Thoughts on the LHD and a fixed wing capability

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F-35B on descent (Lockheed Martin photo) By Commander David Hobbs, MBE, RN (Rtd)*
TO THE the logical mind, the most surprising element of the 2007 decision to build two Canberra class LHDs was the acceptance by the Australian Government of advice from a lobby group that fighter aircraft based in Australia, with their limited radius of action and fixed supply chains, could provide support for these ships and their ‘all-arms’ battle groups wherever they might be deployed.

The Government had already stated its intention to procure the land-based F-35A Lightning II joint strike fighter but showed no interest in the STOVL F-35B variant (pictured) being developed specifically for amphibious operations with the US Marine Corps. Protagonists of the limited ability of ‘land-locked’ air forces to project power pointed to the availability of air-to-air refuelling to extend the range of fighters but there has, as yet, been no break-through that allows them to be re-armed in flight, and crew fatigue on long sorties must be a significant factor that degrades performance.

In 2008 the Sea Power Centre studied the relative value of shore and sea-borne aircraft and noted the observed historical fact that terminal air bases associated with distant crises are seldom secured beforehand and usually lack the capability to provide immediate support at the level of operations needed for crisis response. The same document notes, on the other hand, that embarked aircraft are fully mobile, operational to their maximum level of performance on arrival in the crisis area and largely secure from ground-based interruptions and asymmetric attacks.

The experience of the USS Kearsarge, LHD-3, with six USMC AV-8B Harriers embarked, during operations off Libya in 2011 is relevant since the USMC must be considered the role model for the type of operations the ADF should be able to mount in order to achieve full potential from the Australian LHDs. Positioned just off the relevant area of coast, Kearsarge’s aircraft were able to return to the ship frequently to re-fuel, re-arm and change pilots and her Harriers flew four times the number of sorties that the larger number of RAF aircraft based in the UK, Italy and Cyprus were able to achieve. Combat SAR helicopters were immediately available with a viable radius of action to rescue downed pilots. The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle also flew a large number of sorties in the same operation; a performance described by USN authorities as ‘quite exceptional’.

The best example of rapid and effective reaction to an unexpected crisis is the Falklands conflict of 1982. Possession of the two flat-tops, Hermes and Invincible, allowed the Royal Navy to deploy a task force with naval Sea Harriers and helicopters that were able to fight on, under and over the sea surface. RAF Harriers were subsequently able to join Hermes’ air group but it needs to be pointed out that the ship’s highly skilled aircraft handlers were able to cope with their lack of experience and naval pilots were able to teach them how to operate in a maritime environment. In other words the RAF squadron was not in its primary environment and a force that relied on it for both offence and defence would have been weaker and less effective without the naval professionals who specialised in embarked flying.

A ship that was not as worked up and specialised could not have coped with the new-comers’ inexperience and the example of Illustrious in 2007 is interesting . With no Harrier squadron of her own she embarked 16 AV-8Bs of USMC squadron VMA-542 which flew 152 sorties in twelve hours. In contrast an RAF Harrier squadron embarked in Ark Royal in similar circumstances in 2010 had to carry out several days deck landing training before being considered operational and, in the ensuing exercise, flew less sorties in five days than the USMC had flown in Illustrious in two. Unlike the Marines the RAF were not able to fly at night because of their lack of carrier experience. A land-based unit that undertakes random embarkations as a secondary function will never demonstrate full operational proficiency.

Future conflict in the Pacific region may well rely on control of the sea and that control may not be possible for navies that lack effective aircraft able to operate as an integral part of a triphibious task force. An increasing number of navies have carriers and LHD-type ‘flat-tops’ and Prime Minister Tony Abbot’s May 2014 instruction to planners working on the next Defence White Paper that they are to examine the possibility of putting a squadron of 12 F-35B Lightning II joint strike fighters onto the LHDs to “ensure that Australia maintains a sustainable, versatile and highly capable defence force” shows a ray of hope that the full potential of these ships might be realised. Fortunately their design originated from the Spanish Juan Carlos 1 which was intended to operate STOVL fighters as well as helicopters and even retains the ‘ski-jump’ (it cost less to leave it in place than to redesign the bow to remove it) but significant modifications would be needed to embark F-35Bs on a regular basis. These would include the fitting out of air weapons magazines and handling systems together with the autonomous logistic information system, ALIS, which is at the heart of F-35 operation and maintenance and other arrangements. Aircraft handlers would need training in the operation of both fixed and rotary wing aircraft on deck and sortie generation would require the installation of briefing and flight planning facilities, simulators for pilots to ‘pre-fly’ missions and maintain training standards.

None of this would be cheap but the result would be a significant boost in Australia’s expeditionary capability and her standing in the region. Remember the effect HMAS Sydney’s small air group had during the Korean War in 1951: her aircraft were on the spot and, therefore, much more effective than larger numbers of aircraft of theoretically greater capability a long way away. Her performance was recognised by Allied navies and described as ‘quite excellent’ by the RN flag officer in charge of her task force.

If F-35Bs are procured for operation from the LHDs, the most logical approach would be to operate them as a naval air squadron in order to achieve synergy with, and capitalise on the very relevant experience of the USMC and the Spanish, Italian and British Navies with whom the unit will have to operate seamlessly in a crisis. The unit must specialise in Australian maritime operations but share logistic support and some aspects of common training with the F-35A community of the RAAF within an Australian Defence Force command structure. The French operate a similar structure with their naval and air force Rafales. A naval air squadron would also be conceptually better able to work as a team with specialised aircraft handlers on deck and the rest of a ship’s company and maritime task forces. A naval background and status would also help with cross-deck operations or even deployments to Allied ships during coalition operations.

A decision on the procurement of F-35Bs has not yet been taken, of course, but the news that they are being considered is heartening. It to be hoped that those doing the considering will look at the big picture, the experience of Allies and Australia’s own experience and not force Australia into a unique, fallible solution that will fail the nation when the inevitable crisis happens.

*Commander David Hobbs, MBE, RN (Rtd) is a well-known author and naval historian. He served in the Royal Navy from 1964 until 1997 and flew fixed wing and rotary aircraft though a long career as a Fleet Air Arm pilot. He has flown Gannet, Hunter and Canberra aircraft as well as Wessex Commando Helicopters. His Log Book contains 2,300 hours with 800 deck landings, 150 of which were at night. His service afloat included the aircraft carriers Victorious, Hermes, Albion, Bulwark, Centaur, Ark Royal (IV) and Ark Royal (V).

After retirement from the active list as a commander in 1997 he became Curator and Principal Historian of the Fleet Air Arm Museum at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton in Somerset until 2006 when he became a full time author and lecturer.

He writes for several journals and magazines and in 2005 won the Aerospace Journalist of the Year, Best Defence Submission. He has written 12 books on naval aviation and co-authored nine more. A Century of Carrier Aviation – The evolution of Ships and Shipborne Aircraft has become a standard reference book on the history of flying at sea. His most recent book was The British Pacific Fleet. This is a definitive study of the Royal Navy’s operations in the Indian and Pacific oceans in 1944-45. His interest in the history of maritime aviation in Australia is of long duration. He won the essay prize awarded by the Navy League of Australia in 2008.

David lectures and broadcasts on naval subjects worldwide and has been a regular presenter at King Hall Naval History Conferences. He has become well known to readers of Headmark for his book reviews and his incisive articles. He deploys his historical understanding of flying at sea in the twentieth century to illuminate the opportunities technology make possible in aviation in this new maritime century.

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