JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

VOLUME 6

NOVEMBER 1980

NUMBER 4

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE
1.	The Australian Naval Institute has been formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory
The main objects of the Institute are:—
a.	to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the
Maritime profession.
b.	to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to 1he Navy and
the Maritime profession.
c.	to publish a journal
2.	The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage Ireedom of discussion,
dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge
concerning naval and maritime matters.
3.	Membership of the Institute is open to —
a.	Regular    members    —    Members    of    Ihe    Permanent    Naval    Forces    of    Australia.
b.	Associate Members — (1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia.
 (2)	Members of the Australian Military Forces and Ihe Royal Australian Air Force both permanent and reserve.
 (3)	Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanent and reserve components, provided that they have been honourably discharged from that force
 (4)	Other persons having and professing a special interest in naval and maritime affairs.
c.	Honorary Members —   A person who has made a distinguished contribution to Ihe Naval or maritime
profession or who has rendered distinguished service to the Institute may be elected by the Council to Honorary Membership
 4.	Joining fee for Regular and Associate members is $5. Annual Subscription for both is $15.
 5.	Inquiries and application for membership should be directed to -
The Secretary. Australian Naval Institute, P.O. Box 18, DEAKIN, A.C.T 2600
CONTRIBUTIONS As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledge relating to the Naval and maritime profession, all members are strongly encouraged to submit articles for publication.   Only in this way will our aims be achieved.
DISCLAIMER
In writing for the institute it must be borne in mind that the views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.
Registered for Posting as a Publication — Category B
ISSN 03 72-5807

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE (INC.)
Title	CONTENTS	Page
Correspondence		2
From the Editor		4
1979/80 President's Report		5
From the Secretary s Desk		6
Financial Statements		9
SEAPOWER81		9
New members		9
Industrial Support for Maritime Power
—	By Lieutenant Commander J HazellRANR		10
Captain Gustaf Erikson (1872-1947)
—	by Commander Robin Pennock RAN		20
The Soviet Mercantile Offensive
—	by Mr Micheal Melliar-Phelps		30
An Appropriate Maritime Strategy for Australia post 1980
—	by Major N.A. Bowman		36
Journal Back Issues		34
The Fishery Protection Squadron of the Royal Navy
—	by Sub-Lieutenant J.V.P. Goldrick RAN		44
Book Reviews		52
Application for Membership	56
Articles or condensations of articles are not to be reprinted or reproduced without the permission of the Institute. Extracts may be quoted for the purpose of research, review or comment provided the source is acknowledged
The cover features a drawing of the ocean minesweeper, HMAS WAGGA (1942-62), by Chief Petty Officer G. Vollmer whose book of paintings and drawings of Australian warships was recently published and will be reviewed in the next ANI Journal. (Australia's Men of War published by Reed, recommended retail price $16.95.)
Journal ol lire Australian Naval Institute — Page   I

Correspondence

AUSTRALIAN AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY
Dear Sir,
I read with great anticipation the article entitled Australian Amphibious Capability — An Essential Elemenl ot National Seapower, in the February edition of your excellent journal Unlortunalely, my anticipation was ill-rewarded when I digested a resume ol amphibious operations raids and activities, which tanged trom the Duke ot York and Albany s maritime Regiment ol Fool ot 1664 to Malaya and Vietnam
The writer seems to have ignored Ihe trends ot other nations with regard to amphibious warfare, and tends to gen eralize when reaching the stage of giving his views as lo Australia s needs How many ships would we require and why7 Would the vessels be maintained say, in Sydney Harbour ready lor any amphibious operation, il not. what availability would Ihey really have7 And perhaps mosl importantly WHAT WOULD BE THE COST ot such a capability'' The FlUSI meeting in London earlier this year on the topic Amphibious Forces in Ihe 80 s suggested that because ot the costs ot specialised equipments and Ihe developments in weapon technology. the need tor the expensive LPD'LSL type shipping nay have passed In lieu the use ot existing container ships and ROROs should be examined
The ANI Journal article ignores the relative economies ot the amphibious ships proposed, and also any other options to carry out the same tasks I reler here to the present day capabilities ol aircraft, helicopters and parachuting techniques (Even Ihe Royal Marines Hew to Vanuatu j Perhaps even more importantly the article really tails lo delineate any roles tor the amphibious capability which it proposes, and wiih no role, there can be no justification
Having so tar been extremely critical ol the article. I must now agree with the author on a major point he makes, relative to the mosl recent war in which we have been involved. Vietnam I reler ol course to the US Amphibious activities which were only used in providing support lor a predominantely land campaign ' Dare I as a soktier. suggest in ihis augusl journal that the normal involvement ol the three Australian Services, or tor thai matter those ot any nation with a large land mass, will NORMALLY evolve around what is fundamentally a land campaign' (Ol course there will be exceptions')
Unlortunalely. your author laiied to develop the lull impact ol the waters surrounding Vietnam and their ettects on Ihe war there Although this theatre of war saw the greatest use ot airpower since man lust Hew over 98% ol all materiel arrived in Vietnam by Sea Transport Surely this is important7 Surely Ihe logistic support ot a lorce. however deployed, is more important than a capacity to provide loi the deploy ment ol battalion groups variously structured tor varying amphibious tasks As a nation, we already have several ways to deploy out forces, either within Australia or overseas, but oui capacity lo support those forces lor a protracted period once away Iron ihe main infrastructure. is indeed limited

I contend that Australia cannot afford the luxury ol an amphibious capability, at least until we have sutlcient sea transport available lo enable us lo deploy heavy equipment and maintain a lorce in a remote area ol Australia or overseas, tor a protracted period
Detence Forces ate often accused ol spending their lime lighting past wars, a nation with Detence Forces as small as Australia s with such wide responsibilities, just cannot aftord to lall into this trap History does not always provide the basis, or a lustilicalion lor a modern Defence Force capability It would seem that the approach used in Ihe article could also be developed to lustily a re-establishment ol Ihe Camel Coops in today s Army If however detailed conceptual studies were to determine a role and requirement tor amphibious shipping, (or camels), then perhaps the lessons ol history could correctly assist us
Finally, may I suggest thai il is unnecessary lo spend enormous amounts ol the Naval share ol the Detence Budget on Ihe proposed specialist equipment and vessels, in order to conduct amphibious raids Our Special Air Service and Commando units already train closely and successfully with the RAN using existing equipment and vessels It at some luture lime. Australia alone is called upon lo police the enlire south western pacitic area perhaps that MAY be Ihe lime to raise an amphibious Heel'
Yours laithlully
K L OUNCAN Colonel
11 Richmond Avenue, Cremorne NSW 2090
JARGON
Dear Sir.
In the book review by Tony Howland on page 45 ol the May 1980 issue he mentions a conversation with a long retired lairly senior officer I only til Ihe first ol his two categories but am also rather puzzled by some modern developments
Although 24 years out ol the R A N I try lo keep in louch with developments and am a member of six learned detence institutions and hope soon to be a member ot another
I understand most ot Ihe content ot articles in their journals and even, by means of various U S publications, understand most ot Ihe iargon
However. I am lost in trying lo unravel the article by Commander Daw on pages 18/22 ot the May issue Not only long reined officers surely would scralch Iheir heads over
It behavioural course and subordmale objectives are de veloped then evaluation ot the students using instruments which are congruent with Ihe objectives gives a valid measure ot course effectiveness

Page   2 — Journal ot the Australian Naval institute

Jargon when universally applied and understood is a necessary pan ol any discipline, e g technical terms in seamanship
Old war lime hands will understand the contusion caused by the uniniliated using such lerms as Tie up lhal gizmo to this dootroyd
The terms or jargon used by Commander Daw will be understood by and impress the prolessors at Florida Stale but God help the students at the Star! Course
Despite all the changes in materiel, surely two ol the prime qualities ot a good stall olficer are clarity ol mind and clarity ot expression
The Admiral wants somebody to be able lo rapidly pick the bones out ol a contused situation in a clear appreciation, written or spoken, with the minimum ol words in clear English
Perhaps this should be included as an objective ol the Siatl Course
I am, Sir
Yours faithfully
R J Bassett Commander RAN Reld
P O Box 2. Albrtghton. Wolverhampton, UK
ANI SEMINAR Dear Sir,
I was delighted to read in the Vol 6 No 3 Journal thai plans have been made lor the next Institute Seminar SEAPOWER81
A dissatisfying thought, however, is that once again the Academy ol Science in Canberra has been listed as Ihe venue lor Ihe Seminar Whilst I realise that our beloved nations Capital (no disrespect intended) is centrally located within Ihe Eastern Australian Area, and Ihe home ol Ihe Institute, it is my belief that holding our Seminars in a different slate Capital on each occasion would serve our Institute's aims, certainly Ihe more remotely located members, to a greater degree With the installation ot the Cockbum Sound Naval Base, lor example the theme lor Ihe SEA-POWER 81 Seminar would better provide material lor discussion in Ihe city ot Pedh, not in Canberra
Looking ahead. I hope to see comments and criticisms Irom other members Further to this, il enough interest is shown, then perhaps this point could be lisled as an ilem ot discussion for the agenda ol Ihe Annual General Meeting tor 1981
In Ihe meantime. I thank Ihe Contnbutors and Editorial Staff ot the Journal once again lor providing Ihe Institute with an ever-increasing standard ol quality ol our Journal Incidentally, is it just me that seems to think that we still have a lot ot regulars in Ihe Journal or am I mistaken in lhat actually there are quite a lot ol members and readers out there eagerly penning away for our cause7 Looking forward lo our continued prosperity
Yours taithtully

ELIGIBILITY FOR REGULAR MEMBERSHIP
Sir
In further discussion as to those members who should become eligible lor Regular membership lo the Insiilule, I concur fully, with Ihe categories available, and lo Ihe rights nl members to |oin those categories
II was with amazement and horror that I read in Ihe Corres pondence Section ol your May 1980 Journal (volume 6. number 21 ihe thoughts ol Commander Grazebrook RANR Thisdecis ion lo aller Ihe membership rules lo permit those persons with Ihe Citizen Naval Forces in lists 1.2.3,4. S,8 and 9. his so-called Active Reservists. is to deny such privileges lo Ihose persons in Lists 7 and 8 Lists 7 and 8 are tor medical and dental officers
Does Commander Grazebrook, RANR. leel lhal wo, in Lists 7 and 8 are sufficiently elite thai lull membership is unwarranted or deserved, or does he leel lhal we are unable to otter any contribution to the tuture benefit ot the Institute7 Again, he may wish to cause Irtction among Ihe medical and denial branches those in Ihe Permanent Naval Forces being entitled lo Regular membership whilst Ihose in Ihe Citizen Naval Forces being entitled to Associate Membership
Whatever his motives be. I certainly admire his courage in allowing his opinion ol medical and dental branches lo be published
Sincerely yours.
KEVIN COLLINGS Surgeon Lieutenant Commander RANR PO Box 146 Double Bay NSW 2028
NOM DE PLUMES
Sir.
As I have now been a member (albeil associate) long enough lo have received seven copies ot the journal I presume to make a suggestion
Your aim is, I am sure, to establish the Insiilule and its image. Ihe journal, on the same high level as other Institutes throughout the world concerned with defence studies
However is your policy of printing articles under a nom de plume consistent with a learned journal7
The article by Master Ned in Ihe May 1980 issue oven to a graduate ot the R A N C ol tony live years standing makes very good reading and the guts ot it probably has a relevance lo olher such colleges (even in Mother Russia7)
But is not its impact rather diminished by the tad that only to the In circle is his identity and, therefore his authority known7
To accept articles by authors who are unable lo unwill ing to stand up and be counted surely loses you some standing, particularly among the international readership
Beware ol descending to the level ol Woman s World and ils ilk, with Dorothy Dix letters Irom Puzzled I've Blundered". etc
I am, Sir
Yours taithtully
R J Bassett
P O Box 2,	Commander RAN Retd
Albnghton Wolverhampton. UK

HMAS HOBART GPO Sydney

Garry Canning	I certainly take Commander Bassetts point and would
ABETW3	prefer not to have nom deplumes but it remains me prerogative
ol the author lo be anonymous
THE EDITOR

Journal ol the Australian Naval Insiilule — Page   3

FROM THE EDITOR
Two important decisions, crucial to the future force structure of the RAN, have been announced since the last Journal went to press Firstly, the Government has decided to replace HMAS MELBOURNE with a purpose designed ship to operate ASW helicopters but with the potential for operating short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft. Secondly, the Government has made the decision to commence the Follow-on-Destroyer programme with the building of two FFG-type vessels.
The major articles in this Journal cover a diversity of topics, ranging from the saga of a great sailing ship owner, Captain Gustaf E'ikson, to a discussion of industrial support for Australian maritime power. The latter is a topical subject in view of the theme of the Institute's next seminar. SEAPOWER 81. There is also a particularly commendable ANI Silver Medal prize-winning essay from Course 1 /80 at the RAN Staff College
Of special interest to readers will be an article concerning the Fishery Protection Squadron of the RN In this, James Goldrick discusses the operations and organisation of the squadron before considering the possible relevance of the concept to the RAN It is a timely article in view of the Government s forthcoming review of civil coastal surveillance If an archetypal navy, such as the RN. can be extensively involved in civil law enforcement at sea, then why not the RAN?
Plans for SEAPOWER 81 are becoming firmer and a brochure announcing this Seminar and an advance registration form are ncluded in this Journal. The Organising Committee for SEAPOWER 81 will need help and assistance from other members in the months ahead and volunteers will be very welcome. If you feel you could make some time available to this worthy cause and will be resident in Canberra during the early months of 1981, then please contact the Seminar Director. Captain Nigel Berlyn. on Canberra phone 66 4284

HMAS ADELAIDE (FFG 0") on sea trials
— Defence Public Relations photograph
Page   4 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute
It is with considerable regret that I record the death of noted naval historian and correspondent with this Journal, Mr Alan Payne At the time of his death, Alan was working on two articles for the Journal — one of which on his concept of the light frigate, based on the RN s Offshore Patrol Vessel Mk II, would have been published in this number of the Journal Alan Payne, through his writings, made a major contribution to naval history in Australia and to the public s awareness of the RAN. We will miss him.

1979/80 PRESIDENT'S REPORT
Delivered at the Annual General Meeting of the Australian Naval Institute held on Friday. 24 October 1980. in Canberra, A. C T
This last year has been another year of considerable progress for the Institute.
His Excellency the Governor General Sir Zelman Cowen, AK. GCMG. GCVO. KStJ, OC. became Patron of the Institute in May this year This honour at the present stage in our history is something of which all can be proud
The principal activity of the Institute remains the ANI Journal and its quality continues to improve, with the number of articles submitted by members increasing with time and with the interest in, and demand lor, it increasing Nevertheless, the scope and quality of the Journal must, as in the past, continue to be subiect to budgetary considerations.
The ANI collection of books which is forming the basis of a library is steadily expanding in volume and in quality Our stocks were boosted recently by a generous donation by the Canadian High Commission of books on the official histoiy of Australia in both world wars, presentations by Admiral Sir James Eberle KCB and the Heavy Engineering Manufacturers Association The policy regarding administration of the collection will be a matter for consideration by the incoming council
Your Council has continued to be concerned as mentioned in my last annual report, that our annual subscription, having regard to inflationary and other pressures, might not be sufficient to meet the needs of the Institute in the years ahead The annual subscription of $10 has not changed since the inception of the Institute but costs are increasing and Council has placed an item on the agenda for this Annual General Meeting regarding a variation in subscription rate.
Your Council has been very mindful of the need to address the longer term aspects of management of the Institute and the need to develop policy and procedures related to this. Specific actions taken during the year by Council have included: the establishment of a Financial Sub Committee: a policy on insignia trading whereby we ensure there is trade on a no loss' basis; a policy on the preservation of investment reserves against erosion by inflation and consumption of earnings; a policy of establishing procedures to reflect costs of prizes and medallions in the accounts of the year in which they are presented, investigations into appropriate investment avenues; development of a yearly budget as an integral part of the financial process; and a decision that the journal editor should be an office bearer, subject to the necessary constitutional amendments in due course I am confident that these measures should assist in keeping the Institute on a firm financial basis in the years ahead
The membership of the Institute continues to increase steadily. This year has seen an increase of some 70 members resulting in a total of 478 financial members Noting this continuing and encouraging trend your Council has given some thought to our future administrative capacity to run the Institute effectively in the coming years, recognising that all office bearers are volunteers and tasks undertaken can be at times quite lime consuming It will be a matter for consideration during the coming year tor the new Council to gauge the future administrative capacity and perhaps to consider whether, in the longer term, some semi permanent assistance might be appropriate to ease the burden from some of the councillors and enhance the growth of the Institute
The outstanding success of SEAPOWER 79 led the Council to examine the question of holding another national SEAPOWER seminar After much deliberation your Council decided that there would be considerable merit in holding another seminar two years, as opposed to three years, after the last seminar This decision and subsequent planning has occupied much of the Councils time The Seminar — SEAPOWER 81 — will take place on 10-11 April 1981 in Canberra You will appreciate that the final program for the Seminar is not quite set in concrete' yet as some speakers have to confirm their willingness to participate We do know, however, that SEAPOWER 81 will be opened by His Excellency the Governor General and such distinguished overseas speakers as Admiral of the Fleet, the Lord Hill-Norton, Admiral Sir Anthony Griffin and Sir Ronald Swayne have accepted invitations to participate.
Journal or the Australian Naval Institute — Page  5

Included amongst the Australian speakers who have accepted are Sir Arthur Tange, Mr Kevin Gosper. Professor Wolfgang Kasper, Dr Robert O'Neill. Mr Neil Stevens. Mr Rollo Kingsford-smith. Mr Peter Scott Maxwell and Air Commodore Geoffrey Michael
Captain Nigel Berlyn has accepted the task of being Seminar Director and judging by his efforts to date and those of the team of members he has gathered to assist, the Institute can look forward to another successfully organised seminar in 1981
Before concluding I would like to pay tribute to the activities of the various chapters During the year the council decided to keep the chapters informed of proceedings and to correspond regularly with the convenors and, as a matter of policy, space is made available in the Journal, for reports of their activities
The Sydney Chapter met on three occasions. Presentations were given on the US Coast Guard by Vice Admiral R. I, Price USCG. on the Sea Harrier by Mr John Fozzard and Mr Nat Gould of British Aerospace and on the US/Soviet strategic relationship by Dr R. N Lebow
The activities of the Canberra Chapter are again worthy of mention also. At the last Annual General Meeting. Mr John Hazell of KrLpp-Atlas Electronik addressed members on the theme of Industrial support for maritime power', a topical subject which will be pursued during next years SEAPOWER 81 seminar Mr John Fozzard. Marketing Director of British Aerospace addressed the Canberra Chapter in December on the subject of The Impact cf VSTOL Aircraft on Maritime Operations of the Future' The highlight of the year was an address by Admiral Sir James Eberle KCB. the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, given in July at which about 200 members and guests attended Also represented were the USI, Navy League. Naval Association, Naval Historical Society, the Committee for the Establishment of a Centre for Maritime Studies plus the British High Commissioner and the UK Naval Adviser
In summary, his has been another important year of progress for the Institute. The decision to hold a seminar in 1981 augers well for this coming year I am sure that the valuable work being done by those involved in planning SEAPOWER 81' will ensure that it will be as important a milestone in the Institutes activities as was SEAPOWER 79'.
In conclusion. I would like to mention that during the year there has been a number of changes in the Council and I take this opportunity to thank without reservation, all councillors for the dedication and time they have given to the Institute. I am confident that members would agree with me that your Journal Editor, Captain Sam Bateman, deserves special mention I wish also to express my appreciation (or the continuing support of all members It is this dedication, time and support which augers so well for the future of the Institute
FROM THE SECRETARY'S DESK
The main item of interest to members arising from the Annual General Meeting is that concerning the increase in the annual subscription rate to $15 effective from 1 January 1981 Members should be aware that this is the first increase in the subscription rate since the inception of the Institute and naturally $10 buys less today than it did six years ago. The Council hopes though that it will not have to approach members for further funds for some time
The seminar, Seapower 81, promises to be a great success, since already there is strong interest from industries wishing to attend The quality of the speakers and the issues they will cover will ensure a heavy demand for the 380 available seats. Members are going to be offered a very attractive rate for the seminar and are advised to secure a seat quickly.
Members are also reminded that subscriptions are now due Until December 31 members can renew their subscription at the old rate of $10 pa. From the start of the new year $ 15 will be expected
Membership of the Institute continues to grow steadily which is a healthy sign and one which augers well for the future.
Page   6 — Journal 0/ the Australian Naval Institute

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE
AUDITED ACCOUNTS
FOR THE 12 MONTHS ENDED 30 SEPTEMBER 1980
BALANCE SHEET
AS AT 30TH SEPTEMBER. 1980

ACCUMULATED FUNDS

ASSETS

Balance as at I 10 79	5.094 31	Sundry Debtors	
Less Net Loss tor year	34 50	Commonwealth Bonds Cash al Bank	
	5.059.81	Slock on Hand at Cos! Insignia	
LIABILITIES		AMI Medals AN! Medallion die at W D V	
Subscriplions in Advance ■		Advance Sea Power 81	
Year 1980/81	300 00		
Yeai 1981/1982	50.00		
Year 1982/1983	10 00		
Creditors (August Journal Printing)	1 969 60 $7 389.41		

522 20
4.500 00 1.004 34
284 00 38607 392 80 300 00
$7 389 41

INSIGNIA AND MEDAL TRADING ACCOUNT

INSIGNIA
Slock on Hand 1 10 79
Purchases
Gross Prodi Transferred

59140
71 60
S663 0O

Sales
Presenlations
Slock on Hand 30 6 80

379 00
284 00
S   663 00

MEDAL
Medals on Hand 1 7 79 Purchases 112)

486 66 S   486 66

Presentations (3) Medals on Hand 30 9 60

100 59 386 07
$   486 66

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT

EXPENDITURE	s	INCOME	
Audit Fees	110 00	Advertising	
Stationery and Pnnhng	6.419 12	Joining Fees	
Postage	377 47	Subscnptions	
Bank Fees	35 30	Journal Sales	
Advedising	27 30	Speaker Cost —	
Expenses Chapter Speakers	279 12	Reimbursement	
Library Additions	50 00	Interest — Bonds	
Prizes	95 00	Interest — Savings	
Lodgement Fees	200	Investment A/C	
Presentation ANI Medals	100 59	Oonations	
Depreciation on ANI Medallion		Journal Subscriptions	
Die	98 20 $7,594 10	Gross Profit Insignia Trading	

945.00
349 31
4.634 60
304 10
66 65 241 25
75 59
62 50
806 80
7160
$7 594 10

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute - Page   7

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS 4 PAYMENTS

$10.71271 BANK RECONCILIATION AS AT 30TH SEPTEMBER. 1980
RECEIPTS
Cash at bank 1 10 79 Joining Fees Annual Subscriptions
• 1978/79 Advertising Journal Subscriptions Insignia Sales Journal Sales Interest Received Subscriptions in Advance Donations Speaker Costs & Catering
Reimbursemenl Investmenl Account

	PAYMENTS	
1.967 51	Audu Fees	
34931	Postage	
3 550 00	Advedising	
20 00	Stationery and Prinling	
695 00	Prizes	
708 70	Medals	
379 00	Bank Charges	
305 00	Library Additions	
241 25	Transfer to Bonds	
290 00	Speaker Costs	
62 50	Seapower B1 Advance	
	Relund	
68 85	Lodgement Fee	
2.07559	Cash at Bank 30 9 80	

i io oo
377 47
27 30
4.449 52
95 00
977 66
35 30
50.00
3.000 00
279 12
300 00
5.00
200
1.004 34
S10.712 71

Bank Balance as per Bank Statement Less Unpresenied cheques
BALANCE AS PER CASH BOOK

I 004 34
$1.004 34

SEAPOWER 81
STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS 4 PAYMENTS
FOR THE PERIOD 8TH AUGUST 1980 to 30TH SEPTEMBER 1980

RECEIPTS
Loan trom AN!

3O0 00

PAYMENTS
Stationery Postage
Cash at Bank 30 9 80 as per Bank Statement

6 85
484
288 31

S   300 00

S   30000

AUDITORS' REPORT
8th (October  1980
The President
The Australian Naval Instilule Inc
P O Box 18
DEAKIN    ACT    2600
Dear Sir,
Please find attached an Income and Expenditure Account   Statement ol Receipts and Payments and Balance Sheet ol the Institute which relate to the twelve months ended 30th September 1980
In my opinion the attached accounts are properly drawn up so as to give a true and lair view ol the state ot altairs ot the Institute
The rules relating to Ihe administration ot the funds ol the Institute have been observed
All information required by me has been obtained
Yours taitnlully G P MANN REIS & ASSOCIATES
Page   8 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE'S SECOND NATIONAL SEMINAR
SEAPOWER81 INDUSTRY AND SEAPOWER
For its second National Seminar. SEAPOWER 81, the Council of the Australian Naval Institute has selected the theme, Australia s Maritime Defence and its Relation to Industry Under this general theme and within Australia's maritime defence strategy, it is hoped that discussion will centre on Australian industry's long term contribution in support of our maritime forces.
The Seminar will beheld in Canberra on Friday 10 and Saturday 11 April 1981
On the first day of SEAPOWER 81, some authoritative views will be presented on International and Regional aspects of Maritime Defence, Shipping and Communications leading to a projection of Australia's maritime defence needs
The second day will be devoted to the industrial infrastructure upon which maritime defence must rest Here too. distinguished speakers will provide a balanced background against which the present capabilities and the way ahead for Maritime Defence Industry in Australia can be addressed
During SEAPOWER 81. there will be a unique opportunity for informed discussion and strengthening of the vital nexus between Maritime Defence and Industry. Independent speakers of the highest calibre have already been attracted, but the Council of the Institute is very conscious that the ultimate success must rest on the quality of discussion which it hopes will be promoted both at the Seminar and in the days ahead.
For SEAPOWER 81, strong support is expected not only from members of the Institute and those with regular Defence interests, but also from a wide representation from Industry. This support should provide the forum for the vital interaction and exchange of views. Members are invited to advise the Seminar Director of industry representatives who may wish to attend the seminar.
You are cordially invited to attend SEAPOWER 81 and your early registration would be much appreciated. A Seminar brochure with registration form is included with this Journal. Additional brochures and/or registration forms may be obtained by writing to the Registrar. SEAPOWER 81, P.O. Box 18, DEAKIN, ACT 2600. Please pass unused registration forms on. You will note that there are two types of form — one for members and one for non-members
NEW MEMBERS

Mr MR. Booker 20 Gawler Cres. Deakin ACT. 2600
Lieutenant C.W Darby
HMAS CRESWELL
JervisBayA.C.T 2540
Mr H.H Straw
"Bogadillan"
Via Corowa NSW. 2649
Commander J Mernllees 7 Palmer St. Garran ACT. 2605
Lieut. Cdr. Noel Parker 36 Albatross Rd. Nowra NSW. 2540 Mr Clarence Gaudry 2 Perkins Place TorrensACT 2607
Captain Owen Hughes 13FishburnSt. Red Hill ACT. 2603

Lieutenant Donald Bell HMS Vernon. Portsmouth Hants U.K.
Mr Francis Ryan 36 Stawell St. Romsey VIC 3434
Commodore I.H. Richards
ANRUK
c/- Australia House
Strand London U.K.
Midshipman Paul Koerber
RANC
HMAS CRESWELL
Jervis Bay ACT.
Commodore Ian Burnside
50 Amaroo St.
ReidA.C.T. 2601
Mr Peter Scott-Maxwell c/- Vickers Australia Ltd. Melbourne VIC 3000

Lieut. Cdr. John Newman 58 Bertel Cres. Chapman ACT 2611
Lieutenant Simon Woolrych 2 Maranboy St. Fisher ACT. 2611
Commander Stuart Wilson
Wardroom
HMAS BRISBANE
Lieutenant Philip Davies 39/34 Archer St. Chatswood NSW. 2067
Lieut. Cdr. Richard Francis Fleet HQ HMAS Kuttabul
Commander G. P. Kable 9 Sproule Circuit EvattACT 2617

Joumai of the Australian Naval Institute — Page   9

INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT FOR MARITIME POWER
by Lieutenant Commander J. Hazell. B.Sc. RANR

Foreword
It should be pointed out in the first instance that although the author belongs to an industrial organisation which supplies equipment to international maritime powers, the views which are presented in this article are entirely those of a private associate member of the Institute. These views are presented in the interests of stimulating discussion and debate within the forum of the Institute on a subject closely related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.
Introduction
Having selected such a generalised subject, the lines along which it is intended to develop the discussion should be introduced.
Firstly, the term Maritime Power', is interpreted in its most general sense Any nation or group of nations which desires a capability to exercise maritime power will need to develop an industrial structure whereby equipment required to implement the capability can be supplied in a timely fashion. Supply' should once again be interpreted in its most general sense which means not only the provision of new equipment but also the repair, refurbishment, replacement, etc. of damaged or faulty equipment. Depending on the particular nation this industrial structure will be represented by a mix of organisations, namely:
—	in-house industrial resources
e.g. Naval Dockyards
 —	Government factories e.g. munitions
 —	indigenous commercial enterprises
 —	overseas industry — Government agencies
—    Commercial    enterprises Nations can be desirous of acquiring a capability to exercise maritime power for any number of reasons, for example
 —	protection of maritime trade to ensure economic survival
 —	defence against aggression mounted by a potential enemy's maritime forces
 —	offence directed against a ootential enemy's maritime forces, trade, offshore resources, coastal installations, etc.

 —	exertion of international influence by deployment of maritime forces beyond territorial waters
 —	provision and protection of a logistic support chain supplying land and air forces in remote areas within or without the sovereign territory, etc.
These examples are by no means exhaustive
Such roles of a nation's maritime forces are decided on the basis of intrinsic geography, demography, economy; by foreign policy, by strategic and political developments within a region The decisions are made by Governments and implemented by the national Military organisation within the allocated financial and manpower resources.
Before examining in more detail the term Industrial Support, it should be stated that, as general rules:
 •	industry is only responsive to the requirements for maritime power.
 •	industry does not initiate policy.
It is agreed that there have been precedents where Industry initiative has produced the equipment required for the exercise of maritime power but these precedents are more relevant to the specific aerospace and electronics industries and also more relevant to the past than today and tomorrow As a more general rule the above statements are considered valid for industrial support today.
THE AUTHOR
Following graduation Irom the Royal Australian Naval College in 1962. John Haiell served in a number ot HMA Ships and Establishments during his naval career as well as undergoing general and specialist training in the U K and the U S A In 1968 he graduated Irom Mel bourne University with a Bachelor ol Science Degree maturing in Physics He was Ihe Surface Weapons Trials Oliicer at the RAN Trials and Assessing Unit Irom 1973 until the time ol his resignation Irom Ihe RAN in November 1974 Afler leaving the RAN. he became Manager Delence Systems and Allied Technologies, at Plessey Australia Pty Limited and was appointed to his current position ol Regional Manager Soulh East Asia. Fried Krupp GmbH Krupp Allas-ElektroniK in May 1978

Page 10 — Journal ol the Australian Nay eh Institute

While the foregoing assertions imply a passive role for Industry in this regard, a nation's industrial capability should of course be taken into account by policy makers and implementers when deciding on specific equipment to provide the required capability to exercise maritime power.
Examination of historical precedent provides excellent examples of this axiom In the battle for maritime supremacy in the Atlantic in World War II, both Britain and Germany had made some basically erroneous policy decisions during the preparatory periods. Britain's naval construction programme ordered over the period 1936-1939 consisted of:
 5	battleships
 6	aircraft carriers 19 heavy cruisers
British Industry duly responded and built the vessels. The assumptions that led to such a programme namely:
 —	the Germans would never revert to the merciless unrestricted submarine warfare of W.W.I.,
 —	the ASW potential of the combined British and French fleets, and
 —	the performance of ASDIC,
were consequently proved invalid. Unfortunately, the first indication did not come until April 1939 some five months prior to the outset of maritime hostilities, when Hitler announced his intention to exceed the limits of the 1935 Anglo-German Treaty which provided for equivalent submarine tonnages for each nation. At this time, the Admiralty ordered the construction of 56 Flower Class ASW Corvettes — a small, highly manoeuvrable vessel that could be produced quickly and inexpensively in Britain's shipyards. Even under the accelerated productivity of a war economy, the first Flower class did not commission until June 1940 by which time 300 British ships totalling over 1 million tons had been sunk by U-Boats. The real effectiveness of these vessels in minimising shipping losses due to U-Boats was not felt for at least another 12-18 months when they were available in sufficient numbers.
On the other side of the North Sea. the Germans also had their problems. Admiral Raeder's Navy came a poor third in competition for financial and manpower resources with the Fuehrer's Army and Goering's Luftwaffe. Further, Hitler opted for the balanced naval force, the 2 plan, which concentrated priority of industrial production on surface vessels particularly battleships and pocket battleships because he liked their looks. Consequently, (at the outbreak of war) Doenitz had at his disposal only 22 ocean-going submarines of greater than 500 tons, and 24 small coastal boats suitable only for Baltic operations and training. Of the ocean-going boats, only one

third could be maintained on patrol at any one time, one third being in base for rest and repair and one third in transit to and from patrol areas. In the first 12 months of the war, German submarine production, working to the low allocated priority, could barely produce at a rate to cover the losses which were running at an average of 2 per month. By the time priorities changed in Doenitz's favour leading to a peak production rate of 30 submarines per month in the summer of 1942, the tide of the war had started to turn against the U-Boats due to:
 —	increasing affectiveness of Allied ASW forces due to experience, application of new technologies such as radar and HF/DF, greater number of escorts, consolidation of effective convoy operating procedures, etc., and
 —	increasing inexperience of U-Boat crews caused by the very high attrition rate of personnel (70% of German submarine personnel failed to survive the war).
Both these examples illustrate the passive role of industry in responding to policy changes and also importantly, the lead time required for the user to receive effective benefit of that response.
It is intended to discuss the industrial capabilities for mantime power firstly in relation to a global macroeconomic basis, then magnifying this to the Asia-Western Pacific Region which is of primary interest to Australia: these situations will be presented as are currently seen and then some possible future developments are discussed. Some reference has already been made and will be made to historic precedents of industrial support for the exercise of maritime power but It should be borne in mind that the relevance of historical precedent to today and tomorrow in this matter is debatable. It can however provide sound illustrations of principle.
With some trepidation it is intended to examine in more detail the Australian industrial structure and then conclude with an idea or two which may be of benefit to a future Defence-Industry relationship. The word trepidation is used purposely because so much has been written or spoken or debated or committed in this country in the very recent past on the subject of Defence Industry that the Australian reader will be very familiar with many of the considerations.
Global Macroeconomics
Treaties, alliances, pacts etc. tend to give military power (and particularly maritime power) an appearance of international composition. However, the industrial support tor a free-world nation's military posture is essentially a national issue.

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 11

In the post World War II years, particularly in the 1950s, it was not uncommon for the strongest partner in an alliance to be supplying the majority of military equipment requirements for other members either by aid measures or direct or enforced sale. Industrial development on the one hand, and internal socio-economic factors on the other, have resulted in a shift in both developed and developing countries in creation of their own military industrial infrastructures. In the future, this trend can be expected to continue. In mid-July 1979, the OECD released a report which was titled Facing the Future. Mastering the Probable and Managing the Unpredictable. The major conclusion of this report which attempted to probe the future to the year 2000, was that relations between advanced industrial societies and the less developed economies have entered a period of transition that could well endure into the 21st century.
In specific terms, the report stated that industrialisation would become more internationalised and competitive despite the emergence of some neo-protectionism. Income shifts would occur and economic weights among countries would change. The so-called Third World Countries

would no longer remain in the periphery of world economy, although they would still be in need of the developed countries' markets, technology and finance.
These changes can be expected to occur within and, in some instances, because of, a context of:
 —	natural resource and ecological constraints
 —	technological advances
 —	demographic and social pressures
 —	evolving political institutions.
It is important to note that the OECD did not consider their report as a forecast and I quote The future is not written' The view of the coming world was offered for reflection and hopefully an increased awareness of long term issues.
The reason that a potential increasing spread of industrialisation is important is that there is a relationship between a nations total industrial base and not unnaturally, its capability to supply its own needs for a military capability, or expressed in a complementary manner, the percentage of military equipment it has to import from foreign sources Exact data to quantify this relationship is not available but it would probably be reasonably represented by the hypothetical curve shown as Figure 1.

Figure 1.
INDUSTRIALISATION VS IMPORTATION OF
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
(GLOBAL)
(1977 ECONOMICS)

USA
• JAPAN
• W GERMANY
INDUSTRIALISATION FACTOR (l,F )

BRITAIN
• CHINA
ITALY*	.  ""•	,	AUSTRALIA
INDIA*   CANADA
	I	-I	I	J	   	1_
10	20	30	40	50	60

SO
70

INDONESIA
1
90

100

Page 12 - Journal o1ffie Australian N.ival Inslilule

% MILITARY EQUIPMENT IMPORTED

The Industrialisation Factor Scale on the ordinate is normalised with U.S.A. at 1.0. A line of best fit drawn through these points would most probably be asymptotic in nature and is of academic interest only from about 0.2 I.F. upwards. Nations above this level have the industrial capability to meet the large majority of their own requirements, raw materials supply assumed, but often choose to either work in joint ventures with near continental neighbours, or take economy advantages of a friendly source's volume production for small quantities or one-off buys
Japan for example would be to the right of such a curve mainly by inclination because of the Japan - U.S. security treaty, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces Law and the presence of some 50,000 US troops in Japan Although Japan has designed and built its own naval vessels, it has normally been content to manufacture US designed military equipment under licence (such as the recent 45 P3C and 10OF15 aircraft) and direct its industrial research and development into the non-military area aimed primarily at export markets. Japanese use of its undoubted industrial capacity for military production could well expand in the future due to the ever increasing Soviet Naval presence in the North West Pacific and continuing reduction of US Forces in Japan (40% over last 8 years). There should not be any doubt that Japan could, under the appropriate circumstances of provocation, turn on a very powerful self sufficient industrial military capability In any case, as mentioned previously, the curve from about 2 upwards on the IF scale is largely aca-

demic and is presented mainly lor reasons of perspective.
The lower portion of the curve is much more interesting as it is here that the changes are occurring now and showing medium to high probability of occurring in the future. In 1977. the position of Australia would be as shown almost exactly on the curve indicative of the fact that Australia s military industrialisation situation is largely dictated by free-market forces The greater the degree of economic regulation, either by for example, protectionist measures or forced creation of a self-reliant or self-sufficient Defence Industrial Infrastructure, the further this point could be expected to move to the left, as can be seen in the case of India.
The source for determination of the Australian position is the 1977 Defence Report which tables five years 1972/73 to 1976/77. During this period Australia imported 71.5% of its capital equipment requirements for the Armed Forces and 24.4% of the Armed Forces Requirement for Replacement Equipment and stores, giving an overall average of 47% imported component Just for interest, in 1977/78 the per cent spent overseas was 46.8%, and the estimate in 1978/79 was 44%. (see figure 2).
Now, if we were to magnify the lower portion of this curve the picture seen would be similar to that shown as figure 3. Japan of course is well out ol the bracket high and Canada is included only for reference purposes. Asean countries from an industrialisation viewpoint could be expected to be in the lower right as shown

FIGURE 2 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE OVERSEAS EXPENDITURE

1972-3 1973-4 1974-5 1975-6 1976-7

SM	SM	SM	
CAPITAL	REPLACEMENT	TOTAL	
EQUIPMENT	EQUIPMENT		
85(61)	29 (20)	114(40)	
52 (57)	30 (24)	82 (38)	
58 (67)	29(21)	87 (39)	
105(76)	41 (24)	146(47)	
217(81)	62(31)	279 (60)	

TOTAL

517(71)

191(25)

708 (47)

NOTE:  (-)   =% of Total expenditure 1977/8% = 46.8 1978/9% -- 44
Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 13

ASIA—PACIFIC
REGION
(77-8 ECONOMICS)
100
0 1 • CANADA

50	60
% MILITARY EQUIPMENT IMPORTED

Figure 3

Asian-Western Pacific Region
Having now shifted the locus to the Asian region it is appropriate to expand the discussion on this area on a macroeconomic scale but firstly there is another axiom considered relevant to Industrial Support for the exercise of Maritime Power
In any sustained conventional maritime conflict, the relevant industrial capabilities of the proponents will be a significant determining factor of the outcome.
The industrial capability required in a conflict situation is to replace battle loss and repair battle damage in the minimum possible time. World War II again provides historical precedenl In the early phases of the war. the real significance of the U-Boat effectiveness was found in the fact that British shipping was being lost at a much greater rate than the capacity of British shipyards to replace them. With the entry of the US into the war in October 1941, a crash shipbuilding programme was launched. In 1939-1940, only 102 seagoing ships were constructed in the US. In the first 15 months of the accelerated programme, 646 freighters were completed. By 1943, 140 Liberty Ships were being launched each month. At the

peak of wartime effort. US shipyard workers were able to construct a Liberty Ship totally in 80 hours 30 minutes. The earlier situation was now reversed as US shipyards were producing ships faster than the German U-Boats could sink them. If one looks at the orders of battle of Asian navies today and the relative industrial capabil-ilies. it is reasonably fair to say that only India and Japan would be capable of exercising maritime power for any sustained period utilising indigenous resources. Others perhaps could sustain localised coastal defence operations There is evidence however which suggests that changes can be expected in the future.
The OECD Report referred to earlier used the illustration of the Asian region as an example of the potential future changes. It stated: 'With Japan's increasing prominence, the industrialisation of South East Asia and China's new policy, a zone may emerge in the Far East which would be one of the important centres of the world economy.'
With such an optimistic outlook for the future of the Asian-Pacific Region, some serious thought should be given to development of an assessment of economic prospects and opportunities over the next 20 years

Page 14 — Journal ol the Australian Nawsl Institute

Population Growth Rates will gradually decline, leading to a higher per capita income, but the growth of the labour force will be firm so a labour surplus will persist in many countries. One effect of this situation will be the continuation of the problems of unemployment and underemployment with the uneven distribution of personal income thus implied. Conversely, however, this situation will lead to greater opportunities for rapid industrialisation particularly of the labour intensive export-oriented type.
There will be increased exploitation ol natural resource endowments. New oil and non-oil mineral discoveries are probable. Food production will increase mainly due to increased application of modern agricultural technologies.
National Economic Systems will show a marked trend towards hybridization. Free enterprise economies will be increasingly subject to centralized planning, government regulation and public ownership. Isolationist and command economies will, on the other hand, gradually allow a measure of liberalisation and individualism.
Defence spending will remain as a maior component of Government budgets
Growth Strategy for the more developed countries will be the maintenance ol export orientation and the production of more advanced

industrial goods. The less developed resource based countries will expand non traditional labour intensive exports (primary and manufactured) while simultaneously attempting to develop larger and more mature domestic markets.
The rates of real GNP growth will most likely be continually rising for the currently less developed countries and falling for the more developed and developed countries. (See figure 4.) Most of the shifting within national economic structures will tend to favour the manufacturing sector and secondly the tertiary sector. The Extractive and Agricultural sectors will however continue as significant contributors in Asia Pacific economies.
To provide an example of how these trends are already developing, let me quote from The Australia, Thursday 18 October 1979 in its supplement on Indonesia.
During the second Five Year Plan (or Replita II) which ran from 1974-1979. per capita incomes were increased by 25 per cent, based on a 2.3% annual population growth over the five year period.
Population growth seems well within reach of its target of 2% pa by the year 2000.

Figure 4
REAL GNP GROWTH RATES 1978-1979

TAIWAN
S KOREA
HONG KONG
SINGAPORE
MALAYSIA
CHINA
THAILAND
PHILIPPINES
INDONESIA
JAPAN
N KOREA
BURMA
SRI LANKA
PAKISTAN
INDIA
AUSTRALIA

MEAN 6 14 S.D. 2.73

10

1?

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute - - Page 15

Agriculture:   grew by 3.8% p.a. over
the period
Mining:   grew by 4 8% p.a over the
period
Manufacturing    Industry:   grew    by
12.7% p.a. over the period
Transport and Communication:   grew
by 11.3% p.a. over the period
Construction:   grew   by   11.0%  p.a.
over the period
Other Sectors:   grew by 8.4% p.a
over the period
Replita II also changed the fundamental composition of GDP by reducing agriculture's share from 40% in 1974-5 to 34% in 1978-79. The non-agricultural sectors rose from 60% to nearly 70%
Returning to the general Asian-West Pacific region, it is foreseen that, by the end ol the century, the fess developed countries at present should achieve semi-industrialised status; countries now semi-industrialised will become fully fledged industrial economies.
When looking ahead to the international trade situation in the region it is most probable that
 —	The open' character of the region will not diminish.
 —	Commodities will persist as major exports but manufactured goods will accelerate as development evolves. S.E. Asian countries and China are new areas to watch in this regard
—	Competition for shares in the world market
will become keener in Asia-Pacific countries,
forcing efforts towards product diversifica
tion. The regions domestic markets them
selves will be an area of contention. Sub-
regional blocs will gain strength as a result.
In order to reduce the variables in this re
gional economic assessment, future evolution of
social-political   conditions   have   been   largely
ignored; the assessment provided here is thus
dependent on continued political stability especi
ally of the non-communist countries.
In summary therefore, the next decades should see the Asian Pacific region as a large and rapidly growing segment of the world economic community. Its importance will be significantly more visible as its potential is incresingly exploited and as it moves towards greater self sufficiency
Australian Economic Situation
How is Australia affected by this pattern of economic development in the region'' As a basis for an answer to this question, the most recently released authoritative report was compiled by the

Economist Intelligence Unit, and released on the 13th September 1979, can be used. In general terms, the report forecasts that the majority of Australians can look toward to improved economic conditions and growth over the next 5 years. The minority are the unemployed whose job prospects are not expected to show any significant improvement. The report quotes
In the 5 years to 1983 Australia's GDP is likely to grow in real terms by an average of 3.8% per year which is a full percentage point higher than the average growth rate achieved during the five years to the end of 1978. In the longer term, there is scope for a return to more normal annual growth rates of around 5 per cent per annum.'
The report forecasts business growth in the extraction and agricultural industries in satisfaction of increasing markets for industrial raw materials, energy and agricultural products in the region, and non-residential construction industry to satisfy renewed office space demand in the early eighties
The forecast for the manufacturing industries is predictably not so rosy.
Without significant restructuring, Australian manufacturing will not be well placed to expand exports appreciably at any time, although under favourable demand conditions they may be able to retain their present markets Light manufacturers and the medium-technology sectors are most at risk and without a boost to productivity these industries will face the prospect of increased import penetration at home and the loss of overseas markets. The report further submits:
Investment in light manufacturing sectors should however, be approached with some caution in the light of development of the sector in neighbouring regions where it is much more cost-effective
In summary, forecast free-market conditions do not give any expectation of expansion of Australia's limited overall industnal base to the point where the indigenous industrial capability to support the exercise of maritime power will be enhanced; the more likely event would appear to be a contraction This local situation will occur while Australia's regional neighbours will be becoming increasingly industrialised, some of them at spectacular rates, and such increases being due largely to progress in manufacturing sectors, these developments will of course be continually enhancing these countries' indigenous industrial

Page 16 — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

capacities to support their desired capability to exercise maritime power
The Requirement for Industrial Support in Australian Defence
In recent months, two leaders of Australian Defence Department have been quoted in the National press as stressing the need for Australia to become increasingly self-reliant in defence. In The Australian Wednesday. 27th June 1979. the then Permanent Secretary of the Department of Defence, Sir Arthur Tange. was quoted: The best contribution to Australian self-reliance is to be able, at an acceptable economic cost, to have the maintenance,   support   and   replacement capability in Australia itself — in its factories, in its dockyards and its service industries such as computers. Sir Arthur continued,   but there is a point, admittedly difficult to define, at which the cost to the peace-time economy is not acceptable.'
If reference is made to the hypothetical curves in Figures 1 and 3, it would appear unlikely that in the future, Australia will reduce its dependence on imported military equipment by moving up the curve, Any improvement in this regard will have to be achieved by a lateral movement to the left which will be against the run of forecast free-market forces and hence most probably involve a higher cost to the taxpayer.
Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot (current Chief of the Defence Force Staff) writing in the 3 July 1979 issue of The Bulletin stated:
"	we Australians must take the pri
mary responsibility for our own secur
ity.
Such a policy means that our defence force must have a significant degree of self-reliance. By this I do not mean complete self-sufficiency, because such are the implications of modern military technology that this is practicable now only for the superpowers. Our self-reliance should give us a capability to operate as a unified Australian force with its own Logistics, supported by a repair and modernisation capacity.'
From these two statements, it would appear that the requirement for Industrial Support of Military Power in Australia could be summarised as:
 —	indigenous re-supply of Logistics
 —	indigenous maintenance and repair capability
 —	indigenous modernisation and replacement capability, and
 —	largely overseas sourcing of technology for acquisition of new equipments.

While the fourth requirement could be regarded as not essential to the sustenance of a capability to exercise maritime power in a conflict situation, the three former requirements must be considered as necessary elements of a self-reliant industrial support infrastructure.
By own Logistics this phrase is interpreted as replacement of consumable stores and items many of which would be non-Defence specific but some, such as ammuntion, would be. of course, pertinent only to the Defence function. The exercise of maritime power could not be sustained for any reasonable period without such an indigenous re-supply capability
There can be little doubt that the specialist naval dockyards, Garden Island. Williamstown and Vickers Cockatoo between them provide a comprehensive capacity for maintenance, refit and repair of naval fleet and support units. Their capability for modernisation is arguable — sure they can do the actual work, but a lot of the design work and project management is done outside the yards, mainly in Navy Office but also in some instances by private contractors. The design and systems integration for new construction and modernisation work consumes high-level technical resources at a voluminous and fast rate and is an area which will demand much more attention in future projects.
Australia's Aircraft Industry comprising mainly Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation. Government Aircraft Factories, Hawker de Havilland. between them, possess the necessary capability for maintenance, repair and overhaul of military aircraft in the inventory.
While the foregoing industrial capabililies place Australia in a reasonably sound position to support a unified Australian force and to repair battle damage sustained in a maritime conflict, the industrial capability to replace battle loss must be questionable
Perhaps Australia s strategists believe that potential conflict scenarios involving the exercise of this country's maritime power will be largely unopposed by potential opponents maritime forces as was the case with US Naval forces in Vietnam Perhaps it is felt that potential conflict scenarios involving Australia will be of such short duration that replacement of battle loss equipment is not a feasible proposition for which to prepare.
The answers are not known to the author — only the doubt and the questions are raised. One clear fact should be stated however — the Industry of any country will be in a very poor position to effect the timely replacement of equipment lost due to battle attrition if the requisite industrial skills, experience, management, etc. are not being maintained in peacetime The shipbuilding record of Vickers Cockatoo Ltd 1934-71 can be used to illustrate this point, (see figure 5.)

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 17

Figure 5

TORRENS STUART PARRAMATTA VAMPIRE
VOYAGER TOBRUK
BARWON
BARCOO
GLENELG
BATAAN
BENGAL
MADRAS
CESSNOCK
KARANGI
WOLLONGONG
BENDIGO
GOULBURN
BATHURST
WARRAMUNGA
ARUNTA
WARREGO
PARAMATTA
SWAN
YARRA

	0 6)
-d.6)

-(13) ■11 5)

-(2 8) (2.5)

12 81
(1 3|
(3 4)

(3 6)

(5 7)
|4 5|
(7 3)
COCKATOO DOCKS & ENGIN. CO. LTD.
VICKERS COCKATOO DOCKYARD PTY. LTD.
WARSHIP BUILDING
1934-1971 YEARS TO BUILD
FROM LAID DOWN TO COMPLETION

34     3B

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

It can be seen that pre World War II and during World War II. construction times at the yard were comparable with British yards lor ships of similar class The effects of lay-offs or non loading can be readily seen with the last 5 war ships buill by Vickers culminating in HMAS Torrens which was completed in 1971. The lead time for any new construction contemplated now would obviously be extremely long.
As Admiral Synnot quite rightly said, it is impracticable for Australia to possess the technology base which is necessary today for a modern military equipment inventory Implicit in such a statement is the recognition that Australia will continue to source advanced technology and/or advanced military equipments from overseas suppliers.
So, where does Australian Industrial Support for the Defence function actually stand today and where is it going7
As a base-line reference, one could hardly do better than refer to the transcripts and submissions of the Parliamentary Suo-Committee formed to enquire into Industrial Support for Defence Needs and Allied Matters 1975-77 (Hamer Committee) From the copious volume of evidence examined by this Committee some fairly stark conclusions were drawn viz:

The Committee takes the view however, that whatever the level of (threat) probability, there should be national awareness of the substantial gaps that exist in our Defence Industrial capacity and the problems we could face if suddenly forced by world events to become at least largely self-reliant or. in the   extreme,    self-sufficient.    Such awareness is an important step towards   the   exercise   of   balanced judgement and the initiation of reasoned action while there is still time to do so in an orderly manner.' The Committee went on to record problem areas in Defence — Industry relationships in communication particularly in forward planning and equipment procurement practices  In discussing the role of industry in Defence R&D. the Committee considered it extremely important that industry be involved to the maximum extent feasible in design and development programmes because only in this way does it appear possible to sustain a fully effective defence support capability   This point must be arguable, as it appears to ignore some  fundamental  Australian,  Australian  Defence and Industry problems By opting for a balanced force structure concept,  (once again  I

Page 18 — Journal or rhe Ausrrahan Naval insMure

quote Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot our defence
force must not be closely tailored to meet a spe
cific situation II must be versatile Our force
needs to include many capabilities ....'), and be
cause of the national Australian characteristic of
small number of manpower, this country will need
to acquire the most effective manpower utilisation
equipment which will normally, although not
necessarily, invoke advanced technologies   	
Australia's defence equipment inventory will incorporate a wide range of technologies in small numbers of actual hardware. The commercial feasibility of extensive industry involvement in Defence Research and Development sustained by minimal follow-on production must be assessed as very low.
When it is understood that the Australian Telecommunications Commission (Telecom), the largest buyer of technology-oriented equipment in Australia, sources technology from overseas but. for the large quantity and/or critical network items, insists on local licence manufacture to ensure indigenous industrial support, it should become clear that the emphasis has to be shifted towards production to ensure support rather than Research and Development.
The talented resources available m-house in the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation are funded by the taxpayer and exist for the purpose of carrying out research and development into unique Australian military problems, of assisting the single-service user in evaluation and acquisition of technology equipment and setting up for its in-country support The transfer of any part of this valuable military resource into local industry could well result in its diminution over the long term if it were not able to be maintained as a justifiable commercial undertaking, a real possibility in the peaks and troughs of the Australian Defence market place.
The Defence requirement for self-reliant industrial support is to repair and replace military equipment. Industry's capability to effect timely repairs is significantly enhanced by its participation in the original manufacture occasioned by access and familiarity with documentation, test procedures etc; more importantly, local industry's capability to effect timely equipment replacement will always remain at a low-level if it has not played a significant part in the initial manufacture, ideally by phased-in assumption of total responsibility over the period of the project.

The Hamer Committee Report must be seen in perspective, their enquiry being now some 2-3 years previous. It is fair to say that, at that time. Defence Industry structure in the Australian Government was still recovering from a senes of significant re-organisational steps. In recent times however, there have been some very encouraging signs, maybe as a result of the Hamer Committee findings, that the importance of a Defence Industry manufacturing capability is being realised.
—	naval shipbuilding contracts being let to Aus
tralian yards
Patrol Boats to NQEA in Queensland Landing Ship (Heavy) to Carnngton Slipway in Newcastle, and the AOR to Vickers Cockatoo Ltd. in Sydney
 —	unpublicised but intended rationalisation of the electronics industry with the award of significant H.F. communications equipment contracts to 2 Australian companies involving meaningful and substantial local participation in original equipment manufacture.
 —	establishment of the Katter Parliamentary Sub-Committee to enquire into the Defence procurement processes which hitherto have created difficulties for industry.
Perhaps, in the future. Industry could play an even more meaningful role in the support of Australia s intended exercise of maritime power by increased participation in project management incorporating systems design and integration, so much of which is conducted in-house at present The balanced-force concept of Australian Defence, particularly in the maritime field, will mean the continued acquisition of a wide variety of capabilities and skills which in turn means a large number of projects always in the system Advancing technologies will increasingly stretch the ability of in-house service resources to cope with the requirements of project and systems management which will become more demanding of high level technical and managerial resources
A planned process of divestment of these responsibilities to a rationalised industry with continuity of loading could provide significant benefits for industrial support for Australia's maritime power, and by the creation and consolidation of complementary skills, enhance the prospects for Australia to become involved as an important maritime partner with its rapidly developing regional neighbours.

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 19

CAPTAIN GUSTAF ERIKSON (1872-1947)
by Commander Robin Pennock RAN

Whilst reading the many books and articles needed to research Ship:; and the Sea, I found that one name kept appearing in connection with the wind driven ships. In the dying days of windjammers, the name of Captain Gustaf Erikson became synonymous with the (sail) shipping trade and in particular with the Grain Races from South Australia Doubtless there are inhabitants of the Gulf Ports who remember those tall ships and the name of Captain Erikson The same man's name and history has passed into an almost revered history in his home port of Manenhamn, Finland
From all the upsets and displacements of World War I. only two ship owners emerged who were able and willing to carry on the tradition of sailing (cargo) ships. One of these was Captain Erikson, who eventually became not only the more famous, but owned the largest fleet of sailing ships in the world. He achieved this not only by his love of sail, but also by astute business acumen
Erikson became a collector of windships. all old, but well cared for and well run Aided by post war factors denied to, or overlooked by other shipowners he bought first class vessels at scrap prices The ports or the world were congested with idle sail tonnage and having dispelled the spectre of depreciation by astute buying, Erikson began to bund up his reputation Operating uninsured and with an almost unlimited supply of Scandinavian personnel and premium Apprentices, he solved, what In other countries, were insuperable difficulties. His shrewdness and energy was combined with a business ruthlessness When a vessel became unprofitable or required expensive repairs they were either sold or scrapped The ship GRACE HARWAR. due for an expensive survey and refit in 1935 was sold for breaking up But above all this, Erikson had an affection for and an understanding of deep sea sailing vessels
(Aside —
for those who wish to be technically correct: a Ship is a vessel with three or more masts, square rigged on all masts.

a Barque has 3 masts, square rigged on the fore and main, and fore and aft rigged on the mizzen;
a 4 masted Barque (as the name implies) has 4 masts, square rigged on the fore, main and mizzen, and fore and aft rigged on the jigger.)
Gustaf Adolf Mauritz Erikson was born on Hansas farmstead, Hellestromp. Lemland near Mariehamn, Aland on 24 October 1872. Although his birth was registered by an over-zealous parish Pastor as Gustafsson (son of Gustaf) in the parish register, it was indeed Erikson. At the time of his birth and childhood the Aland townships were full of optimism for sailing ships, building and owning vessels of all sizes and rigs for all the recognised trades, from deep sea to North Sea and Baltic Surrounded by ships and seafarers, it was inevitable that Erikson would go to sea in one way or another Thus at the age of 10, he began his seagoing career in the barque NEPTUN (April 1882). As the Cabin Boy. he was expected to look after the Skipper and the cook and, not the least of his duties, study Biblical history Spending the year 1884 at home, the young Gustaf sailed again in NEPTUN as Cook (1885/ 86) and in the following years as a seaman. Bosun and Steward in the skonertskepp ADELE. barque ANSGAR, schooner FENNIA and barque SOUTHERN BELLE. (Aside —
Aland, a collection of over 6000 islands, many mere rocky outcrops, is situated at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia in the northern Baltic. Aland, the main island is only 18 miles long but contains the capital Mariehamn. Originally part of Sweden the
THE AUTHOR
Commander Robin Pennock is presently serving m HMAS ALBATROSS His interest in wind driven ships dates back many years bol by necessity lay dormant until the inception ot the Ships and the Sea column of the Journal He is an avid believer in practical training, especially in the dying an ot seamanship

Page 20 — Journal ot me Australian Naval Institute

Part of Erikson's fleet at Manehamn in August 1935. The VIKING is in the foreground with WINTERHUDE. PESTALOZZI and PENANG from left to right in the background.

Aland Islands were, after capture by the Russians in 1809. ceded to the Tsar. Subsequent to Finland gaming independence from   Russia  in   1917  both  Finland  and Sweden laid claim to Aland but a referendum     proved     more    favourable    to Sweden    Sweden   however   relinquished its claim and in 1921, in its first settlement of a territorial claim dispute, the League of Nations gave Aland to Finland.) At age 20 (1893). Erikson took command of the ADELE and after two years sat for. and gained   his   Masters  Certificate   Later,   whilst serving in the barque FINLAND he fell from the foretop when the ship was alongside in Pensa-cola (USA), breaking his thigh   After six weeks in hospital (then the maximum time allowable by law) and several weeks ashore, he found a berth  as   Mate  in  the  barque  MARIEHAMN Erikson joined complete with crutches  Returning home he visited a doctor in Finstrom. and on    his    next   visit    home   threw   away   his crutches   From then on he became Master of the barque SOUTHERN BELLE (1901/05) on the North Sea trade  In 1905. he became engaged to the 16 year old Hilde Bergman and in the spring of 1906 took command of the full rigged ship ALBANIA   He and Hilde were married in Swansea,  South Wales,  and his bride sailed with   him   in   ALBANIA   until   reaching   South Africa.

Returning to Fredrikstad. ALBANIA having paid off in Rio de Janeiro. Erikson took command of the barque LOCHEE (mid 1909) and remained her master until 1913 when he came ashore to Manehamn. During the 20 year period. 1893-1913. the Aland fleet had undergone radical changes and all the signs were that the days of sail were numbered
In September 1913. Gustaf Erikson set himself up as a Ships Husband by entering into a partnership with six other Captains to buy the composite barque TJERIMAI This was to be the start of the great Aland's revival of sailing vessels, albiet under the one owner Before the year was out Erikson had bought the four masted barque RENE RICKMERS for the equivalent of £6,500 He owned 15/100th shares, with 50 others becoming small holders in the (re-named) ALAND. Wrecked on 20 August 1920 off New Caledonia. ALAND was paying her way FREDENBORG was his next purchase owning 75/100th shares When sold for breaking up in 1916 she was helping to make a profit too.
During 1918. under pressure and some difficulties. Erikson contemplated selling his small fleet Indeed he offered his ships for sale in August. His asking prices were high and there was to be no sale The asking price for his fleet   was   Kr   54    million,   showing   shrewd

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 21

SWffifN
FINLAND
,     I Ah*,
. ■ 4)
business ideas and conjecture is that he wanted the cash to be able to re-invest as the war faded and freight rates rose. Immediately after the Armistice, in fact on i2 December, he wrote that he was buying vessels of between 2,500 and 4.500 tons dwt and that he was interested in the German windjammers laid up in Chile Whilst Erikson was building up his fleet in the early 1920s, other Aland shipowners were transfering their interests to Helsinki. He was more than content to remain in Mane-hamn Since 1916 he had been negotiating with August Troberg (of Helsinki) about the purchase of ships, and over the years virtually bought Troberg's fieet. His largest purchase LAWHILL served him faithfully from 1917 to 1942.
As the years progressed, Erikson continued to buy ships and enlarge his fleet His purchase of the now legendary HERZOGIN CECILIE in 1921 helped to bring his name to notice amongst shipowners of the outside world. Indeed the popularity and publicity enjoyed by Erikson in the thirties can be said to be attributed to the white hulled HERZOGIN CECILIE. the Duchess', his flagship and his yacht By 1935. his fleet totalled 15 deep sea vessels (Cape Homers as Alan Villiers calls them), three former deep sea vessels (LINGARD. KYLEMORE and PESALOZZI). five small barques and barquentines, several auxiliary schooners and a wood fired tow boat He also owned a slipway at Nystad In 1936, his fleet totalled 44,728 tons gross and included eleven 4 masted barques With 100 premium and indentured Apprentices at sea in his fleet

Erikson  was  demonstrating  that  sail  training was still viable and popular  The approximate monthly wages paid in sailing ships in 1935 are shown in Table 1 (Aside —
In the 1936 grain race. 14 of the 17 vessels taking part were Erikson owned and between them transported over 50.000 tons of wheat In the days of low freight rates, gross rates amounted to only £68,000 or £1 7.0 per ton.
In the 1938 race. 10 of the 14 starters were owned by Gustaf Erikson. In comparison they lifted some 40,000 tons at a gross of approximately £80.000 or £2 0.0 per ton ) One of the hardest blows came to Erikson at the end of the 1936 grain race, often referred to as the Great Grain Race   After a record breaking run of 86 days, PI Lincoln to Falmouth (for Orders). HERZOGIN CECILIE went aground off Sewer Mill Cove, South Devon on 24 April 1936.    Refloated    and   towed    to   Salcombe (Starehole Cove) on  19 June, her back was broken in an onshore gale   The salvage attempt was abandoned on 17 July and her remains are still in that spot. Fortunately many fittings were recovered and the figurehead is preserved at the Alands Marine Museum. So too   is   the   saloon,    re-erected   within   the

The four-masted barque LAWHILL built in 1892 and owned by Erikson 1917-1942. She was condemned at Lourenco Marques in 1942

Page 22 — Journal o' the Australian Naval Institute

museum and complete with the photographs of Gustaf and Hilde Enkson. (These were obligatory in all of his vessels )
The Duchess has been the subject of many books, articles and photographs, so perhaps the best tribute was in words Mrs Pamela Eriksson, wife of the Master (Captain Sven Eriksson) described her thus in her article. Mm Basta Selgats II
Under ideal conditions, she set a record of 21 knots in the Kattegat, but 16. 17 and 18 knots were not unusual, sailing with a strong breeze, slightly abafl the beam If her sails held in hard weather, she seemed to want to set her course for the moon itself, throwing off the sea and rising from the waves like a bird, without it costing her any effort.
Since its inception in 1921. HERZOGIN CECILIE had won the grain race 4 times, a record unequalled The winners of the Grain Races between 1921 and 1939 are shown in Table 2
It is said that time and tide wait for no man', and neither does progress Eventually Erikson moved into the steamship and motor-ship era In the 1930s when other Aland shipowners began to buy into tramp steamer tonnage, Gustaf Erikson invested in most if not all the companies When the Aland Aktiebank found itself in a difficult situation, Erikson gave it a helping hand and acquired most of the shares. The shipyard at Nystad was bought by him when it was on the verge of bankruptcy He also pioneered fur farming in the Aland Islands.    Everything   he   touched   prospered

Loading wheat in Melbourne December 1929 The ships are from left to right — MELBOURNE. POMMERN and BEATRICE.
Fame came to Erikson in the 1930s and as one of the accolades, he was made a Marine Counsellor There was no doubt in any Aland home as to whom Sjofartradet or even Sjofartsradmnan (Marine Counsellor s Lady) referred

TABLE 1
APPROXIMATE SALARIES AND WAGES PAID TO PERSONNEL IN DEEP SEA WINDJAMMERS.        (1935 SCALES)

Masters	between	£5	
Mate	♦+	£9/10/	
2nd Mate	"	£7/10/	
Carpenter	"	£5	
Sailmaker	**	£5	
Steward	"	£8/10/	
Cook	"	£4	
Able Seaman	*'	£2	

and	£22/10/-	
and	£10/10/-	
and	£8/—/—	
and	£5	
and	£6	
and	£10	
and	£5	
and	£3	

(all are monthly rates)
Cadets and Apprentices paid a premium of £50. If paid at all their rate was approximately equal to a Deck Boy i.e. well below the wage of an Able Seaman.
Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 23

TABLE 2

	WINNERS OF THE GRAIN RACES		
		1921 to 1939		
Year	Vessel	Time (days)	Owner	Master	
1921	MARLBOROUGH HILL	91	Finnish		
1922	MILVERTON	91	Groenblom		
1923	BEATRICE	88	Swedish	(no Erikson	
1924	GREIF	110		contender 23/24)	
1925	BEATRICE	103	Swedish		
1926	LAVENIR	110	Belgian Govt		
1927	HERZOGIN CECILIE	98	Erikson	de Cloux	
1928	HERZOGINCECILIE	96	Erikson	de Cloux	
1929	ARCHIBALD RUSSELL	93	Erikson	K S|ogren	
1930	POMMERN	105	Erikson	Granith	
1931	HERZOGINCECILIE	93	Erikson	Sven Enksson	
1932	PARMA	103	Laeisz		
	PAMIR		Erikson	K Sjogren	
1933	PARMA	83	Laeisz		
1934	PASSAT	106	Erikson	K.Sjogren	
1935	PRIWALL	91	Laeisz		
1936	HERZOGIN CECILIE	86	Erikson	Sven Eriksson	
1937	POMMERN	94	Erikson	Broman	
	PASSAT		Erikson	Gronlund	
1938	PASSAT	98	Erikson	Lindvall	
1939	MOSHULU	91	Erikson	M.Sjogren	

Before his death on 15 August 1947, the Erikson Company owned sixteen steamships and eight motorships In the late 1970s, as a result of his astute business sense and leadership, the Company owned a arge fleet of specialised ships in trade around the world But I digress and get ahead of the stony. Another hard blow hit Gustaf Erikson when in his 70th year His son Gustaf-Adolf died when at sea when his ship SS ARGO was torpedoed in June 1942 A daughter. Greta, also preceeded him to the grave and so when the end finally came in the evening of 15 August 1947, it was left to the eldest son, Edgar Erikson. and grandson Bjorn, to run the company. As a permanent family memorial, the Captain's old office was dismantled and relocated within the new office block when built in mid 1970.
As perpetual gifts to his homeland, Captain Gustaf Erikson donated considerable sums of money to the Aland Cultural Foundation, the Aland Maritime Museum and the Lemland Parish Home. The chapel in the Manehamn cemetry is also a gift from him to the people of the town. The names of Gustaf and  Hilde Erikson are perpetuated in a trust

The 4-masted barque POMMERN launched in 1903 and now preserved at Mariehamn.

Pago J* — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

fund set up for seamen s widows and unsupported children; and the fund for the widows and children of Aland Merchant Naval officers was set up to the memory of his son (The Gustaf-Adolf Erikson Fund)
The 4 masted barque POMMERN was presented to the people of Mariehamn by Edgar Erikson and his sister, Eva. as a memorial to the sailing ship history of the Aland Islanders in 1952. Permanently moored near the Aland Sjofartsmuseum. it enpys a similar relationship to CUTTY SARK and the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich.
There remains only to give the subsequent history of the Erikson windjammers that remained after the end of the Second World War:
ARCHIBALD RUSSELL — put up for sale in England No buyers, broken up 1948.
VIKING — recommissioned and sailed under the management of Edgar Erikson until 1949. Sold, she is preserved at Gothenburg
BLAKOON — sold in 1943, converted to a motorship in 1945. Ended her days when the hull became part of a bridge between two islands in the Finnnish Archipelago.
PASSAT — recommissioned and returned to sea   With PAMIR sailed from Austalia in

1949 with a grain cargo Sold in 1951 to German owners, extensively refitted and used as a cargo carrying, sail training ship Withdrawn from service post 1957 and now preserved at Travenmunde
PAMIR — seized by the New Zealand Government during World War II and returned to the Erikson family in 1947 With PASSAT sailed from Australia in 1949 with a full cargo of grain Sold in 1951 to German owners, extensively refitted and used as a cargo carrying, sail training ship. Lost in the Atlantic Ocean in 1957 whilst on passage River Plate to Germany. Overwhelmed by hurricane Carrie with a loss of 80 lives, most of them cadets.
POMMERN — remained at Mariehamn In 1952 presented to the townspeople of Mariehamn by Edgar Erikson and his sis ter Eva (Mrs Eva Hohenthat) Used as a museum ship permanently berthed near the Aland Sjofartsmuseum.
A   full   list  of   sailing   vessels  owned   by Captain Erikson is shown in the Annex
Sources The Call ol High Canvas (AA Hurstl The Way ola Ship (Alan Villiers) The Last Tall Ships (Georg Kahre) Shipping  Wonders ol the  World (Ed bv Clarence Winchesler)

ANNEX
SAILING VESSELS IN CAPTAIN GUSTAF ERIKSONs FLEET

NAME	TYPE BUILT	TON.
LGTH{«)	BUILDER	DATES OF OWNERSHIP	SUBSEQUENT FATE	
TJERIMAI	3m b 1883	1550 188	MEUSING AMSTERDAM	1913-1925	lost in collision 22 August 1925	
ALAND                      3m b exRENERICKMERS   1887	3300 283	RUSSELL & CO PT GLASGOW	1913-1914	stranded and wreck ed August 1914	
FREDENBORG	3m b 1881	600 131	HENRIKSSON ALAND	1914-1916	sold 1916. broken up 1916	
BORROWDALE	3m b 1868	1850 226	POTTER & CO LIVERPOOL	1916-1917	torpedoed 1917	
GRACE HARWAR	3ms 1889	2950 266	HAMILTON PT GLASGOW	1916-1935	sold for breaking Up 1935	
PFIOFESSOR KOCH	3m b 1891	2350 236	RUSSELL PT GLASGOW	1916-1923	condemned 1923	
IN3RID	3msch 1907	650 132	SODERSTROM ALAND	1917-1919	sold to British owners 1919; renamed RIGDIN	
Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page Z5

SOUTHERN BELLE	3m b 1871	850 146	MULCAHA NOVA SCOTIA	1917-1919	sold for breaking up 1919	
LAWHILL	4m b 1892	4600 317	THOMPSON DUNDEE	1917-1942	condemned 1942	
MARGARETA exCRAIGERNE	4m b 1889	3100 270	DUNCAN
PT GLASGOW	1917-1917	torpedoed 1917	
WOODBURN	3m b 1896	2600 242	RUSSELL PT GLASGOW	1919-1924	sold 1924. hulked	
HERZOGINCECIUE4mb 1902	4350 314	RICKMERS
BREMERHAVEN	1921-1936	wrecked (English Channel) 1936	
LOCH LINNHE	3m b 1876	2200 235	THOMPSON GLASGOW	1922-1933	wrecked Aland Island 1933	
POMMERN ex MNEME	4m b 1903	4050 294	REID&CO GLASGOW	1922-1953	preserved at at Marlehamn, presented to town 1953	
CARRADALE	4m b 1889	3300 285	STEPHEN GLASGOW	1923-1924	sold for breaking up 1924	
PENANG ex ALBERT RICKMERS	3m b 1905	3250 265	RICKMERS BREMERHAVEN	1923 1941	missing Southern Ocean 1940	
OLIVEBANK	4m b 1892	4400 326	MACKIE &
THOMPSON
GLASGOW	1924-1939	sunk by mine 1939	
KILLORAN	3m b 1900	3050 261	AILSA TROON	1924-1940	sunk by enemy action 1940	
CARMEN	3m b 1921	850 176	LEMLANDSV ALAND	1924-1934	abandoned 1934	
POLSTJERNAN	4mSch 1920	1600 202	SKINNERVIKS DRAGSFIAND	1924-1925	sold March 1925	
BALTIC	4m6tn 1919	750
171	A/B BALTIC ALAND	1924-1939	sold May 1939	
ARCHIBALD RUSSELL	4m b 1905	3950 291	SCOTT & CO GREENOCK	1924-1948	sold for breaking up 1948	
HOUGOMONT	4m 6 1897	4000 292	SCOTT a CO GREENOCK	1925-1932	dismasted, used as breakwater 1932	
LINGARD ex WATHARA	3m b 1893	1600 213	FEVIGS ARENDAL	1925-1935	sold 1936	
OSTROBOTNIA	3msch 1919	800 163	LUNDQVIST JAKOBSTAD	1925-1934	hulked 1934	
WINTERHUDE ex MABEL RICKMERS	3m b 1898	3250 267	RICKMERS BREMERHAVEN	1925-1944	sold to German Navy: 1944	
LALLA ROOKH ex KARKU ex EFFENDI	3m b 1876	1450 196	EVANS LIVERPOOL	1926-1928	sold for breaking up 1928	
ESTONIA	3mbtn 1921	800 305	WAMMUS GUTMANNSBACH	1927-1936	wrecked 1936	
MELBOURNE ex GUSTAV ex AUSTRASIA	4m b 1892	4250 305	RUSSELL
PT GLASGOW	1929-1932	sunk     in     collision 1932	
MADARE ex FOX III	4msch 1919	900 155	ARUESKJOBING	1929-1939	sequestrated and sold 1939	
Page 26 — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

VIKING
PONAPE	4m b
exBELLHOUSE	1903
ex REGINA ELENA
PAMIR LAVENIR
P4SSAT
4m b	4000	BURMEISTER
1307	293	WAIN
COPENHAGEN
3500	BACINI
283	GENOA
4m b	4500	BLOHM & VOSS
1905	316	HAMBURG
4m b	3650	RICKMERS
1908	278	BREMERHAVEN
4m b	4700	BLOHM & VOSS
1911	322	HAMBURG

1929-1951
1929-
1931-1951
1932-1936
1932-1951

sold 1951,preser ved at Gothenburg
sold for breaking up 1936
sold 1951: lost at sea 1957
sold 1936, renamed ADMIRAL KARP-FANGER: lost at sea 1938
sold 1951, preserved at Travemunde

OMDINE	4msch	1600	McEACHERN	1933-	sold 1933	
ex ASTRELLA	1917	248	OREGAN	1933		
exONDINE						
ex PAULINE						
VARMA	3m b	1400	NYSTADS	1933-	sold 1937	
	1922	201	NYSTAD	1937		
ELAKOON	3m b	1400	NYSTADS	1933-	sold 1943, con-	
	1920	209	NYSTAD	1943	verted to Motor-ship 1945	
VELLAMO	3msch	550	NYSTADS	1933-	sold 1939	
	1919	139	NYSTAD	1939		
VALBORG	4msch	1500	CHOLBERG	1933-	condemned and	
	1919	197	VICTORIA BC	1943	sold 1943	
KYLMORE	3m b	1900	REID	1934-	sold for breaking	
ex SUZANNE	1880	226	PT GLASGOW	1937	up 1937	
PESTALOZZI	3m b	1600	BLOHM & VOSS	1934-	sold for breaking	
ex CLAUDIA	1884	206	HAMBURG	1937	up 1937	
REGINA	4msch	1000	KYNTZELL	1934-	lost by fire 1935	
	1919	182	BORGIA	1935		
DIONE	4m btn	1000	DONNER	1935-	sold 1942	
	1923	160	JOMALA	1942		
MOSHULU	4m b	4900	HAMILTON	1935-	sold 1947. pre-	
ex DREADNAUGHT    1904	335	PT GLASGOW	1947		
ex KURT						
SIRIUS	3msch	180	NORSTOM	1942-	sold 1946	
ex BJERKVIK	1901	93	VASTERVIK	1946		
ex MARTEN						
Explanation of vessel types in column 2

3m	three masted	
4m	four masted	
b	barque	
s	ship	
sen	schooner	
btn	barquentine	
This list only shows vessels in which Erikson was the major shareholder   It does not list the others in which he had shares
Journal at the Australian Naval Institute — Page 27

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Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 29

Lecture to the Canberra Chapter of the Australian Naval Institute April 1980
THE SOVIET
MERCANTILE
OFFENSIVE
by Micheal Melliar-Phelps

At the present time, there are fifteen Soviet State-owned Shipping Companies and they are:
Baltic S.S. Co. (Leningrad)
Black Sea S.S. Co. (Odessa)
Far Eastern S.S. Co. (FESCO) (Vladivostock)
Northern S.S. Co. (Arkhangelsk)
Murmansk S.S. Co. (Murmansk)
Estonian S.S. Co. (Tallin)
Latvian S.S Co. (Riga)
Lithuanian S.S. Co. (Klaipeda)
Novorossisk S.S. Co. (Novorossisk)
Georgian S.S. Co. (Batumi)
Azov Sea S.S. Co. (Zhdanov)
Caspian Sea S.S. Co. (Baku)
Soviet Danube S.S. Co (Izmail)
Kamchatka S.S. Co. (Petropavlovsk)
Sakhalin S.S. Co (Kholmsk).
These companies' are obviously only regional groupings for the sake of administrative convenience Funnels are usually white for motorships and black for steamers, with a red band on which is a gold Hammer and Sickle. Hulls are either black, white or grey, but there does not seem to be a definite ruling, as far as cargo ships are concerned, as to which ships have which colours. Passengei ships apparently are consistent within individual classes
Back in February 1918, Lenin signed a Decree nationalising all Russian shipping, and it was several ex-Tsarist vessels which formed the nucleus of the Sovtorgflot — The Sovietsky Torgovaya Plot — literally translated as the Soviet Merchant Fleet. Formerly privately owned or Government ships were taken over in Russian Ports, and others which had been taken   to   foreign   ports   by   the   pro-Tsarist

Whites were returned as the new regime gained international recognition. However, three Romanian ships which had served in the Russian Navy during the First World War had to be returned to Romania by the Soviets.
By the late 1920s, most of the ex-Tsarist vessels must have been either demolished or unserviceable, and so the first Soviet-built passenger ships were produced by the Sever-ney and Baltika Yards at Leningrad in 1928. The first foreign-built new buildings were ordered in this year; two ships from the Krupp Yard at Kiel in Germany (sisterships to four built at the Baltika Yard). In 1935 one Dutch and one British liner were purchased, followed in 1937 by a British cableship which was converted for passenger use. As well as purchasing second-hand tonnage, orders for new vessels were given to Italy in 1937 and to the Netherlands in 1939.
The Soviet invasion of the Baltic States ol Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940 resulted in three coastal passenger ships being added to the fleet at the expense of Estonia; as far as is known neither Latvia or Lithuania possessed any passenger ships of note.
THE AUTHOR
Michael Melliar Phelps 15 a member ol Ihe United Slates Naval Institute, the ANI and the Naval Historical Society ol Australia He is currently employed by Ihe Australian Broadcasting Commission and his interests include naval history, photography and classical music He has recently co-authored a book with Ross Gillet ton shipping in Sydney Harbour and this is to he released shortly

Pago 30 — Journal ol me Australian Naval institute

The wartime losses ol Soviet merchant ships were very high, although exactly what passenger ships were lost due to enemy action is not known with any certainty. In 1941 the United States transferred two ex-German liners of World War One vintage to the USSR in order to reinforce the fleet. It was the defeat of Germany, however, which provided the greatest impetus to the Sovtorgflot passenger fleet. Twelve large passenger ships and several smaller ones were either seized from the Germans, received as Allied allocations of prizes, or salvaged from German waters at the end ot the War. Most of the larger vessels are still in service today.
Germany's allies of Finland and Romania did not escape having to compensate the USSR for war damage from their own small mercantile fleets — six Finnish and three Romanian ships were handed over between 1944 and 1950, and a further two ships were taken from Japan as a result of the short-lived war status between that country and the Soviet Union.
With the reconstruction of East German shipyards after the Second World War, there became available a source of new tonnage for the Soviet Merchant Fleet, and it has been the Mathias Thesen Wertl Yard at Wismar which has provided the bulk of passenger tonnage by delivering nineteen ships of the Mikhail Kalinin Class and five of the larger Ivan Franko Class Another Communist state — Bulgaria — has

produced a class of at least twelve coastal passenger ships for the shorter sea route of the Morflot.
In 1961, the A, Zhadnov Yard at Leningrad built the first of ten vessels in a class which were the first Soviet-built passenger ships since 1932, and it was in the early 1960s that the title Morflot was introduced, replacing that of Sovtorgflot. Morflot. or to give its full title, Ministerstvo Morskoi Flot — Ministry of the Seagoing Fleet — is the Ministry in Moscow which controls all Soviet merchant ships through the previously mentioned fifteen companies based in the major ports throughout the Union, and recently a further department, Mor-pasflot — Morskoi Passazhirskogo Flot — Seagoing Passenger Fleet — has been established for the management ol the Fleet's passenger ships.
With the worldwide rise of bunker oil prices in 1973, many Western passenger ships were laid up or sold for demolition, and this gave the Morflot the opportunity to purchase two Cunard Line ships in 1973, and a large modern West German ship (the Hamburg) the following year. She was only six years old and the pride of the City of Hamburg. A smaller cruise ship was bought from Vickers Ltd., Barrow, in 1975, after the builders had not handed her over to the Danish company which had ordered her. 1975 also saw the delivery of the first of a class of five cruise ships ordered from a Finnish yard; the Morflot now taking a good

The Soviet passenger ship. FEDOR SHALYAPIN. built as the Cunard liner IVERNIA in 1955, re-named FRANCONIA in 1962. and sold to the USSR in 1973.
— by courtesy John Mortimer
Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 31

share of the lucrative world cruising trade as a source of foreign currency. This is possibly the first time for some years that the larger vessels have been run on a profitable basis.
But now a trade war of sods is developing between the Soviets and the traditional shipping lines, and the latter are screaming unfair'. We have already seen one example of the Soviets forcing a shipping line out of Australia — Chandris Lines have ceased operation here as a direct result of Soviet undercutting.
So, what is happening on the world trade routes?
In the heart of Siberia, across thousands of miles of forest and permafrost, the Soviets are laying new railroad tracks. It's the Baikal-Amur Railway. It will go from the Pacific Coast (north of Lake Baikal and join up with the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Containers will be shipped to Nahodka on the Pacific coast; loaded onto high-speed intercontinental goods trains, and then taken across the new stretch of the Trans-Siberian to join up with the established main line, and thence all the way to the Baltic. From there, they will be trans-shipped to wherever they are supposed to go in Europe This will, of course, have an absolutely devastating effect on the European—Oriental shipping runs.
At ihe moment, it takes about six weeks to ship cargo around the Cape or about five weeks through the politically unstable Suez Canal. Doing the journey by rail would cut the time down by about three wee«s, and it would be much cheaper. Of course, this is a long time into the future, but for this very lucrative North Pacific and Far East-Asian trade, the battle-lines are being drawn up.
The Soviets are constructing new harbours for new ships together with the most modern port facilities. They are building icebreakers to keep these ports open all the year round, and even new ice-breaking and container ships. In 1978. the Soviets claimed to have clocked up a record: Ihey transferred containers from ship to rail in only 90 seconds each. On the Baltic and Pacific coasts, the Soviets are building some of the largest container terminals in the world, and they are building the ships that will match and supply them At Vostochny in Northern Siberia, they are building (with Japanese technical help) another huge container terminal.
Whatever terms one uses to describe these startling developments, the figures speak for themselves. The Soviet Union now has the sixth largest Merchant Navy in the world Twenty years ago, it had only 26th place. By this year, 5,000,000 tons dwt will be added to that fleet. That's 55 ships, and that should  bring them  up to somewhere around

HMAS MELBOURNE viewed from the bridge of the ORSHA during 1976 The question may be asked whether an Australian National Line ship would have a similar berth in Leningrad.
— by courtesy of the author
20,000,000 dwt, and that s a considerable fleet in anyone's language. At the moment they have the largest conventional cargo liner fleet in the world, but they are building additional fast Ro-Ro container vessels and bulk oil carriers as quickly as possible. Just suffice to say that of all the ships that are building at present in the world, over 20% are destined to sail under the Hammer and Sickle.
The Soviet shipping rates have set 'the cat amongst the pigeons' in the Pacific, and that's one of the areas where it affects Australia With crews paid the equivalent of only 30 dollars a week, and with low overheads, they are supposed to be undercutting established shipping lines by 15 and 20%. There are even reports of 40 and even 70% reductions in tariffs. Overall, the Soviets now haul about 12% of world liner cargoes. But that vastly understates their impact Avoiding as far as possible heavy, low-profit commodities on the world scene, Soviet masters and their agents batten on such lucrative freight as cameras, small high-quality machinery and electronic components.   In   other  words  the   small   volume.

Page 32 — Journal ot trie Australian Naval Institute

The general cargo vessel PRAVDINSK, 10954 g.r.t.. built in East Germany in 1974, leaving Sydney Harbour June 1980.
— by courtesy John Mortimer

high value cargoes. State-owned, financed and operated by a system that permits no large-scale internal competition, and fuelled from State-owned oil reserves and refineries at prices which are approximately 30% of world prices, Soviet masters are often able to break into new routes using operating methods which would most likely prove to be ruinous to Western shipping firms. For example, individual Soviet vessels will operate and leave harbour only half-full as often as they can, thereby using saturation tactics to 'swamp-out' competition from as many shipping lines and nations as they can manage.
Why have the Soviets become such cutthroat capitalists? Aside from gaining precious foreign exchange, Moscow's merchant fleet bolsters the Soviet Unions prestige by showing the Hammer and Sickle in as many farflung ports as possible. The last time the Western world saw much rapacious competition potential was in the bad old days' of the 1890s in the United States of America when unbridled commercial greed created the vast railroad and shipping empires owned by such moguls as the Astors. the Vanderbilts and J.P. Morgan himself.
So far, the Soviet Merchant Fleet operates on an intrude and conciliate strategy. Soviet negotiators claim they simply want to join — not wreck — the established shipping conferences. When pressed, as they were in 1977, by a proposed  U.S.  law aimed at limiting third-

flag shipping, the Soviets were conveniently quick to reach a deal with the conferences; but the shipping conferences have been putting pressure on Western governments around the world to create legislation designed to keep the Soviets in check.
With unemployment high throughout the West, and with many shipyards overseas idle and some trade stagnating, the Soviet threat is ominous. In August 1977, West Germany. Holland and Belgium delivered private messages of protest to the Soviet Union. British officials met Soviet counterparts separately, but on a Black Sea cruise ship. However, as one trade agreement after another lurches towards a signed but shaky compromise, Moscow shows few signs of letting up on its long-range goal of carving out for itself a disproportionate share of the world's commercial shipping October 3 last year saw the formal acceptance of the Black Sea Shipping Company as a full member of the India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Conference which controls the trade between the region and the U.K. and Continent. The 22 existing members of the Conference are reassigning a proportion of their share of the trade to the USSR
Australia herself has contributed to Soviet as well as flag-of-convenience carriers with her fantastically high seaman salaries combined with multi-month vacation time. A stark contrast with the Soviet seaman's $30 approximate per week.

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Pago 33

Bear in mind that the Soviet Union does not have a Merchant Marine structured, organised and directed by the free-wheeling Western understanding of the term The Soviets possess the most modern, fastest-growing Navy in the world. The Soviet High Command looks upon all units of the Merchant Fleet, both passenger and cargo, as indispensable unit extensions of the Navy. I have colour photographs which clearly show otherwise ordinary Soviet cargo vessels in merchant livery replenishing major naval units on the high seas. Only in the last couple of years, the Fedor Shalyapin was involved in a mid-ocean nocturnal contact with a submarine whilst a cn_ise was in progress. I personally witnessed, through a telescope, the surfacing and subsequent submersion of a Whisky Long Bin' class submarine about fifteen miles off Collaroy beach eight years ago Operation Okean in 1976 (and its successors) was designed to demonstrate the operational and replenishment world-wide capabilities of the entire Soviet marine structure
Even whilst acknowledging the obvious massive intrusions of international airline operations, one cannot help but notice the almost   total   disappearance  from   Australia  of

passenger line operations in any capacity. The identity of the principal cruising operator in this part of the world was hardly a mystery: until its operator invaded Afghanistan, that is. Now their passenger vessels are forbidden the use of Australian ports until further notice
The traditional Western way lies in equal trading opportunities for all with corporate behaviour governed by more-or-less mutually agreed upon legislation. If we continue to allow our shipping operations to wither through lack of judiciously-conceived and quickly-applied legislation, then our ships will rapidly become useless in themselves and we will be unable to purchase their replacements through lack of trade-earned moneys. Even now we are unable to economically build replacements, and our skilled shipbuilding talents are dispersing. Our active merchant fleet is a shadow of its former self, and we could be in real trouble in a future conflict as a result. If the west is either unable or unwilling, through the apathy engendered through 35 years of questionable peace' to control or contain Soviet mercantile expansion, then we will be gambling with our long-term national security. And when gambling, it's not nice to know that the Soviets, with their record, provide the only game in town.

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Page 3* — Journal o> the Australian Naval Institute

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Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 35

Australian Naval Institute Silver Medal Essay
AN APPROPRIATE MARITIME
STRATEGY FOR AUSTRALIA
POST 1980
By Major NA Bowman

Introduction
Determining a maritime strategy for Australia is essentially a problem of perspective and balance It is a problem of balance because it requires the coordination of interests and national power, the ends and the means. But it is also a problem of perspective because neither interests nor power have abolute measurements. Both are complex mixtures of objective factors and highly generalized abstractions Nevertheless strategic doctrine must not become something theoretical. A wrong strategic doctrine can lead to disaster while in the absence of strategy a nation's decision making processes becomes costly and in cohesive.
The purpose of this paper is to question national strategy It does not seek to find simple answers to complex problems.
Taking the advice of the great naval theorist, Sir Julian Corbett, I have not attempted to treat maritime strategy as a separate subject. I have first tried to obtain a direction tram a brief examination of strategic theory. This theory suggests that since war is a continuation of policy by other means, the determination of a strategy must start with the aims of policy I have then attempted to examine the maritime requirements of that policy.
The Meaning of Strategy
Because its implications are so broad, the term strategy' needs continual definition. Prior to the period of Napoleonic warfare it existed primarily as an operational concept referring to the maintenance and employment of armed forces Strategy was delined narrowly as the art of the general' because the battlefield, the environment of strategy, was limited in its parameters of time and space However, the French and Industrial Revolutions represented the political and technological dimensions of a social upheaval which led to fundamental changes in both the conduct and meaning o1 war Industrialization meant that the resources available to the state to wage war in creased dramatically. As a result success in war came to depend on the economic strength to create, move and maintain large forces Moreover the vastness of the resources required for war and the increasing popular participation in government made power a function of national will as well as capabilities.

These changes had important implications for the meaning of strategy. War was no longer an independent phenomenon of military force but a social development and political instrument Clausewitz was one of the first thinkers on strategy to recognize the broader implications of strategy He described strategy as a trinity composed of political motivation, operational activity and social participation However. Clausewitz's most important contribution was in establishing the fundamental importance of the relationship between war and politics in his famous dictum War is not merely a political act, but also .. a continuation of policy by other means He defined strategy as the art of the employment of battles as a means to gam the ob|ect of war'
Unfortunately the true implications of Clausewitz s philosophy of war were not recognized. Misled by Clausewitz's tendency to the extreme, his disciples accepted the destruction of the enemy s armed forces in battle as the proper objective of strategy. In the First World War the consequences of this misconception were disastrous. The military considerations affecting the actual application of force completely dominated political objectives and as a result the outcome was marked mainly by the disparity between the end sought, the price paid and the results obtained. Even in the Second World War, allied strategy was characterized more by the practical application of technology to operational and m-dustralial problems than by the successful attainment of policy objectives
The problem was that while the importance of political, economic and social forces as components of national power were recognized, these
THE AUTHOR
Major Bowman graduated from the Royal Military College. Duntroon in December 1970 and has served in regimental postings in the Special Air Service Regiment and the 4th and 2nd/4th Battalions Royal Australian Regiment During 1974-5 he was an observer with the United Nations in Israel and Syria He has served in statt appointments at the Infantry Centre and the Director ale General ot Army Training in Army Oftice During January-June 1980 he attended the RANSC Currently Maior Bowman is the S02 (Force Structure) in the Directorate General of Army Developmenl Ho is married with two children

Page 36 — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

were seen as the means of developing greater military force to be applied in battle Once battle came to be accepted as the only means to a strategic end. it was an easy step to confuse the means with the end and to reach the conclusion that in war every other consideration should be subordinated to the aim of fighting a decisive battle. The distinction between the national objective, the purpose of policy, and the military aim had been lost Attaining a military aim is in itself valueless unless it assists in gaining the objective of national policy The true concern of strategy is the effect of the application of power
It is now possible to form a conceptual understanding of strategy as the direction of power in different planes, with national strategy as the direction of all elements of national power, military strategy as the direction of military lorce and tactics as the immediate employment of military forces in combat The focus or centre of gravity of these planes is provided by the perception of national interest. This perception is expressed in the different dimensions as a national policy objective, a military aim and a tactical mission The actual shape of these planes is determined by national policies.
Having established this hierarchical relationship between national and military strategy, it might be concluded that the problems of military strategy can be solved deductively. In this approach once fundamental national interests are articulated into national security objectives and the constraints of policy are established, determining a military strategy is essentially a technical problem of applying the available means to the desired end However, in practice this is rarely true despite the apparent logic of this approach and its attraction to the military professional.
The problem is that abstract national interests are difficult to translate into achievable objectives Both objectives and policies may be broadly defined and are liable to sudden change according to circumstances The formulation and execution of policy are rarely distinct processes. Instead policy is dominated by the play of events as they are perceived and interpreted by the interest groups in power Thus, it is misleading to think of strategy as a fixed plan for the application of given resources to a particular end. Rather, it is the creation of the flexibility to be able to react to likely circumstances in a way which allows a nation to influence, and ideally control, events in its favour As defined by Eccles. strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives But. in addition, there is a psychological dimension to strategy It also provides a perspective for decision making By defining likely dangers and how to deal with them, by projecting feasible goals and methods of attaining them, strategy furnishes a basis for action.

An Approach to Australian National Strategy
Having examined the meaning of strategy, it is necessary to determine an appropriate strategy for Australia, highlighting the place of maritime strategy As seen, the aim of strategic doctrine must be to maximize the control a nation can exercise in its international relations However, because Australia's interests are. in varying degrees, global and its resources are finite, our aim in practice must be modified What we desire is a strategy which balances ends and means in a way which provides the best opportunity of influencing those situations which are most important from the point of view of national interests
Important' situations may be defined in two ways. Either as those likely to threaten our vital interests or as those situations affecting our interests which are most likely to occur Our strategy must be able to react to both sets of circumstances If a strategy does not protect vital interests, its value may well be questioned. Equally, a strategy is likely to disintegrate and be disgarded if it does not have the flexibility to deal with likely contingencies.
The basis of a sound strategy must be a clear identification of national interests However. I have pointed out that it is more difficult m reality than in theory to convert interests into specific objectives This is particularly true in Australia at present It is frequently argued that Australia does not currently have either stated national objectives or a clear national strategy In part this is due to an absence of a credible short term threat to Australia. The way in which a nation defines its interests into objectives is closely related to its perceptions of external threats At times when there is scepticism about the realities of threats, there is equal uncertainty about the nature of objectives This difficulty in deriving clear objectives may also be attributed to the paucity of informed debate on defence and the increasing difficulty of obtaining consensus in Australian society on many issues of national importance.
Notwithstanding the above discussion, much of the current pessimism about the lack of objectives is unwarranted because it is based on misconceptions concerning the detail in which objectives need to be, or are able to be, stated in Australia's current circumstances The purpose of current defence objectives is two fold: to provide broad options for decision makers and to make assessments on the requirements for certain defence capabilities and infrastructure. At times when threats are difficult to identify, objectives are more likely to be generalized and closer to the expression of national interests II is only when threats are clearly identifiable that objectives will be specific In summary, it may be concluded that at present a broad statement and explanation of interests is as close as we can come to the formulation of objectives

Journal ot She Australian Naval Institute — Page 37

There are strong reasons, therefore, for suggesting that at present, objectives are less necessary for determining a national strategy than is sometimes suggested. A more valid approach to deriving a military strategy is to identify national interests concerning security and how these interests might be threatened, to examine the factors likely to affect the form and extent of Australian's reaction and finally establish the appropriate national defence strategy Maritime strategy will be an element of national strategy A Definition of Australian Interests
While Australia has a broad range of peripheral interests, only two are so important as to be regarded as vital interests. The foremost of these is the protection of the nation from attack and from the threat of attack, a hostile infringement of national sovereignty including Australian territory, territorial or exclusive economic zones Such an attack may involve varying levels of force At the lowest level it may be the application of limited force against carefully selected objectives to disrupt normal activity or cause physical damage These attacks could be aimed at provoking such a disproportionate response that an Australian government, possibly under the pressure of public opinion, would make concessions in the favour of the aggressor At a higher level, force could be applied by conventional armed forces Such attacks could also be coercive in terms of influencing Australian policy or may be directed at the control of a particular Australian resource. The highest level of threat would be the use of massive lorce to the extent that our continued existence as a nation state is endangered Such an eventuality would require the application of massive offensive power in the context of an irreconcilable clash of national interests and a widescale breakdown in international relations
A complementary interest Is to protect Australia from the threat ol some military, political or economic action that would adversely affect national sovereignty, the exercise of fundamental rights or national and international prosperity This form of threat is closely aligned to the actual employment of force. In many cases, force is applied at one level to increase the coercive effect of the threat of greater force. For practical purposes, protection from actual use of force and the threat of force should be regarded as a single problem
Australian interests regarding security may be stated from a general consideration of how such threats outlined above may be countered. The first response would be diplomatic Australia should seek to influence international relations in such a way that reduces the possibility of international disputes developing into conflicts. One means of achieving this aim is to support inter-

national and regional bodies such as the United Nations and ASEAN which provide a mechanism for resolving or at least limiting disputes. This support would be in concert with normal bilateral diplomacy.
Alternatively, Australia may seek to control the development of a threat by use of armed force. Within this option there are several possiblities The most attractive is to maintain sufficient armed forces so that no potential aggressor could hope to be successful in an armed attack That is, an attack would be deterred by the clear ability of Australian forces to respond successfully. Finally, there is the option of using force to resist an attack. While this option is the least attractive because of its costs, human and economic, the credibility of an armed response must be the foundation of all other alternatives.
Thus Australian security interests may be defined as:
 •	To actively support international and regional bodies as effective organs for the resolution of conflicts.
 •	To deter armed attack on Australian national territory
 •	To react successfully in the event of an armed attack.
The second of Australia's basic interests is the maintenance of the economic well-being of the population. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss domestic economic policies, it is necessary to consider the international context of Australian prosperity The most obvious factor is international trade currently valued at over S23 billion per year While this trade is not critical to our survival in the sense that energy imports are to Japan and some EEC member states, the continuation of this trade in general is necessary for our present standards of living
In addition, continued access to particular products such as heavy oils and key manufactured goods is essential for the economy to continue to function at an adequate level of production. It has also been argued most strongly that Australia's economic future will depend heavily on the nation's ability to increase its international trade. The essential supports of trade are the strength of the domestic economy, the strength of the Australian currency, access to overseas investment, access to markets, and the general economic stablility of the world economy There are a number of ways in which trade could be threatened: by disrupting the internal economy, by denying Australia access to key imports or by disrupting the transportation of Australian goods.
Our national security interests in relation to trade may be expressed as
•	To protect key areas of industry from disrup
tion

Page 38 — Journal ol me Australian Nazal Institute

 •	To promote measures supporting international economic stability and the removal of barriers to trade
 •	To ensure uninhibited passage of shipping carrying Australian trade
The Determinants of a National Strategy
Any proposal for a national defence strategy must take into account those permanent and long term factors which have national policies As seen. Australian's fundamental interests are largely fixed. Equally, there are a number of factors which limit the freedom of manoeuvre of Australian governments in formulating policies to further these interests For convenience these factors may be grouped under the broad headings of internal and external factors
A primary and obvious determinant is geography Briefly, the dominating considerations from geography are that this country is an island continent, wealthy in natural resources and isolated from her natural friends and allies but close to a region of present and potential instability The areas of important resources in the north and north west are separated by a broad inhospitable hinterland from the major concentrations of population and industry The most superficial glance at Ihis geography leads to the observations that the nodh and west of the country are the most vulnerable areas to attack and that in these regions the distance from support areas, lack of local infrastructure and poor communications would severely inhibit an Australian response Moreover, geography indicates that not only would a military force be required to use the sea for its initial lodgement but also that the continued use of the sea would be essential for the maintenance of a force of any size on Australian territory Further, control of the sea would be important for subsequent operations which would be required to leapfrog along, or at least hug, the coast
It is also clear that geography requires that Australian be able to use the sea If Australia is to maintain its access to important raw materials, to sources of military material and come to assistance of friendly powers, then it must use the sea Even Australia's internal trade is heavily dependent upon shipping. It is because Australian governments have in varying degrees always recognized that Australian defence must be essentially a problem of controlling the sea that alliance with a major naval power has always been a key feature of national policy
Since strategy concerns the application of national power, the nature and extent of a nation's power must influence its strategy If a country has much greater power than any possible rival, it has the freedom to act aggressively or react extremely passively according to its perception of its interests Where, however, the power of a country is limited it must choose its policies carefully to gain

maximum benefit from limited resources It is evident that in Australia's case, we do not have the economic or human resources to be a ma|or power Nevertheless, this does not mean we are defenceless. Rather, we have sufficient national wealth and industrial capacity to maintain an effective defence force for most foreseeable eventualities provided our resources are carefully allocated
The aim is to find a strategy that is suited to fulfil our inherently limited objectives in the most economic way At first glance, it might seem that a purely defensive strategy is the most economic method; but this implies strategic defence which historical experience has shown to be a dangerously brittle method on which to rely Economy of force and deterrence are best achieved by retaining the mobility and force for quick offensive action.
A more intangible determinant of defence strategy is the attitude of Australians to defence From its beginning. Australian society has had a preoccupation with the threat of external aggression Since the early nineteenth century the role of the chief menace has been given at various times to France, Czanst Russia, China. Japan. Indonesia and the Soviety Union However, except for a two short periods, immediately before and after the First World War, this preoccupation has not led to the formulation of a credible defence strategy Instead the Australian response has been to seek the protection of a major ally and rely upon a general call to arms when danger threatens There are a number of factors which challenge the credibility of both expectations. Nevertheless views are widely held and the effects are real. The effect of excessive reliance on a major power has been to distort our view of the world into seeing international relations purely in terms of great power nvaltry and as a result inhibited Australian governments from devising flexible policies capable of responding to the rapid economic and political changes occurring in the Asian-Pacific region But in contradiction, the effect of our vague confidence to react as necessary has made the public at large complacent on defence The danger is likely to be that long term defence planning may be dislocated by alternate periods of government interest or neglect accordingly to current international events and that popular indifference may limit a major military response being initiated to the last possible moment
In addition to the above internal factors, there are a number of important external influences in determining a strategy The most important of these are: a nations attitude to the central balance of power, its attitudes to other powers, its trading patterns, its membership of collective groupings and its conception of the geography of its strategic situation If any one of these elements

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 39

is more important than the others in defining Australia's policy, it is the central importance attached to the global balance of power
While possessing a number of apparent important differences of emphasis, the policies of both the Whitlam and Fraser governments have been reactions to new trends in US-Soviet relations rather than coherent domestic initiatives Thus while the American alliance will continue to be of fundamental importance in determining an Australian strategy, the problem for Australia is to ensure that the benefits of this alliance outweigh the costs Specifically we must ensure that an alliance essentia'ly for the purpose of deterring the highest levels of threat does not become an end in itself and mislead us as to the nature of our true interests
An Appropriate Military Strategy for Australia
To a considerable extent. Australia's national interests can be supported by a combination ot diplomatic and political means International trade and diplomacy can contribute to national security in a sense that they reduce potential causes of friction. In the final analysis, however, a nation must fall back on its military force to preserve its interests But. it must always be remembered that the object of war is a better peace. The use of force must be directed at giving a nation the ability to control a situation so as to give a favourable outcome In doing so there must be a sound calculation and coordination of ends and means Diplomacy and defence are not alternatives Military power should be unable' in opening initiatives in policy
The nature of Australia's nterests and the determinants of her foreign anc defence policies require that Australia's strategy be essentially defensive In most instances we will be required to wait until threats materialize before taking precautionary action The problem is how to develop a military strategy which allows Australia to retain the initiative in these circumstances The solution is that Australia requires two forms of national power Firstly it requires deterrent power, the ability to influence the behaviour of a potential enemy through the threat of retaliation Secondly, defensive power, the ability to counter possible enemy action, is required Clearly there are many common elements between these two forms of power, but they are not the same The essential difference is that while defensive power depends essentially on military force, deterrent power is a psychological lorced.
Deterrence power is difficult to measure because it involves an assessment of risks concerning many factors, some of which are extremely subjective Also deterrence proves itself negatively, that is in the fact that things do not happen. Success can rarely be measured as it is difficult   to   show   why   something   has   not

occurred. Nevertheless deterrence power is valuable because it allows a direct influence to be exerted on the will of an opponent without the risks and costs of war. The first requirement of an effective deterrent posture is that the adversary be made aware of what range of actions is likely to be regarded as unacceptable and what the reaction will be The clearer, more salient the line a potential aggressor must not cross and the less ambiguous the reaction, the more successful is deterrence likely to be Establishing this line is a question of a government reaching clear decisions on its vital interests Communicating a position to a potential aggressor is a function of foreign policy The second requirement of deterrence is the capability to convince a potential enemy that the costs likely to be incurred from his initiative will outweigh the possible gams Therefore, deterrence is not a fixed level of force but a measure of a potential enemy s perceptions of costs, gams and values Australia's deterrent power will depend on both an assessment of the capability of present forces and an assessment of Australian's ability to create larger forces in time to counter more serious threats.
Because Australia is unlikely to maintain large forces in peace, the deterrent power of the Defence Force must rely largely on equipment and technical competence Equally, planning for expansion must be carefully designed to necessitate a disproportionate response on the part of the aggressor Finally, the third element in deterrence is credibility Not only must a potential aggressor be aware of the capability to inflict unacceptable losses, but also of the certainty that this capability would be used
However, non-nuclear deterrence is fragile since there is considerable room for miscalculation and mistakes Deterrence must therefore be backed up by defensive power One requirement of defensive power is that it has depth. That is depth in both planning and capabilities Australia's strategy must ensure that the force in being is sufficient to undertake likely short term tasks and has the relevant skills and equipment to be capable of timely expansion to meet a developing situation In addition, our Defence Force must contain the capability to conduct operations in depth It must possess the ability to engage an enemy in or near his base areas, on the approaches to Australia and ultimately in sustained operations on the Australian continent It should not be thought that these operations must be purely defensive in nature The aim of Australian strategy must be to conduct operations aggressively so as to regain the initiative and control over events The number of missions required means that each Service will require a variety of capabilities often in the same equipment

Page 40 — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

Defence in depth also includes operations not directly related to the defence of Australian territory. A vital additional requirement is the need to protect Australia's lines of communiations Expansion in a time of crisis will depend on the ability to ensure the passage of merchant vessels carrying military equipment and strategic raw materials. In addition, Australian strategy should include precautionary operations within the area of Australia's primary concern. The aims of precautionary operations would be to provide military aid and assistance to the governments of neighbouring states. Such assistance could be relatively limited and provided on a bilatera' basis. However, the possibility of a larger contribution to an allied force in the region should not be discounted entirely Nevertheless it should be clearly stated that the structure and development of the Australian Defence Force should be primarily directed to providing those capabilities required for the defence of Australian territory.
In summary Australian strategy should be based upon deterrent and defensive power obtained from:
 •	a clear statement and communication of Australian vital interests;
 •	a force in being capable of defeating likely short term threats;
 •	a core force capable of timely expansion to provide the necessary capabilities to counter longer term threats;
 •	a strategic strike capability capable of providing a credible deterrence to a regional power;
 •	the ability to protect essential supply lines;
 •	the capacity to provide defence assistance to neighbouring states when requested;
 •	the ability to participate in allied forces within our own area o( interest
The Role of Maritime Strategy
It is now necessary to turn to the particular role of maritime strategy Maritime strategy concerns exploiting the sea for both economic and military purposes. Mahan was careful to point out that maritime strength does not only consist of naval and air forces used to project power at sea or from the sea, but also bases, seaborne trade and fishing fleets. These additional elements are even more important now than when Mahan wrote The use of the seas for transport has become more than a source of wealth for in many instances nations depend on trade carried in shipping for the very existence of their national economy In addition the oceans are now exploited for an infinitely larger range of resources. A basic objective in Australia s maritime strategy must, therefore, relate to the economic exploitation of our territorial waters and exclusive economic zone
A major economic and miliiury weakness is the present paucity of Australian controlled over-

seas merchant shipping and parallel decline in the Australian shipbuilding industry Nevertheless there are no easy solutions to these problems Australian shipping cannot be given an unlimited subsidy at the expense of the economy but equally the existence of some form of shipbuilding capacity and control over at least limited merchant shipping is crucial to a national strategy
The role of seapower, or the application of force at or from the sea, may be considered under the four basic missions of seapower, deterrence, sea control, naval presence and the projection of power ashore As has already been argued. Australian military strategy should initially be based upon deterrence Thus an important role for the maritime forces is to deter hostile intrusion into maritime frontiers At the simplest level this will require reconnaissance and surveillance activities by aircraft and patrol boats often working in cooperation But at a higher level it involves having the ability to apply significant military force at sea against the potential enemy. If the approaches to Australia are defended the difficulties of an aggressor in mounting an attack on Australia increase enormously Such an enemy would be required to acquire the expensive and sophisticated equipment necessary to fight his way to a lodgement area, conduct an opposed amphibious assault and then support a force by sea on the Australian continent in the face of continuing opposition. The deterrent power of maritime forces could be further enhanced should the enemy" be faced with a severe interdiction of his own seaborne trade or by the possibility of sudden strikes from the sea against his homeland or base areas. The flexibility and power of modern maritime forces are capable of placing a very high price on attempted aggression.
Assuming, however, thai deterrence tailed, the primary role of maritime forces would be sea control Control of the sea may be achieved defensively by denying the enemy the use of the sea or offensively by using the sea for one's own purposes In the former instance, maritime forces would be required to conduct the type of operation described above. This requires operations based on causing such losses to the aggressor that he cannot use his maritime forces in key areas such as the approaches to possible lodgement areas Alternatively, there will be occasions when our use of the sea will be vital such as in operations in support of ground forces and the protection of convoys. In such instances Australian maritime forces must be capable of defeating all forms of attack that the enemy is capable of mounting To some extent this division is artificial since forces deployed for sea control will also deny an area to an enemy Sea control is a concept which can be applied only in actual conflict; until that time forces can only demonstrate their determination and potential for sea control

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page * t

In periods short of conlhct maritime forces may be used as an extension of foreign policy In some circumstances the aim may be related to deterrence and in others at reassuring allies and neighbours of Australian support In an era of increased constraints on the overt use of force, the naval pressure mission has assumed considerable importance.
The projection of force ashore may lake many forms Firstly the conclusions drawn from a review of Australian geography suggests that the Defence Forces will require a high degree of strategic and tactical mobility in conducting operations on the Australian continent The ability to move and maintain army elements from the sea would be a valuable capability In addition, there are many islands included in Australian offshore possessions requiring an amphibious capability respond to requests for assistance from neighbouring states. In fact an amphibious capability is in all probability essential for such support A special use of an amphibious capability is in seaborne raids by special forces Such operations would be a valuable element in deterrence and in the strategic strike operations Finally, naval projection of force ashore would be required to provide supporting fire to army operations
Capabilities Required
The determination of the specific capabilities required for Australian maritime forces is an extremely complex task beyond the scope of this paper However an attempt will be made to outline some of the more critical capabilities considered to be essential to fulfilling the maritime element of Australian military strategy It should be noted that because of the complexity and acquisition time associated with its equipment, the Navy's present structure must be more closely related to long term objectives than the other two Services.
The primary capability required by the man-time forces is the ability to detect, identify, and sink, enemy shipping on the approaches to Australia, We should, therefore, possess a range of anti shipping weapon systems carried in airborne, surface and sub-surface platforms. A combination of systems is required to provide an overlapping range of capabilities and to complicate the enemy's defence The most effective combination available to Australia at present is the sub-surface to surface missile and torpedo armed submarine The long range, weapon capacity, and survivability make this an essential weapon system for Australia Additional combinations which Australia should possess are the long range maritime reconnaissance and strike aircraft and destroyer size warship armed with stand-off anti-ship missiles The distances involved in operating in the Australian environment indicate that a destroyer size vessel is required to possess adequate endurance and sea-keeping ability However, be-causrvthese vessels are expensive and the num-

ber we can afford is limited, they should be supplemented by a larger number of patrol craft Additional capabilities required are mmewarfare vessels and an airborne early warning aircraft.
The second major role required of maritime forces is to control selected areas of the sea tor use by Australian allied vessels In this instance what is required is the ability to form a force capable of providing collectively anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities Thus the platforms required will be essentially the same as determined for sea denial The equipment may be required to have several capabilities. For example, a large destroyer might have weapon systems capable of defence against all three types of threat It is likely, however, that ships and aircraft optimized for one role will work in company with other units providing supporting characteristics. In considering this topic a key question is the need for carrier aircraft There is no doubt that this capability is expensive and that a carrier is liable to damage or destruction, but equally a carrier provides great flexibility and significant increase in defensive capabilities It would be a major loss should it no longer be possible to maintain a carrier
A third role required by maritime forces is amphibious warfare This role would require those capabilities indicated as necessary for sea assertion plus special amphibious warfare ships. This capability would give the Defence force additional capacity for strategic and tactical movement on Australian Territory and also provide the government with the flexibility to undertake military assistance operations in our region
Conclusion
This paper has not sought to answer the many questions concerning force structure which arise out of a consideration of maritime strategy Rather it has sought to provide an understanding of how to approach the subject It has been argued that in Australia s circumstances, strategy cannot be taken to mean the determination of a set solution to a particular problem Moreover, strategy is concerned not with the destruction of an enemy s armed forces as an end in itself
The paper has argued that strategy involves the use of national power to give a nation the flexibility to control or influence the outcome of events in favour of its national interests. As such it exists in two dimensions Strategy concerns both the creation of the physical elements of power and also the establishment of a psychological framework for decision making to provide an insight into the relationship between events and interests.
Australian interests and policies require that Australian national strategy be essentially defensive in nature However, Australia does not possess sufficient national power to permit her to

Page *2 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

passively allow threats to arise before taking action in her defence. Australian national strategy should seek to resolve this apparent ambiguity by in the first instance having sufficient deterrent power to influence the behaviour of a potential enemy. Should deterrence fail Australian strategy should be based on possessing the defensive power, both actua1 and potential, to counter enemy initiatives and regain control of events Maritime strategy has an important role in creating both forms of national power.
In peace seapower is a highly visible means of demonstrating the capabilities of a nation's armed forces and the national determination to vigorously defend its interests Further, strong Australian maritime forces support deterrence in that they add significantly to the difficulties of a potential aggressor seeking to establish a military force on Australian territory.
In war, seapower is a significant element in providing the capability to conduct defensive operations in depth. Maritime strategy must also give Australia the capacity to control selected precautionary operations in the region. In the final analysis, a maritime strategy must give a government the capacity to influence events rather than allowing a nation's future to become a reed in the wind of changing fortunes
NOTES
1	Strategy depends tor success, lirst and toremost on a
tound calculation and coordination ol live end and ihe
means
liddell Hart. B H The Strategy ol the Indirect Approach. London.1952.page 336
2	Much energy can be expended trying to reconcile percep
tion with reality
See McCarthy J M Australia and imperial Defence SI Lucia, 1976
 3	Corbett. J S Some Principles ot Maritime Strategy. London. I972.ps
 4	Michael Howard argues lhal Ihe era ol decisive battle in the sense ol decisive victory and defeal was really limited to Ihe 200 years between Gustavers Adolphers and Moitke Before that time nations did nol have Ihe resources lo win a decisive victory bul by the start ol the twentieth century national resources were loo vast to make decisive victory in a single bailie possible
Howard. M   The Demand tor Military History   Australian Army Journal. July 1970. pages 36-77
 6	In place ol the old rules and constraints, modern war tended to Iree itself of limitations Modern war was nourished by nationalism and ideological conviction, il became equipped with The products Ihe industrial revolution, and il was manned by the system ol universal conscnplion With the Napoleonic era wadare became a clash between whole peoples lor their political and physical independence, see Booth. K The Evolution ol Strategic Thinking in Baylis. J (ed) Contemporary Strategy Theories and Policies. London. 1975. page 23
 7	Howard. M The Forgotten Dimensions ol Strategy page 982
 8	Von Clausewitz. C On War, London 1940
 9	Clausewitz was aware that his Absolute War was an abstract idea ol war as an act ol violence earned to an extreme conclusion In practice he recognized that in Real War the energy exhibited would always be moditted by the value ot the object
ID    Booth, op cit. pp 37-8
11     Liddell Hart. B H  The Strategy ot the Indirect Approach.

 12	Liddell Hart. 7be Ob/ective in War. page 31
 13	As tactics is the application ol strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on a lower plane ot grand strategy While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct ol war, as distinct Irom the more fundamental policy which should govern its obtecl. the term grand strategy serves to bring out the sense ol policy in execution For the role ol grand strategy — higher strategy — is lo coordinate and direct all the resources ol a nation, or band ot nations towards the attainment ot the political object ol the war - Ihe goal defined by lundamen tat policy Liddell Hart The Strategy ot the Indirect Approach, p 335-6
 14	The usual deductive approach to strategy is that national security interests, obiectives. policies and commitments constitute ends or guidance lor achieving them The means are all Ihe elements of national power Strategy is regarded as matching the two within the rules established by policy See. Collins, J M Grand Strategy Principles and Practices. Annapolis. 1973. pp 1-7
 15	The attraction to the Anglo-Saxon military professional is two told Firstly while it re atlirms the primary of political control ol Ihe military, it seems to promise the insulations from Ihe intrusion ot politics into Ihe actual military decision making process Secondly it has a sociological attraction in titling into the hierarchical perspective ot military thinking
 16	Eccles, HE , Suez. 1956 Some Military Lessons in War. Strategy and Maritime Policy, page 242
 17	Eccles. H E The Basic Elements ot Strategy in ibid, page 75
 18	Kissenger. H , American Strategic Doctrine and Dipto macy in Howard. M (ed ) The Theory and Practice ot War. London. 1965 p276
 19	For example. Mediansky. F A tedl The Military and Aus tralia s Defence, 1979. page 33
 20	Gaddis. J L The Cold War Some Lessons lor Policy Makers . in War Strategy and Maritime Power, page 256
 21	Renoul. A The Frightened Country. Melbourne 1979. page 1 Collins, op cit. page 1
 22	This should also be taken to include the threat ol internal aggression
 23	I am referring to incursions involving the use ot threat ot the use ol force and nol incidents such as lishenes poaching or customs evasion
 24	Millar, T B Australia s National Objectives, Lecture to Joint Services Staff College. 26 September 1979
 25	For example, an overtlighl by military aircraft or small scale raid may be used to indicate an ability to escalate a situation and lo domonstrate tne impotence ot an adversary
 26	Renoul. op cil. page I
 27	Commonwealth of Australia. 1979 Yearbook
 28	Kasper. W (el at) Australia at the Crossroads Our Choices to the Year 2000. Sydney 1980
 29	Liddell Hart, The Strategy ot the Indirect Approach, page 368
 30	Since Ihe announcement ol the Guam doctrine in 1969. Australians have been becoming increasingly aware ot physical limits to Amencan power and the domestic con stramts on its use In addition, while in 1914 and 1939 Australia did muddle through the difference between the situations are rarely examined in the public forum
 31	Patience. A and Head. B From Whitlam to Ftaser Retonri and Reaction in Australian Politics. Melbourne 1979 page 28
 32	Bell. C The Diplomacy ot Detente The Kissinger Era London. 1977 pages 184 200
 33	Kissinger op cit.. page 275
 34	Williams. P Deterrence in Contemporary Strategy pages 71-2
 35	See Ball. D and Langlry J O Development ol Australia s Defence Force Structure — An Alternative Approach Pacific Defence Reporter. September 1979, pages 7-16
 36	At 30 June 1977. there were only 20 Australian owned overseas trading vessels ot 908.193 tonnes deadweight Transportation costs for imports tor 1976-77 wereSt 218 million

Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 43

THE FISHERY PROTECTION SQUADRON OF THE ROYAL
NAVY
by Sub-Lieutenant J. V P. Goldrick RAN

Introduction
The Fishery Protection Squadron ot the Royal Navy is one of the oldest constituted units of HM Fleet, The RN has been involved in fishery protection since the despatch of a Wafting Ship' in 1586 to (he North Sea for the herring season, and armed ships were operating under local jurisdiction for two hundred years before that date.
Full time fishery protection operations began in 1891 with a single gunboat and have grown steadily over the years to require the present 15 operational units, which are divided into the Offshore and Coastal, or Inshore Divisions. The former consists of the seven modern ISLAND class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), while the latter includes eight of the elderly TON class MCMVs.
Duties
The tasks of the Fishery Protection Squadron are defined as follows:
 •	To enforce National Fishery Laws.
 •	To enforce International Regulations relevant to fishing in UK waters
 •	To prevent fishery incidents, whether illegal or merely ill mannerec.
 •	To investigate and, if necessary, adjudicate fishery disputes.
 •	To assist distressed fishing vessels.
 •	To locate and identify foreign fishing vessels within the UK Exclusive Economic Zone.
 •	Boardings and provision of detailed information on fishery matters by inspection.
 •	To provide platforms if requested by the concerned civilian Ministry for authorised members of the Sea Fisheries Committee to enforce by-laws.
In addition, the Squadron has more recent tasks assigned it, first in the matter of dealing with pollution at sea, by dispersing oil slicks or otherwise dealing with them, and, second, to provide a deterrent presence and surveillance of gas and oil installations with the capability of rapid response to any emergencies which may occur

Government
The higher administrative organization is somewhat complex. The Ministry of Defence, in operating the FPS, is involved primarily with three other Departments The first two are the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), which has responsibility in England. Wales and Northern Ireland for the establishment and maintenance of appropriate UK. and, where applicable, European Economic Community, rules for fishery protection and conservation, and the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (DAFS), which has the same responsibilities for waters around the tatter country.
The third is the Department of Energy, which has policy responsibility for the protection of offshore gas and oil installations. The Ministry of Defence is thus responsible to these Departments for the operation of the FPS to meet their requirements, In return, the three authorities provide from their own budgets a substantial portion of the costs of the FPS — notably in the Offshore Division.
The three Departments also pay for the cost of the frequent RAF Nimrod TAPESTRY' flights, which maintain a watch on the oil rigs and provide a most detailed and extensive flow of information concerning the operations of fishing vessels in UK waters
The fact that much of the FPS costs are paid for by other sources than the MOD budget is of great significance, for he who pays the piper calls the tune' In fact, co-operation between the Ministries is very good on this
THE AUTHOR
Sub Lieutenant James Goldnck joined the RANC as a Junior Entry Cadel Midshipman in January 1974 After completion of his matriculation studies, he attended the University ot NSW graduating with a BA degree in early 1979 He is al present undertaking bridge watchkeeping training in the RN where he has served in HM Ships ALDERNEY and SIRIUS On return to Australia al the end ot this year, he will lake up a posling as XO of the LCH. HMAS TARAKAN

Page 44 — Journal ot the Australian Na^al Institute

matter and neither Energy nor MAFF make objection to the occasional use of the FPS for purely naval requirements
The ships of the FPS are not the only vessels employed on fisheries duties in the UK. Notable in addition are the vessels run by DAFS. which include the two tore-runners of the ISLAND class, JURA and WESTRA. The former actually served a term under the White Ensign, but she has now been dismissed and returned to DAFS control. The cost of running the DAFS vessels is far lower than that for the RN's. but, it must be said, so is their efficiency Constrained by mercantile regulations and routines, they can do neither the number of boardings nor constitute as effective a deterrent as the RN units. On more than one occasion, because the DAFS vessel has been unable to make any threat of force, its instructions have been cooly disregarded by fishing vessels.
Patrol Areas
There are four Offshore Patrol Areas, as displayed in the attached chart of UK waters. Each area has vastly different concerns and problems attached to it. Area 1 is largely the preserve of DAFS and must be considered the most low pressure' area, since the majority of fishermen are British and those foreign vessels which do operate there are almost always legal.
Area 2 is of more interest, including as it does the more northerly oil and gas installations. Russian trawlers frequently operate around the boundaries of the EEZ and must be watched to ensure that they do not intrude. ISLAND class OPVs are occasionally employed in surveillance duties with Soviet warships transiting to and from the Northern Fleet French and Norwegian fishing vessels are numerous, many large stern trawlers or long-liners congregating along the 11 fathom line to the north of the Shetlands.
In Area 3, which includes the majority of the North Sea, and the oil and gas fields, many more smaller British vessels operate, as well as ships from practically every North European country. A great deal of time is spent keeing watch on the installations in the area — it is only after a patrol in Area 3 that one begins to comprehend the immensity, and vulnerability, of the British offshore oil and gas production effort. What Britain's position would be without North Sea oil is mercifully difficult to imagine.
Area A is the area of greatest activity in surveillance and prosecution of illegal foreign fishing vessels. Political considerations generally determine which countries are to be 'blitzed' and which are not. The Spaniards are

generally the worst offenders, not only for Illegal fishing, but for the whole gamut ol undersized nets, immature catch and every other conceivable offence. The generally elderly and rather decrepit Spanish vessels make an interesting contrast to the big and modern French ships Sympathy with the unfortunate arrested Spaniard can, however, be somewhat modified by the discovery that the owner/skipper is actually an extremely rich man at home1
The various coastal areas, whose domain normally extends to the twelve mile limit, contain very different problems. Up to the twelve mile limit includes waters which are governed by local bylaws and Historic Rights What these two considerations amount to is a general result that any fishing activity which has been going on for a long time is legal, despite whatever modifying laws may have been introduced There are certain exceptions to this, notably in the matter of bans on species, such as herring, which are being overfished, but a case will not be brought to court if a fisherman is doing what he has always done in the waters in which he has always worked
The body of law and custom in coastal waters is so complicated that it is frequently wise to request the presence of a local fisheries inspector onboard whether or not such a move has been suggested.
Fishery Problems
An area of activity which will be of particular interest, because it demonstrates the folly of employing the Navy on purely national fishery duties, is that of salmon patrols. Poaching salmon is a time-honoured, popular and very well organised activity on many parts of the coast. Small and fast boats laying and hauling pre-positioned nets can catch vast quantities of the valuable fish
Their intelligence and communications are excellent Even the fastest naval sea boat can rarely come up on them unawares, or even catch them in an outright stern chase Evidence is difficult to assemble and a prosecution, in the face of intense and skilful defence, almost impossible to secure. Local sympathies are very much on the side of the poachers and it has more than once happened that a naval boat chasing a poacher into harbour has been hissed, abused and even stoned The local constabularly, it should be remarked, frequently display a suspicious lack of enthusiasm for the entire affair
The fact is that Navy should not be employed on domestic police duties and becomes extremely unpopular when it has to execute such duties in the long term The Navy can only work in the fishery protection role if it can be seen to be keeping foreigners well in check.

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page <5

CHART OF OFFSHORE & COASTAL PATROL AREAS AROUND GREAT BRITAIN
(Not to Scale)

OSF   i

4eg V
OSP  2

s?

Definitions:
Area 1:   4 degrees West off Northern Scotland, north to the median line with the Faeroes.
south to a line joining Mull of Kintyre Area 2:    4 degrees East to UK/Norway median line, south to 57 degrees 30' North outside 12
miles Area 3:    57 degrees 30' North, south to 52 degrees 30' North, east to UK/Norwegian/Danish/
German line outside 12 miles Area 4:    52 degrees 30' North, south to the median line UK/France, West to UK/Eire median,
East to UK 12 mile limit 5 degrees West
Coastal Areas
Scottish;    12 mile limit, south to Berwick & Solway Firth
North Sea:    Berwick to 2 degrees West in the Channel, East to 12 mile limit
English Channel:   2 degrees West to the Scillies and out to the median line to 5 degrees West
between UK and France. To the 12 mile limit further West. Western:   Scottish border to the Scillies. out West to UK/Eire median in the north and out to UK 12 mile limit further south
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British ships do not take kindly to being boarded and inspected when foreign vessels (legal or not) sail blithely by It is generally politic, even if one is perfectly well aware of the fishing activity in an area, to ask a skipper being examined if he has seen any foreign fishing vessels recently
Another matter in which the Navy must tread particularly carefully is that of the long standing dispute concerning French trawlers fishing over pots in the vicinity of Selsey Bill on and south coast. The British potters frequently claim that the Frenchmen have trawled over and dragged up their pots, knowing that they are operating in areas closed to trawling by mutual agreement. Feelings run very high — there is some truth in the accusation — but the fact of the matter is that far more often the British fishermen have laid their gear outside the areas allotted for potting and the French have been quite within their rights in trawling up the pots. As might be expected, it requires considerable tact and forbearance on the part of the Captain and crew of a Fishery Protection Ship to deal with the complaints of British fishermen who expect the FPS to sort out the Frenchies' right or wrong.
Co-operation between the Ministries is generally very good, save for the fact that DAFS cannot be regarded as a paragon of efficiency A case in point is the Scottish Law requirement for two responsible' witnesses to testify in court to secure a prosecution DAFS policy has been that the two must be officers, but the FPS has very sensibly and repeatedly

pointed out that a Senior Rating such as the Coxswain should be quite competent to act as the second witness. DAFS had. at the time of writing, agreed in principle on several occasions, but had failed to actually do anything practical.
Another point of concern is the matter of the level within the Ministries at which the decision is taken to prosecute or not to prosecute. On more than one occasion a unit of the FPS has brought in foreign fishing vessels for prosecution on the instruction of MAFF or DAFS only to find that such action has imperilled complex and delicate international regulations. Conversely, orders have been passed to release arrested fishing vessels when it appeared absolutely clear that prosecution was not only desirable but politically essential.
Grenada and Oil Rig Protection
The Fishery Protection Squadron shares responsibility with other RN vessels and Service Commands for two most important duties. The first of these is the patrol in the waters around Northern Ireland against gunrunners. This is demanding work and, at times, very dangerous. TON class MCMVs and smaller craft are usually employed. The Royal Navy has developed, drawing from its experience in Confrontation and in Hong Kong, great skill in dealing with suspicious and possibly armed vessels.
The second task, oil rig protection, falls mainly upon the ISLAND class, although TONS

The Island Class patrol vessel HMS ORKNEY (920 tonnes standard displacement. 60 m overall, built 1977, one 40 mm gun. speed 16 knots, complement 34).
— by courtesy James Goss
Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 47

are sometimes used in the southern parts of the North Sea. The major duty is simply maintaining a presence, being seen in the vicinity of oil and gas installations and developing a liaison with the personnel on the rigs themselves. Exchanges are frequent, much helped by the fact that a large number of the personnel on the rigs are ex-Royal Navy.
One major problem concerns the possibility of a violation of the 500 metre safety zones around each ng. Unless injury or major damage can be proved, no warship has any authority to stop or arrest any vessel for violation of the zones outside territorial waters. Thus, a ship can sail within yards of a rig and nothing can. legally, be done about it. In fact, the authority of the White Ensign is such that vessels will stop, accept reproof anc the warning that the matter will be reported to your authorities ..' but erring ships would be quite within their rights if they failed to stop — and the warship would not have any right to resort to force in the event of such disobedience.
The escape for the FPS is that many of the violations are made by fishing vessels and that any failure to heave to and accept a boarding party — whether or not on specific fisheries inspection — can be taken as refusal to obey a Bntish Sea Fisheries Officer and thus an offence for which the skipper is liable to prosecution
The situation is, however, most unsatisfactory Legislation has not caught up with practice or, still worse, the problem was not even foreseen when the first regulations were decided. It is clearly essential that the body of law by which patrols are to be operated and installations protected requires quite as much attention as the methods of protection themselves. This situation is also yet another demonstration of the need for naval officers to be fully aware of the minutiae of national and international law at sea.
The ISLAND class OPVs participate in frequent exercises with COMACCHIO Company, the newly established unit of the Special Boat Service of the Royal Marines which has responsibility for protecting the oil rigs and dealing with any terrorist activity. Co-operation between the Company, the ISLAND class and the Fleet Air Arm's commando helicopter squadrons is excellent. The ISLANDS possess even/ facility for the carriage of a platoon of Marines and their gear and aircraft-ship and ship-to-ship transfers can be accomplished with great speed and efficiency. Australia would do well to watch and emulate Britain's system of rig protection, especially in the matter of developing expertise in Commando tactics and communications between the units which would be involved — the latter, it being the exper-

ience, require just as much work as the former The ISLANDS can, by themselves, do nothing active to deal with a terrorist take-over of a rig; in such incidents it is they who support the troops and not the other way about.
Organization
Barring a number of relatively minor problems, the Fishery Protection Squadron must be considered an efficient unit. Support staff and facilities, shared with the Captain, Mine Counter-Measures, are based at Rosyth. centred upon LOCHINVAR Block, named in memory of the old base at Port Edgar, across the Firth of Forth.
The greatest criticism which can be expressed concerns the staff, which, if anything, display a loading far too much in favour of purely naval matters and not enough on the fishery side, No officer who has served recently in command in the FPS is on the staff and their actual practical expertise in fishery protection is not such as to be of any service to the ships at sea. Although ships requiring instructions such as whether or not to arrest a fishing vessel request advice from FPS, the latter merely act as a staging post for MAFF or DAFS and do not in fact constitute an esssen tial part of the command chain.
There is some confusion apparent in the training programme for the ISLAND class, largely because the latter have no clear war role. The obvious solution is to work the ships up wholly and solely for fishery duties, but against this must be put the requirement to maintain the state of naval training of the ships' personnel. The TON class MCMV have, of course, no such problem and frequently exercise themselves in sweeping techniques while on patrol.
The initial training of Commanding and Executive Officers for fishery work is very good indeed. A three week fish' course is run by the Ministries concerned and this covers the whole range of fishing methods, fish identification, boarding techniques and legal problems. The standard of knowledge of the graduates is very impressive and their expertise is consolidated by the practice whereby a civilian fisheries inspector accompanies them to sea on their first patrol and qualifies them as British Sea Fisheries Officers. The First Lieutenant is normally the Boarding Officer, accompanied by the Correspondence Officer (CORRO) or Midshipman, if the latter is borne. The ISLANDS often aim to have two officers qualified as inspectors in order to be able to conduct double boardings, thereby speeding the inspection task greatly. The average ISLAND will conduct in the region of 120 boardings a year, the TON class rather less.

Page 48 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

The morale of the crews is generally reasonable, despite all the difficulties of the situation. Many of the ratings are Scots or 'Geordies' and have volunteered for the area and the duty. What major problems which do occur seem to be confined to officers. The RN is certainly open to criticism for its policy of posting an officer straight from his OW (Stage III) Courses to a TON for a billet job as NO or CORRO or to an ISLANDas CORRO and keeping him there for 18 months. This is a grave mistake, for although it may do much for an officer's confidence and self-reliance, it robs him of the essential experience of fleet work and big ship routines. Certainly a far better programme would be to have such officers for only 8-9months in the FPS. sending them on to frigates or destroyers thereafter.
The task is, in the long term, an arduous and monotonous one. Patrols interspersed with maintenance periods provide relatively little light relief and amusement — what would be a delightful routine in, say, the climate of the Barrier Reef, becomes very hard work in the north of Scotland. This problem is fully appreciated by the authorities. Spurred on by the present C-in-C Fleet, Admiral Sir James Eberle, who has declared that the RN should have more 'Fun in the sun', the FPS ships are allowed a summer holiday', with a visit to a European port of their choice. In another, associated measure, OPVs now do short maintenance periods in Gibraltar.

A third step has been to reduce the sea-time required from ratings from the standard 27 months before shore posting to 18 months The workload and routines more than justify this decision and, indeed, the case could be made for the FPS to run on an 18 month (or less) commission per ship with block drafting in the old fashion. The rule supposedly applied to officers is that no one should do more than one winter in the squadron, but it seems that this is more honoured in the breach than the observance.
The Ships
The ISLAND class are. on the whole, a great success. They are cheap to buy. economical in manpower and resources, relatively mechanically reliable and very efficient in their duties. There have been some problems in settling down. Because of their size and facilities it has been rather difficult to decide whether they should run as big ships or small ships.
The equipping of the OPVs with the 5.4 metre SEA RIDER rigid inflatable has been an enormous success. These boats are so much an improvement over the now time-honoured GEMINI as to defy description. The problem in boarding now is only whether the boarding party can get on board the fishing vessel safely. With care, although it is not the usual practice, the boats can be operated in Force 7/8

The Bird Class patrol vessel HMS PETEREL (190 tonnes. 37 m overall, built 1977, one 40 mm gun, speed 21 knots complement 24) This class is based on the SEAL Class RAF rescue launches with stabilisers and improved sea-keeping qualities
— by courtesy John Callis
journal ol the Australian Naval Institute - Page 49

conditions. Force 6 is normally the upper operational limit One example which indicates the effectiveness of the SEA RIDER was the occasion when an OPV was due to act as the victim of a boarding exercise by a Type 42 destroyer. The latter hove over the horizon and signalled that the exercise was cancelled because the weather was too bad for her boats. In reply, the OPV cheerfully sent away a SEA RIDER with mail and some Dover Sole for the Captain s supper' Game, set and match to the FPS
The major problems with the OPVs have been their extreme liveliness in a seaway and their speed. The OPV is quite big enough to face any weather, but, like the FLOWER class corvettes of World War II, moves so much in oceanic conditions that the crew become worn out. The roll has been damped by fitting deepened bilge keels in the first five of the class and rather erratic stabilisers in ALDERNEY and ANGLESEY, but all pitch very badly in a head sea.
The OPVs have only a 16V2-17 knot maximum speed. When dealing with large and fast fishing vessels, this is an inadequate margin of supenority and can result in some very long stern chases.
The TON class MCMV. for their part, do a sterling job but are becoming increasingly decrepit There are exceptions —CUXTON, for example, recently commissioned after 22 years spent in reserve — but most leak abominably, are cramped and uncomfortable, subject to frequent breakdowns and will naturally roll on wet grass. They are practically incapable of operations in Force 6 or over — and veterans of operations around the British Isles will realise just what a limitation this constitutes.
The solution appears to be to consider the ISLANDS as replacements for the TONS. Attempts were made to employ KINGFISHER class patrol boats, and these still work around North Ireland, but they have proved to be even more cranky than our own ATTACKS. The ISLANDS carry only one more man than the TONS, they are very cheap and very roomy Their great draft does restrict them somewhat in coastal operations, but the flexibility of the SEA RIDERS more than compensates They can also be employed in the Offshore Patrol Areas, which the TONS cannot.
Two CASTLE class OPVs Mk II are presently under construction in Hall Russell Ltd. ol Aberdeen. With greater length than the ISLANDS, a speed of 20 knots and a helicopter flight deck, they and additional members of the class should prove to be an admirable supplement to the ISLANDS, replacing them in the more exposed patrol areas. Thus, we could expect a

squadron of five CASTLE class OPVs Mark II. in addition to nine ISLAND class OPVs Mark I
There is another line of development, which began with the recently paid-off TENACITY and is continuing with the operational evaluation of the surface effect ship SPEEDY TENACITY, plagued by engineering problems and structural weaknesses, was never a success. The hope is that the jet-foil SPEEDY will provide a 'sprint' capability; remaining in harbour until she has precise information concerning a fishing violation she will then proceed at 55 knots to the scene of action.
There is certainly a lot to be said for this idea, but it is so much more expensive to purchase and operate a SPEEDY than an ISLAND that it is unlikely, unless the trials with SPEEDY are unusually successful, that the cost can be countenanced.
This matter of the cost of units and the level of technology which can be employed is one of great importance. Because DAFS. MAFF and the Ministry of Energy pay a proportion of the costs they are very keen to ensure value for money and will resist attempts to introduce ships or systems which they do not perceive to be cost-effective for the duties in which they are to be employed
Such thinking brought about the introduction of the ISLAND class despite all the protests over their tack of armament and mercantile design. It was fully justified by the results Similarly, the Ministries resisted the proposed introduction of the OTO MELARA 76 mm gun with the CASTLE class because of its great cost and lack of relevance to the fishery protection role. The Navy is not likely to get warships on the cheap through the FPS — although the CASTLEs must be seen as something nearer to the ideal than their predecessors.
Conclusion
Inevitably the question must arise as to whether the Fishery Protection Squadron's duties can more adequately be carried out by a Coast Guard on the model of that of the United States. The answer seems to be Yes. but it must be stressed that such a conclusion is hedged about with reservations and that it should in no way betaken as evidence that Australia should establish a Coast Guard
There are a number of reasons for arguing in favour of a British Coast Guard, but not an Australian one. First, and most important, the duties of the FPS are primarily commercial and economic, removal of the FPS to a Coast Guard would not mean any real reduction in the military surveillance effort around Britain. To create an Australian Coast Guard would definitely result in a degradation of the defence information gathering network in the North of Australia

Page 50 — Journal ol tne Australian Naval Institute

Second, there is the element of scale. Were the functions of the FPS, the DAFS units at sea, the seaborne Customs and excise patrols, the present HM Coast Guard, Service SAR units and Trinity House to be combined a true 'Fourth Service' would be brought into being. In Australia such a Service would be far too small to be a workable proposition and would in any case drain both the RAN and RAAF of their limited fighting strength. The RAN's patrol boats, unsophisticated as they are, constitute a significant part of the Navy's actual and potential fighting strength and would be the front line in the event of any limited conflict in Australia's northern waters.
Third, the environment is completely different. There is no doubt at all that relations between British Fishery Protection ships and foreign fishing vessels are far more civilised and are conducted on a far more controlled basis than those in Australia. A fishing vessel which refuses to stop will, even if she reaches her home port, finally be dealt with — can the same be said for a Taiwanese fishing vessel which has the edge of speed over its RAN pursuer?
Fourth, the quality of 'high command' is, for the reasons already discussed, inevitably

higher in Australia. Having been in patrol boat operations for over a decade the RAN has built up considerable expertise and is very inter ested in maintaining such expertise. The FPS is, when all is said and done, not an integral part of the Fleet. The lack of interest in the FPS and the ignorance of its functions among the 'fighting' Fleet are astonishing. The same can-no' be said of the RAN — the criticism that has been levelled that patrol boat command is 'only a stage in an officer's career' is quite mistaken because the fact that success in small ship command is now almost an essential for the RAN seaman officer means that all senior officers will eventually be intimately acquainted with the details of surveillance and fisheries work. It is a great pity that this can never be the case in the Royal Navy, which has become very much bound up in the PWO syndrome.
Finally, British national fisheries need far more policing than do the Australian. The salmon patrols already mentioned are just one example — the scale of operations being so much greater and the problems more comptex than in Australia. The Royal Navy would be well pleased to rid itself of such police duties; the RAN has no such problem.

QFEMA
REPRESENTING
FRENCH AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
CAPITAL SAVINGS CENTRE
CANBERRA A.C.T. PHONE CANBERRA 48 6866
Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 51

BOOK REVIEWS

THE ROYAL TOUR 1901 By Petty Officer Harry Price. Webb & Bower, 196 pp. Illustrated. Recommended price S34 95
The ship s company, especially the seamen, were highly delighted with the turn ol events as today was Sunday and they knew that there would be no divisions II appears that the cancellation ol divisions due to loul weather was welcomed by the sailors ol 1901 |usl as it is loday
This book is a facsimile of the journal ol Petty Ofticer Harry Price, and covers the tour in the Royal Yacht HMS OPHIR by the Duke and Duchess ol Cornwall and York (later King George V and Oueen Mary) in 1901 Amongst the colonies and countries visited were Malta Singapore Australia. New Zealand South Alnca and Canada
Price was a seaman petty officer who pined the Royal Navy as a Boy Second Class in 1893 transferred to the Royal Fleel Reserve in 1907 re-enrolled in 1912 and was finally dernobil ured in 1919 He died in 1965 at the age ol 88 His service certilicate is reproduced at the beginn ng ol the purnal and shows by the deprivation and restoration ol various Good Conduct Badges, character assessments o< less than Very Good and a couple ol demotions thai he had a tew brushes with authority Nevertheless he comes across as a loyal and patriotic sailor, and was awarded the DSM at the and ol World War I
Profusely illustraled with sketches ft line and watercotoui the pumal presents a very readable and eyecatching account of the tour from Price s viewpoint In copoerplate writing and an easy flowing style which is not really sport by numerous spelling mistakes, he chronicles the day to day happenings on board and ashore He writes in a straightforward way of events such as a funeral at sea. a crossing the line ceremony coaling and storing ship, shipboard concerts and sports days, and Ihe warm and lavish receptions accorded the Royal couple at alt their ports ot call However he records only a lew deta Is ol his personal life or involvement in the tour
From a professional aspect. I was a little disappointed that there is not more in the journal covering seamanship and other evolutions which must have been undertaken with the numerous RN Squadrons and single ships that were mel Bui ihere is one hair-raising accounl ol an under way transfer ol dispatches Irom Ihe OPHIR to Ihe torpedo boat destroye' HMS QUAIL near the mouth ol the Si Lawrence River The method used was to run the mail bag out to the end ot the OPHIR s towei boom while the QUAIL was instructed to steam alongside and recover the bag As Price records. We were steaming atout fifteen knots at the time but she came up alongside quite easily bul a little too far oul to reach the bag she then made another try and whether we then moved our helm or not I can t say but iust as they reached the papets. the destroyer was drawn nghi under our bows, and as we came together she heeled over alarmingly, and Ihe ashes came up her tunnels in dense clouds, but as you know these boats have an extraordinary speed, so she went lull speed ahead, and just managed to slip rounc the other side ot us. missing our stem by a lew inches only
Shortly alter this incident Price notes that the OPHIR entered the rivet and one wonders whether the near collision might have oeen caused by a combination ot pressure and suction, and shallow water effects whir h were probably little understood in those days

Webb and Bower also published the well known Country Diary ot an Edwardian lady, which I am sure many ol us have presented to a lady relative or friend Country Diary sold one and a halt million copies in two and a hall years Because ol its narrower interest I cannot see The Royal Tour 190; approach mg these sales liqures but with Christmas approaching a broad hint to a recipient ot Counfry Diary might be appropriate
J. M KELLY
THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF SHIPS Edited by E L Cornwell, Octopus Books Limited London 1979 pp 477 Recommended price $29 95
Wilh around 6000 years ot history to draw on for lis material any book thai attempts to follow mankind s long progress Irom Iho floating tree trunk thruuqii to modem (fay cruras tin nuclear powered leviathans requires considerable powers of concise English and compression ot lad The slated aim ol the book is important because it sets the scene ol what the editor is trying to do lor the reader namely
to present a balance illustrated history by selecting a number ot Ihe major aspects ot mankind s association with the sea and each ot these areas to trace (he significant (me or lines ol development in rouqhty chronological order
The book traces the beginnings and goes on to discuss Ihe ovolution ot sail The process is interrupted by a seymi-m on Navigators and discoverers before letuining 10 Ships 0) War and Naval Weaponry Before discussing Ihe world Navies a segment on Piracy Mutiny and smuggling appears Discussions on Ihe world S navies are confined to the USA UK, Germany France. Russia. Japan Italy and Soulh America Why South America should appear wilh the Dttyat notable naval maritime nations is not clear lo me The book goes on to discuss inpt it;><t segments Commerce and Trade (including a lew well known ports and shipping lines) Science at Sea propulsion Ships al War Sea Iravel a very interesting section on Dangers and Disasters Safety at Sea and Pomp and Circumstance
Much research 15 evident in Ihe production ol Ihe book nevertheless in some areas incorrecl descriptions betray the age ol or lack ol attention to detail The illustrations and photo graphs are ot a high quality although Ihe binding will soon show signs ot the passage of time The difficulties ot producing a book ol this magnitude are appreciated bul I leel the editor might nave served the aim better by omitting some ol the detail particularly m ihp warship and weaponry segments Detail begs cnticism1
In summary I think Ihe book would appeal more il it concentrated on hislory and arrived at Ihe preseni day without entering discussion in detail The segment The World s Navies should be expanded lo accommodate all or olimin.it.-bowing to other notable publications which do il more oompre hensively
Who will read Ihe book 7 The professional naval Ott likely to want more detail aliemalively is aware ol Ihe history and development Irom other sources For those with an interest in maritime hislory Ihe book would be ol interest, as it would 10 like-minded older children
D WEBSTER

Page 52 — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

DECEPTION IN WORLD WAR II By Dr Charles Cruickshank. Oxford University Press. 1979 pp 248 Hecommended Retail Price S23.00
Even Ihe most casual sludent ol military history would re cognise the codenames TORCH HUSKY and OVERLORD, bul very lew would lind familiarity in ihe codenames KENNECOTT FERDINAND and FORTITUDE The former trio ol course refer respectively lo Ihe Allied landings in North Attica Sicily and Normandy while the lattei are some ot the deception operaliens which preceded Ihem Facts about these have been slow to emerge Irom military archives and records, and now Charles Cruickshank has produced a concise history ol the development of deception as a weapon in the Second World War
We are already tamiliar with some deception operations through dramatisations such as The Man Who Never Was and' Was Monty s Double, and the story ot TAXABLE and GLIMMER involving deception against the Atlantic Wall in the Pas de Calais following D Day has been recounted many times Bul Cruick-shank s book dispassionately tackles the topic with great thoroughness, neither dwelling on Ihe failures nor glamorising the successes He recounts the difficulties which the deception planning staffs — deceptionists rather than deceivers — laced the suspicions, scepticisms, lealousies. patent lack of imagina lion, shortages ol materials and sheer poor planning, together with a regular share ol good and bad luck The author traces the accumulation ol experience by the deception expens beginning with methods used to decoy German bombers into bombing dummy British airfields (successful) and deliberately in blazing targets (moderately successful) through the execution ol elaborate tactical deceplion plans by A Force in coniunction with El Alamein (thoroughly successlul) to Ihe first strategic deception operations dotal failures) The photographs which accompany Ihe text are tascmating
The deceptionists tried initially lo mount operations on a shoestring wilh ludicrous results — (he pre invasion commando reconnaisance tads lor a bogus assault on Ihe Brittany coast in
1943	(Operation STARKEY) were so unsuccessful thai the Ger
mans never realised that they had taken place With experience
came the recognition ol the need lor total participation by all
sections of Ihe Allied military machine it deceplion was to be
successlul Deceplion operations required |usi as much careful
planning and attention to detail and otten a signilicant pro
porlion ol Ihe same resources, as the real operations which they
were designed to protect
Clearly the |ewel in the deceptionists crown was Operation BODYGUARD, the overall deception plan lo cover Allied assaults on Europe in 1944 It was first dratted in July 1943 and was finally approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in January
1944	All the tools ot Ihe deceptionists trade were employed —
inadvertent security breaches m the press, poor circuit dis
cipline, indiscreet after dinner revelations by diplomats in neu
tral countries, dummy ships, planes, vehicles and camps, indif
ferent camouflage, disinformation passed to the Abwehr
through M15 — controlled German agents, deceptive lighting
misleading beach and aerial reconnaissance missions, and
even a deceptive pattern ol bombing attacks in France Need lo
know was rigidly controlled, the maxim being that personnel
involved in deception must remain totally unaware ol the fact In
the event BODYGUARD proved to be a glorious vindication ol
Ihe an ol deception and with German reserves remaining out ot
the Normandy area until it was too late, waiting poised lor Ihe
anticipated Allied attacks in Norway. Pas de Calais Cole d Azur
and the Eastern Mediterranean
Dr Cruickshank also provides us with a briel overview ol German deception measures which were designed to keep Ihe British in a slate ot apprehension over invasion, and Ihe Russians in a slate ol blissful ignorance over German inlentions in the East
In his summary ot the effectiveness ol deception operations and ol its value to the Allied war effort, Dr Cruickshank concludes thai there is no doubl that tactical deception was successful, sometimes, as at El Alamein. spectacularly so Strategic

operations on Ihe other hand had had a patchy record, until BODYGUARD but that the evident success of Ihe taller changed the minds ol even Ihe sceptical US commanders An official US appreciation ol deception at the end ot the war states lhal Ihe Americans were completely convinced of Ihe effectiveness of strategic, deception as an offensive weapon despite strong reservations held in 1943
Deception has none of Ihe panache or excitement of The UL TRA Secret or Cave Brown s Bodyguard ot Lies but then it doesn t set out to be that kind ol book It is not so much emoyabie as interesting, and I recommend it to scholars ol Ihe more cerebral modes ol warfare
I. E. PFENNIGWERTH
WHALEY - THE STORY OF HMS EXCELLENT - 1830 TO 1980. by Captain J. G. Wells CBE. DSC. RN Rid. HMSO 1980. pp 247 Price UK C6 50
This is Ihe story ol HMS EXCELLENT the Royal navy Gunnery School 1830-1980 HMSEXCELLENT athreedecker ol 74 guns which had fought at the Batlie ol Cape SI Vincent under Ihe Command ol Captain Cotlincrwood. was in 1830 moored off Ihe north west comer ot Portsmouth Dockyard with her port broadside pointing up Fareham Creek when she be came the first RN Gunnery School The book traces the development ol Ihe school Irom its inception on board the EXCELLENT, under Commander G Smith, eventual transfer to Whale Island (Whaley) in 1891 (the island having been built by convict labour Irom two mudbanks named Big and Little Whale Island). through lo the present an establishment covering a variety ol disciplines tincluding Ceremonial, Internal Security NBCD Naval Wea pons Trials and Ihe Divisional Leadership and Regulating Schools), under the command ol Captain R K S Bethell OBE a TAS officer
Captain Wells. Ihe author, under whose command the reviewer served al Whale Island, was a 1941 Long Course grad uate who had a distinguished Naval Career including command Ol Whale Island 1961-63 and who is eminently qualified to produce a history ol Whaley The book contains a deal ot detail and traces the development of Naval gunnery particularly that relating to Whale Island from the Napoleonic Wars through to the 1970s The people who instigated development are detailed and the book is really about these people and. Whale Island being what it was inevitably Ihe book is lo a certain extent a potted history ot the RN in Ihe period
The author is carelul lo present a balanced book welt spiced with anecdotes and incidents ol interest and avoids details ol technical minutiae Indeed the introduction of gun sights, standard charges Dumaresg deflection instrument Vickers Range Clock and Ihe Dreyer Fire Control Table is nicely balanced by descriptions of Ihe developers and the innovators, particularly the three great men Fisher Jellicoe and Scott al the turn ol the century
The number and vanety ol non gunnery matters, now well established, introduced by and via Whaley are remarkable These range Irom Ihe commencement ol a permanent professional career lor seamen in the RN al Ihe EXCELLENT in 1830 with innovations such as permanent corps renewable en gagements and advancement according to merit. the introduction ol naval diving in 1839 based al and conducted by gunners at Whale Island land not transferred to the VERNON until post WWII), the introduction ol torpedoes and electricity in 1867, passed lo Ihe VERNON, a hulk that had been a tender to Whale Island, in 1876 Notabty it was two gunners. Fisher and Wilson, who championed Ihe need lor a separate torpedo war (are school Their influence is illustrated by an Able Seaman s answer in an examination that Electricity is a subtle and im-ponderous fluid invented by Captain Fisher and perfected by Captain Wilson Ihe privilege accorded the RN of providing the gun carriage crow lor the funeral of Ihe Sovereign the ac-knowledgemanl of the Navy s claim to the right of the line on ceremonial occasions in 1872

Journal ol Ihe Australian Naval Institute — Page 53

A continuing thread in the book is that ol the Long Gunnery Course and its graduates, running from 1861 with the drat qualifiers as Gunnery Lieutenants, through the Long Course, first called such in 1874, to the last Long Course in 1972 A list ol graduales together wrth Captains. Commanders, Commander (G). XP officers. OE officers and others are contained in the appendix to Whaley Stones ol the Lorg Courses deeds and misdeeds and those ol the Sub-Lieutenants Course are well covered and range Irom the 1955 Sub-Lieutenants elephant on parade to (he sale of Whale Island by the 1972 Long Course
Like the Long Course Officer, the senior sailors — the Gunner's Male and the Gunnery Instructor — are a maior part ot the thread of continuity and the foundation ol Whale Island and are recognised as such in Whaley This reviewer recalls his view ol the Gl ol his youth as respectful trepidation which view in later years was one ol pure respect Whaley makes this point and the knowledge, confidence, smartness and professionalism ol the Gl are well covered These lust class men ot mvanabty stern visage were however, not without a sense ol humour and were seldom lost for an answer Two Whaley anecdotes make this point In WWI a Chiet Gunner's male rnslrucling his class on the mystenes ot a new type of AA sight
CGM Now this is called the Woolwich Approximating or Cosine Sight'
Bemused Able Seaman Please. Chiel. whals a Cosine?'
CGM      Now my lad that snol tor yoj to know There s only one on the island and that s kept in the Caplain s sate In 1972, the Long Course POGI
POGI Right Long Course because ot your looting around over the last three days, we have missed two periods
Long Course member taking a pace torward
POGI. it we have missed two penods we must be pregnant.
POGI     Sir. with your length ol hair you probably are
The RAN input to Whale Island and vice versa is easily gleaned from Whaley 67 RAN Long Course graduates commencing with LEUT J Burnett in 1923. and ending the LEUTS G P Martin and D J Gaul in 1972, have to date produced ten RAN Admirals 16 OE graduates commencing with LEUT R LShimmtn in 1946. and ending with LELTS B P Frutell and L W Renlrey, have to date produced two RAN Admirals.
Whaley is handsomely presented, well proof read and well laid out and illustrated Indeed the photographs are quite excellent and many are ol considerable historical significance The records and statistical researching appear, to this reviewers knowledge to be good, though the omiss-on of the RAN's arguably most distinguished gunner from the Appendix is unfortunate
Overall Captain Wells has achieved Tie aim ol producing a hiBtory ot HMS EXCELLENT admirably, with Whaley being a well written and readable book
A. M. CARWARDINE
I All applications tor copies ol Whalay sliould be addressed to the Anniversary Office, HMS EXCELLEN r. Whale Island. Portsmouth. Hampshire Cost ot the copies is £5.50 (plus 50p postage and packing) within the U K. Outside U K £6 50 plus postage and packing)
AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS by A. C Theo-phanue. Oxford University Press. Melbourne, i960. Recommended retell price J7.95
This is a book tor the student ol politics. As the title suggests. Theophanus argues that democracy in Australia is in crisis — a crisis of legitimacy He develops his argument using a carelulty constructed socio-economic-political model against which he tests his perceptions ol Australian political, economic and social behaviour, giving emphasis to the events ol the last twelve years
There Is. says Theophanus, an economic crisis inherent rn advanced Western society which extendi to Australia It cannot

be resolved by the short term measures which have been intra duced by either the Liberal or Labor parties when in government Nor, he argues, can the crisis in the social structure be resolved by attempts to hide social problems Politically, he asserts that the democratic ideal is such an embarrassment to the modem state that the state attempts to create new philosophies ol democracy to explain away the ideal The sense ot equality, participation and complete nghts which constitutes the democratic ideal is not allowed by the stale because to do so would create challenges 10 the unequal and non participatory character of the existing structure Ergo, the modem stale has a problem of legitimacy, which has assumed crisis proportions
All is not lost however, as the author argues there is a way out ot the crisis A new torni ot democratic socialism, termed participatory socialism is postulated Under this banner there would be progressive transfer ot more ot the productive sector ot the economy Irom the private sphere to the public one Simul taneously. these public enterprises would be managed by democratic committees Parliament would elect a council to coordinate public enterprise While some differentials would remain between incomes tor different skills, the amount ol total wealth an individual could accumulate would be limited There would be tree social services lor all who need them
The general model developed is based on Habermass relationships between the socio-cutlural sub-system, the economic sub-system and the politico-administralive system The ideal-type democratic model is Padicipalive Democratic Theory (PDTl. heavily laced with Marxian interpretation and the author also draws heavily on Marx tor the descriptions ot the economic sub system before reverting to Habermas tor the socio-cuttural model Fairly heavy going tor the non-student (and many students) ot politics, but essential to an understanding ol Australia as portrayed in later chapters ot the book If the reader accepts the author's model, then he is likely to lind it difficult to refute Dr Theophanus s cogent and articulate thesis.
The naval reader will lind scant reference to Ihe Armed Forces in the 450 pages, but may be surprised to find that tar from being Ihe servant of the people he may have londly imagined himself to be, one author at least places him firmly in the ruling class as a member of the Military and espionage forces acting tor capital (p 83) That there is tittle discussion ot the rale ot Ihe military in the work, may or may not say something about the military's socio-economic-political influence in Australia, but the author raises two points which seem important to this reviewer
First in his use ot Playtord (p44) to suggest that most members ol Ihe armed lorces are extremely conservative politically and thai therefore many see their role not in terms of democratic principles, but in opposition to radical people Second is a central issue that anses from a radical perspective (pt 19) Will a time arise when the detence lorces are employed against their own people, to put down rebellions and demonstrations'? These two sub|scts demand thought, both in a personal and institutional sense In a country of limited population and institutional resources. Ihe temptation lot Governments to use their Armed Forces in a quasi police role must always be a possibility, and one, it is hoped, both Governments and the Australian Defence Force will continue to resist
Finally, in the other mention ol the military in Ihe book, is the old assertion that Ihe Army was placed on Ihe alert dunng the constitutional crisis ot November 1975 As one who was in Canberra at Ihe time, and who has been a persistent questioner since. I have yet to find anyone prepared to state that some form ot Armed Forces alert was instituted. Given Ihe leaks which have become fashionable in Government circles nowadays, one can only draw the conclusion that the assertion is just that — an assertion lacking in supporting evidence
This book is a valuable contribution to the study ol Australian society, particularly Australian political society The radical political sector has always been vociferous and articulate, il nol always coherent Theophanus makes sense, even it you do not subscribe lo either his descnption or explanation ol Australian societal behaviour or his participatory socialism solution lor the future society
A   L. BEAUMONT

Rage 54 — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY IN VIETNAM By Denis Fairfax. Australian Government Publishing Service 1980. 232 pages Recommended Retail Price $11.00.
This was very nearly the book thai never was' — tor alter the material had been extensively researched between 1970 and 1974 by Denis Fairfax, an Instructor Lieutenant Commander in the RAN the author left Australia to transfer to the RNZN There were several attempts to have Ihe book published and when the funds lor preliminary printing had been exhausted Ihe galley proofs lay languishing until linally six years after its completion, it has been published by the Australian Government Publishing Service
I m very glad Ihe story of Ihe RAN s involvement in Vietnam 1965-1972. has now appeared, covering the operations ol tour destroyers (over nine deployments!. Ihe RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam and Clearance Diving Team No 3 together with the sea transport and logislic support provided by HMA Ships SYDNEY, JEPARIT and BOONAROO As Ihe foreword by Vice Admiral G J Willis AO. Chief ol Naval Staff says — To those who served in Vietnam this book is an appreciation - To those who lost then lives the book is a tribute
More than this it is an imponanl record ol Ihe RAN s involvement m Vietnam, based mainly on Ihe Official Reports ol Proceedings of each ship and unit taking part The extensive appendices include lists of all RAN personnel allotted tor service in the Vietnam War The photographs are excellent and cover Ihe wide field of the RAN s endeavours It is also good lo see so many ol the presenl senior officers looking ten years younger
While the printing is ol a high standard I was disappointed in the rather garish, soft cover looking a bil like a telephone directory - apparently the long sought atler funds lor printing didn t stretch to a hard one Nevertheless, good value tor money that will bring back many memories
D.W. LEACH
Rear Admiral RAN
Chief of Naval Personnel
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIALISM IN THE PACIFIC: THE EXPANSIONIST ERA 1820-1920 by Roger C. Thompson. Melbourne University Press, 1980. pp 289. Recommended price $25.
Dr Thompsons account ol Australias relationships with the other islands ol the Pacific before and after Federation is yel another example ot that meticulous scholarship which has become Ihe identifying mark ot the modern historian ot Australia
Perhaps if is testimony to the tact that Australians, historically, engaged vigorously in public debate about the great issues ol their day with commendable enthusiasm thai there exists such a vast literature upon which the historian can draw Besides a wealth ol official papers. Dr Thompson has culled no less than 201 foumals and newspapers all but a few published in Australia As a South East Asian histonan hard pul lo find a single intact periodical archive, this reviewer stands both envious and impressed
The main thrust ot Dr Thompsons thesis is that in the last decade ot the 19th century the Australian Colonies perception of their northern and western neighbours changed dramatically Whal had been a simple combination ol missionary zeal and individual economic enterprise in then attitude to the Pacific islands became an obsessive concern with strategic security The Russtan scare of 1878. the renewed imperialism ot Ihe French with its threat ot establishing penal settlements in the region, and perhaps the greatest crisis of all. the German encroachments in New Guinea, seemed suddenly to undermine the rather smug confidence in the Colonies in the limitless inviolability of their geographic isolation The apparent dnve south ol other imperialist powers — in effect an incidental spill-over Irom the scramble lo dismember China and padition South East Asia — created an almost hysterical demand lor a stronger British presence in the Pacific lake

This reaction Dr Thompson argues, can be descnbed as a form ol early Australian imperialism The case is clearly debatable, as Ihe author well knows As he presents his view here without attempting even a cursory definition ol whal he means by imperialism sub-impenalism or expansionism within any form of theoretical framework, it is exceedingly ditficull to accept Dr Thompsons contention Further at no point does he demonstrate that the altitudes expressed by people, like Service, were anything more than a reflection of the shifting moods of a generalised Anglo-Saxon imperial dream, not as sinister as that ot Rhodes with its tragic consequences, but ol the same genus There was nothing especially Australian qua Australian apart from geography about the agitation ot the ideology
The usefulness and the strength ot the book lie elsewhere
In narrating the marvellously turbulent and factious quarrels between an aggressive Victoria and a prickry New South Wales about Ihe virtues ol island annexation, Or Thompson throws an often ironical tight on the miracle that was Federation The spectacle ol Queensland dragged back by the scrutt ot Ihe neck Irom the olf-shore islands ol the northern sea has a contemporary relevance Perhaps ol even greater interest is the character ot the British response to the combative clamour ol colonial Australia bewilder men), mild irntation and some contusion Here indeed is a hint of things to come in relations between London arid the new Commonwealth at the end ot the First World War
Dr Thompson's book, efficiently edited and produced by Melbourne University Press has much ot value tor the serious lay reader as well as Ihe scholar
CHARLES GLYN DANIEL
THE ROYAL NAVY DAY BY DAY. Edited by R. E A Shrubb and A. B Salnsbury Centaur Press 1979. pp392.
Admiral Sir James Eberle KCB, Commander in Chiet Fleet ot the Royal Navy honoured Ihe Australian Naval Institute in July by addressing Ihe Canberra chapter His address showed us that the Royal Navy still plays a most prominent pan in British lite both at home and abroad As a memento ot his visit the Admiral most kindly presented Ihe ANI with the book 7he Royal Navy Day by Day
The Royal Navy Day by Day outlines lor each day ot Ihe year, signilicant and interesting events that occured on that day through Ihe years, that formed pan ol the history ol the Royal Navy Listed are maytr battles (Trafalgar 21 October 1805) actions (KANGAROO and SPEEDY engaged shore defences at Oropesa 9 June 18011, losses (DERWENT sunk by mine oil Lo Havre 2 May 1917), dress changes (moustaches banned and beards permitted 24 June 1869). administrative aspects (Senior engineers became commissioned officers 27 February 1847) and people (Nelson mel Lady Hamillon ! t September 1793) Shod descnplions ol some events and people provide colour and are well augmented by the many photographs and sketches
The diary also includes Australian and Commonwealth Naval events A comprehensivesetol indexes lists RN and allied ships, people, places, medals, aircraft. Fleel Air Arm squadruns. army unns and German submarines There is also a large bibli ography lor those who have had their appetites whetted
Should you wish to make a speech or research Naval history, you will lind this book a great source ul reference It will add colour and spice to your efforts II you wish lo iusl browse you will be fascinated and stimulated by these events For any person with a bent lor Naval history, a love ot Naval tradition or interest in Ihe Navy this book will be o' great value It deserves a place on the book shell ot all Naval Libraries and yours at home
R.M JESSURUN
(The Royal Navy Day by Day should be available Irom Ihe publisher — Cenlaur Press Ltd . Fontwell. Sussex. UK. BN1080TAI

Journal ot me Australian Naval Institute — Page 55

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
1    I	
(Full name in block letters)
Of 	-	
(Address)
apply to join the Australian Naval Institute as a Regular/Associate" Member
2.	Membership of the Institute is open to:
a   Regular Members — Members of the Permanent Naval Forces of Australia
b.  Associate Members — (1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia
 (2)	Members of the Australian Military Forces and the Royal Royal Australian Air Force both permanent and reserve
 (3)	Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanent and reserve components, provided thai they have been honourably discharged from that force
 (4)	Other persons having and professing a special interest in naval and maritime affairs.
3.	'My rank/former rank* is/was'	and briel
details of my service/former service' are	
"I have a special interest in naval and maritime affairs because
 4.	I enclose my cheque for $20 (being $5 joining tee and $15 annual subscription) payable to the Australian Naval Institute.
 5.	My signature on this form indicates that, if accepted for membership. I agree to abide by the Constitution and By-laws of the Institute

(Date)	Signed)
NB 1   'Delete items not applicable
2.  Return to the Secretary, Australian Naval Institute, P.O. Box 18. DEAKIN. ACT 2600
FOR INSTITUTE USE ONLY
Application Received:	Fees Received:
Application Approved:	Membership Registered:
Applicant Notified:	Membership Number:

o

Page 56 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

		3
(Honorary Secretary)       (J

COUNCIL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE 1980-1981

OFFICE BEARERS
President
Rear-Admiral R.C. Swan CBE Senior Vice President
Captain D.J. Orr Junior Vice President
Commodore PR. Sinclair Secretary
Lieutenant K.R. Clancy Treasurer
Lieutenant Commander D.T. Bennet

COUNCILLORS
Captain W.S.G. Bateman Captain N.R.B. Bertyn AM Commander A.H.R. Brecht Lieutenant Commander D.A. Caton Captain S.F. Comfort AM Captain OR. Cooper Lieutenant Commander M.K. Gahan Cc/nmcoore I.H. Nicholson Commander N.D. Uhlmann WRANS Lieutenant S.R.H. Woolrych

PATRON
His Excellency, Sir Zelman Cowen. AK, GCMG, GCVO, KSTJ.QC Governor-General of Australia
PAST PRESIDENTS
1975-77 Commodore V A Parker 1977-78 Commodore J A Robertson
HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS
Admiral Sir Victor Smith AC KBE CB DSC Vice Admiral Sir David Stevenson AC KBE Commodore V.A. Parker Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot KBE AO Commodore J.A. Robertson

Public officer    Commander D R  Patterson RANEM	
	FOUNDATION MEMBERS			
Bennett. G A	Hermann, B.J.		Parker. V.A.	
Berlyn. N R B	Histed.G	+	Patterson. D R	
Bonnett, V W L	James, IB.		Ralph. N	
Brecht. A H R	Jervis. G E		Read. B.J.	
Broben. | w	Josselyn, 1 K.	+	Reynolds. 1.	
Calderwood. G C	Kemp.W.A.		Robertson, J. A	
Cole. SEW	Knox.l W	+	Scott, B P	
Cummins. A R	Lee, N.E.		Sharp, WR	
Cutis. G	Loftus.WB		Shearing. J. A.	
Dalrymple.H.H.G	Loosli. R.G		Smyth, D.H D	
Davidson, J	Martin, D J	+	Snell. K E	
Dickie. DD	i   Martin,PCS		Stephen, K.C	
Fisher, T.R	*   Mayson.JH		Stevens, E.V	
Fox. L G	McDonald. N.E		Stevens, J.D	
George. J	Macleod, B D		Summers. AM F	
Gibbs.BG	Nattey. R.J.		Swan. R.C.	
Goddard, F.C.	i   Nicholson, BM	+	Swan, W.N	
Gnerson. K.W.	Nicholson, I.H		Williams. K.A.	
Hall, I.W.	Orr. D J		York, D	
Associate Member				

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