)2666010 (06)2653194 (06)2662794 (06)2662388 (06) 2803761 (06)2651156 (06) 2858406 (06)2656959 (06)2588152 (06) 2663854

Public Officer
CAFrLGFoxRANIM

MELBOURNE
Vacant
Vacant Vacant

CHAPTER
Convenor
Secretary
Treasurer

I'axe til — August IW

Journal of lite Australian Naval Institute

ADVERTISING   INFORMATION
Size of Journal Printing   process full  page  size Half page size
Material form required
Screen  size:

 -	B5 international (Print area 215mm x 145mm)
 -	Offset litho
 -	50 picas deep by 33 picas wide
 -	50 picas deep by 16 picas wide
 -	25 picas deep by 33 picas wide B&W: Clean artwork or negatives
 -	Colour: Four colour separation negatives
 -	133 preferred but 125 - 150 acceptable

ADVERTISING CHARGES - 1991
Colour
Centre double page
Rack page
Internal page - single
Internal page - double
Half page
Black and White
Centre double page Rack page
Internal page - single Internal page - double I lalf page

Standard SA
BOQ
500
40
ton
330 180 165 300 135

Discount	Hulk	
SA	SA	
700	63(1	
450	405	
3S0	315	
600	340	
275	250	
330	270	
160	150	
150	135	
275	250	
120	110	

Notes:
I
2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
The Discount Rate applies if a booking is for four or more successive journals with the same
advertisement. The Bulk Rale is (or the same if the loud bill is paid with the initial order.
lire deadlines for materia) arc: Nol - 21 Jan; No2 - 21 Apr; No3 - 21 Jul; No4 - 21 Oct
Payment should be made on receipt of invoice.
The above prices do nol include any agency commissions.
A copy of each Journal will be setu to the advertisers.
Two- Three- and Four-colour line advertisements can be inserted. Prices will be supplied on
request.
Further information can be supplied on request to the Advertising Manager, who can be
contacted by phone on (06) 265 3194 between 8:30am and 4pm Monday to Friday.
AIR MAIL RATES

Members and libraries overseas who would like to receive their journals by air mail should add the following sums to their subscription orders:

For those in:        New Zealand, PNG
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Hong Kong, India, Japan USA, Canada
UK, Europe. South America Other countries
NOTE:	Surface/ordinary rales arc included in the subscription

AS .9.00
ASll.OO AS 13.00 AS 16.00 AS18.00 On request

August Ml — PaKe 63

Page o4 -  Aueusl 1991

Journal oflhc Ausiralian Naval Institute

THE  AUSTRALIAN   NAVAL  INSTITUTE  INC
Patron
His excellency the Honourable Bill Hayden, AC Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia
COUNCIL

OFFICE    BEARERS President
Commodore 1 A Callaway Senior Vice President
Commander E J Coles Junior Vice President
Captain 1 A Noble .Secretary
Lieutenant A Nelson Treasurer-Insignia. Suitscriplion
Lieutenant Commander M S Barnes Journal Editor
Commander D R G Agar Public Relations Officer
Commander T Bloomficld

COUNCILLORS
Commander N Ton-ens Lieutenant Commander P Jones Lieutenant T R Frame

PAST    PRESIDENTS
1975-77 Commodore V A Parker
1977-78 Commodore J A Robertson
1978-83 Rear Admiral R C Swan AO OBE
1983-85 Commodore I B James. AM
1985-86 Commodore A H R Brecht
HONORARY   LIFE   MEMBERS
Admiral Sir Victor Smith AC KBE CB DSC
Vice Admiral Sir David Stevenson AC KBE
Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot KBE AO
Commodore J A Robertson
Rt Hon Sir Zelman Cowan AK GCMG GCVO QC
Rear Admiral R C Swan AO CBE
Commodore 1 B James AM
Commander G Cutis Commodore A H R Brecht
FOUNDATION    MEMBERS

Bennett G A Bcrlvn N R B Bonncll V W L Brcchl A H R Brobcn I W Calderwood G C Cole SEW Cummins A R Cutis G
Dilrymple H H G Davidson J Dickie D D Fisher T R Fox LG George J

Gibbs B G GoddardFC Gnerson K W Hall I W Herman F J HisledG James I B Jcrvis G E Josslyn 1 K Kemp W A KnoxlW LeeNE Lofius W B Lossli R G

Martin D J Martin PCS Mavson J H McDonald N E Macleod B D Nalley R J Nicholson B M Nicholson I H OrrDJ Parker V A Patterson D R Ralph N Read B J Reynolds I

Robertson J A Scon B P Sharp W R Shearing J A Smyth D H D Snell K E Stephen K C Stevens E V Stevens J D Summers A M F Swan R C SwanWN Williams K A YorkD

Public Officer: Captain L G Fox RANEM

>»irTEfPWr

«.**