The Bureaucratization of War: Moral challenges exemplified by the covert lethal drone

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A New Model Navy

Cut and Come Again – a Barber at sea

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Letter to the Editor

Dear Editor,

In the latest issue of Headmark, at the bottom of page 17, there is a line drawing titled HMAS Sydney. Unfortunately it is not Sydney but is either of her sister ships PERTH or HOBART.

Seen beam on, Sydney had a very prominent boom projecting forward from the compass platform to which was secured the lower end of a foredown wireless aerial. In addition, the crow’s nest was at the top of the forecast and not half way between the truck and the upper yardarm as in the drawing.

I have no idea why these differences were peculiar to Sydney but they make for very obvious identifiers.

Yours,

John Smith
Senior Researcher
Naval Historical Society of Australia Inc
GARDEN ISLAND NSW 2011

Contents

The Bureaucratization of War: Moral challenges exemplified by the covert lethal drone 4


General de Gaulle, The Dakar Affair and the Role of HMAS Australia 25

A New Model Navy 31

Cut and Come Again — a Barber at sea 36

Recording Naval Valour and Service — the Bravo Zulu Project 38

Vernon Parker Oration 2014, with Mike Carlton 41

Westward Ho: Expanding Global Role for China’s Navy? 50

Addressing Indonesia’s Maritime Needs: Jokowi’s Ground and Sea-level Challenges 52

A Grand Strategic Framework for Australia — a Maritime Nation 54

Book Reviews 59

Visions from the Vault 67

Style Notes for Headmark 69

ANI Membership Application Form 70

Front page: After completing Exercise Kakadu in the Northern Australia Exercise Area, HMAS Arunta took the long way home to Rockingham, Western Australia, to make a series of port visits to eastern cities.

After visiting Sydney, Port Arthur and Hobart, the ship continued her transit to Western Australia with visits to Melbourne and Fremantle before participating in the centenary of the ANZAC departure at Albany, Western Australia.
This paper interrogates the bureaucratization of war, incarnate in the covert lethal drone. Bureaucracies are criticized typically for their complexity, inefficiency, and inflexibility. The present paper is concerned with their moral indifference. We explore killing, which is so highly administered, so morally remote, and of such scale, that we acknowledge a covert lethal program. This is a bureaucratized program of assassination in contravention of critical human rights.

In the paper this program is seen to compromise the advance of global justice. As well, the bureaucratization of lethal force is seen to dissolve democratic ideals from within. The bureaucracy isolates the citizens from lethal force applied in their name. People are killed, in the name of the State; but without conspicuous justification, or judicial review, and without informed public debate.

The discussion gives an account of the risk associated with the bureaucratization of the State’s lethal power. Exemplified by the covert drone, this is power with formidable reach. It is power as well, which requires great moral sensitivity. Considering the drone program, we identify challenges, which will become more prominent and pressing, as technology advances.

In introduction we consider some of the moral problems which follow from bureaucratization of the State’s lethal power. Speaking of bureaucratization, we identify operations embedded in the secretive agencies and undeclared bureaus of the political administration. These operations, though highly administered, are seen to be insufficiently attentive to moral ideas. The covert lethal drone program exemplifies such operations, and points to moral challenges that will only become more prominent, pressing and complex with the advance and proliferation of technology.

Speaking at the National Defense University at Fort McNair on Thursday, May 23 2013, President Obama acknowledged covert drone operations outside declared war zones. The President acknowledged civilian deaths; the inevitable entailment of covert strikes. And, though the President spoke of a diminished terrorist threat, he made it clear the covert lethal drone program would remain intact.

Flown typically by civilians of the Central Intelligence Agency, covert lethal drone operations are seen to yield strategic advantage at negligible cost. Unlike the special forces soldiers, who would otherwise carry out targeted killing, the civilians who fly secret robotic missions bear no evident physical risk. Their victims are ambushed, innominate screen images who cannot fight back. The bureaucracy deploys the drone to kill, without seeming consequence. But, there is significant moral risk and cost. The employment of covert lethal
The continuance of these operations appears less vindicable. The United States must now set the security offered by covert drones, against the critical human freedoms they efface. The balance struck will define the justice the United States and her allies might hope to uphold and advance. For this reason, policy concerning covert lethal drone operations concerns all nations.1

Exploring the operation of covert lethal drones, this paper looks past questions concerning military action or international law, which have been characteristic of public debate. Analysis does not concern the jus in bello challenges of military drones. Neither is the focus of discussion on the problem of covert political assassination, which in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, has a new allure and complexity. Rather, this paper confines its attention to problems entailing from the bureaucratization of lethal force. Discussion is not about selective or occasional political assassination; specific murders, which might be justified when a single homicide avoids wholesale war. This analysis is about the bureaucratization of covert killing, political execution, killing which has become so highly administered and organized, so impersonal and morally remote, and of such a scale, that we acknowledge a covert lethal drone program. The idea of a program is significant, since it references a schedule, a pattern of killing reduced by “the system” to hum-drum routine, and exemplified by:

A New York Times report (which) showed a president who had weekly meetings with his advisors on ’Terror Tuesdays’ to look at profiles of terror suspects much as one would flip through baseball cards, and ’nominate’ people (the article says, ’without hand wringing’) to be on a kill list.2

This paper peers behind the façade and gloss of political respectability, and behind the routine of schedules and systems. We explore the democracy’s use of force as a consequential expression of democracy. Killing by covert drone is killing in the name of the State. But, immersed in the secret bureaucracy, lethal power is without moral sensitivity. This discussion observes how, concealed by officialdom, killing by covert drone is killing without justification, without judicial oversight, and without the informed public debate, which is critical to the collective democratic conscience.

This paper seeks to inform the perspective of all of us who are isolated by the political bureaucracy from the deadly force applied, outside the framework of law3 in our name. We do not address remote and abstract philosopher’s questions. The paper asks questions which must be answered, if democracies are to exert constructive
influence as the agents of global justice.

**The Bureaucratization of War**

Speaking of bureaucratization, this paper identifies operations entrenched in the political establishment. These operations are purposeful, scheduled and highly organized; yet they are insufficiently attentive to moral ideas. Covert lethal drone operations exemplify such operations.

Covert lethal drones epitomize the evolution of State-sanctioned lethal force. Conspicuously, drone missions have changed the face of warfare. Less evidently, covert lethal drones threaten the democracy they are supposed to defend, and the ideals they are supposed to protect. Hidden from scrutiny by the mechanisms of official secrecy and dissimulated by bureaucratic routine, the drone menace is misjudged.

Concealed by technology’s veneer and bureaucracy’s methodical order, sub rosa drone strikes appear clinical. Together, ingenious instrument and bureaucratic mechanism cast an anodyne camouflage over deathly force. Programmed and scheduled: technology conforms to bureaucratic habit. The bureaucracy plans, forecasts, orders events and measures results. Killing becomes less intensely human and less patently moral.

The covert drone exemplifies the attenuation of moral reasoning when schemes become programmes, and programmes routine. The covert drone illuminates the moral lacuna that divides standard operating procedures from individual decision and discernment. The drone highlights the dehumanising attention, which is paid to detailed metrics such as cost or technological effectiveness. This is what happens when civilian contractors or non-commissioned and non-elected officials manage departments and the process of killing on behalf of the State. Bureaucracies are often criticized for their complexity, their inefficiency, and their inflexibility. The present paper is most concerned with the bureaucracy’s indifference and moral unconcern.

In *The Trial*, Kafka captures bureaucracy’s insupportable moral unresponsiveness. Kafka reveals the hallmarks of bureaucracy at its worst: remote and unapproachable, cold-blooded and unstoppable. In a telling passage, Kafka criticizes the secrecy and concealment, which is “an essential part of the justice dispensed here that you should be condemned not only in innocence but also in ignorance.” Unfolding the futility of human resistance, Kafka apprehends bureaucracy as an unsafe reason and a poor excuse. Dirty hands are not cleaned merely because evil conformed to bureaucratic convention.

Speaking at the National Defense University, President Obama acknowledged the lethal reach of drone technology. And, though President Obama claimed the drone program conformed to the highest standards, political practice does not dispel doubt. Observing the moral jobbery of contemporary public life, Thomas Pogge wrote:

> Moral language is all around us – praising and condemning as good or evil, right or wrong, just or unjust, virtuous or vicious. In all too many cases, however, such language is used only to advance personal or group interests.  

Pogge draws attention to play politics where moral language is a cover for wrongdoing, cunning and realist convenience. At the same time, he sheds light on the moral frailty of the covert lethal drone program. By its nature, such a program is bureaucratic. The program is deep-rooted within the established structures and procedures of government, judged by quantitative metrics and invisible to public scrutiny. Nowhere does the covert drone program call upon personal rectitude, which Pogge points out is merely occasional in public life. Immersed in the establishment, the covert drone exemplifies lethal power without moral sensitivity.

**The Covert Drone Program**

Before Al Qaeda’s attack on New York and Washington, the US denounced Israel’s targeted killing of Palestinian terrorists. The United States’ Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, said; “The United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations;” which he described as “extrajudicial killing.”

This posture changed dramatically following the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Since this time, State-sponsored assassination, described euphemistically as targeted killing, had become an official United States policy.

Implemented through the Predator and Reaper drone platforms, the strategy of covert targeted killing uses private contractors for various tasks, including flying the drones. This targeted bureaucratized program (identified in this paper as the covert lethal drone program) runs in parallel to drone missions flown by the United States military (identified in this paper as military drones).

But, though technically similar, the two programs are philosophically different. Military personnel fly military drones, in declared war zones against recognized military objectives. Military drones are a mechanism of conventional war, not materially different from any weapons system where lethal force is applied with precision from an extended range. As a stand-off weapons system, drones are necessary since, as Hans
Morgenthau said, in some cases we deem it necessary to fight. But more particularly, military drones enable a certain mode of fighting. We seek precision weapons – like military drones – because we wish to fight with exactitude and thus reduce risk to non-combatants. We seek weapons of extended range – also like military drones – so as to safeguard the soldiers who defend our societies. Military drones then, are not remarkably different from any other weapons system operated by uniformed personnel in declared war zones.

The bureaucratic program of remote controlled assassination is quite a separate thing. Operated covertly by the Central Intelligence Agency against suspected terrorists, and beyond the boundaries of declared war zones, the program was initiated by the Bush Administration and has since been expanded under President Obama. Hidden away in the corridors of political power, this program has become habit, a custom. As bureaucracy's rococo routine conceals the moral gravity of decisions; within the labyrinth, people become insufficiently attentive to the decisions they make.

**Drones, Bureaucracy and Moral Responsibility**

Drone operations are not, of and in themselves, unethical. But drone operations are ensnared in bureaucracy, and the bureaucratisation of killing is problematic. Entwined in officialdom; the lethal power of the State is un governed by foundational moral ideas. And, with their moral acumen tranquilized by the bureaucracy's procedural regimen, individuals exercise the State's lethal force without compassion or compunction. Bureaucrats reduce blood-shedding to a routine. When these people pass verdicts of life and death, the potential for abuse and overreach is beyond calculation.

This section considers the decisions to kill, which are made by people immersed in the political bureaucracy and isolated from the point-blank moral intensity of battle. For them, exercising the State's lethal power has become unproblematic and devoid of moral concern. Their victims are dehumanized by a “political label” as “terrorists” and executed by remote control. Yet, though mechanized and impersonal – killing by drone is still killing, and it must not be immoral or without moral concern.

In *Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands*, the philosopher Michael Walzer acknowledges utilitarian imperatives. Arguing that “it is easy to get one's hands dirty in politics and it is often right to do so,” Walzer describes the political dilemma of moral people confronted by utilitarian pressure. When deeply held moral convictions are confronted by circumstances, Walzer argues that good people will typically accept the utilitarian calculation and try to measure up. Faced with extremity, Walzer argues that in order to do the right thing, good people will commit a moral wrong. The innocent will not remain innocent should they choose to abide by absolute moral principles because, says Walzer, they will fail to measure up.

Confronted by stakes of a significant magnitude, Walzer argues it is right to get one's hands dirty. But it is not
right, Walzer reasons, to dirty one’s hands with neither qualm nor moral second thought. His position is pragmatic and prudential. But Walzer is not callous; he is not unrealistically realist, blind to critical human rights and dignities. The argument Walzer makes enables us to see how people who act against deeply held moral convictions might feel distress, or even guilt, whilst not actually being guilty. Walzer illuminates the moral challenge faced by those who find themselves confronted by dilemma, and forced to “weigh the wrong (they) are willing to do in order to do right.” Spelling out the problem of dirty hands, Walzer identifies a moral awareness and insight, which is not conspicuous amidst the pressures of politically realist bureaucracy.

Walzer argues that when the consequences of not acting are “beyond calculation, immeasurably awful... (amounting to) evil objectified in the world... a threat to human values so radical that its imminence would surely constitute a supreme emergency” then deep moral convictions must be overridden in the pursuit of a greater good. But Walzer does not suggest that no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty. Walzer does not believe that good effects inevitably justify reprehensible action.

Walzer acknowledges moral standards, which might be overridden in only indescribably grave circumstances. Walzer advocates the sacrifice of personal goodness, only when there is no other course of action. He allows the mindful, conscious and presumably regretted sacrifice of personal ideals, and argues against the careless wanton abandonment of moral standards. Richly textured and nuanced, Walzer’s argument advances powerful claims against the sort of moral insensitivity, which is typical of large-scale bureaucracy. In his text, *Criminal Case 40/61: The trial of Adolf Eichmann*, Harry Mulisch offers an influential and profound illustration of the evil which follows from morally heedless bureaucratic compliance.

Enumerating the war crimes of Adolf Eichmann, Mulisch explains how “a dull group of godforsaken civil servants doing their godforsaken duty” turned the bureaucracy into a weapon. Describing an insensitive, process-driven administration, Mulisch coined the term “psycho-technology.” The term speaks to a quintessentially bureaucratic engrossment with obedience, and to the culpable moral torpor that pervades bureaucratic habit. Eichmann did not get his hands dirty in the way Walzer conceives, because Eichmann was morally oblivious. Insufficiently attentive to moral ideas, Eichmann was tranquilized by bureaucracy’s regimen. Like bureaucrats everywhere, Eichmann exercised the State’s lethal force without compassion or concern, and with a clear conscience.

In her compelling investigation, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Hannah Arendt describes how Eichmann, seduced by the Third Reich, was “not Iago and not Macbeth, and nothing would have been further from his mind than to determine with Richard III ‘to prove a villain.’” Submissive to the bureaucracy, Eichmann’s evil was monstrous. But more significantly it was, in Arendt’s famous term, banal. Eichmann was predictable and conventional: his compliance was ordinary and commonplace. “He merely, to put the matter colloquially, merely never realized what he was doing.” When on trial, Eichmann was described unsurprisingly by his defence as “only a ‘tiny cog’ in the machinery of the Final Solution” (and) in its judgement the court naturally conceded that such a crime could be committed only by a giant bureaucracy.”

Acknowledging the suffusive authority of bureaucracy, the court understood what Foucault called the “subtle, calculated technology of subjugation... the separation, coordination and supervision of tasks...
(which) constitutes an operational schema of power.”25 This was “panopticism,” designed “to ensure the prompt obedience of the people and the most absolute authority of the magistrates...”26 Which MacIntyre understood to depend for its success upon disguise and concealment.25 Applied through an insidious ensemble of technical interventions, bureaucratic influence commodifies people and dissolves moral autonomy. In bureaucracy, people are valued when their character is inclined toward rule-following.

But Arendt recognizes that bureaucracy does not excuse individuals from moral responsibility. Arendt presumes ideas of virtue ought inform interpretation of laws and regulations. Her analysis reveals how moral thinking is much more than the licit compliance, which is valued in bureaucratic systems. Eichmann’s merciless obedience makes clear the limitations of “the simple principles of the deontologist,” which R. M. Hare acknowledged to be a “prime concern of churches and other ‘moral authorities’.28

Depicting Eichmann’s moral failure, Arendt underlines Walzer’s reasoning that political action should be informed by scruple and moral discernment.27 Her account of Eichmann’s moral inanity is shocking. The implication for the contemporary program of C.I.A. murder is appalling. The C.I.A. has secured the background conditions, which make systematized murder by the State seem unremarkable and banal.

In an authoritative investigative text, *The Way of the Knife*, Mark Mazzetti explores the C.I.A. covert drone program. Recalling Eichmann’s grotesque delinquency, Mazzetti describes political murder committed without discernment or remorse. Citing Richard Blee, formerly head of the C.I.A. unit tasked with finding Osama bin Laden, Mazzetti describes how selective covert strikes came to be morally vacuous matters of routine. As bureaucratic habit overwhelmed ethical sensitivity, lethal force came to be abused and permission to launch lethal strikes in Pakistan was given, even when American spies were not certain whom they were killing.28 Reliant on notoriously inexact intelligence,29 these so-called “signature strikes” often resulted in high proportions of non-combatant causalities. Mazzetti quotes Blee: “In the early days, for our consciences we wanted to know who we were killing before anyone pulled the trigger, now we’re lighting these people up all over the place.”30

Mazzetti reveals how, greasead by bureaucratic routine, “the pistons of the killing machine operate entirely without friction.”31 Immersed in the political bureaucracy, people exercise the State’s lethal power without qualm, and without a mind to democratic ideals. And critically, as Mazzetti acknowledges, the frictionless bureaucratic mechanism dissolves the fabric of public democracy.32

**Drones, Bureaucracy and Public Democracy**

In *The New Yorker*, Jane Mayer cites Mary Dudziak, a professor at the University of Southern California’s Gould School of Law, who argues “drones are a technological step that further isolates the American people from military action, undermining political checks on...endless war.”32 Michael Walzer is similarly disturbed that a civilian intelligence agency wields the State’s lethal power in secret.”33 Walzer’s concern is that people are killed in the name of the United States – and in the name of nations allied to the United States – without any public justification.

Philip Alston, United Nations

Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, tacks a parallel tack. In a study on targeted killings, submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council on 28 May 2010, he criticized “the displacement of clear legal standards with a vaguely defined licence to kill, and the creation of a major accountability vacuum.”35 Alston explained how the legitimate struggle against terrorism has been compromised by a proliferation of wicked acts, routinely explained away by the bureaucratic gloss of legal language, and he protested the failure of governments to:

Specify the legal justification for policies, to disclose the safeguards in place to ensure that targeted killings are in fact legal and accurate, or to provide accountability mechanisms for violations.36

The bureaucratisation of drone warfare involves a hefty price, particularly in the corrosion of public democracy. People are isolated by the bureaucracy, from war and from the horrors done in the their name. Equally, government agencies are protected by bureaucratic obfuscation and escape the reckoning of public accountability. As William Felice observes, within bureaucracy it is:

Often difficult to attribute moral responsibility to anyone...and where there is a tendency to deny the responsibility of an individual person, instead attributing blame abstractly to ‘the system’, the government, or, ‘the State’.”37

Political bureaucracy, as Felice depicts it, is a large-scale feature of the contemporary world. Such bureaucracy structures human interaction, and presumes a moral theory in the modes of action and interaction, which it enjoins. Of foundational concern, is the presumption that citizens are rightly disarticulated from political decision;
that citizens are merely ruled and no
to the political bureaucracy manipulates
the community. Mills described how
“there is the propagandist, the publicity
expert, the public-relations man, who
would control the very formation of
public opinion in order to be able to
include it as one more pacified item
in calculations of effective power.” He
argued that:

The communications which prevail
are so organized that it is difficult or
impossible for the individual to answer
back immediately or with any effect.
The realisation of opinion in action is
controlled by authorities who organize
and control the channel of such
action.

Mills critiques a mode of
bureaucratic functioning, which
presumes citizens are content to
experience political events at an
unworried and indifferent distance.
He identifies the spin and concoction,
which operates to put a cordon sanitaire
around politics. The people are kept
at a safe distance, their engagement
in politics regulated by the apparatus
and ordinance of the press office.
Part of this is political stagecraft, the
rehearsed rhetoric that has been a part
of democratic life since the Pnyx. But
there is a part that is not so innocuous:
a part that bowdlerizes public
statements and keeps the people silent.

Citizens, of course, do not declare
war. They may be able to veto military
operations at the ballot box, though
usually only after a declared conflict
has exacted a terrific cost. Even so,
in modern mass democracies, the
consent of the people remains a critical
condition of war’s legitimacy. Such
consent will, of course, be influenced
by propaganda and bellicose patriotism
as much as by a commitment to the
high ideals of justice. But at a critical
level, public consent for war depends
upon the manifest and meaningful
accountability of legitimate authority.
The drone campaign, which is
concealed by political bureaucracy, fails
to meet any standard of accountability.

A different concern about
covert drone killings, acknowledges
democracy’s use of force as a
consequential expression of democracy.
A democracy should be very mindful of
the force it uses at home, and abroad.
Speaking against the death penalty,
Cesare Beccaria argued in his 1764
Essay on Crimes and Punishments, the
State ought only go so far. He argued
that the State’s obligation to maintain
order does not mean the State has
licence to do whatever it wants. The
protection of public security does
justify some measure of imposition,
but “every act of authority of one man
over another for which there is not an
absolute necessity, is tyrannical.” Thus
the smallest encroachment beyond that
which is strictly necessary is “abuse,
not justice.” Thus, a democratic
people will not accept that the State
has the power to use force against
them in secret, without any measure of
accountability. Similarly, a democracy
should be circumspect in its use of
force abroad.

But the covert drone program
contravenes critical human rights
and democratic ideals, and dissipates
the integrity of democratic justice.
Covert drone strikes are not flown by
military personnel in declared war
zones. Covert missions do not target
identified military targets. Covert
drone strikes are mounted against
those who are merely presumed
to be terrorists; against those who
merely look like terrorists, who fit a
profile — in the argot of C.I.A. covert
strikes — a signature. The risks are very
great. Since covert operations began in
Pakistan in 2004, one estimate is that
780 civilians, including 175 children,
have been casualties.

Sustaining a covert drone program
therefore, erodes the capacity of a
democratic nation to advance global
justice. As a program, covert drone
operations are highly structured and
of such a scale that they have become
bureaucratized. The inescapable
corollary is that decisions to kill are not
like the decision soldiers may make to
kill an adversary. The drone program
makes killing impersonal, a matter of
routine. Killing is less intensely and less
patently a moral judgment.

The Einsatzgruppen and the
crematoria gave pitiless and
repugnant expression to the minutes
and decisions of political staff, of
meetings and committees. Just so,
covert drones give lethal effect to the
recommendations and determinations
of bureaucrats who define the official
criteria of signature targets.

The dangerous
convenience of drones
Concealed behind the muddiness of
bureaucratic language and routine,
covert drone killing seems merely
expedient and not at all upsetting
or shocking. Targets are serviced:
problems are solved. On its face, justice
is served. But without the conscientious
and purposeful commitment of the
polity, killing is less an act of just war
than low murder. Enabled by the
bureaucracies and disconnected from
the social conscience, drone killing is
effortless — but it is not bloodless, and
not without moral significance.

In Perpetual Peace, Kant argued
powerfully that the democratic state
should be less likely to go to war
because:

If, as must be so under (the
republican or democratic) constitution,
the consent of the subjects is required
to determine whether there shall be
war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such bad business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the miseries of war upon the country. This implies: they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war out of their own property; they must do their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even peace itself.44

Kant understands that democratic citizens, realising the price to be paid in blood and treasure, will deliberate the necessity of conflict seriously. But, disguised and glossed by the political bureaucracy, covert drone killing seems costless and without moral risk. The citizens are misinformed; they cannot give fully formed consent to the killing committed in their name.

The dissimulation of bureaucratic language is aided and abetted by drone technology. Pioneering technology informs the rhetorical devices which aim to reduce political and societal inhibitions to conflict. Drones are described as “unmanned,” “robotic” and “remote.” Technological ideas are applied with practiced artifice to amplify the psychological distance, which separates advanced democratic society from the distant impact of Hellfire missiles. Technological language dissolves the human empathy, which should inform the moral calculus of war.

The misappropriation of technical language may bring about more than concern about deceit. Technology, which enables the political bureaucracy to depict drone strikes as clinical, routine, regulated and efficient, may contribute to a public callousness, to a public susceptible to the idea of costless war, and to a public predisposed to tolerate wars waged by the bureaucratic class. In his book, Wired for War, political scientist P. W. Singer writes, “unmanned systems represent the ultimate break between the public and its military.”45 Singer recognizes that a weapons system can shape the viability of military action. But more importantly, he illuminates the way that technology can erode our controlling humanity and moral insight. From this perspective he informs the debate about the dehumanising bureaucratization of war, which may make war more likely.

**Drones, Bureaucracy and the Meaning of War**

Vesting the secret bureaucracy with lethal power has transformed the idea of war. Traditionally trusted and commissioned by the State as custodians of lethal power, the military has been supplanted unwisely. Waged covertly by the bureaucracy, war has become remote and killing sneaky. Society ought to remember the critical role of honourable soldiers.

When Thucydides relates how the Corinthians sneered at the Athenian use of mercenary soldiers,46 he reveals the inter-relationship of soldiers and the State, which is foundational to the western military tradition. Thucydides understands how martial ideals embody – or should embody – the aspirations of society. Disparaging the Athenian mercenaries, Thucydides reveals the deep-set roots of our understanding that war is an act of national sacrifice.

Covert drones exaggerate the moral distance, which separates civilians from the reality of killing done in their name. The lethal bureaucracy reduces war to outright industrial carnage. Without sacrifice, lacking chivalry, bravery and moral discernment, war becomes a merely legal-technical term, which is applied to excuse political butchery.

This is a dangerous turn of events because more than a legal construct, war is a moral endeavor. “For as long as men and women have talked about war, they have talked about it in terms of right and wrong.” War – more than a physical fight or base slaughter – is a moral concept, richly and powerfully informed by ideals which societies recognize as critically important. These ideas are not conspicuous in the narrative of drone warfare and secret agencies.

Once high ideals are sacrificed to pragmatism, the war is lost. Often tacit, the power and credence of the appeal to high-mindedness is made explicit in United States Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine, which argues “lose moral legitimacy, lose the war.”48

This is a critical idea. In The Trojan Women (415 b.c.), Euripides demonstrates the significance and complexity of the moral thinking which textures the profession of arms. Following the capitulation and slaughter of Melos, and butchery at Plataea, Scione, Hysiae and (almost) Mytilene (where the decree to murder the populace was rescinded at the last minute) Euripides was heartsick at “simple barbarity.”49 When he has Hecuba exclaim: “Achaeans! All your strength is in your spears, not in the mind,”50 Euripides illustrates the ethical perspective that should distinguish soldiers from murderers and war from mere butchery. When Euripides has Poseidon curses the victorious Greeks: *That mortal who sacks fallen cities is a fool, Who gives the temples and the tombs and hallowed places Of the dead to desolation. His own turn must come.*51

He points out a fundamental truth – war should advance in the cause of a better peace. Such an end can be accomplished only when conflict is
**The Bureaucratization of War: Moral challenges exemplified by the covert lethal drone**

conducted with chivalry and ethical sensitivity. Without regard for ideals, the drone-wielding realist bureaucracy will earn resentment and inspire revenge. As Euripides cautions; their own turn will come.

**Drones and a democratic commitment to end terrorism**

The legitimate struggle against terrorism will not, in the end, be won by military force. Neither will terrorists be defeated by drones of the bureaucracy. Terrorism poses a threat, which might best be combated by the law, and by political dialogue and integration. In a 2008 research report, the RAND Corporation found that “a transition to the political process is the most common way in which terrorist groups (end).” When political integration was not the answer, the RAND report found policing to be the next most effective strategy for combating terrorism.

A sustained commitment to drone operations is not, therefore, a sensible long-term strategy.

The drone is a military instrument, an implement of the bureaucratization of war. As the drawdown from major operations in Afghanistan takes effect, various lawless frontiers will likely emerge as a new and difficult area of operation. These will not be the defined battlefields of declared wars. Insurrectionary frontiers will be the territory of failed or failing States and, conceivably, the incubators of hostile radicalism. Drones, deployed as part of the post Afghanistan force projection strategy, will patrol these inexact marches. Such operations, though they may well be covert, need to be philosophically transparent. Publicly accessible rules of engagement need to define the basis upon which a covert lethal drone strike may be authorized. Force projection needs to be more than lawful, and recognized as just and responsible.

The drone, though stealthy, needs to emerge from the bureaucracy. Drones must not be the implements of a bureaucratized murder program. The drone is a military instrument, materially indistinguishable from airborne munitions, or from cruise missiles launched from far-flung platforms at sea. As a military apparatus, lethal drones should be deployed only in declared war zones, by a disclosed military command.

**Drones: their future responsible use**

What is once seen or heard cannot be unseen and unheard. The drone is a technological advance, which represents a profound and now pervasive challenge to the western profession of arms, to western democracy and to the prospects of global justice. Where the drone leads, other weapons systems will follow. Our moral thinking must keep up.

The drone is an instrument of the State’s lethal power, which rightly belongs in the hands of the military. But the governance and regulation of drones must be transparent. Drone operations should be morally defensible, as well as operationally practical. Even if the specific details of operations are concealed, the citizens in whose name violence is practiced should be able to trust that State sanctioned killing is not furtive murder, and not habituated bureaucratic routine.

As the drawdown from major operations in Afghanistan takes effect, various lawless frontiers will likely emerge as a new and difficult area of operation. These will not be the defined battlefields of declared wars. Insurrectionary frontiers will be the territory of failed or failing States and, conceivably, the incubators of hostile radicalism. Drones, deployed as part of the post Afghanistan force projection strategy, will patrol these inexact marches. Such operations, though they may well be covert, need to be philosophically transparent. Publicly accessible rules of engagement need to define the basis upon which a covert lethal drone strike may be authorized. Force projection needs to be more than lawful, and recognized as just and responsible.

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In conclusion, covert lethal drone operations exemplify the recasting of state-sanctioned lethal force. But, beyond their constructive part in operations, drones menace the democracy they are supposed to defend, and the ideals they are supposed to protect.

The paper did not argue against the operation of covert lethal drones per se. The focus of discussion was on the bureaucratization of lethal drones. We argued that when killing is meshed in bureaucratic routine, the State connives at foundational moral ideas. As a program formalized in government procedures, lethal drone operations are unlike particular strikes against named individuals. Bureaucratized covert killing is mechanical in character and petrifying in scale.

Lethal drones reduce war to a political pogrom. People are murdered by the State beyond the bounds of declared war zones, because they fit an undisclosed profile. The ritual of legalistic language rationalizes killing, but the high ideals of democracy and justice are irretrievably diminished. And, with every covert strike, the legitimate struggle against terrorism is compromised.

The drone is precise weapon, and one that limits the requirement for “boots on the ground”. But the drone is...
not the means by which peace will be won, nor the means by which justice will be advanced. Though stealthy, the drone needs to emerge from the bureaucracy. Drones must not be the concealed weapons of injustice.

Acknowledgement
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Notes

(Endnotes)

The Australian Defence White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia: 2013) p. 20 paragraph 2.81 acknowledges the importance of policy, which must inform the operation of autonomous systems.

Philip Dorlin, “Pine Gap Drives US Drone kills,” in The Sunday Age Newspaper, 21 July 2013. Dorlin describes the involvement of the Australian signals intelligence base at Pine Gap in United States’ drone operations. The article does not specify the missions that have been supported. But the article does make plain that American drone operations have received critical geolocation signals intelligence from the Australian base. Thus, Dorlin underlines the interest of nations apart from the United States in drone operations and policy.


9 Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun, “From Jus ad Bellum to Jus ad Vim,” p. 90.

10 Alex Bellamy, “Is the War on Terror Just?” in International Relations, 19:3 (2005) p. 283


19 Harry Mulisch, Criminal Case 40/61: The trial of Adolf Eichmann, p. 113.


21 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 287. (Emphasis in the original)

22 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 289.


24 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 195, 196, 197.


31 Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, p. 319.


The Bureaucratization of War: Moral challenges exemplified by the covert lethal drone


Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control, p. 105. Benjamin cites the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. She also cites the New America Foundation estimate that from 2004 - 2011, between 1717 and 2680 individuals were the victims of drone strikes, and of those between 391 - 780 were civilians.


48 The United States Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: US Field Manual 3-24 also published as Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007) paragraph 7.44. The example of the French counterinsurgency in Algeria is provided as an example. In this campaign, the French condoned the use of torture against insurgents. This was seen to undermine the moral legitimacy of the French campaign, and to empower the insurgent campaign, which became associated with ideas of just cause and seen as a defensive action against oppression.


51 Euripides, Trojan Women, in Grene, D and Lattimore, R. (eds) The Complete Greek Tragedies: Volume III, (three volumes)
ADAPTING NAVY TRAINING PROCESSES TO THE RAPID EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATION & LEARNING TECHNOLOGIES
– A Design Pattern Approach to Training Design

BY LCDR CHRIS MCCONACHY

“Training innovation enhances flexible and effective training delivery options. Technology and simulation applications provide opportunities for improvement in safety, flexibility, cost, rapid development, training throughput and overall standard of graduates…”

“The ADF actively seeks to exploit advances in technologies to enhance training delivery options.” Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 7.0 (2011, p. 51)

The learning and communication technologies revolution

The rapid evolution of learning and communication technologies is bringing greater change to the education and training sectors than most practitioners could have foreseen, even a decade ago. The design and delivery modes of education and training are coevolving with the technologies. Factors such as increasing bandwidth and storage capacity, the proliferation of mobile devices, improved affordability, and the development of Web 2.0 applications, have created a new range of possibilities for the design and delivery of education and training. It would not be overstating the case to say that a technology-driven education and training revolution is occurring. Education and training have undergone a shift from an industrial-age paradigm to an information-age paradigm.1

The Challenges for Navy training

This situation presents two interrelated challenges for the Navy training organisation. The first is to leverage the technologies to improve training safety, flexibility, cost, throughput, and outcomes.2 The second is to match the expectations and learning styles of new generations of trainees who are accustomed to learning with technology.

The Navy’s training development processes, developed during the pre-digital era, are based on the Defence Training Model (DTM). The DTM is a close variant of the ADDIE model. The ADDIE model represents a generic design process used by instructional designers and training developers. It consists of five phases; analyse, design, develop, implement, and evaluate.3 Its emphasis on high upfront analysis makes it cumbersome to use and slow to apply. It provides minimal direction in the design process. ADDIE is not ideally suited to the tasks of adapting existing training, or designing new training, to leverage the rapidly evolving learning and communication technologies.

An Alexandrian design pattern-based approach

Design patterns and pattern languages were originally conceived by Christopher Alexander4 for application in architecture and town-planning. A design pattern is a solution to a recurrent problem in a context. Patterns describe a problem, its context, and a solution to the problem. They should be written in such a way that they enable the reader to understand enough of the problem and its context to adapt a solution to their own needs. Patterns form a bridge between theory, empirical evidence and experience, and the design solution. Patterns relate to one another to create a pattern language.5

Training design based on Alexandrian design patterns may offer an approach suited to dealing with the rapid evolution of learning and communications technologies. Design patterns are modular solutions to recurring design problems. They could work in conjunction with the ADDIE model, providing the detailed guidance and direction that is currently lacking in the design phase.

1 (Reigeluth & Carr-Chellman, 2009)
2 (Defence, 2006)
3 (Morrison, 2010)
4 et al. (1977)
5 (Goodyear, 2004)

Sonar Technician (Surface) Seaman Apprentice Joseph Barnes reports simulated mines during an undersea warfare training scenario in the sonar room aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd (US Navy)

Design patterns articulate a direct link between underpinning theory, or corporate knowledge, and the practice they inform. Individual patterns could be developed or updated, as required, to reflect changes in technologies and approaches to training. They are sufficiently fine grained to allow for the adaption of existing training to new technologies.

Design patterns could also provide a systematic approach to capturing corporate knowledge in a format that can be readily stored in a knowledge bank and shared throughout the training organisation. They offer a means of facilitating organisational learning which could, in turn, drive policy development.

I aim here to evaluate an approach to training design based on Alexandrian design patterns, as a means of addressing the challenges for Navy training created by the rapid evolution of learning and communication technologies.

The requirement to design Navy training around rapidly evolving learning technologies

Learning requirements and expectations of trainees. The 18 year olds of today have never known a world without home computers, the internet, and mobile phones. Their social lives are heavily reliant on social networking sites. Many are dedicated gamers, spending hours each week immersed in virtual worlds. This generation has gone through school with laptops, tablets, and mobile phones. They are accustomed to learning with technology, and to the freedom and flexibility that it provides.6 This is the current generation of Navy trainees.

For this generation of learners, many of their critical learning conversations no longer take place in the class, they now take place online, out of school hours. Others7 support this, pointing to research conducted by the National Schools Board Association (2007) which reported that students’ online sharing in social network sites involves education and learning. 50% reported talking specifically about schoolwork.

It is known that military trainees, while on residential training courses, are creating online networks using Web 2.0 technologies. Given the high intensity of military training courses, and the emphasis placed on teamwork, it is improbable that trainees are not leveraging their online networks in support of their learning, and the sharing of learning resources.

It is important for Navy training to evolve in such a way that it will be suited to the learning styles, preferences, and expectations of the new generations of trainees. In order to provide opportunities for learning that are consistent with trainees’ experiences outside of the Navy, a systematic, trainee-centred transformation of pre-digital training methodologies needs to occur.

Potential inconsistencies in the use of learning technologies

The potential exists for significant differences to emerge across the Navy training organisation in the learning technologies being used and the ways in which they are being used. This is what Stone (2008) refers to as a patchwork model. Such models are characterised by an eclectic mix of hardware and software, with no unifying user interface.

As well as creating inefficiencies, patchwork models generate unnecessary extraneous cognitive load as trainees are subjected to different user interfaces, password prompts, and navigation hurdles,8 as they move between schools and courses. Extraneous cognitive load has the potential to negatively impact training outcomes and can, in extreme cases, prevent any learning occurring at all.9 Stone10 makes the point that the

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6 (Bennett, Maton, & Kervin, 2008)
7 (Senge, 2000)
8 Greenhow, Robelia, and Hughes (2009)
9 (Stone, 2008)
10 (Sweller, Kalyuga, & Slava, 2011)
11 (2008)
value of a simple to use, universal user interface cannot be overstated.

**Building a bank of corporate knowledge**

There is currently no Navy-wide systematic method for generating a bank of corporate knowledge regarding the use of learning technologies; for example, lessons learned, or advice about what works in different training scenarios. Without such a knowledge bank the capacity for organisational learning is limited, there is little on which to base policy, there is no baseline for continuous improvement, and the subsequent dialogue on the use of learning technologies between various parts of the Navy training organisation is limited.

Articulating learning technology requirements to external training providers. Without a significant body of corporate knowledge to guide and inform the use of learning technologies the Navy has no systematic means of articulating its requirements to training providers. Consequently, the potential exists for external training providers to determine the format and technical specifications of much of the technology-based training they produce for the Navy. This, in turn, would contribute to the realisation of the patchwork model described by Stone.

A robust policy on the use of learning technologies should provide contractors with;

1. the underlying Navy training philosophy,
2. delivery mode (instructor led, distance, etc.),
3. specifications for technologies (hardware, software, simulator fidelity, etc.),
4. specifications for media types,
5. guidelines for use of media,
6. course shell templates,
7. style guides,
8. navigation conventions,
9. assessment requirements, and
10. examples of similar applications of technology.

**Current Navy training design practices**

For the purpose of this discussion, the distinction must be made between training design and training development, as they are practiced in the Navy. Training development is the entire cyclical process of creating, implementing, and evaluating training. Training design is much narrower in scope and is limited to the second phase of the training development process.

**Training development in the Navy**

Training development in the Navy is carried out in accordance with the DTM, as described in Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 7.0.2. The DTM is a close variant of the generic and widely used ADDIE model.\(^ {12} \) ADDIE has five phases: analyse, design, develop, implement, and evaluate, forming a continuous improvement loop. (SEE FIGURE 1).

ADDIE is based on a rigorous upfront analysis process to determine the desired behavioural outcomes in terms of knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSA). The identified KSA are those required by a learner in order to perform specified tasks, in the workplace, at the required level. A gap analysis is performed to determine the learner’s current levels of KSA relative to those required to perform the tasks in question. Based on that analysis, learning outcomes and assessment criteria are developed. The method of assessment is then determined, that is, the process by which a learner’s competence can be observed and measured. The method of assessment then informs the training design.

**Training Design**

Training design is the process that occurs in the second phase of ADDIE. The training design determines what the training will look like. This is when the training strategies are selected. The object of these strategies is to ensure that training is conducted as effectively and efficiently as possible, and that the original training objectives are met. The design phase involves making decisions about what is to be done, when, where, by whom, and with what resources. It is during the design phase that the most appropriate instructional...
theory on which to base the training is determined.

**ADFP 7.0.2**

The DTM provides very detailed information and guidelines on how to conduct the training analysis process. When it comes to the training design process, however, only the most general information and guidance are provided. Most of Chapter Three, which deals with the design phase, expands on the analysis process, or describes the factors to be considered when designing training.¹³

The relative weight given to the analysis process is to be expected. Analysis is relatively easy, if approached systematically. Analysis may, at times, be painstaking, but it is fundamentally deconstruction, which is a conceptually straightforward process. Training design, on the other hand, is construction, which is less straightforward. Training problems fall into the category of wicked problems. Wicked problems are the type of problems that will typically allow for a broad range of solutions. They are ill-formulated and involve many clients and decision makers with conflicting values.¹⁴ Training problems fit these criteria because there is usually no one, obvious way to solve a training problem, and there are usually a number of stakeholders with different opinions and agendas.

It is not surprising, therefore, that ADFP 7.0.2 Defence Training Model provides only very general information and guidance on training design. As Buchanan (1992) points out, design eludes reduction and remains a surprisingly flexible activity. In short, the ADDIE works very well for defining the problem, but not for developing a solution.

Gibbons and Rogers (2009) characterised ADDIE as an admixture of design processes with instructional theory. The result being a set of loosely specified, non-standard and highly variable design activities. The training outcomes achieved by this approach are highly variable across the organisation, and are highly dependent on the skills and knowledge of individuals within the training system.

How Navy training is actually designed

The requirement for new Navy training is almost invariably due to the introduction of new equipment or changed processes. These generally require the updating of curricula, not the design of new training. Existing courseware is often used as a template for new training. A relatively small range of training methodologies are continually reapplied, and Navy training tends to remain more-or-less static. As a result, the process prescribed by ADDIE is rarely applied in total.

ADDIE is cumbersome to use when applied to the development of new training. It has a high upfront analysis requirement, and it provides very little information or guidance on the actual design process. Historically, this has not been an issue, for the reasons outlined above. If training design is to keep pace with, and reflect the rapid evolution of learning and communication technologies, a more agile approach to training design is required.

The technology challenges. There are two separate but interrelated challenges for the Navy if it is to leverage rapidly developing learning and communications technologies to improve training safety, flexibility, cost, throughput, and outcomes. The first challenge is to review existing training to determine if technology can value-add and, if so, to retrospectively incorporate the technology. The second challenge is to systematically evaluate the use of technology in the design of all new training.

These challenges will be ongoing. There is nothing to suggest that

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¹³ (Defence, 2006) ¹⁴ (Buchanan, 1992)
the evolution of learning and communication technologies will not continue on its current trajectory. Bandwidth, storage capacity, and processing speed will continue to increase, Web 3.0 technologies will evolve, and costs will continue to come down. Technologies that are currently prohibitively expensive, such as some simulator technologies, will become increasingly affordable, allowing for their wider application. This evolution means that simply updating curricula, and recycling existing courseware and training methodologies, is no longer a viable approach to training design.

The Requirement to Supplement the existing Training Design process

The lack of specific detail and guidance provided by the design phase of ADDIE has rarely been an issue in the past. In the face of the challenges created by rapidly evolving technologies, however, additional detail and guidance are required. What is now needed is a means of populating the design phase of ADDIE with detailed guidance on how to design training to take best advantage of learning and communication technologies.

Any detailed guidance will need to address two interrelated issues that will both influence the final design – the choice of technology, and how to design the training around it. The first issue, which technology, if any, should be used, will be based on more than purely design considerations. From a purely design perspective, the best technology-based solution may not be cost-effective, for example. When deciding on the most appropriate technology-based training solution, the following types of questions will need to be addressed:

1. Do training staff have the skills necessary to apply the technology?
2. What are the initial and ongoing costs of the technology?
3. What are the maintenance overheads associated with the technology?
4. Is the technology scalable?
5. Is the technology used elsewhere in the organisation?
6. Does the technology integrate with other technology in use?

Guidance on these factors can take the form of a series of structured questions that the training developer should consider. This is consistent with the type of general guidance that is currently provided in the design phase of the DTM.15

Guidance on how best to design training around the chosen technology should address factors including, but not limited to, the following:

1. how the technology can be used to best support the underlying training philosophy;
2. when, where, and how the technology will be used to support the training;
3. how the technology enhanced training integrates with the rest of the training;
4. how trainees will interact with the technology; and
5. how the technology might be used for assessments (formative and summative).

It is this set of factors that constitutes the wicked design problem, and this is where the design phase of ADDIE needs to provide detailed guidance. Any detailed guidance provided should fulfil a number of criteria. First, it should be informed by research, or by corporate experience. Second, it should be readily updatable, to reflect the evolution of technologies and training practices. Third, it should be modularised and sufficiently fine-grained to allow its selective application to existing training.

Alexandrian Design Patterns

Design patterns are a concept conceived by Christopher Alexander in the 1970s, for application in architecture and town planning.16 A design pattern is a semi-structured description of an expert’s method for solving a recurring design problem. They include a description of the problem itself, the context in which the method is applicable, but they do not include directives which bind the solution to unique circumstances.17

Design patterns relate to each other in position and utility to create a pattern language. Design problems can be deconstructed into sub-problems, and sub-problems further deconstructed into still smaller problems. These small problems form the basis of design patterns. This means that each design pattern provides a solution that is actually part of a bigger solution. Each design pattern, therefore, has to indicate what its relationship is to other patterns that

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15 (Defence, 2006)
16 Alexander et al., 1977)
17 (Mor & Winters, 2007)
make up the pattern language.\(^{19}\)

An explicit aim of design patterns is to externalise knowledge to allow accumulation and generalisation of solutions, and to allow members of a community of practice or design group to participate in discussions relating to the design. They also explicitly articulate how theory, empirical evidence, and experience have informed the design solution. These features of design patterns enable their function as tools of communication, collaboration, and learning.\(^{20}\)

Since Alexander developed the concept of design patterns in the 1970s it has been applied in fields other than architecture and town planning. Most notably, the concept has been applied in the field of software engineering. It has also, to a lesser degree, been applied in the fields of learning and training design, to document good pedagogical practice.\(^{20}\)

**A Proposed Model of Training Design based on Alexandrian Design Patterns**

Design patterns for organisational learning and knowledge building. Learning technologies are being used widely throughout the Navy training organisation. In the absence of detailed guidance on how best to incorporate technologies in training designs, schools and instructors are forced to make informed guesses. Feedback provided through the quality control process allows iterative improvements to be made. As a result of this process a substantial body of knowledge regarding the application of learning technologies is being acquired throughout the Navy training organisation at the local level. This body of knowledge will continue to grow as more technology-based solutions to training problems are developed. (See Figure 2).

While this knowledge is held in the memories of individual instructors, or in artefacts at the school level, it does not constitute organisational knowledge. For this knowledge to become organisational knowledge, and for organisational learning to occur, this knowledge must be systematically captured in organisational artefacts and be made available to the wider organisation.\(^{21}\)

It is proposed that design patterns be used as a medium for capturing this knowledge and disseminating it throughout the Navy training organisation in a standard, readily useable format. As schools and individual instructors develop effective technology-based solutions to training problems they record them as design patterns. Patterns are then lodged with a central coordinating authority whose role is to vet them, assign metadata, and make amendments if required. Design patterns are then made available to the wider training organisation as an online resource. Design patterns, by virtue of their modular format and fine grain, can be individually amended or replaced, to reflect developments in technology, or changes to the training resulting from quality control feedback. This can be done without the requirement to amend other related patterns in the pattern language. It also means that those elements of training specifically relating to the design pattern can be changed, leaving the rest of the training unaltered.

It is proposed that an online library of design patterns be established as a resource for the Navy training organisation. It can be used to capture organisational knowledge that may otherwise be lost, or remain in localised artefacts, unavailable to the wider organisation. An online library of design patterns can serve as a dynamic body of knowledge, continually evolving, and forming a key part of the continuous improvement cycle. A library of design patterns can be an invaluable asset for teaching training developers, and for facilitating dialogue with training contractors. Most importantly, it can provide the detail lacking in design phase of ADDIE.

Design patterns require that technology use be justified. Design patterns include an explanation of how theory, empirical evidence, or experience has informed the design solution. This requirement may serve to ensure that the Navy’s use of learning technologies is informed and considered.

The requirement imposed by design patterns for training

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18. (Goodyear, 2004)
19. (Mor & Winters, 2007)
20. (Goodyear, 2004)
designers to articulate how theory, empirical evidence, and experience have informed the design solution, may have a positive influence on the ways learning technologies are used. Training designers would have to consider how the proposed technologies can be used in order to achieve the anticipated benefits. The context in which the technology can be used and the training methodology employed will have to be considered in detail. Such detailed considerations will help prevent the use of technology for technology’s sake, which Trasler (2002) has observed in some organisations.

In order to articulate the expected benefits from learning technologies, training designers will be required to quantify those benefits. This will, in turn, require consideration of the metrics by which the benefits will be measured. Design patterns may generate a more rigorous and thoughtful approach to the design of training, making it less likely for training designers to base their application of learning technologies on assumed efficacy.

### The teaching function of design patterns

A feature of design patterns is that they explicitly articulate how theory, empirical evidence, and experience have informed the design solution. This means that design patterns also perform a teaching or explanatory function. This teaching function may prove valuable for building the level of training knowledge and expertise in the Training Systems (TS) branch, and in the training of junior TS Officers.

The deconstruction of training by problem type is another feature of design patterns that may prove valuable for building training design knowledge and skills in the TS branch. Training is commonly conceptualised as a series of training events, such as demonstrations, practical exercises, or tests. Design patterns require the deconstruction of training by problem type. An example of a problem type might be how to demonstrate the operation of a piece of equipment, given a particular context.

This way of conceptualising training is a generic approach, focusing on the problem type, not the specific training in question. It potentially leads to a much more fine-grained analysis of training design than an approach based on training events. An approach based on training events might, for example, produce a lesson plan that stipulated a demonstration. How to conduct that demonstration is typically left to the discretion of the individual instructor. A design pattern, on the other hand, can provide fine-grained detail of how to conduct the demonstration, in the given context.

Writing design patterns will require the training designer to consider all aspect of the training solution in fine detail. They will also need to give detailed consideration to the training context. If applied to the use of learning technologies, this approach has the potential to generate well-considered, evidence-based training solutions that could be reapplied in similar contexts.

Design patterns as boundary objects. Training design in the Navy often involves collaboration between the training designer, subject matter experts, and training contractors. Increasingly, collaborations also include the producers of learning technologies, such as multimedia designers, graphic artists, or video producers. In the case of such cross-disciplinary collaborations, design patterns can serve as boundary objects. Boundary objects are flexible, epistemic artefacts that inhabit several intersecting social worlds and satisfy the information requirements of each of them. They provide a shared language that allows idiosyncratic knowledge to be represented in a structure that is understood across disciplinary boundaries.

There are a number of features of design patterns that make them suitable boundary objects for mediating cross-disciplinary training design collaborations. Their simple, standardised format makes them easy to read and understand. They provide a clear link between the training problem, the context, and the design solution, making the purpose of the collaboration clear to all team members. Finally, they articulate how theory, empirical evidence, and experience have informed the design solution, so minimal background knowledge is required.

McAndrew, Goodyear, and Dalziel (2013) point out that in communities that have adopted a design pattern approach, the patterns become the focus of an extended process of collaboration. Patterns therefore, have the potential to make a major contribution to the sharing of techniques between developers of learning activities.

Design patterns as instruments of continuous improvement. The Navy has two levels of training evaluation. Training is evaluated internally, at the school level, and by the Navy External Evaluation Agency (EEA). Schools generally have a dedicated Quality Control Officer (QCO). The QCO is responsible for monitoring the quality of all courses conducted by the school, ensuring that the curricula are being delivered in accordance with course documentation, and that learning outcomes are being achieved. The EEA evaluates courses from an

22 (Goodyear, 2004)
23 (Nicolini, Mengis, & Swan, 2012)
organisational perspective, ensuring that the training outcomes are meeting organisational requirements.

Navy training evaluation processes are geared towards finding deficiencies in training; that is, where the prescribed curriculum has been deviated from, or learning outcomes have not been achieved. The evaluation reports provided to schools by their QCO or the EEA provide recommendations on how to address identified deficiencies. Reports tend not to offer advice or make recommendations on how to improve training that is not found to be deficient in some way. This is not in the QCO’s or EEA’s charters, nor do they have processes to facilitate the provision of this type of advice.

ADDIE is represented as a continuous improvement cycle. This is arguably a mischaracterisation. Continuous improvement implies that training keeps incrementally improving. Due to the nature of the evaluation process, improvement plateaus at the point at which learning outcomes are being achieved, and organisational requirements are being met. The continual improvement cycle only serves to bring deficient training back to that point. The evaluation process does not identify sources of potential improvement beyond that.

Design patterns provide a means of implementing a true continuous improvement process, by establishing baseline training methodologies on which improvement can be built. The training evaluation process can be used to identify effective training practices, which can be captured as design patterns. Patterns can be continuously updated to reflect improvements in methodologies.

Design patterns can then be used to inform training processes across the entire training organisation. This will ensure that all schools are using optimal methodologies, and that training approaches are consistent across the training organisation. Training evaluation reports can offer schools useful, specific advice on how to improve training processes, by recommending appropriate design patterns to implement.

QCOs and the EEA, who have visibility of training methodologies in use, and which ones are most effective, are ideally placed to administer such a process. QCOs can write design patterns, based on the data they collect from training evaluations. They can then use these to inform training practices across the school. Patterns can be submitted to the EEA, who are to be responsible for maintaining the central library of design patterns, and coordinating the use of patterns across the wider training organisation. Over time, the QCOs and EEA evaluation staff will evolve into a cadre of training design experts within the Navy training organisation.

**A Design Pattern Exemplar (see example at end)**

The rapid co-evolution of learning and communications technologies provides both opportunities and challenges for the Navy training organisation. Technology-based training solutions can potentially improve training safety, efficiency, throughput, trainee satisfaction, and learning outcomes.

The DTM (ADDIE), by virtue of its high upfront analysis requirement, and lack of detailed guidance in the design phase, is not ideally suited to the task of designing technology-based training solutions. If the Navy training organisation is to leverage learning and communications technologies, and avoid the negative consequences associated with inaction, it will require a modified approach to training design.

A modified approach to the design of training that supplements ADDIE with Alexandrian design patterns offers a number of potential advantages over ADDIE, alone. Design patterns:

- are a means of organisational learning and knowledge building;
- require that the use of technology be justified;
- serve a teaching function;
- act as boundary objects in cross-discipline training development collaborations; and
- serve as instruments of continuous improvement.

A design pattern-based approach could be implemented utilising the standard Navy QC and EEA structures and processes. QCOs could write design patterns, based on the data they collect from training evaluations. Patterns could be submitted to the EEA, who would be responsible for maintaining the central library of design patterns, and coordinating the use of patterns across the wider training organisation.

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A Design Pattern Exemplar

Design of PowerPoint presentations to support face-to-face instruction

This pattern is concerned with how to present information in PowerPoint presentations, to support face-to-face instruction. It addresses how to combine text and graphic content to enhance learner engagement and comprehension. It is a way of helping to implement the patterns INTRODUCING FACE-TO-FACE INSTRUCTION, SEQUENCING CONTENT IN FACE-TO-FACE INSTRUCTION, and FORMATIVE ASSESSMENT THROUGH DIRECT QUESTIONING.

The use of PowerPoint presentations to support face-to-face instruction has become ubiquitous. Overuse of text, and a tendency for text to mirror verbal delivery, has given rise to the expression “death by PowerPoint”. Used in this way, PowerPoint presentations are demotivating for learners, lead to learner disengagement, and can negatively impact training outcomes. Used appropriately, PowerPoint is a powerful visual medium that can be used to incorporate multimedia learning in face-to-face instruction. This can have a positive effect on learner engagement, and enhance learner comprehension.

Microsoft PowerPoint is a powerful tool for the delivery of multimedia learning in the context of face-to-face instruction. PowerPoint supports pictures, graphic representations, video, audio, and animation.

PowerPoint’s capacity to deliver multimedia learning is often underexploited in training applications. Presentations commonly contain only text, which often mirrors the instructor’s verbal presentation. When pictures or other graphic content are incorporated in presentations they often serve a design purpose rather than an explanatory one. PowerPoint presentations often appear to be used as speakers’ notes, more for the instructors’ benefit than the trainees’.

The core principle of multimedia learning, from a psychological perspective, is the combined comprehension of text and pictures. Numerous studies have shown that students generally learn better from words and pictures than form words alone.

When learners process multiple representations in a multimedia learning environment they develop a richer overview of the domain, which facilitate more in-depth knowledge construction. This is based on the concept that relating and combining multiple representations promotes deeper reflection than the processing of single representations.

The multimedia effect is consistent with generative learning theory, which involves the integration of new ideas with the learner’s existing schemata. When learners are presented with multiple representations, in a multimedia learning environment, they must select relevant information from that presented, organise the information into a coherent mental representation, and integrate the newly constructed representation with others. This process promotes deep learning.

Based on a review of research Mayer (2005) identified a number multimedia instructional design principles for reducing the load on working memory and promoting deeper learning. They are as follows:
1. The coherence and redundancy principles recommend minimising the amount of unneeded and confusing detail in the graphical and textual materials in multimedia messages. Words, pictures, and sounds that are not directly relevant to the goal of instruction should be removed, leaving only the core of essential content that is salient to the learner.
2. The signalling and spatial contiguity principles recommend providing cues, such as an outline and headings, to direct the learner’s cognitive processing of the essential material.
3. Based on the redundancy principle, when a multimedia message consists of animations or illustrations and narration, no redundant on-screen text that mirrors the narration should be included.
4. Based on the spatial contiguity principle, when a multimedia message contains images and text, the text should be collocated with the part of the image it refers to.
5. Based on the temporal contiguity principle, it is important to present corresponding animation and narration at the same time.

Supporting the third design principle, Schnottz (2005) suggests that individuals learn better from pictures combined with spoken explanation than they do from pictures combined with spoken and text-based explanations. He points out that when text and a picture are presented together, the learner’s attention is split between the two pieces of visual information. He also theorises that the negative effect of presenting pictures with spoken and redundant written text might be a problem of synchronisation between listening and reading.

Ainsworth (1999) suggests that learner exposure to multiple representations leads to deeper understanding by enabling learners to consider complex ideas in a new way. It is hoped that by providing
ADAPTING NAVY TRAINING PROCESSES TO THE RAPID EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATION & LEARNING TECHNOLOGIES – A DESIGN PATTERN APPROACH TO TRAINING DESIGN

learners with a rich source of domain representations they will translate or construct references across these representations. Ainsworth (1999) further suggests that if multiple representations are used to develop deeper understanding, then translation should be scaffolded.

Therefore:

When designing PowerPoint presentations to support face-to-face instruction, eliminate all unneeded and confusing detail in graphics and text. Only include graphics, text, and sounds directly relevant to the goals of instruction. Never include text that mirrors spoken explanation provided by the instructor. Provide a spoken narrative to accompany animations or illustrations, not a text-based narrative. Always present corresponding animation and narration at the same time. Use headings and outlines as cues to direct the learner’s cognitive processing of the essential material. When using explanatory text with images, always collocate text with the part of the image it refers to. Where possible, incorporate multiple representations and provide verbal or text-based scaffolding to guide trainee’s translation between representations.

Patterns needed to complete this pattern include: PRODUCING PHOTOGRAPHS FOR MULTIMEDIA LEARNING, GRAPHIC REPRESENTATIONS FOR MULTIMEDIA LEARNING, and SELF-EXPLANATION PROMPTS IN MULTIMEDIA LEARNING. (SEE DIAGRAM ABOVE)

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**General de Gaulle, The Dakar Affair and the Role of HMAS Australia**

**By Matthew B Willis**

Volume I of de Gaulle’s war memoirs is entitled *The Call to Honour*. For him the call to honour was nothing less than the redemption of the honour of France which had dishonoured herself by her capitulation in June 1940. Furthermore, he believed that the liberation of France could not be left solely to Britain and America whom he sometime referred to rather condescendingly as the Anglo Saxons. He fervently believed that a French army of liberation needed to be raised under his command on French territory. By French territory he meant France’s colonies in Africa.

When this unknown, 49-year old brigadier first thought of an expedition against Dakar is unclear; however, it was within 30 days of the French surrender on 22 June. Since ‘The Free French,’ the name that he gave to all those who rallied to his cause, had almost no warships, de Gaulle approached Churchill about an expedition backed by the Royal Navy.

Churchill had focused his attention on Dakar early in July after the battleship *Richelieu* had steamed there from Brest. Completed in April 1928, *Richelieu* was the pride of the French Navy and was indeed one of the finest battleships in the world. Her main armament was eight 15” guns in two forward turrets. The secondary armament of fifteen 6” guns in five turrets was itself formidable. As protection from enemy shells and bombs she had a sixteen-inch belt of steel on both sides of the ship. Her deck armour combining her upper and lower deck was eight inches.

On 7 and 8 July 1940 the British made a determined effort to disable the *Richelieu*. In the first action Royal Marines with blackened faces in a small craft were able to slip into Dakar harbour and explode a depth charge near her. The ship was not seriously damaged. The next day torpedo aircraft from HMAS *Hermes* attacked her. One torpedo struck near her stern. At least one propeller was destroyed and would need to be replaced before *Richelieu* could put to sea.

Neither this attack nor the much larger operation against French naval units at Oran on 3 July was carried out with de Gaulle’s foreknowledge. He was aggrieved at the loss of life at Oran where over 1,000 French sailors perished. Privately he criticized Churchill on the grounds that there was no real risk that the French Fleet would end up in the hands of the Germans.

In hindsight it appears far-fetched that the *Richelieu* at far off Dakar was within reach of German airborne forces much less of ground forces.

On 7 July one of HMAS *Hermes'* escorts was HMAS *Australia*. She was one of two heavy cruisers in the young Australian Navy; the other being her sister ship HMAS *Canberra*. Australia was laid down by John Brown & Co. Ltd, Clydebank, in 1925. She was completed in April 1928. Her main armament was eight 8” guns in four turrets, two forward and two aft. She had never fired her main guns in anger until the naval engagement at Dakar over 23-25 September 1940.

Churchill seems to have been reluctant to approve a major engagement with the *Richelieu* in light of the casualties inflicted on the French Navy at Oran; however, his fertile mind soon devised a plan that would give de Gaulle both Dakar and the *Richelieu* with little or no blood spilled.

In his memoir de Gaulle writes about their key meeting at 10 Downing Street on 6 August.

‘Then Mr. Churchill, colouring his eloquence with the most picturesque tints, set to work to paint for me the following picture: ‘Dakar wakes up one morning, sad and uncertain. But behold, by the light of the rising sun, its inhabitants perceive the sea, to a great distance, covered with ships. An immense fleet! A hundred war or transport vessels! These approach slowly, addressing messages of friendship by radio to the town, to the navy, to the garrison. Some of them are flying the tricolour. The others are sailing under the British, Dutch, Polish or Belgian colours. From this Allied Force there breaks away an inoffensive small ship bearing the white flag of parley. It enters the port and disembarks the envoys of General de Gaulle. These are brought to the Governor. Their job is to convince him that if he lets you land the Allied fleet retires, and that nothing remains but to settle, between him and you, the terms of his cooperation. On the contrary, if he wants to fight, he has every…’
chance of being crushed.”

Shortly after 6 August these two vastly different leaders reached an agreement on the Dakar expedition along the lines of Churchill’s imagination. Unfortunately it was not agreed that de Gaulle would serve under Vice-Admiral Sir John Cunningham who commanded all British ships. De Gaulle would sail on a Dutch liner, the Westerland, which flew the French flag beside the Dutch in command of all Free French forces.

In his memoir there is a photograph of de Gaulle standing on the bridge of his ship. He is wearing the kepi of a brigadier, a turtleneck jersey and a rainproof jacket. With his penetrating dark eyes and dark moustache he has the look of an army officer standing in the turret of his tank which was his background. De Gaulle had never before experienced a major amphibious operation, much less commanded one.

The naval force designated for this operation was far less than the one that Churchill had envisioned. The Royal Navy vessels consisted of two battleships, Barham and Resolution, one carrier, Ark Royal, three cruisers, Devonshire, Cumberland and Australia; ten destroyers and two sloops, plus transports carrying 4,200 soldiers and Royal Marines. HMAS Australia was a replacement for HMS Fiji which had been torpedoed by a submarine west of the Hebrides and severely damaged.

The Free French component consisted of three sloops and two armed trawlers and four French cargo boats. Two Dutch liners, the Pennland and the previously mentioned Westerland, carried Free French troops that numbered approximately 2,700.

Churchill had made it clear to de Gaulle that he could not keep British ships off Dakar for a lengthy blockade. He would need to bring them back to home waters and the Mediterranean in a short time.

Two unexpected events made the success of the expedition highly problematic. The first was the arrival of a squadron of (Ed: nominally enemy) French cruisers accompanied by three destroyers in the vicinity of Dakar. Historians have speculated whether the news of the forthcoming operation leaked out of Free French sources in London; however, based on a note of Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, Commander in Chief of the French Navy, it is virtually certain that the mission of this squadron was not to reinforce Dakar but to recapture French Equatorial Africa.

These cruisers, Gloire, Montcalm and Georges Leygues, completed only three years before the war, were among the finest light cruisers in the French Navy. Their main armament was nine rapid firing 6” guns in three turrets. If they joined the Richelieu at Dakar, the Vichy French would have a formidable concentration of surface ships. In addition they had at least two submarines in Dakar.

The Admiralty ordered Admiral Cunningham to prevent their passage to Dakar. Two of the cruisers, Montcalm and Georges Leygues, got there ahead of the British force. Gloire had engine trouble and Australia was able to intercept her. On 19 September Cunningham ordered Australia to escort Gloire to Casablanca, too far away to succour the garrison at Dakar.

What followed was a deliberate effort on the parts of Captain Stewart RAN in Australia and the French captain in Gloire to avoid the need to open fire one on the other. On the following day the two ships proceeded northward at increasing speeds, Gloire’s engine trouble having been remedied. At 7 a.m. on the 21st, Stewart having requested and received the word of the French captain that his ship would proceed to Casablanca, parted company and charted a course southward to rejoin the British ships. His final signal to Gloire was not ungallant. ‘Bon voyage. Je vous remercie pour votre courtoisie dans une situation difficile.’

The other event that caused difficulties for Cunningham and de Gaulle was a dense fog that descended over Dakar and the surrounding waters. The citizens of Dakar could not be intimidated by an invisible fleet. In the event of a fight the British heavy ships would find it difficult to target the Richelieu, the three cruisers and the shore batteries.

A peaceful settlement, which in reality would have been a capitulation to de Gaulle and the British, was still a possibility. De Gaulle has described the Governor-General, Boisson, as ‘a man of energy, whose ambition – greater than his discernment – had made him
choose to play on the Vichy side. De Gaulle described the attitude of the French officers in the powerful Richelieu as officers (whose) one dream had been vengeance since the British torpedoes had damaged the ship.4

On 23 September, de Gaulle prudently decided not to be part of two groups who were to parlay with the Governor-General. After three of his officers landed in two small aircraft at the main airfield, they were soon arrested. Not knowing their fate, de Gaulle ordered two small craft from his sloops to enter the harbour. His senior naval officer, Commander d’Argenlieu, together with four lower ranking officers, landed on the quay and asked for the port commander. This individual with unconcealed embarrassment informed them he had orders to arrest them. They quickly returned to their small boats. As they drew away, machinegun fire seriously wounded d’Argenlieu and one other officer.

Churchill had been confident that if the garrison and the warships failed to rally to de Gaulle, the British fleet could crush the Vichy forces. For three days the issue hung in the balance. In this three-day battle Admiral Cunningham’s larger force was unable to destroy the shore batteries, to silence the Richelieu’s 15” guns or to sink the cruisers Montcalm and Georges Leygues. The British lost no ships, but three of their most important ships were damaged. The battleship Barham was hit by a 15” shell from the Richelieu. The heavy cruiser, Cumberland, was heavily damaged by a high calibre shell. The battleship Resolution was severely damaged by a torpedo.

At the commencement of this three-day battle the odds of the Richelieu’s survival were not high. The two British battleships had sixteen 15” guns as opposed to the Richelieu’s eight 15” guns. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal carried at least twelve Fairey Swordfish torpedo aircraft. If the two British battleships were unable to sink Richelieu, then the Fairey Swordfish could do the job.

Because she had been partially disabled in the earlier British attack on 8 July Richelieu was essentially a stationary target for the British warships and the British torpedo aircraft. Her survival from the combined guns of Barham and Resolution can be partially attributed to extremely poor visibility. On the first day Richelieu was concealed by heavy fog which lifted only gradually. During the remainder of the battle she was partially obscured by smoke from her own guns and by a smoke screen. Richelieu was never hit by a torpedo from any of the Fairey Swordfish aircraft. This is an enigma. She was armed with 36 antiaircraft guns consisting of twelve 37 mm guns and twenty-four 13 mm guns which seem to have taken a heavy toll of British aircraft. According to the British naval historian Correlli Barnett, 19 British aircraft were destroyed in the three-day battle. Whether the Richelieu was saved solely by her accurate antiaircraft fire is unclear. There are other possible explanations. The French had over two months to prepare for a second attack by torpedo aircraft. The naval authorities in Dakar may have installed anti-torpedo nets around the Richelieu that could explain the absence of a single torpedo hit.

One other possibility deserves mention. The Richelieu had a normal complement of 1,670. If she were to capsize as a result of one or more torpedo hits, the casualties would be...
enormous. Admiral Cunningham’s original instructions were to minimize French naval casualties. It is conceivable that he would not allow torpedoes to be used against the Richelieu.

The unknown captain of Richelieu undoubtedly wrote a comprehensive report on this three-day battle. If this report still exists, future historians will have an invaluable primary source to write the definitive story of the Richelieu and her captain. Based on what is now known it can be said without equivocation that he fought his ship in a way that upheld the honour of the French Navy.

While the French saved their greatest capital ship from destruction, they lost at least three warships, the destroyer Audacieux and the submarines Persée and Ajax. Despite these losses the French forced the British to abandon the operation. It was clearly a French victory.

Two engagements deserve special mention. On 23 September, shortly before 4 pm, HMAS Australia with two destroyers was ordered to attack the destroyer Audacieux that had sallied forth to engage any British ships near the harbour’s entrance. It was a courageous decision by Audacieux’s captain. Australia had eight 8” guns all of which could be brought to bear. Audacieux had five 5” guns that were manually operated from open barbettes. Her only hope was to engage Australia with her nine torpedo tubes. This engagement barely lasted three minutes. Australia ceased firing after her eighth salvo. By then the French ship was on fire fore and aft. She had only managed to fire two rounds and two torpedoes none of which hit Australia. Captain Stewart deserves credit for sparing the surviving sailors in Audacieux. Whether her captain survived seems doubtful.

The Persée was a Redoutable class submarine of the French Navy. Twenty-nine of the class were constructed before World War II. According to Jane’s Fighting Ships 1940 they “have proved very successful vessels.” Persée’s most lethal weapons were eleven 21.7 inch torpedo tubes including revolving tubes in triple and quadruple mountings. The ship’s complement was 67.

Shortly after dawn on 25 September Persée’s captain manoeuvred her into position to attack HMS Resolution, a 33,500 ton battleship carrying a complement of over 1,000. One of the French submarine’s torpedoes hit the Resolution amidships with the ship under full helm. More than anything else that successful attack by Persée determined the outcome of the three-day battle. “The torpedo that struck Resolution resulted in flooding (in) her port boiler room and causing a 12½ degree list to port.” Shortly afterwards, the destroyer Foresight sank the Persée. Her captain and his entire crew perished. He too was courageous. HMAS Australia suffered no severe damage; however, she was hit twice aft by 6 inch shells from one of the French cruisers. There were no casualties. Tragically, as she was withdrawing from the action, one of her AA guns shot down what was thought to be an enemy plane. It was the Australia’s Walrus which was lost together with its crew.

De Gaulle took the defeat at Dakar philosophically. He blamed neither Cunningham nor Churchill. He later wrote:

But at such a moment and on that particular ground, for us to engage in a big battle (on land) would, whatever its outcome, have gravely diminished our chances. The course of the Dakar affair cannot be understood if it is not realized that that was the conviction which dominated my mind. 7

Churchill escaped widespread criticism over the Dakar defeat because it was overshadowed by the Battle of Britain. Churchill spoke to the House of Commons about the young pilots of the RAF. “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.” 8 Even today in the UK those
pilots are still known as ‘the few.’

One voice of criticism over Dakar was that of the Australian prime minister, the Right Honourable Robert Gordon Menzies. His cable to Churchill read in part, ‘We are very disturbed in regard to Dakar incident which has had an unfortunate effect in Australia. ... To make what appears at this distance to be a half-hearted attack is to incur a damaging loss of prestige.’

Churchill, who was stung by this criticism from someone he considered a faithful friend, responded with strong words, ‘I cannot accept the reproach to be a half-hearted Government’ or that I am half-hearted in the endeavours it is my duty to make.

Churchill and Menzies quickly made up and remained firm friends for the rest of their lives. *HMAS Australia* had a long war that she fought with great distinction. On 21 October 1944 off the coast of Leyte, *Australia* was hit by a kamikaze aircraft which killed her captain, Captain EFV Dechaineux RAN, who had assumed command of *Australia* on 7 March 1944. In future operations *Australia* would be hit by four more kamikaze aircraft.

*Australia* deserves to be remembered for more than the Dakar affair and the kamikaze attacks. In May 1942 she participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Shortly before that battle Admiral Sir John Crace hoisted his flag in *HMAS Australia*. While the Admiral was Royal Navy, his birthplace was Gungahleen (now Gungahlin, ACT) where he grew up as one of nine children of a pioneer family. He never failed to take pride in his Australian roots.

Admiral Frank Fletcher USN, who was in overall command of Allied naval forces, hoisted his flag in the aircraft carrier, *LISS Yorktown*. In the initial stages of the battle Fletcher had established Task Group 17.3 under Crace’s command consisting of the heavy cruisers *HMAS Australia* and *LISS Chicago*, the light cruiser *HMS Hobart* and US destroyers *Farragut*, *Perkins* and *Walke* which he dispatched westward to cover the Jomard Passage. On 7 May Crace’s situation was parlous. He was within the range of Japanese high-level bombers and low-level torpedo aircraft based in Rabaul but beyond the range of air cover from Fletcher’s two carriers, *LISS Lexington* and *LISS Yorktown*.

At 230 pm that day *Australia* and the other ships in the Group were attacked by 12 twin engine naval torpedo bombers followed by 19 high-level bombers. The former aircraft were Mitsubishi G3M2s known by the code name Nell. Only five months earlier, this same aircraft type had sunk *HMS Prince of Wales* and *HMS Repulse* in the South China Sea. Because of heavy, concentrated flak the Nells released their torpedoes from long range. All torpedoes missed. The high-level bombers also missed their targets. None of Crace’s ships suffered a hit other than cannon fire from the strafing Nells.

The Battle of the Coral Sea was a turning point in the Pacific war. American carrier aircraft sank the small carrier *Shōkō*. They severely damaged the large carrier *Shōkaku*. Her sister ship *Zuikaku* escaped serious damage only by taking advantage of a sudden squall that produced heavy rain. On the American side *Yorktown* took a bomb hit that penetrated her flight deck before exploding four decks below. Despite heavy casualties she remained operational. *Lexington* eventually had to be sunk by an American destroyer after she had been hit by two torpedoes, two bombs and had several near misses.

The Americans also lost the oiler, *Neosho* and her escort, the destroyer *LISS Sims*. Despite these losses it was a vital, strategic victory for the Allies. Never again would Japanese aircraft carriers threaten Australia.

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### Author’s Note

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### Sources

(Endnotes)

4. Ibid., p. 113.
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10. Ibid., p. 719.
There is a remarkable transition occurring led by Chief Navy, silently and patiently (stealthily even), within what many of us maintain is truly our Senior Service, the Royal Australian Navy. There are many reasons but underpinning this and at the highest of political levels within the Commonwealth, is recognition that the Maritime is our future.

Not simply our economic but our geo-political, strategic and defence/security futures too. We need only reflect on the impact caused by the recent small-scale operational deployment of the PLA Navy through the Sunda Straits, to Sumatra and Christmas Island (Feb 2014) to consider the impact the Chinese aircraft carrier LIAONING (中国人民解放军海军辽宁舰) will have when she deploys to Fiji, say, in the next few years. As she will.

It will arguably have a similar impact to the deployment of the White Fleet to Australia by the US in 1908 and that led to the formation of the RAN. A Navy, necessarily, is its people and it is its people that keep it, its capabilities and Fleet ‘in being’. This paper builds on recent events and commentary to develop potentially an alternative and affordable maritime future.

A Starting Point

“The lessons of history are clear. Relative economic power is the wellspring of strategic strength. And conversely, economic weakness debilitates every arm of government. Structural economic weakness, if not dealt with, will bring an unavoidable reduction in our ability to shape the world.”

The blue and the gold of Australia’s older colours speak not only of its present but also to an older more ancient past entirely. A past in which people of all traditions, of all religions and indeed of none arrived by sea and from the sea. It was the seas that brought their futures, their pasts and their present together and bequeathed on the people of Australia, from whatever background, that great Digger mentality of survival, tenacity hope, spirit, ‘mate-ship’ and fortitude.

It is the sea which still binds the peoples of Australia – providing its blue girth – and will bound our futures. We are the people ‘of the Blue’ – the old nickname for Australians – our flag deriving from the Admiral or Flag of the Blue. It is by the sea that the vast majority of Australians will gather in the future to feed and fend for themselves just as the hard and harsh hinterlands continue to define our inner horizons. And it is the seas’ horizons that will forever speak to us of other lands and of other peoples and of us to them.

These are also our futures – of arrival, adieu, re-definition and renewal generation upon generation. And it is to the seas that we will inevitably return – drawn by the common weal/goods and benign effects of adventure, survival, hope, economy, industry and productivity. Yet, as we edge towards uncertain recovery from global recession, Australia has a unique challenge: ‘we have to go 4000nm to have an influence and 4000nm beyond that to have an affect’. And, since ‘the projection of power for a maritime nation was, is and always will be from the sea, [these will be] the immutable facts upon which our future Knowledge Enterprise Economy (KEE) [2], security and defence will rest.

“When you de-industrialise, all kinds of things change. Then there is no [industry] or research and development, therefore there are no breakthroughs; therefore there is no innovation. And you end up flattened with a parasitic

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1 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP previous UK Secretary of State for Defence (2010-2011). Strong Economy, Strong Defence, Strategic Reach: Protecting National Security in the 21st Century. Chatham House, 19 May 2011

2 Attributed to Professor Dr Captain S Reay Atkinson RAN in discussion with Admiral James Goldrick RAN (rtd).
population...standing around not doing much, while all the while the foreign currency is earned by raw material exports. [And then you end up being] worked back into being a purely colonial phenomenon. We have seen what happens when in the Midlands in England deindustrialisation takes place. You get the population marooned with nothing to do. The one thing [you] cannot afford do to is to remain enthralled; imprisoned of old theories that do not work.3

There is an emerging bi-partisan view of the importance of Maritime and of Navy and taking forward/ implementing the amphibious and submarine strategies set out in the 2009 White Paper; noting the call by The Honourable Anthony Albanese MP for ‘stronger shipping, for a stronger Australia’.3

Some argue that it is regrettable that much of what was set out in the 2009 White Paper and called for by Albanese – including becoming a ‘participant’ in and of the seas, ‘not just customers’; ‘upgrading Fleets’; ‘creating a new regulatory framework’; providing a ‘best of class’ financial and ‘tax system’ to sustain its ‘shipping’ base, and creating ‘a pool of skilled seafarers to operate the ships of the future’ across the oceans of our futures – was undone by the 2013 Defence White Paper. Yet others say that there are factors working in Navy’s favour, including a maritime leaning and knowledgeable Prime Minister who ‘gets it’, as witnessed by his adroit command and handling of ministers who ‘get it’, as witnessed by his adroit command and handling of maritime sector (people, equipment, fleets and industry) and in so doing bootstrap its people and economy to a new and viable co-adaptive future. This will not be easy and will require thinking through a coherent strategy if it is to be achieved.3

The Red White and Blue of It

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) was formed in 1905 to provide logistics support to the Royal Navy – particularly relevant in the days of steam – and so to support the forward operating (and coaling) bases established around the world, including Aden, Hong Kong and Singapore.

Uniquely, RFA crews are members of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) civil [public] service, who come under naval / joint (post the Armed Force Act 2006) discipline when operationally engaged / for war-fighting. Ships are either owned directly by the MOD or leased by them. To distinguish Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels from the Merchant or Royal Navy, RFA ships wear the Blue Ensign with gold stock anchor. For practical purposes, RFA ships comply to, at least, the minimum of Lloyds standards, EU Maritime Engineering/Safety and Trade regulations and UNCLOS. RFAs are crewed to civilian manning standards – HMAS Choules, for example, had an RFA passage crew of 25 or less. RFA ships are augmented for their operational tasking with specialist Regular or Reserve Royal Navy crews and from the British Army.

Effectively, these ‘operational crews’ leverage the RFA through modularisation – where the modules can include boats (e.g. for counter...
piracy); aircraft / hangars / flight decks (e.g. for ASW) and Mexeflot’s / Landing Craft (e.g. for Amphibious Warfare and Disaster Relief). Specialist combined ammunition tankers, for example the Wave Knight and Fort Class, can also undertake Counter Piracy operations.

Increasing regulation and the need for nations to safeguard their oceanic claims and maintain regulation and control over them – as also part of energy security – is re-emphasising the need for island-nation states to maintain and strengthen their own maritime postures. This includes both having a flagged Merchant Fleet and the personnel and manning to support it.

More recently, operators such as P&O have recognised the need to up-skill and develop future strategic depth in terms of officers and engineers drawn from certifying nations; specifically from the EU (including the UK) and also the US and Australia. This is increasingly required by regulation and certification – thus returning to the role of the City of London and Lloyds, in terms of both registering and insurance.

There are also significant economic reasons for maintaining a viable Merchant Fleet, including arbitraging the ‘Chinese Dollar’ during recovery from recession. This also connects to complying with regulations; maintaining safety on the high seas (by UNCLOS) and maritime (including energy) security. This is particularly relevant to nations like Australia, with its significant exports of minerals.

4 For example Largs Bay (now HMAS Choules) following the 2010 Haiti earthquake.
5 RFA Fort Victoria assisted in rescuing the Italian bulk carrier Monte Cristo from pirates in Oct 2011.

Auxiliary, there is considerable pressure on manning the big ship Amphibious Fleet emerging (including Choules) and the Submarine Force. Both these factors can create tension: a reluctance not to cede any more ground while defending what one has. Arguably, our Fleet structure is not capitalised, scaled, composed and ‘fitted’ to the type of threats we are likely to face in the future. Yet, at the same time, Navy constitutes the major capital base of our Armed Forces, just ask anyone living in Sydney!

The question may become ‘how to maximise the maritime capital base to best effect?’ Five roles of a navy are identified by British Maritime Doctrine [8]; by exception for the RFA and, by default, the Merchant Marine, see Figure 3.

The pyramid is intended to show the connected flows between the

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**Figure 1**: Ensigns of the RAN; a possible Auxiliary Fleet and the Merchant Marine

**Figure 1**: Versatile Role Adaptation: White, Red and Blue
three Fleets. Versatile Modular Systems designed applying dual-use (commercial and / or military) hulls by application (Apps) have been suggested: ‘VMApps’ designed to ‘equip crews and systems rather than ship them’ [7]. To be viable and allow for hulls to be operated effectively and efficiently in each domain, VMApps works at the system level. An example might be the High Speed Ship as Troop Transport (Blue Flag) or for Amphibious Operations (White Flag or Blue Flag with White VMApps).

This has cultural implications for command (at the system) and crewing (at the tactical / unit levels). It does though enable choice and potentially releasing RAN crews for crewing capital ships, like Canberra and Adelaide, and our emerging Submarine Strike capability. Seafarers wishing to remain at sea through a career could do so in the Blue or Red Fleets. Those wishing to command, operate, lead and control at the system level could do so in the White Fleet. There is a coming together. Commercial operators wish to upgrade / upskill their fleets, which is finding PSE and legislative favour. A three flagged approach (White-Blue-Red) may enable the new capitalisation, scaling and composition of Fleets. Significantly, this would be a return to proper Admiralty and the enfanchised leveraging of capital, capability and personnel in [full] partnership – more by fitting the crews, than crewing the fits!

New Model Designs

‘A consensus is emerging amongst those concerned with the [Defence] industry…to the effect that radical change is inevitable.’ [9]

Amphibious Manoeuvre comprises three essential system components: specialist amphibious shipping (Naval); the landing force (Army) and the tailored air group (Army, Navy and Air), who contribute the tactical lift (and area protection) essential to amphibious operations. Only Sealift provides the practicable means of deploying equipment and logistic support and then sustaining forces at ranges beyond 600nm, over time at anything other than very small scale. [10]

An Amphibious Manoeuvre System (AMS), incorporating Sealift, manages the flows of material and personnel to and from beachheads and landing sites. Australia cannot deliver this system applying current force structure designs – and even if we could, it would bankrupt us in the doing.

The underlying message of the US, UK and AS Defence Reviews was that current fleet designs (be they ships, aircraft, tanks of for people) – exacerbated by Defence Cost Inflation (DCI), [10] – are simply unaffordable and irreplaceable. [11] The 2009 White Paper was in many regards an exemplar; setting the strategic goals and aiming to shape and command the context through amphibious (the two LHDs and Choules) and maritime control through (submarine / TLAM) influence projection. [11]

Following withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014, there is no politician in the US, the UK, Australia or Canada or in the Netherlands, France and Denmark who will commit to any scale of enduring warfighting in Asia, South West Asia or the Middle East for the foreseeable future. Therefore, for a maritime nation like Australia, our influence and effect will need to be projected from and by the sea – and upon that projection will rest the success of our Knowledge Enterprise Economies and our political sûreté economy. These economies will be based upon exploiting integration and modularity – the content – rather than the platforms (cars / hulls etc) that ‘underwrite’ and convey them. It is within the content, which includes the Cyber (which is also part of the Maritime) [5] that Australia needs to define, identify and leverage its future co-adaptive advantage. And it is here that we are in potential competition not with China but with the US.

In this context, Australia needs to tread very carefully between US policy seemingly aimed at containing China, our major trading partner, and a China balanced precariously between the forces of growth and decline. From a military perspective, this is about interest and influence; recognising that for the majority of the time an effective Armed Force will be occupying the prevention and recovery roles and, if its interests are strategically aligned, only engaging when and where necessary. This is also the underpinning concept behind Asymmetric Offshore Counter Balancing (AOCB) – the de-facto post Afghanistan maritime-based policy being adopted by the US and UK [12].

This comes down to how we crew our future Fleets of the White; the Blue and the Red. A strategic assessment based upon the interests of Australia and what Australia wants its disciplined, commanded forces to do, would ask ‘what should the size of Australia’s Armed Forces be?’ [11]

Given a population of 20-23 million, a reasonable suggestion would be about 85,000: 45,000 in the Army; 20,000 in the RAN and 20,000 in the RAAF; supported by an effective APS (the 4th Arm) of about 20,000. This is broadly

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7 In good Australian fashion we have knocked our submarines so hard that they have and are becoming silently very good – certainly the front half. Our submarines have a strike capability in terms of deterrence and managing the escalator, up and down. They are a political weapon of choice and needed to be regarded as such – just as the Amphibious Task Group will overtly project political influence.

8 The RAAF declared limit of operations from the Australian Coast, Chief Air, Pacific Jan 2012.
the size of the Army (with Reserves) over the last decade but would mean growing the RAAF and RAN by between 17 and 25%, respectively. This would require a new model.

A potential design may be the Federation militia model with an RAN consisting of 11,000 regulars; 4,500 Reserves and 4,500 Private Reserve (potentially an auxiliary service as in the RFA[5]). The issue is that personnel designs need to change to enable the provision of worthwhile careers that will also align affordably with national, economic, security and industrial interests and strategies—which current models do not. These designs will also mean pump-priming Research; not models do not. These designs will also align affordably with national, economic, security and industrial interests and strategies—which current models do not. These designs will also mean pump-priming Research; not models do not.

We are similarly expanding the Reserves who come from all walks of life—some with remarkable skill sets that, I suggest, we would wish to use rather than fit into a naval cocked hat. At the same time, the system is groaning to take on and suitably apply this talent appropriately—which is in danger of becoming a classic case of ‘use it or lose it.’

Trumping all of this is the fact that our existing ship and crewing designs are simply unaffordable over the short and longer term—yet if we are to return to the seas[5] we are going to need to significantly enhance the scale (size and numbers) at which we operate. At some point this is going to mean deploying to sea something that looks remarkably like an Aircraft Carrier, even if it is UCAVs and Turboprops deploying from its decks.[11]

To do this we are going to have to start doing some real thinking if we are to design, shape and sustain an Amphibious Maritime Force (including our Submarines) capable of exercising the type of political influence projection we will need to maintain the peace. A secure maritime industry will provide Australia with the type of assurances and security necessary to walk with confidence along the seaways of an uncertain future. It will enable Australia to do what it does well—speak quietly and assuredly and to carry a big stick for those times when diplomacy fails. Australia is of the sea and will always be so.[5]

Navy is right to have as its motto ‘Fight and Win.’ There is though a problem with this motto in that, in the recent past we, or at least our principal Allies, have been doing rather too much fighting and too little thinking, hence the strategic failures (certainly for the UK) of both Iraq and Afghanistan.

As a result, it has been argued that as we exit Afghanistan we need to move from ‘fought to thought.’ In this respect and as we capitalise of those remarkable strengths that make us Australians and as we glimpse a Pacific future rich with promise, we may also wish to consider revising our motto along more Sun Tzu and Clausewitzean lines to: ‘Think, Fight, Win.’

Robert Cuthbert Blake is a non-de-plume

References:
As an Albert, I’ve always felt empathy with Norman Lindsay’s ‘cut-and-come-again’ Magic Pudding. Initially this was purely physical because as a youngster I was, like that Albert, rather pudding-shaped, with spindly legs. I was probably grumpy like him too.

Fortuitously I escaped the blight of some of my peers – the basin-cut hairdo, so named because it was achieved by one’s mum via judicious trimming with scissors around an upturned pudding basin on the head.

My dad Ted had been a barber. He hated it, even though eventually he had his own shop in premises that he shared with Will Alma, the famous Australian magician (who no doubt had magic puddings of his own).

Ted must have thought WWII a godsend because it imposed an excuse to leave the barber shop. He enlisted, and after training at HMAS Cerberus at Crib Point, was posted as a stoker aboard the ex-WA State Shipping Service MV Kybra that had been commissioned in 1940 as HMAS Kybra and sent to Sydney for naval service as an anti-submarine escort and training ship.

But one’s past always catches up. In no time Ted found himself the surrogate ship’s barber.

During a recent haircut I mentioned my father’s story to Leo, my barber at the time. He explained that he had done his apprenticeship in Italy many years ago, before he migrated to Australia. He said his mentor had told him ‘When you’re a barber, you’ll always have money in your pocket. But they’ll only be coins!’

Leo said that while this had been his own experience in relation to acquiring wealth, he had always found his profession ‘transportable’ and in demand. He said the same applied for cobblers and tailors.

‘Somebody will always need their hair cut, or their shoes or clothes mended. It doesn’t matter whether you are on a ship or in the army. Even if you are in prison there’ll always be a warden who wants to look good for his girlfriend, and who will tender favours in return.’

Ted didn’t work as a barber after the war (except that his mother insisted that he cut her hair, which he did until her death). Instead, in Melbourne, he worked on ships on the piers and docks as a ‘wharfie.’ After about five years, looking to build a better future, he took on a small mixed business that incorporated a post office, newsagent, grocery and milk bar.

It was a seven-days-a-week job for him and my mother (and for that matter to a fair extent for me also). After seven years of this we moved to a small self-service grocery store that was closed from midday on Saturday until Monday morning, providing some respite.

By the end of another seven years Ted felt it time to retire from the retail game. He was tired of the long hours, but was also faced with declining custom because of the opening half-a-mile away of a new shopping mall that incorporated a large supermarket.

After selling the shop and biding time with some interim part-time work, he and my mother embarked on the world-cruise holiday that they had worked towards for their 14 years in retail. They left Melbourne for Sydney, catching up there with some old friends from their war years. Next came Auckland, their first foreign port, where they enjoyed local sightseeing before setting out for Fiji.

But Ted suffered a fatal heart attack one morning in the shower two days before reaching Suva. Strangely, he had always told my mother that he would like to be buried at sea; and so, sadly, his wish was granted.

**HMAS Kybra**

MV Kybra was a single screw passenger and cargo motor vessel built for the Government of Western Australia by the Coastal Construction Company of Montrose, Scotland. She was requisition for naval service on 8 July 1940.
After discharging a cargo at Esperance, WA, Kybra sailed for Sydney to be fitted out as an auxiliary anti-submarine vessel. She was commissioned on 30 September 1940 as a tender to the anti-submarine training establishment, HMAS Rushcutter, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Basil T Brewster, DSC, RN.

Over the next five years she served in eastern Australian waters mainly off the NSW coast but as far north as Townsville and as far south as Devonport.

In June 1942, with the institution of the convoy system, Kybra began operations as an escort vessel out of Sydney. In March the following year, she was attached as a seagoing radar training ship to the RAN radar school located at South Head, later named HMAS Watson. She was later relieved in this capacity by HMAS Yandra. On 12 May 1943, she escorted SS Ormiston, damaged after being torpedoed by a Japanese submarine, back into Sydney.

On 19 October 1945, Kybra departed Sydney to return to Western Australia. She decommissioned at Fremantle on 23 November 1945 and was returned to her owners on 25 March the following year. She was sold to Panamanian interests in 1957 and later re-sold to a Singapore company and re-named Floretta. She departed Fremantle in tow on 28 February 1958 bound for Singapore.1

Type: Anti-submarine and RDF Training Vessel
Builder: Coastal Construction Company Ltd, Montrose, Scotland
Launched: 13 January 1926
Commissioned: 30 September 1940
Decommissioned: 23 November 1945
Displacement: 858 Tons (Gross); 440 Tons (Net)
Length: 204 feet 2 inches
Beam: 31 feet 1 inch
Draught: 11 feet 10 inches
Speed: 10.5 knots
Complement: 55
Propulsion Machinery: six-cylinder oil engine, single screw, 233 NHP
Armament:
1 x 4 inch gun
1 x 2 pounder gun
2 machine guns
2 depth charge throwers

1 Kybra history and specifications courtesy of the Royal Australian Navy
If Australians in general and the RAN in particular, have a very shaky grasp upon the major events which have shaped this nation’s naval history, then they have even less recall (and perhaps regard) for the exploits and achievements of those naval men and women Australia has chosen to distinguish and recognise with honours and awards.

Up until very recently, and perhaps not even now, how many knew and acknowledged that the first decoration won under the Australian flag in World War I was the DSO awarded to Lieutenant Thomas Bond RANR for his actions at Bita Paka on 11 September 1914? There are records of other actions at Bita Paka on 25th March, 1916, for acts of bravery. They have probably been awarded for their part in the Battle of the Somme.

Don’t feel too bad about that: until I started my research in 2009, I didn’t know about his DSO either after 35 years of naval service and eight years researching our naval history.

The Project

The idea for the project came about in conversation with my collaborator and researcher-in-chief for several of my books on Australia’s naval history, David Ruffin. We had noted that, except for the significant record of honours and awards (H&A) in the two world wars created by Chief Petty Officer Atkinson in the 1980s, With Skill and Valour, and that for the most part was just a bare record of the awards, one had to hunt around for any similar information on H&A for later conflicts.

As well, there was no record we could find of H&A for service in what is now termed ‘non-warlike’ circumstances. (Veterans of the Somme. For services to motor transport.

Working on the premise that one can tell quite a lot about the development of an organisation and its activities by the H&A it dishes out, we resolved to make an attempt to put flesh on these little bland notices. We would find out and tell the story of Bloggs, starting with his service history and things he had been engaged in, and then why he had got his gong. Women readers can relax: I’ve used the male pronoun because the vast majority of those little one-line citations for fortunate folk in the Military Divisions of the Honours lists. ‘Chief Petty Officer M. Bloggs, OAM for services to motor transport’

We resolved to go back as far as we could and still be able to claim that the recipient was ‘Australian.’ That turned out to be a DSO won in 1900 in South Africa, but presented in 1901. We would draw a line on our research sometime in the future as we concluded the writing. We thought that might be 2011 – the centennial of the RAN – but, although we are getting much closer to the end we haven’t reached it yet, and Queens Birthday 2014 might turn out to be the finish line.

The net crucial decision was who we would include in our research. ‘Everybody’ sounded good, but even then we recognised the danger in biting off more than we could chew. ‘All with post-nominal entitlements’ sounded better, but we recognised that scales for awards active during four of the conflicts meant that, in many cases, there was little to choose between the actions which eventually gained a recipient a DSM and those that resulted in a MID. So, we decided to include the MID and its later Australian equivalent.

Foreigners who got gongs while they were serving with the RAN or on RAN service would be included. Foreign awards to Australian naval people would also be included where these had a similar status to Imperial or Australian awards, as would bravery awards, governmental or otherwise. Campaign medals and awards for longevity and service would not, nor would commendations. For those who will take umbrage at their omission under these criteria I can only say that we have left the field open to you to produce the companion volumes to Bravo Zulu covering what we have omitted and wish you an easier time with your research.
Methodology

Herein lies our worst mistake. We assumed that, just as Atkinson and researchers who have come after him have had access to the details of naval H&A, we too would simply need to access the records safely and securely lodged in the National Archives of Australia (as the Archives Act requires) by the Department of the Navy and Department of Defence. As we started our quest at the beginning (a very good place to start as Julie Andrews reminded everybody), we appeared to be on a sound research footing as there is a delightful amount of information on most naval H&A up until World War II.

However, the access enjoyed by Atkinson began to look privileged the deeper we got into that conflict. We realised that there had been a war on, but the writing up of recommendations for awards varied from excellent to awful, with most RAN commanding officers exhibiting a marked disinclination to say clearly why their men deserved gongs. Those who have, in recent times, constructed cases for retrospective awards to various naval people generally take aim at the bureaucracy or even ‘bias’ at senior levels of the Navy. I think there is a simpler explanation: the appalling standards of many recommendations must have left the poor bureaucrats and Admirals scratching their heads.

Records of H&A were a little better for the Korean War, not very good for Indonesian Confrontation (for which only two decorations were made) and Vietnam (Australian Army) is a delightful amount of information on most naval H&A up until World War II. After that things got much worse. I won’t go into all the stratagems we assumed that, just as Atkinson and researchers who have come after him have had access to the details of naval H&A, we too would simply need to access the records safely and securely lodged in the National Archives of Australia (as the Archives Act requires) by the Department of the Navy and Department of Defence. As we started our quest at the beginning (a very good place to start as Julie Andrews reminded everybody), we appeared to be on a sound research footing as there is a delightful amount of information on most naval H&A up until World War II.

Which brings up my final comment in this section. In January 2012 David and I analysed the situation. In broad terms, after three year’s work we still need to discover the details and circumstances of around 2,000 awards. Extrapolating our rate of progress, especially as we had already picked the low-hanging fruit, showed that we would not finish the task before the grim reaper came for us. We resolved to seek help with the research. The team of volunteers we assembled, collectively known as the Beavers, has made all the difference. The composition of the group has changed and we have been helped by many others on an opportunity basis, but the project would have sunk, probably without trace, except for the enthusiasm and diligence of the Beavers.

Outcomes and Progress

What is going to emerge from all this effort? That’s always been pretty clear. My habit is to start a book project by writing the Introduction, which sets out what the reader is going to find in the finished product, and then setting out the Table of Contents, which outlines the steps by which the tale will be told. The Introduction has changed very little over the six years although the Table of Contents has got longer. Whatever title is settled on for the manuscript, Bravo Zulu will result in a history of the development of Australia’s navy as told through the contributions of its H&A recipients. There are 16 chapters, three of them describing the H&A system as it applied throughout the past 114 years and the other 13 telling the stories of...
recipients, set in a framework of what was happening around them.

In A4 sheets, and with the five finals chapters covering the period 1975-2014 still with holes in them to be filled, the manuscript extends to over 800 pages.

At time of writing there are just under 500 stories to be completely researched. The first 11 chapters have been reviewed by a civilian ‘Control Group’ and are in good shape, the remaining five have been drafted, and I am working to update the final chapter. Our research is concentrated on filling the gaps in the period 1975-2001, after which things get somewhat easier.

We have given very serious attention to reducing or eliminating all navalisms, acronyms and the other things that distract lay readers in the average book of naval history. We have assumed no knowledge of navies or of the RAN. There are introductory and explanatory notes and extensive use of footnotes, thanks largely to the work of the Control Group. Access to individual entries on recipients will be via the Index at the back of the book which contains (abbreviated as appropriate out of concerns for space) surname and initials, rank at the time of the award, number, service, award, date of award and the page reference.

When the work will be finished is a question I cannot answer. ‘Soon’ is my profound hope. But then comes the hard part – finding a publisher. I’m already examining options on how to get what will be a very substantial pile of paper into the hands of the public at an affordable cost, including crowd funding. I would hope to achieve this in 2015.

**What Can the Reader Expect?**

It might not come as much of a surprise, but the reader will discover, as we did, that official records can be in error like any other account. One group of men received awards for their performance in a battle they did not fight. Other were credited with service they did not perform (as an anguished pencil marginal note against one recipient’s name exclaimed). Citations concealed more than they revealed, often for security reasons but also because of confusion in the minds of those who wrote them.

They will marvel at the kinds of situations in which RAN people found themselves and, I believe, be impressed by the service they rendered to Australia or to our allies. It may be observed that our US allies frequently use language verging on hyperbole (although, from a researcher’s point of view they write damn fine citations which tell the recipient what he or she is getting the gong for, not like the Imperial and Australian habit of obfuscating something so gross). That won’t disguise their appreciation for the duty rendered by Australians who seem, in this as in other national endeavours, to punch above their weight.

It is my hope that readers will also come to realise that navies, including our own, are more than collections of expensive grey-painted machinery, and that it is people who make them what they are. I also hope that the readers will appreciate just what it takes to create and keep in existence a navy by reading of the contributions made in so many different ways to making the RAN a little better by enthusiastic and dedicated people doing a bit more than they are paid to do, and sometimes a lot more than that.

The nature of the narrative also changes as the chapters advance. Necessarily, the background stories are largely descriptive in the earlier chapters. As we gained access to living recipients there was more to tell and the entries (and chapters) became longer, but I think more interesting. I have tried to keep the word count under control: in doing so there are some excellent tales which do not get a decent airing. My resolve is to tell these outside the confines of the current manuscript.

There were two things the reader will not find. Except for one or two mild remarks about the nature of an award in the circumstances, Bravo Zulu is about H&A that were received, and not about those that might or should have been received. Those eager to rewrite history will not find any basis for their arguments in the book.

We regret that readers will also not find the reasons behind each and every award, which had been our goal. Faced with incontrovertible proof that, for example, all the recommendations for awards to members serving with the British Pacific Fleet were destroyed in London after the war, we can do little but infer why they were probably made. Others have simply defied our ability to get to the story.

**A Final Word**

If any of the readers of this article are H&A recipients who want to know if they are in the book, the answer is ‘Yes’. If your award fits the criteria above, you’re in. The quality and completeness of the entry that describes the background to your award will depend on the information we have been able to glean. I’m always happy to discuss this with a view to improving the end product. 

Dr Ian Pfennigwerth followed 35 years in the RAN with the award of his PhD in 2005, and has since researched and written on Australia’s naval history. With eight books published, another, on the campaign fought against the Germans by the RAN in 1914-15, has just been released.

Ian may be contacted on pfennigs1@bigpond.com
Vernon Parker Oration 2014, with Mike Carlton

Mr Carlton is the author of the 2013 book *First Victory 1914 – HMAS Sydney’s hunt for SMS Emden*.

Vice Admiral Griggs, Vice Admiral Barrett, Rear Admiral Sammut, ladies and gentlemen.

It’s both an honour and a pleasure to be here with you this evening. As a mere civilian invited into your midst, I take it as a great compliment.

I should admit that I did come very close to the 1963 entry at the RANC, but squibbed it at the last minute. But I hold a profound respect for the men and women who serve in the Royal Australian Navy today, and for those many more thousands who went before you in peace and war over a century and more.

And I’m delighted to note that there are more admirals here tonight than there were at Trafalgar; that’s very flattering.

Let us go back 100 years to this very day, the 16th of October, 1914. It was a Friday. The First World War is not yet three months old. In Europe, the German army’s race towards Paris has been checked at the Battle of the Marne, and the Battle of First Ypres is about to begin. Millions of men face each other across the fortifications and the trenches.

Here at home, Australia has taken the colonies of German New Guinea, at the cost of six lives at the Battle of Bita Paka, all but one of them sailors. One of them, LCDR Charles Elwell RN, was killed, sword in hand, leading a bayonet charge; an unusual way for a naval officer to go, and one we are unlikely to see again. As ever, it was the Navy first in. Thirty-five more men are dead with the loss of the submarine *AE1*.

At home, in seaports around the country, the 20–thousand men of the 1st AIF are in camp, waiting to join the great convoy that will take them – they think – to England and, eventually, a crack at the Kaiser. And on this very day, the Kiwis set sail from Auckland across the Tasman to join that ANZAC convoy.

The battlecruiser *HMAS Australia* is at Suva with the cruiser *Encounter*, the destroyers *WARREGO* and *Parramatta* and the submarine *AE2*. Vice Admiral Sir George Patey, commanding the Australian Squadron, is convinced that Germany’s East Asia Squadron is heading east across the Pacific towards South America. In this he is correct. But the British Admiralty knows better, it believes. So Patey is ordered to remain in the western Pacific where – in the words of the official Australian naval historian, AW Jose, he is kept tethered like a dog to his kennel, and bombarded with silly and contradictory suggestions from London.

And in the Indian Ocean, on this same day, just off the south–western tip of India itself, near the Minicoy Light, at 8 degrees 21 north, 72 degrees 24 east, the small German cruiser *SMS Emden* sinks another two British merchant vessels. Her eleventh and twelfth victims. They are the steamer *Clan Grant*, of 4000 tons, with general cargo on passage from Liverpool to Calcutta. To the delight of Emden’s crew that cargo includes a load of much–needed English cigarettes.

The second vessel was the most novel capture of *Emden*’s raiding career: the *Ponrabbel*, a dredger of some 400 grossly unseaworthy tons plodding along at five knots from Scotland to Tasmania. The *Ponrabbel*’s crew were thrilled. They’d already been paid for...
their voyage: they could not wait to be rescued from this floating nightmare. They were packed and ready to leave even before the German boarding party set foot on their deck.

So that was the 16th of October. Let’s pause for some wider context. There is a modern view that the First World War was a quarrel between the crowned heads of Europe – kings and emperors – and their arms makers. And that, therefore, far distant Australia had no reason to enter their fight. There is enough truth to the first part of that argument to provide a flimsy platform for the second.

But that simplification ignores some important facts. As war broke out in 1914, the Kaiser boasted a flourishing colonial empire in China, East Asia and the Pacific. Germany’s place in the sun, as he called it. Deutsch Neuguinea sprawled across Australia’s northern doorstep. With its capital at Rabaul, it commanded a great sweep of the islands of New Guinea, of New Britain, the Solomons, Nauru and as far south as German Samoa.

With Deutsch New Guinea as its base, the Kaiser’s navy – the Kaiserliche Marine – had laid detailed plans to attack Australia’s seaborne trade in the event of war with England and the British Empire. It would sever the links of commerce and communication between Britain and Australia (and New Zealand as well) and – if necessary – it would send warships to bombard Sydney and Melbourne and other port cities. So Australia was directly menaced by Imperial Germany lying just over the northern horizon, a threat that our forebears understood very well. We did have a dog in the fight.

And it was a threat not just to Australia. Our exports of wool, of wheat, of gold and meat were vital to the economy of Britain. Take wool alone: essential for Britain’s army and navy. No wool, no uniforms. It was as stark as that.

This German Pacific empire was policed by a modern and powerful naval force, the Ostasiengeschwader, the East Asia Squadron, based on the colony of Tsingtao, now Quingdao, in Northern China.

Under the command of a capable and honourable officer, Vice Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee, the squadron was made up of two 12,000 ton heavy cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and a handful of smaller cruisers, including the light cruiser Emden. It was this squadron that would have attacked us, but which was now making its escape across the Pacific.

Because one formidable presence had seen it off: HMAS Australia. For a small navy and nation, she was an extraordinary thing to possess. A capital ship. Fast, powerful, state of the art. 25,000 tons. Eight 12–inch guns, a speed of 26 knots, a ship’s company of more than 800. Arguably, she was the most powerful ship in the Pacific; certainly in the southern hemisphere.

We had set aside the enormous sum of two million pounds to have her built on the Clyde in Scotland. She was completed before time, and under–budget by an impressive 295,000 pounds. (A feat, a triumph never again repeated in Australian defence procurement.) And she was, in the words of my friend James Goldrick, the single most effective defence purchase this nation has ever made. As Admiral von Spee wrote to his wife, she was too powerful for his squadron ever to think of challenging her. Australia was the ultimate, successful deterrent.

On the 13th of August, Spee was at Pagan, in the Marianas group of islands. He called his captains for a conference in his cabin. In their best white uniforms with swords and decorations – they were a very formal navy – they listened as he explained his plans for South America. Coal would be readily available from Chile and other countries believed to be well–disposed towards Germany, and British trade could still be attacked.

Spee asked for the opinions of his captains. Most agreed. But one did not. Fregattenkapitän Karl von Müller, commanding officer of Emden, respectfully offered another idea. He objected that the Squadron would be
almost inactive, doing no harm to the enemy in the long weeks of crossing the Pacific. And his personal account of that conference survives in the German Naval History. He wrote:

I asked that consideration might be given to whether it might not be a good thing to detach at least one small cruiser from the squadron to the Indian Ocean, where circumstances were particularly favourable for trade warfare, and where the intervention of German forces against the Indian littoral would have a favourable influence on the morale of the Indian population. There was a silence in the cabin, each officer aware of what this meant. To all intents and purposes, the Indian Ocean was a British lake. The Dutch East Indies were neutral, offering only limited port entry to a belligerent warship. And anyway, turning up in a Dutch port would only alert British intelligence.

So a lone German cruiser would be thrown on her own resources. *Emden* would at first have a supply ship with her, but eventually she would have to sustain herself on whatever coal and food she could capture.

And coaling itself – it was filthy, backbreaking work alongside in harbour. Coaling at sea, which she would have to do, would be a nightmare job. She could not replenish her ammunition, for Allied shells would not fit her guns. Engine maintenance, too – she had no fewer than twelve water–tube boilers, which would have to be regularly cleaned. And perhaps most challenging of all, the morale and fighting efficiency of the ship’s company would have to be maintained, 400 men alone at sea for months on end, with no chance for a run ashore and no contact from home.

In theory, all this was possible. It was known as cruiser warfare – or Kreuzerkrieg in German – the destruction of the enemy’s maritime trade. But it had never been done in the age of steam. In the age of sail yes, when a ship could keep the sea almost indefinitely as long as water could be obtained. It was the legalised piracy of the centuries.

But by 1914 naval warfare had changed beyond recognition, and in ways that even its most skilled practitioners barely understood. The arrival of wireless was bringing even more revolutionary advances in the control and command of ships and squadrons and fleets, of the very seas themselves.

But even if *Emden* and von Muller overcame all these odds and were successful in their war on British trade, their troubles would just be beginning. They could be certain that the might of the British navy would be turned into the hunt for them. They might survive if the war were to end quickly in a German victory, but if it were to drag on there would be little chance of ever returning home. Even if coal could be obtained for the voyage north across the world – a virtual impossibility – they would have to go via the Cape of Good Hope or the Horn, for Suez and the newly opened Panama Canal would be closed to them. And if, by some miracle, they made it north through the Atlantic and back to the North Sea, the British blockade would be lying there in wait. Every officer there in the admiral’s cabin in *Scharnhorst* knew this.

The hush was broken by Spee’s chief of staff who, to everyone’s surprise, said he agreed with von Müller. Spee promised to consider the proposal and said he would give his answer that afternoon. He did. And it was yes. So began this extraordinary story in the annals of war at sea.

Karl von Muller was the son of a Prussian army colonel, born in Hanover in 1873. A reserved and studious figure, his career as a junior officer had been conventional. Battleships in the Baltic Fleet, watch–keeping certificate, gunnery officer here, signals there, a posting to a gunboat in Germany’s East African colonies, where he contracted the malaria that would plague him all his life. In a lucky break, he had a spell on the staff of the founding father of the German navy, Alfred von Tirpitz, who marked him for promotion. The East Asia squadron was a coveted posting – so much more exotic, more congenial than the drab grey Baltic or the North Sea. And *Emden* was his first command. He was, as it would turn
out, the perfect man for the mission: he proved to be a skilled seaman, with extraordinary qualities of leadership and endurance, and a firm grasp of tactics and strategy. He had courage and resolve. And indeed humanity. His steward recorded that he kept a biography of Horatio Nelson by his bedside.

And either by accident or design – certainly by marvellous good fortune – his Executive Officer – or First Officer, as the Germans called them – Kapitanleutnant Helmuth von Mucke, was the right choice as well. Von Mucke was also highly competent – but where his captain was reticent, thoughtful and aloof – the XO was the opposite: energetic, gregarious, a flamboyant character who took no nonsense but was nonetheless liked and respected by the ship's company. They made the perfect pair. The wardroom was full of handpicked young lieutenants, many of them aristocrats with the “von” in front of their surnames, one of them a Hohenzollern prince who was a distant cousin of the Kaiser.

Emden herself was a graceful, elegant ship, commissioned into the navy in 1909 and later nicknamed the Swan of the East. Curiously, she was almost exactly the same size as one of our modern Anzac frigates: a length of 118 metres; she displaced some 3,600 tons. For any engineers present, she had two triple-expansion, 3-cylinder steam engines, the last in her class before turbines arrived. Flat out on her trials, she notched a top speed of 24 knots, but that was exceptional. Her optimal cruising speed was around 12 knots. Depending on the quality of her coal, that gave her a range of some 6,000 kilometres.

She bristled fore and aft and port and starboard with Germany’s most modern naval weapons: no fewer than ten 10.5cm or 4.1-inch quick firing guns, of such an advanced design they were still in use in Hitler’s Kriegsmarine in World War II. There were also two 18” or 45cm torpedo tubes, amidships on either side. In her final wartime months, her ship’s company numbered just over 400 men. God knows where they put them all.

But by any standards, Emden was an impressive vessel, a ship any sailor could be proud of. Von Müller would command her from his bridge in an armoured conning tower, a small space but usefully protected from the weather, and from flying shrapnel.

And so, with the admiral’s blessing, she set off, to create havoc in the Indian Ocean. By late August she had scraped through the Dutch East Indies and was there, with a supply vessel, the Markomannia, to keep her company.

Von Muller set about his task with energy and audacity. He was bold and clever, dodging here and there, turning up where he was least expected; now in the Bay of Bengal, next south of Ceylon, then off India’s west coast. Luck, and the weather, and skill and seamanship were with him. For three months from late August 1914, he caught and sank no fewer than 18 ships, 16 of them British merchant vessels.

Emden learned on the job. She would halt her quarry by signal lamp, rarely having to fire a shot across the bows. That done, she would lie off to windward while her boats plied back and forth, taking off the crew and the spoils. No fancy RHIBs dashing about; Emden did have a steam pinnace, but that was rarely used because it took time to make ready. The boat work was oar–power, men pulling whalers.

To the chagrin of her gunnery officer, though, it proved extraordinarily difficult to sink a ship by gunfire, no matter how many shells were poured into or below the waterline. Torpedoes were an option, but Emden carried only five of them, and they were not to be wasted. Eventually the ships had to be scuttled, by sending a party below to open the Kingston valves and to lay explosive charges in the bilges. That worked.

Von Muller obeyed all the rules of war at sea as they stood at the time. This
was before the onslaught of unrestricted submarine warfare, which changed everything. Before that, the rules required civilian crews to be taken off to a place of safety, unquote. Von Muller kept one or two of his captured vessels as accommodation ships, and when they were full he’d pack them off to the nearest British port. Not one life was lost in any of those merchant ships he took and sank. Those merchant seamen set free spoke of him with high praise: the gentleman raider, they called him. To the despair of the Admiralty in London. The Royal Navy threw what few ships it had available into the hunt – a handful of cruisers from the China station – but it was the classic search for the needle in the haystack. And not made any easier by the meddling of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, who had already begun his lifelong habit of interfering in naval operational matters beyond his competence, and who harried the wretched First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, with directives, orders, queries and ideas. Most of them quite impractical.

Emden and Von Muller also bombarded Madras on the east coast of India – modern day Chennai – setting fire to the oil storage tanks there and, as he’d planned, causing panic in the population. Doubling back, he made a daring raid on Penang, in modern Malaysia, on the 28th of October, where he dashed into the harbour at speed just after dawn and torpedoed and sank a Russian cruiser, dashed out again, and then sank a French torpedo boat destroyer that set after him in pursuit.

The Swan of the East was thumbing her nose at the British Empire and its allies with apparent impunity. And causing much anxiety for the governments of Australia and New Zealand, who would very soon be sending the flower of their young men across the Indian Ocean to join the war. Time and again the convoy sailing from Albany was postponed. But eventually it set off on the 1st of November. Coincidentally, on that very same day, across the Pacific, von Spee destroyed the weak and obsolete ships of a British squadron at the Battle of Coronel off Chile, with the loss of 1,500 men. The Admiralty had paid a tragic price for ignoring George Patey. But it was now that von Muller in Emden made his fatal miscalculation. In early November he decided to destroy the British cable and wireless station at the Cocos Islands. This station was a vital link in Australia’s communication with the Empire and the world. An undersea cable ran to and from Perth and then on to Europe. To cut that would be a crippling blow to both Britain and Australia.

Emden arrived there in the lagoon early in the morning of Monday the 9th of November. All was quiet as she dropped anchor. She sent a raiding party ashore, 50 sailors under the command of the XO, Helmuth von Mucke armed with axes and hammers and explosives to smash the wireless and cable gear and demolish the mast. But as they landed, the Cocos wireless operators managed to get off an SOS. “Strange ship in harbour,” they sent. That spelt Emden’s doom. Because that great AIF troop convoy was just 50 miles, away, heading northwest towards Colombo. The Germans had no idea it existed, let alone that it was so close. Cocos didn’t know about it either, for it was maintaining absolute radio silence. But that convoy was escorted by three warships – the cruisers Melbourne and Sydney and by a big black Japanese battlecruiser, the Ibuki, a ship notable for the vast clouds of smoke it emitted. They heard the SOS and guessed that the strange ship could only be
Enfield, Melbourne heeled over in a turn to port and set off, until, to his bitter disappointment, her captain — Mortimer Silver, RN — realised that as escort commander his duty was to stay with the convoy. He then ordered Sydney away. What a moment it must have been: the ship working up to full speed, black smoke pouring from her funnels, plates vibrating, stern digging deep from the thrust of her four propellers. She would be at the Cocos in two hours.

Sydney was in every way bigger, faster and more powerful than Emden. 138 metres long, 5,500 tons, and a top speed of close on 26 knots (again depending on the coal.) Her main armament of eight 6-inch guns packed a much bigger punch than Emden’s 4.1-inch. She was modern, state of the art.

Her commanding officer, Captain John Glossop was an Englishman, the son of a country vicar, now 43 years old. He had served as a midshipman and then lieutenant on the old Australia station in colonial days, had liked the life, and had therefore expressed a desire to their Lordships of the Admiralty that he might command a ship of the brand new RAN.

Glossop had never fired a shot in anger. But he was a competent officer, schooled in the finest navy the world had known. And now here he was, presented with an opportunity that every cruiser captain would have given his right arm for. With 300 years of naval tradition behind him, he knew what he had to do, and he set off to do it.

Most of his officers and senior rates were British as well, although his first lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander John Finlayson, was Australian born, the son of a manager of the Bank of New South Wales from Vaucluse. Sydney had a crew all up of around 400 men. (I was never able to find a definite, accurate figure.) Just over a third of them were Australians, native born. Many of them teenagers, boys as young as 16, brought up for the sea in the old training ship Tingira, a hulk moored in Rose Bay. Glossop had not been keen to take them, but there they were.

With time to spare, he sent the hands to breakfast, and then when that was finished, he cleared lower deck and spoke to the ship’s company in words that were jotted down later by Able Seaman Jimmy Stewart:

“There is a German ship at or near the Cocos Islands and, should it be a German cruiser, this young ship’s company is going to taste its baptism of fire. This opportunity will probably be given to our young Australian Navy to make history, and I want every officer and man aboard this ship to do his duty quickly but coolly and with every co-operation. I hope to bring an action, if there is one, to a successful completion.”

Then they went to action stations.

The two ships sighted each other just after 9 o’clock that morning, in fine, calm weather. Glossop ordered his yeoman to hoist the challenge, but everyone knew what they had met. Emden had been trapped; caught at anchor, with her guard down. At first von Muller had thought the smoke coming towards him from the nor–east was from a collier he’d captured and kept in company and which was due to join him that morning.

But soon enough the speed of the approach and the volume of smoke told him he was facing a warship. He frantically went to action stations, called for steam, weighed anchor, and began to move, leaving his shore party behind at the wireless station. Sydney bore down towards him.

Miraculously it was Emden which drew first blood. Captain Glossop had underestimated the range of the German’s guns, and he’d brought Sydney in too close. It was not his fault; nobody in the navy, not the gunnery experts at Whale Island, not the entire British Admiralty knew that Emden’s guns had a range of well over 10–thousand metres. The Germans could elevate their barrels to an unheard of 30 degrees, whereas the best the British could manage was not quite 20. The difference was crucial.

Von Muller’s action report, written after the war, said he opened fire at 8,900 metres. Sydney’s gunnery officer,
Lieutenant Denis Rahilly, thought it was more like 10,000. But either way, *Emden*'s gunners were experienced and accurate, and they hit hard and fast.

One of those shots might have changed the entire battle. It struck *Sydney*’s bridge where the captain was conning the ship on the compass platform. In the words of Leading Signalman John Seabrook, who was there:

“This shot first of all cut away a pair of signal halyards, cut the rangetaker’s leg off below the knee, cut the rangefinder in half, went through the hammocks lining the inside of the bridge, cut a bridge rail off, went through the screen and then burst in the awning, which was rolled up and flaked around the upper bridge. One piece went straight through the lower bridge screen, taking exactly half a pair of binoculars with it, which were left hanging there.

The rangetaker, a 30 year old able seaman named Albert Hoy, collapsed on the deck, blood pumping from a severed artery. He died later. But that was it. No one else on the bridge was scratched. Again the ship might have been lost but for the quick thinking and courage of two young Australian–born sailors, 17 year old Boy First Class Tom Williamson of Melbourne, and 19 year old Ordinary Seaman Les Kinniburgh of Mildura who, with their bare hands, flung overboard some burning cordite charges which might have blown back to the ship’s magazines.

Von Muller’s luck had drained away. Fifteen of his shells struck *Sydney*, but only five exploded. Four of *Sydney*’s crew were killed, and half a dozen more were injured. And then fortunes changed.

Shocked but still thinking, Glossop quickly withdrew out of range and began pouring in a fire of his own. Both ships were heading more or less northeast at around 20 knots. Less experienced, and without the bridge rangefinder – and the aft rangefinder, which had also been damaged – *Sydney*’s guns took a while to get the eye in. Director fire was unknown, of course. But when they did get the range it was devastating, it was carnage, with the bloody inevitability of a heavyweight boxer battering a flyweight. *Emden* twisted and turned like a hunted animal, trying to draw in close for a lucky torpedo shot, *Sydney* holding off.

But slowly and surely the Swan of the East was smashed to pieces, her guns falling silent one by one. Von Muller called for a torpedo attack but that, too, failed because the torpedo compartment was wrecked and flooded. This is a description from one of her petty officers:

Almost all those who had been in the ammunition rooms as well as those at the guns had been killed. Blood was flowing in streams on deck, and terribly mutilated corpses were lying about. We were answering the fire of the enemy, but more feebly. I myself had only a few unimportant injuries. My mate Hartmann came towards me to give me an order, but he had not opened his lips when shrapnel came bursting over us between the tower and the bridge. Hartmann fell, and I got a shell splinter on the right hand.

The ship was burning in several places. Several shells of ours exploded on deck; the fourth gun on our starboard side exploded and the feeding machinery threw down all the crew, opened the compartment and threw a crewman of the 5th gun overboard.

An officer went overboard too. Miraculously, Captain von Muller on his armoured bridge was only slightly scratched. He determined he would not allow *Emden* to be taken, and he decided to run her aground on one of the Cocos group, North Keeling Island, which lay dead ahead to the north. He gave the order for full speed and with one final, convulsive lunge from her engines, she crunched onto a coral reef, never to move again. It was just after 11 am. The battle had lasted almost exactly two hours.

Glossop sent a signal which electrified the navy and the world. Just five words:

“*Emden* beached and done for.”

But he had more work to do, and there were more chapters to be written. First, he took care of *Emden*’s accompanying collier which had been hovering uncertainly on the horizon, her German prize officers scuttled her as she approached, and the crew had to be taken off.

He sent a boat to *Emden* with food and water and medical supplies, carrying one of the German prize officers. And then *Sydney* returned to Direction Island and the wireless station – where, for all Glossop knew, there might have been fighting, with civilian dead and wounded. In fact there hadn’t been. *Emden*’s shore party had behaved impeccably, not harming a hair on anyone’s head, and leaving civilian possessions strictly alone. Von Mucke had been efficient and courteous, and the station staff actually offered the Germans sandwiches and a cup of tea. In one, almost surreal incident, they realised the Germans were going to blow up the signals mast. They went to von Mucke and asked him:

“Would you mind not bringing it down on the tennis court?” they said.

“Certainly,” said the Germans.

And the mast toppled the other way – although unfortunately it crushed some cases of scotch whisky which had been carefully hidden from the invading Hun. The raiding party had vanished, though, before *Sydney*’s arrival, getting away on a schooner they’d commandeered in the lagoon.
The story of their escape and eventual return to Germany via the Red Sea and Constantinople is quite extraordinary.

Sydney returned to the wreck of the *Emden* at around 1600 the next afternoon, the 10th of November. What happened next was a collision of misunderstanding on both sides so sad and so devastating that it colours the memory of the battle to this day. John Glossop opened fire again on *Emden*'s shattered and still smouldering hulk. He did not do so immediately.

Sydney slowed almost to halt perhaps four kilometres off, while Glossop and the watch on the bridge scanned the enemy with glasses and telescopes. They could clearly see the destruction they had wrought and the men in the midst of it, but they could also see that the enemy ensign still flying from what was left of her mainmast. Perhaps the Germans wanted to keep fighting.

Glossop ordered a signal to be sent by flag hoist: "Do you surrender?" There was no reply, and so he ordered Lieutenant Rahilly to open fire again. He would say later in his report that he did so reluctantly, which there cannot leave this island and my misfortune, I will endeavour to do all I can for your sick and wounded and take them to a hospital.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant.
John Glossop.

Sydney's survivors. Surf was still smacking against the side of the wreck. But he had written a letter to his opponent, the captain of His Imperial German Majesty's Ship *Emden*, remarkable for its tone of decency and chivalry:

Sir, I have the honour to request that in the name of humanity you now surrender your ship to me. In order to show how much I appreciate your gallantry, I will recapitulate the position. You are ashore, 3 funnels and one mast down, and most guns disabled. You cannot leave this island and my ship is intact. In the event of your surrendering in which I venture to assure you there is no disgrace but rather your misfortune, I will endeavour to do all I can for your sick and wounded and take them to a hospital.

In the end, it was never delivered, although it has been preserved for posterity, and a copy of it hangs in the captain's cabin of the current HMAS Sydney.

First thing the next morning, the rescue began, of men from the ship, and the handful who has somehow managed to swim and scramble ashore through the surf onto the island. Many were severely wounded, in agonies of thirst and hunger. They were treated with great care and compassion, with *Sydney*'s two doctors and one of the German surgeons working on them for hours on end.

134 of *Emden*'s crew had died, with 65 wounded. The last to be recovered was von Muller himself. He had asked for no special treatment, but Glossop sent his gig for him, and the defeated captain was properly piped aboard, where he was welcomed by Glossop and saluted by a circle of officers, and ushered below to the captain’s cabin. Over dinner, the two captains drew a track of the battle, which they both signed.

One of the most touching accounts of this day comes from an unidentified *Emden* sailor, who had been badly lacerated by two pieces of shrapnel, one of which tore a hole in his back. He wrote:

We were rowed along to the *Sydney* one by one, put into a crane and hoisted on board. I myself was put in the wardroom, which had been transformed into a hospital. Here too were berthed the wounded of the *Sydney*. We were at once properly bandaged, and well treated as far as circumstances allowed.

Next to me lay a sailor of the *Sydney*. He had his right foot blown away. He bent himself towards me and gave me his hand.

The two men lay there, side by side, German and Australian, holding hands in a silent affirmation of their humanity.
I admired the Germans for their seamanship, their patriotism and above all, their courage. I admired the young, untried crew of Sydney for their bravery and skill as well...they were aware that they were laying down a foundation stone for the traditions of the RAN. And they rose magnificently to the task.

The tragedy is that these men were not very different. Australian, British or German. They were serving their country in a war that was not of their making.

The destruction of the Emden sent Australia wild with delight. None other than Banjo Patterson was travelling with the AIF convoy as a war correspondent for The Sydney Morning Herald, and he wrote:

Arrived in Colombo to find everybody in a wild state of excitement over the sinking of the Emden by the Sydney. We can hardly believe that Australia’s first naval engagement could have been such a sensational win, for our people are not sea-going people and our navy – which some of us used to call a pannikin navy – was never taken very seriously. And now we have actually sunk a German ship!

Telegram of congratulations poured in from around the world. Patriotic songs and marches and poems were written by the score, including one hilarious effort from the British poet Sir Henry Newbolt, which went:

The Sydney and the Emden
They went it shovel and tongs,
The Emden had her rights to prove,
The Sydney had her wrongs:
The Sydney had her wrongs, my lads.
And a crew of South Sea blues;
Their hearts were hot, and as they shot
They sang like kangaroos –
Which caused a certain amount of amusement then, too. Underlying it all was a feeling of relief. In some exalted circles, particularly in Britain, there had been a nagging worry that Australians, the descendants of English and Irish convicts, might not be up to the job. But they had proved themselves worthy sons of Britannia. The Australian High Commissioner in London, Sir George Reid, wrote to Winston Churchill that: “The Mother Country will see that the breed is all right, and that it was never more all right than when Australians are on Australian ships under the White Ensign with the Australian flag at the jackstaff.”

100 years on, it is right and proper to pause and reflect. World War I swept away great Empires: The German, the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire. It opened the world to the evils of Communism and Nazism. We still see the effects of the war today, most notably in the Middle East.

There’s a view of the past that I love, from the British poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge: “If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us. But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives us is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves behind us.”

In that lantern’s light, I think the Sydney-Emden battle holds lessons and truths for today and the future. Lessons and truths that were re-enforced in World War II.

Paramount of these is that Australia is a maritime nation. We are one of the world’s great trading powers, but no other has a coastline like ours, washed by the waters of three great oceans. And none of those great trading powers is so dependent, so reliant as we are, on the security of the seas to sustain the inbound and outbound trade in commodities that is our lifeblood. Maritime security is not merely desirable for Australia; it is the very core of our existence.

I am not trying to teach you to suck eggs here. But I fear these truths are sometimes not appreciated, or sometimes lost altogether, by government, parliament and people.

Speaking as a journalist, I concede that much of this is the fault of the media, which understands only two stories about Navy. Story One: coloured flags, brass bands, frigate home from the Gulf. And Story Two: rum, sodomy and the lash, frigging on the fo’c’le.

So Navy must never give up on the job of explaining itself to the Australian people. Sometimes you are not very good at it, even now most Australians believe the Collins Class submarines were duds, ruinously expensive white elephants, a disaster. You cannot afford to let that happen again, to lose the public relations battle with the new submarine acquisition.

You must hammer home that the RAN is not just a glorified coastguard, stopping SIEVS off Christmas Island, not just a ferry service to take the Army somewhere. The Australian people must grip the fact that this maritime nation requires a blue water navy capable of trade protection and war fighting wherever those imperatives arise.

I’m delighted tonight to see here some young men and women from ADFA, the Australian Defence Force Academy. What a future lies before you. Some of the ships you will serve in – perhaps command – have yet to be imagined or designed. You and they will be the envy of the grey and grizzled old admirals at the tables here this evening. Good luck with your careers.

So I finish tonight with words written some 300 years ago, which appeared as a preamble to the Royal Navy’s Articles of War in the reign of the Stuart kings; which are carved in stone at the Royal Naval College, HMS Britannia, at Dartmouth. “It is upon the navy under the good Providence of God that the safety, honour and welfare of this realm do chiefly attend.”

Personally, I’m not so sure about God. But nearly four centuries on, and a world away, those lines still proclaim an essential truth which we ignore at our peril.

Thank you so much for inviting me this evening.
China has recently deployed a frigate in support of multinational efforts to dismantle and dispose of Syrian chemical weapons. Will this herald an expanding global role for the People’s Liberation Army Navy?

China has recently joined multinational efforts to dismantle and dispose of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. It has deployed a frigate of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the escort mission with ships from Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States. Under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), this mission marks another milestone in the PLAN’s westward forays since 2008 when it committed the first task force to counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

That major initiative was followed in 2010 by the PLAN hospital ship Peace Ark embarking on the first “Harmonious Mission” voyage to countries worldwide, including Africa. In the same year, PLAN warships entered the Persian Gulf for the first time.

**Strategic underpinnings**

Since 2011 the PLAN’s exposure in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has increased, mostly within the multinational context. In February 2011, the PLAN frigate Xuzhou was deployed to “support and protect” the evacuation of Chinese nationals from then Libyan civil war zone – the PLA’s first humanitarian mission abroad.

A month later, the PLAN frigate Maanshan provided the first Chinese armed escort for the UN World Food Programme shipments to refugees in Somalia.

The expansion of PLAN’s participation in international security operations dates back to the concept of New Approach to Security first promulgated by Beijing in the 1990s, which envisages a “3C” approach – common security, comprehensive security and cooperative security. In no small part, this is due to its security interests particularly vested in the crucial sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean as well as mineral and hydrocarbon resources. Indeed China has always regarded the geopolitically volatile MENA as strategically important.

The PLAN made its first-ever port calls to Indian Ocean littoral states back in 1985, and only further afield to Africa for the first time in 2000. It steadily enhanced its capabilities to project force farther in the recent two decades. This facilitated expanded PLAN forays into MENA, where it increasingly participates in multinational security operations.

The expanded PLAN presence in MENA is part of the overall broadening of PLA contributions to international security operations, including the deployment of servicemen to join the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) – marking the first time the PLA deployed security forces for peacekeeping operations, albeit for the purpose of providing area security for MINUSMA headquarters and living areas of the peacekeepers.

PLAN participation in such operations essentially facilitates Beijing’s contributing more “public goods” for international security – in
contrast to the backdrop of recent tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, where Beijing is involved in various disputes with its neighbours and its deployment of vessels tends to create suspicion.

**Capability Considerations**

With its new shipbuilding programmes proceeding unabated, the PLAN will possess sufficient bluewater-capable naval capacity in the future to keep up with an expected increase in “out-of-area” participation in international security operations. The Type-054A Jiangkai II-class frigates in particular have so far proven their worth during recent missions in MENA. They will most likely continue to remain primary workhorses for the PLAN’s international security involvements, with 16 of these warships already commissioned by the end of 2013, with more under construction.

The PLAN remains lacking in the area of replenishment ships necessary for providing logistical support for warships’ operations far away from home bases for a sustained duration. However, it appears that the PLAN is gradually rectifying this shortfall, having commissioned a pair of new, 23,000-tonne Type-903 Fuchi-class replenishment ships in 2013. Judging from the present trajectory of PLAN buildup, it is likely that future Chinese naval shipbuilding programmes will encompass the construction of even more capable replenishment ships that will enable the PLAN to carry out prolonged “out-of-area” operations.

These vessels, together with a more sizeable fleet of bluewater-capable warships entering service, will not just equip the PLAN to undertake operations within China’s immediate Asia-Pacific security milieu but also create surplus capacity to facilitate its expanding global role. As seapower theorists put it, the ability of navies to project and sustain force further afield is also dependent on the availability of surplus physical capacity.

**Mitigating Negative Image**

From the strategic standpoint of its overarching global security interests, Beijing is steadily expanding its naval force projection capabilities to enhance its reach. Towards this end, we can expect the PLAN to maintain its current level of involvement in international security operations and even expand its global role.

Undoubtedly the foremost fungible instrument of Beijing’s diplomacy, this development will strengthen China’s role as a positive stakeholder in the maintenance of regional and international order. Not only will the PLAN expand its physical commitment to international security operations, but it will most likely build on the foundation of existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partner navies in MENA. This expanding global role for the PLAN, couched within the multinational context, will help mitigate negative perceptions of China’s rapid naval modernisation.

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Addressing Indonesia’s Maritime Needs: Jokowi’s Ground and Sea-level Challenges

By Farish Ahmad-Noor

The new Jokowi government faces a major challenge to upgrade its maritime policy to safeguard Indonesia’s economic and defence needs. Besides securing its sea-lanes and overcoming logistical hurdles, the policy has to address the needs of Indonesia’s fishing and sea-based communities across the archipelago.

The New Indonesian administration of President Joko Widodo will face a number of challenges as a result of the promises of reform made during his presidential campaign in July. Among other things, the Jokowi-Kalla team promised an impressive and ambitious maritime policy to safeguard Indonesia’s future economic and defence needs.

That maritime concerns took centre stage is understandable, for millions of Indonesians still move across the vast archipelago by boats and ferries. This means an improvement of the country’s maritime logistical capabilities would be hugely important to connect production and population centres across the nation. This comes at a time when Indonesia’s internal ferry system is still slowly developing, and ferry accidents – particularly during peak periods such as national or religious holidays – are a continuing hazard.

Securing Indonesia’s sealanes

Additionally the Jokowi-Kalla team has promised a major upgrade of the Indonesian navy and the modernisation of its naval and maritime police capabilities. The new administration has committed itself to a shallow ‘green water’ fleet that will secure the internal sea-lanes and coastal areas of Indonesia by 2024, a move that is intended to address the problems of smuggling (including human trafficking, illegal immigration and refugees) as well as piracy across the archipelago.

On the macro-level these moves have been greeted positively by Indonesia’s neighbours. Securing the internal sea lanes of Indonesia will do much in the global effort against piracy and smuggling, and will pay dividends to other international actors who see a more secure Southeast Asia as a boon to international trade.

Domestically the promise to overcome logistical hurdles has also been well-met by the Indonesian business community that has been fed up with local cartels. These cartels control national logistical networks, which in turn have added to costs and prices of basic necessities like gas, oil, rice and sugar in the outer islands.

Maritime reform for a maritime nation

But on the ground-level the need for a coherent and effective maritime policy also serves a domestic political need, particularly for those communities in Indonesia whose political-economy is

Indonesian Navy selects VSTEP’s NAUTIS Class A Full Mission Bridge Simulators for SIGMA Class Corvette bridge training (Courtesy Asia Pacific Security Magazine)
tied to the sea, such as the Bajao Laut people who live along the Timoro Straits off the Southeastern Peninsula of Sulawesi. A community of seafarers, their nomadic ways have been recorded since the 16th century when the first Europeans arrived in Southeast Asia.

The ‘world’ of the Bajao Laut is one that is sea-based rather than land-based. The Bajao are found across Sulawesi but also further, along the coast of Kalimantan, Sabah (East Malaysia) and Southern Philippines, making them a community that transcends political borders.

Up to the 1980s many of the Bajao still did not possess passports or identity cards that would identify them as Indonesian citizens. Many of them lived on boats out at sea and their life-rituals were tied to the sea, as was their income. Today most of them are settled in floating villages and their economic activity focuses on fishing and the harvesting of sea cucumbers — a delicacy much sought after in Hong Kong and China.

Globalisation has arrived in the form of traders who buy sea cucumbers in huge amounts, destined for restaurants in other countries like China. However their methods of fishing remain rudimentary, and most of them do not possess large fishing boats. Today Bajao fishermen are facing pressure from other fishing communities, including foreign fishing vessels, that have been encroaching upon their waters.

National agendas and local communal politics

Addressing the needs of communities like the Bajao Laut will be one of the priorities of the new government of Indonesia. The Jokowi administration has committed itself to a new maritime policy and the promise of a Maritime Ministry, in keeping with his vision of Indonesia as a maritime country where almost two-thirds of its territory happens to be maritime.

The Bajao Laut are a sizeable community, one among many across Indonesia. With the slow process of settlement, they are now accounted for, registered and have also become voters. Bajao community activism is on the rise, with the younger generation making demands upon both the Sulawesi provincial government and the central government to recognise their culture, language and address issues related to their political economy: the main concern being their lack of supportive infrastructure and their inability to compete with non-Bajao fishing vessels that may encroach upon their waters, robbing them of their livelihood.

Groups like ‘Bajao Bangkit’ (Bajao Arise) have begun to call for better security, better education and better protection of their fishing-waters, and in time such groups have also learned the art of political lobbying.

The challenges that lie ahead for the Jokowi-Kalla administration are therefore many and complex, but they also have to do with the need to create a governmental system that takes into account not only economic and security needs but also communal demands from Indonesia’s complex multi-ethnic society. With democratisation and increased political education, the new government now realises that no community is too small or isolated to be neglected.

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A Grand Strategic Framework for Australia – a Maritime Nation

By Captain Christopher Skinner

Australia is truly an island nation that stands astride three great oceans – Indian, Pacific and Southern – and trades with the world to the west, north and east over those oceans and the archipelagic countries of South East Asia and South West Pacific. More than 90% by value is carried by shipping and Australia has responsibility for some 10% of the world’s ocean areas making Australia a significant maritime nation.

However in the more than a century since Australia was created by federation of six colonial and other territories, there has never been a coherent grand strategic framework for Australia’s national security and defence policy and the development of force posture and structure.

For the period until 1942 Australia relied entirely on the British Empire strategic policy and force implementation. Following the Japanese occupation of Malaya and the fall of Singapore this reliance diminished significantly and was replaced by reliance on the United States of America that had retreated from the Philippines in the face of the Japanese onslaught. At the invitation of the Australian Government, US General Macarthur commanded American and Australian forces in the campaign to push back the Japanese and to retake the Philippines, and the ultimate defeat of Japan.

Following the successful conclusion of World War II in the Pacific, Australia entered into an alliance with USA and New Zealand that is called the ANZUS Treaty. This treaty continues to the present day as the bedrock of the Australian strategic alliance and defence framework.

This article does not suggest any dramatic change to the ANZUS alliance itself but with changing strategic and international responsibilities and changing expectations among alliance members it is timely to discuss the grand strategic framework for Australia as a maritime power.

Australia’s geostategic circumstances

Australia is a large island continent situated in large oceanic expanses with limited littoral adjacency to Indonesia, East Timor and Papua New Guinea, plus trade and commercial links with south-west Pacific countries, notably New Zealand. In addition Australia has several isolated small island territories in the Indian and Southern Oceans. Finally Australia has responsibility for a large segment of the Antarctic continent and offshore territories.

Australia trades with many countries but the most important components of trade comprise bulk cargoes of iron ore, coal, wheat and other agricultural produce, and increasingly exports of liquefied natural gas [LNG] and liquefied petroleum gas [LPG]. These trade flows are mainly northwards to China, Japan, South Korea and other Indo-Pacific countries. Australia imports oil from the Middle East and finished goods from Japan, China and South Korea.

In addition there is substantial international trade in value-added products, passenger travel and telecommunications exchanges. Finally Australia is a financial trading centre that includes stock, real estate, currency exchange facilities and inbound foreign investment.

Australia’s national interests

Australia’s national security and defence strategic bases comprise the following national interests:

• Geographic fundamentals of territorial integrity and sovereignty

• International relationships and intercourse, especially movement of people, bulk and value-added goods and products, intangible goods and services and currency movements

• Australia is, by its past history, a multi-cultural community and this has tended to increase since World War II when multicultural immigration has formed a large segment of national population growth

• Longer term, Australia has past connections with Dutch and French explorers but has primarily been British in its modern historical development. It is worth noting that serious development of the Australian colony occurred after the American War of Independence as a means to transport convicts that had previously been sent to the American colonies

• Further development of the Australia colonies occurred after many convicts were freed and with other free settlers developed successful pastoral properties and even more so after the discovery of gold in the south-east and south-west of the continent

• Later development followed from exploration of the vast continent, much of it arid, and discovery of other minerals and inland rivers that
gave rise to irrigated agriculture.

- The Commonwealth of Australia was formed in 1901 by federation of the six states and other territories. The Constitution is largely unchanged from that date and assigns many national powers and responsibilities to a national government centred in a dedicated Australian Capital Territory [ACT] and the city of Canberra.

**Australia’s strategic self-reliance**

It was apparent from the start that due to the delays in transport and even the time zone differences Australia needed to provide for the protection of its own national interests and could not rely on any other country to take that responsibility. Nevertheless there was a lingering reliance on Britain and then USA for dealing with the larger geostrategic challenges.

In return Australia has always given its tangible support for the policies and campaigns of its larger partner in all major conflicts and many lesser conflicts when they were located in the area of Australia’s geopolitical interests. The exceptions to the latter can be illustrated by Australia being absent from the UK war in the Falklands or the US engagement in Bosnia.

The most alarming direct threat to Australian self-interests was undoubtedly the Japanese aggressive expansion in World War II that spread on the ground to Papua-New Guinea, in the air to the bombing of Darwin and other northern towns, and at sea to the sinking of coastal shipping and the shelling of Sydney by Japanese submarines and the sinking of a ship within Sydney Harbour by torpedo.

As a result of the extraordinary US leadership and resources devoted to defeat of Japan, Australia (and New Zealand) entered enthusiastically into the ANZUS treaty with USA and this continues to provide the bedrock of Australian strategic policy, such as it is.

In more recent times the closer relationship of Australia with Japan has become more significant and has been encouraged by the USA and the current Japanese leadership without much opposition within Australian strategic thinkers.

Another influence has been the greater awareness of Indian Ocean issues due to the instability within the Middle East, the continuing reliance of many countries on oil from that area (especially China and Japan, but conversely not USA which is becoming steadily more self-reliant in petroleum supplies). This has coincided with the rise of India’s international profile and greater contributions through such fora as the G20 and the BRICS’ agreements.

Finally Australia has in its Exclusive Economic Zone [EEZ] on continental shelf areas large reserves of resources especially gas and oil and these are located in some areas well outside the traditional twelve nautical mile coastal zones.

**Australia’s long term geostrategic interests**

Australia then is inherently secure from localized threats for most of its territory, notwithstanding the recent upsurge in attention to illegal entry by boats from Indonesia. The latter are the subject of much public comment and attention but do not represent major geostrategic issues as such. What does matter is that the surveillance and patrolling capability needed for this illegal boat activity is also capable of dealing with more sinister threats if and when they arise.

Another topical threat area is so-called cyber-crime and even cyber-war based on the use of the internet and other online capacity to threaten national interests. This is a real threat but is no more significant for Australia than for any other country. Fortunately Australia is afforded preferential treatment in such areas of intelligence by its membership of the five-nation sharing agreement among USA, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

Thirdly the offshore island territories could be invaded or blockaded leaving Australia a real challenge to mount an opposing force. The range and endurance of Australian Defence Force [ADF] capabilities is important for this reason, and also for its reach to secure supply lines and trade routes (sea lines of communication [SLOC]).

**Future possible changes to Australia’s geostrategic situation**

There are a number of foreseeable trends and even disruptive changes that are conceivable and therefore should be considered in developing a grand-strategic framework for Australia.

First and foremost the rise of China as a major international power is accepted universally and has become the focus of most projections for the 21st Century. This of itself is both an opportunity and a challenge for Australia, which is starting to consider a middle path between its traditional alliance with USA and closer ties with Japan and other countries on the one hand, and its close trade and other ties with China on the other hand.

The influence of energy demands and self-sufficiency for all states and organizations will become more...
significant as the years pass and the current trends reflect self-sufficiency by USA and increasing supplier status by Russia, the latter affecting both western Europe and China.

The offsetting trends will be increased cost-effectiveness of renewable energy sources and as a fall-back option, the greater use of nuclear energy. Australia has a major stake in both these fields. The wide availability of internet-based telecommunications will give rise to greater expectations and dissatisfaction among those communities lacking in the most basic human needs including water, food shelter and freedom of action. Major issues will increasingly become international and even global issues. This in turn will give rise to greater collaboration by states and international groups. Australia provides a stable, well-resourced base for this to occur in the Indo-Pacific region.

Globalisation of trade and commerce and hence financial arrangements will increase with the predictable result of greater flexibility but also greater vulnerability of the international connected arrangements. Supply chains are increasing in scope and complexity as commerce is decentralized and distributed more widely.

Oppression and lack of freedom and opportunity will continue to produce major migratory movements of people and the accommodation of these movements will become increasingly challenging for developed countries such as Australia.

Climate change is definitely occurring even if the precise causes and forecasting of the effects are the subject of some debate. Australia will be affected by world-wide-effects more than domestically and this will require explicit attention in framing Australia’s grand strategic framework. In general we should expect disruptive changes to be precipitated by reactions to the extreme effects of climate change on weather and flooding of low-lying areas and islands, especially the many such areas in the Indo-Pacific region.

**What should form Australia’s grand strategic framework?**

The conventional wisdom for the basis of strategy emphasises the linkage of political and military activity to achieve national goals. Unfortunately the current Australian objectives are mostly about maintaining the status quo when it is readily apparent that the current situation will change due to climate changes, greater internet communications and awareness, and increasing world population.

Therefore a more realistic stance for Australia would be to define her core national interests and then to articulate a grand strategic framework to provide a basis to protect and sustain those interests. This is the primary thesis of this essay that follows from the matters discussed thus far.

A primary basis of the grand strategic framework must be self-reliance to the greatest extent affordable and justifiable in terms of the constraints and opportunity costs incurred in so doing. This aligns with the direction stated by the USA in announcing in 2011 its rebalancing to the Indo-Pacific area and the need for greater self-reliance by other nations. In any event Australia’s geostrategic situation dictates that we exercise this approach due to the different relative priorities that we place on the effects of policies in our own region and our own relationships with third-party countries.

A second basis for Australia’s grand strategic framework is the development of capabilities relevant to the overall region in which we exert and experience influences. This means a capable and extensive diplomatic and intelligence network and assets with the range, endurance and inherent technological capabilities to undertake intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR] throughout our region of interest. This includes cyber, space and undersea capabilities in addition to the traditional land, sea and air capabilities.

A third basis for Australia’s grand strategic framework is the deep understanding through scientific and human intercourse of the highly varied physical and demographic constituents of the region. The greater intercourse of people, trade, language and cultural awareness, aid and assistance, economic cooperation and co-development will all help to reinforce the achievement of the grand strategic framework advocated here.

A fourth basis is the possession of potent capabilities to deter and if necessary defeat armed or violent disruption to regional stability or rules-based trade and intercourse. This requirement has been recognised by Australian governments for some time; increasingly the development of paramilitary and defence forces reflects a realistic investment in such capabilities for Australia. What has not always occurred is the concurrent articulation of grand strategy to provide the basis for the employment of these forces within a coherent national framework. Hence the importance of this complementary need for a grand strategic framework.

Finally there is an essential basis for the grand strategic framework to possess resilience – the ability to persist and prevail in spite of unexpected and substantial changes in the make-up or underlying bases for the framework.

It has never been possible to predict the effects of unexpected events or changes in circumstances, so if the framework lacks resilience it will
suffer and even fail to provide the essential basis for Australia’s security of its national and shared interests in the future. We therefore need to undertake some contingency analysis of the framework to hypothesise how we might respond to conceivable major disruptions.

**Disruptive influences on Australia’s grand strategic framework**

We can hypothesise a number of possible disruptive influences upon the bases of the grand strategic framework, for example:

- A major financial crisis brought on by accidental or deliberate interference in the global financial system
- A major failure in information and communications networks precipitated by cyber-action, deliberate or accidental
- A major nuclear incident caused by deliberate or accidental exposure of radio-active materials to regional populations
- The deliberate interference in the availability of hydrocarbon energy supplies – oil and gas – and the resulting pressure for military action to restore the access
- A fundamental change in political control in an area of the world where the influence of religious or autocratic rule has been imposed
- The catastrophic change in geographic viability for populations due to severe climatic changes in regional areas and to traditional agricultural and fishing resources.
- Internal divisions within the Australian Commonwealth or its close alliances and trade groupings that disrupt the effective collaboration that has been customary in the past

These possible disruptive influences are not predicted as such but are considered representative of the events for which the Grand Strategic Framework should possess the resilience to persist.

**Capabilities needed for Australia’s Grand Strategic Framework**

We should now conduct a critical review of the capabilities needed to provide best security of Australia’s national interests and greatest resilience for the grand strategic framework.

- First and foremost we should expect the unexpected. Hence the capabilities must possess inherently general application and be readily adapted for new roles and threats.
- Secondly the capabilities must be sustainable from a national resources perspective and with the underlying support from the Australian community. For example it is no good relying on nuclear power for the grand strategic framework if there is an underlying antipathy for such power within the Australian community.
- Thirdly the capabilities must be achievable and maintainable within realistic time frames and limitations of affordable infrastructure
- Fourthly the capabilities must be interoperable or capable of constructive coordination with all possible collaborators in the future.
- Finally the capabilities must be readily operable and controllable by Australia alone without recourse to others. This means for example that leasing a capability from another country that retains some form of veto over its use is not an acceptable basis for our grand strategic framework. Similarly unfettered access to the intellectual property rights relating to Defence capability materiel must be assured.

Australia needs a grand strategic framework on which to base its development of capabilities for the security of national interests and its contribution to regional and alliance efforts.

This article has dealt primarily with the security of national interests and has assumed that once this has been satisfactorily provided then there will be inherent capability to contribute to regional and alliance efforts, but these are not the primary determinants of the capabilities per se.

Fundamentally Australia needs to articulate a grand strategic framework of its own that enjoys the support of the Australian community and demonstrates to allies and trade and other international entities that we have a sound basis for what we are doing and a basis that does not rely on any specific scenario coming to pass. Rather it is a framework that exhibits resilience to world and local eventualities and the possible consequences thereof.

In conclusion the creation and explanation of a grand strategic framework for Australia is desirable and feasible and should be undertaken forthwith. A number of relevant principles for the grand strategic framework have been proposed in this essay.

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**Endnotes**

1 Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa

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Captain Christopher Skinner RAN (Rtd.) retired from the Royal Australian Navy after 30 years service as a weapons and electrical engineering officer. He served at sea in six RAN ships including full postings to all three RAN ships of the USS Charles F Adams (DDG-2) class. Other postings included Test and Evaluation Manager for the USS Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) in NAVSEA and the first project director for the ANZAC Frigate class of ten ships built in Australia.
Service anchored in experience and skill

- Fleet operations and management
- Fleet maintenance and management
- Vessel and port services
- Integrated logistics management
- Marine systems support
- Vessel build and modification
- Maritime project management
- Maritime training
Book Reviews

THE SEARCH FOR HMAS SYDNEY: AN AUSTRALIAN STORY

Edited by Ted Graham, Bob King, Bob Trotter, and Kim Kirsner
UNSW Press, 328 pages, hard cover with dust jacket
Reviewed by Tom Lewis

The story of HMAS Sydney’s discovery is now being told in book form for only the second time. The first was in David Mearns’ work on the blue-water operations some years ago. This new publication concentrates more on the work of the Finding Sydney Foundation which began its quest from the 1970s. It is a worthy production which dovetails well with the previous publication.

From the beginning the realisation that the WWII cruiser Sydney could only be found by investigating the original story of the action was understood by the people behind the Foundation. They brought to the quest some powerful research procedures, but above all a spirit which imbues these pages: a calm and rational analysis that was streets away from the often hysterical and usually fanciful so-called analysis of sadly, many others. They took the cold hard facts: a highly capable, battle-proven warship had been sunk by a German raider with the loss of all 645 of her ship’s company.

The purpose-built cruiser should have mastered the retro-fitted raider with ease but did not. The survivors probably were telling the truth. And so the analysis began.

A Preface by Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston begins the work, with an disclosure of his role in setting up the March 2008 Commission of Inquiry looking into the warship’s loss. Presided over by The Hon. Terence Cole QC, that Inquiry produced a three-volume report: The Loss of HMAS Sydney II. (Acknowledgement: this reviewer made an Inquiry submission on the supposed involvement of the submarine I-124, sunk outside Darwin.)

Successive chapters of The Search for HMAS Sydney then set out the background to the concept that Sydney was locatable, and how government, organisations, and private individuals came together to fuse themselves into a united purpose. On 12 March 2008 the raider Kormoran was found and Sydney followed soon afterwards. But behind this was years of assisted investigation.

The book features the stories of several Sydney crewmembers’ families, whose relatives never surrendered their need to complete the circle of understanding. These have been well-written with a careful editorial hand, and feature both colour and archival greyscale photographs. The book’s physical layout – it is a hardback slightly wider than portrait A4 – lends itself well to such stories, with the photos and graphics given generous space.

There are background chapters explaining the evolution of the Royal Australian Navy, and the force structure which saw the cruiser Sydney’s place in it. The various searches for the warship are catalogued, and the many pages of false claims, genuine searches, blind allies, allegations, and investigations show how far the whole saga has come and the decades that were spent on it. The oceanographic difficulties and various possibilities for where the wreck lay are catalogued, using many colour charts which are well-drawn and easy to follow.

For those familiar with the many books written about the Sydney this new work does not, thankfully, analyse them all to bits, which would have made the book twice the length it is. Some of them, of course, are not worth revisiting again. But in general they mostly all get a mention.

This is a handsome and admirable finalization to the sad story of a fighting ship that went down in what were mysterious circumstances but which now stand revealed as simply being an understandable refusal by many people of WWII and beyond to admit her loss. The Search for HMAS Sydney: an Australian Story, is most highly recommended.
Book Reviews

British Aircraft Carriers: Design, Development and Service Histories
By David Hobbs,
Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2013
Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert

These ships will have a flexible and adaptive capability that has the potential to serve the nation well in a range of likely scenarios, but it will take firm leadership, ingenuity and determination to achieve it.

David Hobbs, p. 372 concerning the new carriers Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales

British Aircraft Carriers is a magnificent book which provides a concisely written and well-illustrated compendium of the warships that have maintained their status as the world’s capital ships for over 75 years. It is a large work (489 x 465mm) with 384 pages of detail including appendices, bibliography, glossary and index. There are many illustrations, suitably positioned with accurate captions, but the colour Admiralty drawings reproduced in the centre of the book are amazing. For anyone wishing to see framed original 1948 drawings for HMAS Sydney (III) you need to check out the walls of the RAN’s Centre for Maritime Engineering (CME) in Pitt Street, Sydney.

Despite what some believe, and the reluctance to debate aircraft carriers in the Australian context since 1982, aircraft carriers will remain the arbiters of sea power of the 21st century. Since the formation of the Royal Air Force in 1918 there have been many prophets who have prophesised the demise of the aircraft carrier, most recently due to the development of anti-ship ballistic missiles by China, however the roles and functions of naval aircraft carriers have endured.

Claims that aircraft carriers are inherently vulnerable are blatantly untrue; even though, as with any weapon system, aircraft carriers can indeed be defeated. This is important as an aircraft carrier that is poorly designed, developed to inappropriate restraints set by financial wallahs, and then operated by uninformed commanders will fail in combat.

To avoid such mistakes we need to understand and learn from history, something which British Aircraft Carriers sets out to do.

The author, Commander David Hobbs, MBE, RN(Rtd), is well known to the ANI membership. Hobbs is the leading historian of British carrier aviation, who retired as a Fleet Air Arm pilot after 33 years before working as the Curator of the FAA Museum. As one would expect, his love of the subject comes through with pride in this book. But David Hobbs provides much more than just a collection of technical facts about British aircraft carriers. Hobbs provides detailed service histories for each vessel, including details of peacetime deployments whether on exercise, as a deterrent or just showing the flag in the naval diplomacy role. This includes the British Commonwealth and Indian aircraft carriers of the post-war period.

Hobbs explains how such carrier designs evolved over time with characteristic British features, good and bad, arising from lessons learnt from actual experience. In order to better understand carrier design, Hobbs also reviews unbuilt carrier designs and concurrent foreign carriers. Carrier-borne aircraft and their operation is considered in detail, as are 21st century carrier-borne aircraft and unmanned aircraft effectively leading the reader to the latest carrier considerations.

A few examples will help to highlight why this book is relevant to Australians. The seaplane carrier Ark Royal (1914), which took part in the 1915 Gallipoli campaign, is described in detail, as is the Ben-my-Chree. The later vessel was sunk after Turkish gunfire from shore batteries started fires and explosions which became uncontrollable. This incident, the only loss of a British carrier in World War I, led to the development of better armour, safer fuel storage and handling, as well as improvements to fire and damage control by the ship’s crew.

These typified the passive survivability inherent in British carrier design – something which will be familiar to the veterans of HMA Ships Sydney (III) and Melbourne (II).

The story of the maintenance carriers Unicorn, Pioneer and Perseus is also illuminating. During the Abyssinian Crisis of 1935 it was calculated that a single carrier could lose up to 20 per cent of its air group lost or damaged beyond repair in a single operation. An additional 10 per cent would require major repair well above that capable onboard an average operational carrier.

These best guess statistics were largely confirmed in 1945 during sustained carrier operations by the British Pacific Fleet – not to mention the large requirements for replenishment of aviation munitions and fuel. The maintenance carrier
experience is well worth considering in light of the need to support the new Adelaide class LHDs. Several years ago there was talk about Australia purchasing a third LHD for logistic support however this never eventuated.

David Hobbs records how the British Government and Royal Navy have prevaricated over policy concerning carrier strike capability over the last 30 years. Even since the contract to build two Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers (each over 60,000 tonne) was awarded in 2007 there has been considerable movement on whether these vessels will have a full strike capacity or not. The brave decision to accept a ten year capability gap in British aircraft carriers in order to save money for when the Queen Elizabeth and F-35 aircraft will be fully operational — around 2020 — is already demonstrating policy limitations as international crises adversely affecting Britain’s interests have only intensified. The carrier decision, when associated with reductions in US submarine capacity and the increasing anti-access warfare capabilities, contributes to a perceived window of opportunity for military action by those nations hoping to challenge Western naval supremacy.

The success or otherwise of this British policy will be one to watch. Also the success or otherwise of the future French second aircraft carrier PA-02, which will be based upon the Queen Elizabeth class carriers but with a fixed-wing strike capability, will be of interest. The Australian Government should at least consider acquiring a strike carrier similar to the French PA-02 to fulfil our maritime strategic needs. Unfortunately this nation has very few subject matter experts able to make informed decisions when it comes to the air-side of sea control and carrier strike. British Aircraft Carriers should help to inform such a debate — in my opinion, a debate that should be happening now.

British Aircraft Carriers also includes development information that is not found anywhere else in the literature. David Hobbs examines the political and naval decisions that impacted upon the development of carriers from the earliest pre-1914 seaplane carriers to the carriers currently under construction. And he does not hold back on criticism when it is deserved. For example, when he concedes "that cynics who say that the British Government has never really understood naval aviation and actually constitutes its worst enemy may have a point", Hobbs is only highlighting the fluctuating British carrier programs since 1945 that have often ended paying much more for limited capabilities due to political interference, grand-standing and insular Service thinking. The last chapter ‘The Royal Navy’s Future Prospects: The Author’s Afterwords’ is particularly pertinent. One hopes that the message does not continue to fall upon deaf ears.

British Aircraft Carriers is an outstanding highly informative reference work. It is a masterpiece which should be on every naval person’s bookshelf. It is a pleasure to read and a pleasure to own.

THE FIRST SOUTH PACIFIC CAMPAIGN: PACIFIC FLEET STRATEGY DECEMBER 1941-JUNE 1942

By John B. Lundstrom
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MA, 2014
Reviewed by Dr Gregory P Gilbert

The ‘defensive-offensive’ may be paraphrased as ‘hold what you’ve got and hit them when you can’, the hitting to be done, not only by seizing opportunities, but making them.

Admiral Ernest J. King, 8 February 1942

Reprints are not normally included in the ANI’s book reviews however there is always an exception and The First South Pacific Campaign is deservedly one of these. As a youth I can remember when a retired naval friend suggested I should read John Lundstrom’s new book to better understand the strategy that underpinned Australia’s involvement in the Pacific War.

My first thought was that this was not really necessary – I had already read the four Army volumes of the
Australian Official History which dealt with the Pacific. What more could I ever need? The truth is that, although I did not know it at the time, Lundstrom’s *The First South Pacific Campaign* did influence the way I think about the major events of 1941-42.

Originally published in 1976 and well received at the time, this book has remained somewhat hidden to Australian readers since the late 1970s. The Naval Institute Press should be congratulated for making this enduring work accessible to the modern reader.

Lundstrom is expert at chasing down the important sources in archives and uncovering details that others may have overlooked because the documents are often buried within a wealth of less relevant source material. For *The First South Pacific Campaign* Lundstrom examines Japanese, Allied and United States records to uncover the strategic intent, plans and actions of those concerned. Having left almost no file unopened, he does not swamp the reader with trivial details but rather assembles a well-reasoned and succinct review of the Pacific fleet strategies during the first six months of the Pacific War.

The *First South Pacific Campaign* discusses the Japanese and US plans for war in the Pacific before describing how they were executed in the South Pacific during the first few months of the conflict. The strategic level planning and execution of the Japanese second operational stage – Operation MO and the planned invasion of Port Moresby – is then described. Lundstrom also provides one of the most succinct strategic overviews of the Battle of the Coral Sea that is available, establishing the context for that battle which is rarely discussed in other sources.

Lundstrom is a master of the understated historical revelation. At times you can hear the penny drop in your own mind, as all becomes clear – this is really a book about naval strategy as it is applied by some of the masters of that art. *The First South Pacific Campaign* continues by describing the strategic aftermath of the Coral Sea battle, finishing with the Battle of Midway and the end of the ‘defensive-offensive’ campaign. The US victory at the Battle of Midway in June 1942 was indeed one of the most decisive factors in the ultimate defeat of the Japanese in the South Pacific and the defence of Australia. The book concludes with an insightful examination of the roots of the US strategic victory and the Japanese strategic defeat in the Pacific.

Although neither the Japanese Imperial Navy nor the US Navy planned to fight in the South Pacific, wartime events led to both sides increasing their strategic commitment in that area. During the early months of 1942 the US expanded its efforts to control the South Pacific principally to meet the Japanese advance in the region and to protect the supply lines to Australia. This was achieved with limited resources by what Admiral King – Commander-in-Chief US Navy Fleet – labelled a ‘defensive-offensive’ strategy. It was Admiral King who developed a great interest in the South Pacific and who ordered US forces to hold vital strategic positions. It was also King who convinced the Europe-first diehards in Washington to support limited fleet carrier operations in the South Pacific and later the offensive on Guadalcanal.

Australia was not represented in the strategic decision making processes in Washington but our nation loomed large in both US and Japanese plans. The Japanese Imperial Navy were rightly concerned that the Allies would pour men and materiel into Australia to turn it into an offensive base for attacks against their southern defensive perimeter. In such circumstances the Japanese positions in New Guinea, the Bismarcks and Truk would be directly threatened.

Realising that an invasion of the Australian continent was not feasible, the Japanese strategy in the South Pacific aimed to sever sea and air communications between the United States and Australia, believing that isolation would knock out the Australian Government. The United States strategy was to conduct ‘defensive-offensive’ operations in the South Pacific until their industrial might generated new forces that would sweep across the Pacific in the second half of 1943. The US strategy was ultimately successful.

Overall there is very little new in *The First South Pacific Campaign*. However, it is the very fact that almost four decades have passed and still many of the strategic decisions which underpinned the early part of the Pacific War are misinterpreted or ignored, which means this book needs to be read. For Australian nationalistic military historians, works such as this continue to be ignored as they do not neatly fit their agenda. Today, however, members of the profession of arms, strategic analysts and political advisors need to sweep away the past myths and embrace the historical truths of the relationship with the United States and the critical importance of maritime strategy to Australia’s national security.

*The First South Pacific Campaign* is useful as it can help to develop and improve this understanding.

John Lundstrom’s *The First South Pacific Campaign* remains an important resource for members of the Australian Naval Institute. It needs to be widely read, as it is also an important historical resource which can influence the Australian understanding of strategy in the Asia-Pacific during the 21st century.
The Lucky Few: The Fall of Saigon and the Rescue Mission of the USS Kirk

By Jan K. Herman
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2013, 134pp.
Reviewed by CDRE Jack McCaffrie

The Lucky Few is a slim, easily read account of the chaotic evacuation from South Vietnam in April and May 1975, as the North Vietnamese Army approached Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City). It focuses on the convoy of mostly South Vietnamese Navy vessels carrying about 30,000 refugees from Saigon to Subic Bay, before their onward passage to the USA. But it is also the story of the USS Kirk, a Knox-class frigate commanded by Commander Paul Jacobs, which played a key role in the successful operation.

In setting the scene, author Jan Herman traced Commander Jacobs’ career from entry to the Massachusetts Marine Academy, transfer to the USN and to his frigate command. Jacobs brought a strong engineering background from his merchant marine experience and impressed his superiors as he progressed through the ranks.

According to Herman he was down to earth, very practical and very much concerned for the welfare of individual crew members. Confident in his ability, he made the most of any opportunities for his ship and crew to shine.

The real story begins with the air evacuation from Saigon on 29 April that saw many South Vietnamese take advantage of Operation Frequent Wind, using US and South Vietnamese helicopters. They flew mostly to the big deck ships within TF 76, which were some 20nm off the coast. But as the author notes, Kirk was keen to be part of the action and by late in the afternoon had become host to a small number of helicopters and a substantial number of refugees. Herman provides a vivid picture of the absolute chaos with overloaded helicopters disgorging their passengers and then being pushed over the side of the receiving ships.

In the Kirk and in other USN ships, amidst the confusion and desperation of the refugees, there were some genuine security fears confronting commanders. Many of the South Vietnamese were armed and no one could be sure that North Vietnamese Army elements had not infiltrated them. Additionally, the fear of North Vietnamese air or sea threat remained for several days.

The author tells of several individual escapes by Vietnamese who, officially or otherwise, gained access to the helicopters, ships and boats heading for TF 76. They highlight the sometimes split-second decisions needed and the acceptance that some family members left behind might never be seen again. The personal accounts also highlight the fact that those with connections stood a better chance of escaping. But for all who were able to leave, in whatever manner, there was simply no telling what the future held.

At this point the author introduces Rich Armitage, who was to become well known a quarter of a century later as Deputy Secretary of State in the George W Bush administration. Armitage had the task of coordinating aspects of the evacuation, including the destruction of any sensitive naval equipment on South Vietnamese ships and the gathering of some 80 Vietnamese vessels off Con Son Island some 115nm southwest of Vung Tau. The ships were a motley collection of various types, many of them old and many in poor condition. All were overcrowded and lacking facilities to cope with the thousands of refugees cramming their decks and needing food and water as well as medical attention in some cases. The presence among them of armed South Vietnamese troops added a dimension of terror to the whole saga. Ultimately, US Marine guards were placed in all of the ships to ensure order.

Once at the rendezvous, Commander Jacobs in the Kirk tried to establish some order among the refugee ships and allocated supplies as best he could from his own ship. He also allocated refugees to those ships best able to make the onward voyage to Subic Bay and safety.

The voyage from the rendezvous to Subic Bay is really the heart of the book and the author provides a graphic account of the Kirk and her crew totally overwhelmed by the scale of the humanitarian operation they were leading. The provision of food, water and medical care to the refugees was the most urgent task for Commander Jacobs and his crew. Becoming secure from the prospect of air and surface attack from North Vietnamese forces was also a major consideration and was achieved only gradually, as the convoy was limited to a five knot speed of advance. No less important was the task of keeping the motley collection of vessels going at all in light of the parlous mechanical state of many of them.

Of all the humanitarian work carried out during the transit to Subic Bay the
health care provided by HMC (Chief) Stephen Burwinkel stands out. As well as caring for all pregnant women, who were transferred to the Kirk, Burwinkel spent his days visiting each of the refugee vessels and caring for many of the 30,000 people. Lack of sanitation and a shortage of medical supplies proved to be major problems and despite the sterling efforts of Burwinkel and his team, several refugees died during the voyage. In describing the efforts to care for the refugees the author points out the incredible US Air Force bureaucracy that required authorities in the USA to approve the air dropping of additional medical supplies to the Kirk by Philippines-based aircraft.

Jan Herman conveys well the frustration associated with the diplomatic manoeuvring needed to have the Philippines government accept the refugees, before their onward passage to the USA, via Guam in many cases. The eventual solution to the diplomatic problem involved reflagging all of the South Vietnamese vessels as USN units.

The book ends with a recounting of mainly happy transitions by the refugees to life in the USA, helped by families throughout the country acting as sponsors for them. The stories included several cases of families reunited in the USA after being split in the dash for freedom.

The Lucky Few is a well told story of the USS Kirk and its crew engaged in a major humanitarian assistance operation. Although the events took place almost 40 years ago they resonate today because of the stream of refugees fleeing dangerous situations around the world, and the fact that many of them are still rescued and cared for by navies. The book will be of most interest to students of the Vietnam War and to those with an interest in humanitarian operations at sea.
the period; the nomenclature of British convoys; armed merchant cruisers; the minefields laid off the Norwegian coast by the RN in April 1940 and several other topics. The descriptions of the torpedoing of the Athenia, the loss of the armed merchant cruiser Rawalpindi and the Altmark incident bring new perspectives to earlier versions of the events and make this book stand out.

Overall, The Gathering Storm is a very readable book with much that is new to offer and, while somewhat disappointing in regards to the coverage of naval aviation, this book stimulates the reader to look at the period in question from a new angle. I would add that the cover artwork of Cossack approaching Altmark with her boarding party stood ready, painted by Anthony Cowland, is superb; I have added this book to my own library and I thoroughly recommend it.
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On 11 September 1914 the RAN landed the first elements of the Australian Naval & Military Expeditionary Force near Rabaul in German New Guinea. The assembled fleet, including a battlecruiser, three cruisers, three destroyers, two submarines, a gunboat and more than half a dozen auxiliaries, was not only the largest but also the most balanced and self-reliant force ever gathered during wartime under a single Australian naval commander.

Notwithstanding subsequent flaws in tactical execution, the ultimately successful operation stands as a notable achievement for a people that had been at war for just four weeks, and that had only recently begun to meditate seriously upon sea power’s role in protecting the national interest. Not for another 85 years, when it controlled a 16-ship multi-national task group off East Timor, did the RAN deploy and command a comparable flotilla for a defined operation.

Six Australians died on 11 September, our first Great War casualties. One, Signalman Robert Moffatt, was wounded ashore and later died onboard the flagship HMAS Australia. This photograph shows his burial at sea on 12 September.
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