A retired RAN lieutenant reflects – An AS 519 journal for 2015

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Author at HMAS Harman 1971
Author at HMAS Harman 1971
By Mike Fogarty (a.k.a student Z at ADFA)

IN 2015 I studied Australian Defence Policy (Concepts and Challenges) at the Australian Defence Force Academy, in Canberra with UNSW. As a former RAN midshipman (1966-1968), I was once obliged to complete and submit a weekly journal entry, to be assessed by the training officer.

Publication AS 519 was designed to train junior officers in the power of observation, the power of expression and the habit of orderliness. As part of that professional learning experience, such a personal journal is as much a point of arrival as departure. This journal defaults to the first person, outside of expected academic conventions.

Decades later, I am responding to the concepts and challenges of Australian defence policy this year. Such an initiative might be expected from anyone with an interest in the overall theme and its specific modes. At year’s end, on the eve of the long-anticipated Defence White Paper, it is timely to reflect on whether we have learned from the past, how are we relating to Australian defence strategy now, and how prepared the ADF is in confronting an uncertain future. Consider some key defence policies.

In the Middle East. HMAS Anzac as seen from a friendly helicopter. (RAN)
In the Middle East. HMAS Anzac as seen from a friendly helicopter. (RAN)
Engaging the immediate region: relations with South-East Asia.

One student noted that the Australian government flagged the revival of the US, India, Japan and Australia quadrilateral defence dialogue and naval exercises. He contrasted the Rudd government’s dislike of upsetting China. As Medcalf states, “there is no doubt a major catalyst for this will have been China’s behaviour in the SCS”.

A classmate reminded us about the vital role India plays in the wider region (now styled as the Indo-Pacific) and how successive Australian governments “rediscover” it. India attempts friendly relations towards its Asian neighbours although a politically unstable proximate Pakistan is its key diplomatic challenge. India is a nuclear power and Australia’s relations have suffered for it due to Canberra’s alarm over its program; thus Australia’s exports of uranium were suspended for a period in response. Andrew Carr observed: “Despite India’s democratic and capitalist political system, it has no interest in joining a US-led alliance.” India seeks to be a friend to all but an ally of none.

Crisis in Paradise? Australia and the South Pacific

Surmising in general terms about the South Pacific, one unmet colleague (we made forum posts as long-distance students in the cyber world) concluded that:

The challenge for Australia’s Defence planners (is) to create a whole-of-Government approach from what has primarily, especially since the Rudd Government, been a Defence-led effort. This was a prescient comment as Defence Department secretary, Dennis Richardson, said as much at a talk to the AIIA on 18 November. The crux of the challenge is to do so in a way that reinforces state independence rather than Australian interventionism.”

Hugh White supports that contention as he sources the-then Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, when he launched the government’s Foreign Policy White Paper in 2003. “In the South Pacific, Australia has a particular responsibility to help the small, fragile countries with deep-seated problems. But we can help effectively only if the Pacific Island countries are prepared to help themselves. We are not a neo-colonial power. We can’t impose solutions.”

The Solomon Islands are also a concern and Australia has a responsibility to restore stability. Journalist Adam Morton assessed the legacy of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. His reference to “constituency development funds” was familiar, being “… stockpiles that are personally available for MPs to spend in their electorates. Each MP has in excess of $1 million a year, and there is little detailed reporting of where it goes.” If so, then this might be a modern day outcome of a cargo cult manna first experienced in WWII. Political corruption is corrosive as it degrades trust-building confidence mechanisms and weakens probity and rectitude in regional governance.

From denial to pre-emption: Options for defence strategy

This topic is worthy of a course in itself for it surveys several strategic thinkers; including: Paul Dibb, Alan Dupont, Stephan Fruhling and Hugh White. An introductory course must encompass a wide field yet it surrenders some depth for the comprehension needed to fully master the concepts of both defence policy per se and the vicarious challenges of a burgeoning national security policy which arrays more threats than can be adequately studied in ADFA course ZHSS 8410, which will be offered next in 2017.

Strategy is also concerned with the future. As Jacques Derrida said, in an eponymous documentary: “… know that the future also has its own future – for its also unpredictable and unanswerable …” These conflated double-speak sentiments would soon become apparent to anyone who is currently grappling with the Russian intervention in Syria, if the incipient crisis was not complicated enough, once unknowable. ISIS is conducting atrocities which are unspeakable. One has to be comfortable with ambiguity, in responding to new vital strategic challenges we face.

Strategic analysts now confront a developing and challenging geo-strategic environment, in all of its politico-military threats, known as unknown, in planning responses to confused, uncertain and (yes) emerging geo-political contingencies. Our responses demand an urgent and informed reconceptualisation as we re-order strategy, doctrine and tactics. Again, we need to align force structure with capabilities so the ADF can optimally discharge the many missions it has invested in. This is why the RAN is still currently deployed to the Middle East, as they operationalise their mission to good effect, as they also join with others, for mutual purposes, in “maintaining political stability and the free flow of oil to the global economy (which) have been the overarching objectives of US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf for almost half a century.”
That construct is also shared by Australia as, from 1990 to 2015; the RAN has deployed over 60 warships (and counting) to the region. “Half of the world’s oil supplies pass through the Straits of Hormuz. US policy-makers continue to act on the presumption that this situation will prevail.” The ADF still augments the coalition. (I have previously commented on Australia’s maritime strategy in the Middle East, in its historical and political continuum, since 1990.)

Planning amid uncertainty: shaping the future ADF.

Unlike North Korea, Australia does not have a psychological need for enemies. Notwithstanding that foreign strategic culture, Australia resources its own political psychology which is alive to potential existential threats from within and without of our immediate region, be they symmetrical or asymmetrical. The violent edge of history has informed our strategic consciousness and it is neither neurotic nor paranoiac to prepare for a future which might include flash-point conflicts in a range of scales, shapes and intensity.

A credible defence force should be structured to meet many unforeseen contingencies and it must afford the capabilities inherent to project such power in wartime. It is too late to debate semantic arguments about continental self-defence and expeditionary forces at the onset of a looming conflict. In their modalities, we should not be blind-sided by the wrong strategic vision in Australia’s defence psyche.

But as in any defence planning, which segues from strategy, doctrine to tactics, it defaults to funding in that the rhetoric outstrips the available budget appropriations to support it. Australia still needs a submarine platform to cover the sea-gap in our northern approaches in enforcing sea denial and control. A submarine force must also possess a reconnaissance and surveillance role. New Zealand once toyed with the acquisition of a submarine arm, yet decided against it, as a newly elected Labor Government dispensed with the need for such a costly capability.

In developing defence capability, consider the debate over the new submarine project. At a recent Canberra conference, a visiting academic bemoaned that the government was actively considering the acquisition of a new fleet of (up to) 12 submarines, subject to costs and design choice. He argued the opportunity costs, advancing that the money ($45 billion dollars) should be allocated for a mega infrastructure project, a high-speed rail link between Melbourne and Sydney. An audience participant who attended was privately alarmed and dismayed that the critic failed to acknowledge the deterrent capabilities of our submarines. A report noted that the 2015 Defence White Paper “… has a strong focus on naval shipbuilding.”

This observation should be ranged against current strategic thought as the academic has found an unlikely ally within Defence ranks. Gregory Gilbert, avowedly in a personal view, has argued that the RAN could effectively function with fewer submarines. “The requirement for six submarines … is not the best use of such valuable and costly assets. Two submarines would be the minimum force necessary to meet the ADF mission.” On analysis, while he recognises the challenges, he conceptualises the realities involved in competing claims for budget allocations from scarce budget supplies. To privilege the RAN, at the expense of the RAAF and Australian Army hardware needs, distorts and compromises force structure capabilities designed to confront a multitude of threats.

In contrast, Fruhling advocates the submarine primacy in naval warfare, seeking twelve “boats” as a minimum. While he adequately explains sea control and denial, the air-sea gap to our north and border force protection, his strategic analysis is interesting. His complex modelling is not so much emphatic as equivocal. “The White Paper should cancel the AWD (Air Warfare Destroyer), restructure the amphibious ship programme, and start building (twelve) submarines now.”

The problem in his argument is that he also asserts a multi-dimensional range of force re-structuring with its enhanced suasive capabilities. Over-emphasis on one inventory (submarines), against the fleet silhouette, diminishes the weaponry and sensor potential of the remaining older warships and their restricted combat roles, he contends. The RAN needs to discharge a revitalised amphibious role with its commensurate heavy lift sea platform to project maritime and naval power into the littoral region. A multi-purpose fleet demands air defence protection, and like any symphony, all its ships need to be well orchestrated. Remember Singapore in 1941.

Beyond the Rubicon? Crossing the civil-military divide

Student Y posted this comment on 13 October – and I agree with him.
This is also evident in the Navy’s role in Operation Sovereign Boarders. The job of patrolling our coastline to the north for suspected illegal immigrants (as well as other roles hunting for illegal fisherman) should not fall under the scope of a navy, but rather a coastguard. Too many defence resources (not just navy, but the other two services) are currently being employed for minor tasks that fall well beyond their main function.

The RAN has been a de facto coastguard for many years in its deployment to interdict illegal immigrants, also known as refugees or asylum-seekers. The ships are not purpose built for their tasks and morale has suffered from the nature of their work. Detecting and countering unauthorized commercial vessels should not be a major priority for a combat arm of the services. An adequately resourced civilian coastguard service would free up our warships for their traditional missions and roles.

Major-General Duncan Lewis is the Director-General of ASIO. He surveys the historic incidence of terrorism in Australia and how the Government responded to the threat in creating the institutional apparatus to co-ordinate a whole-of-Government response. His arguments are persuasive. “In Australia, terrorism is a criminal matter that is the responsibility of our law enforcement agencies. In the war against terrorism, the ADF is not the first but the last line of defence.” Aid to civil power?

In conclusion, no reflective journal would be complete without locating the influence of Paul Dibb in sustaining any informed discussion of defence policy. In a seminal article on Australia’s strategic geography, he lists the minimum requirements for an effective defence force. He reminds us that we can be too ambitious in our attempts to provide a force structure to buttress a host of competing military capabilities. It is a useful shopping list, but it might demand at least 3 % or more of the GDP to accommodate his optimal inventory. To summarise his theories, a sound strategy should resource a credible force structure, which in turn can deploy the capabilities needed to secure the defence of Australia and project combat against potential aggressors.

This ADFA course Defence Policy has taught me much as it will now allow me to critique the 2015 Defence White Paper with more confidence than before. I urge any prospective ADF post-graduate students to consider studying it.

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